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1. EARLY FRANCISCAN THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION  
 
For generations, the work of the early Franciscan intellectuals has been regarded as 
relatively unoriginal: a mere attempt to codify and systematize the ideas of earlier authorities, 
above all, Augustine.1 Thus, the tradition of thought that was founded by the first scholar-
members of the Franciscan order has been almost entirely neglected in scholarly literature. 
By contrast, the work of later Franciscans like John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham has 
garnered considerable attention, on the ground that they supposedly broke from their 
predecessors to develop innovative ideas that laid the foundations for the rise of modern 
theology and philosophy.2 
The present volume proposes to make a case for the innovativeness of early 
Franciscan theology, that is, the theology that was formulated by first-generation Franciscans. 
These scholars flourished in the 1230s and 40s at the University of Paris, which was the 
centre for theological study at the time. In investigating the scholarly tradition they 
                                                        
1 Artur Michael Landgraf, Introduction à l’histoire de la litérature théologique de la scolastique naissante, ed. 
A.M. Landry, trans. L.B. Geiger (Paris: Vrin, 1973). Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the 
Development of Doctrine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Jacques LeClercq, ‘The Renewal of 
Theology,’ in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, ed. Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). G.R. Evans, Language and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier 
Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).  
2 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge: MIT, 1985). Olivier Boulnois, Être et 
representation: Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1999). Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity: Essays in the Hermeneutics of Nature and 
Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, repr. 2012). Ludger Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens: Die 
formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner, 1990). 
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established, I will call attention to various aspects of the context in which they worked, most 
importantly, the intellectual context afforded by the recently established university, the 
context of the Franciscan order itself, and the philosophical context associated with the 
translation movement of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, which witnessed the 
introduction of many Greco-Arabic philosophical sources in the West. 
The exploration of these contextual factors over the course of the first three chapters 
of the book will help to contest the longstanding assumption that early Franciscans did little 
but systematize the tradition of Augustine, which had prevailed in the Latin West for most of 
the earlier Middle Ages. The subsequent chapters will treat the theological vision, theistic 
proof, doctrines of God and of the Trinity, Christology, Incarnational and moral theologies of 
the Summa. In the process, they will highlight how the friars enlisted Augustine to say 
nothing of many other authorities in the effort to bolster their own unique, indeed, innovative, 
system of thought. The present chapter sets the stage for the book’s discussion in a number of 
ways. In the first place, I seek to define what I mean by ‘early Franciscan thought’ in light of 
the fact that there were numerous contributors to its development. For reasons that will soon 
become clear, I ultimately opt to focus on the so-called Summa fratris Alexandri or Summa 
Halensis, a multi-volume text that was co-authored by leading members of the early school.  
As one of the first and arguably the most significant theological synthesis to date, the 
Summa project was taken up just ten years after Francis of Assisi’s death in 1226 and mostly 
completed by 1245, twenty years before Thomas Aquinas even set his hand to the task of 
authoring his own Summa Theologiae, on which he worked between 1265-74. In many 
respects, therefore, the Summa Halensis laid the groundwork for the further development of 
the Franciscan intellectual tradition as well as for the establishment of the burgeoning 
discipline of systematic theology. Following a corollary discussion of the Summa’s 
historiography, I will evaluate the scholastic context in which it was written, laying the 
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groundwork for an explanation of my approach to its interpretation in the remaining chapters 
of this book. 
 
Early Franciscan Theology and the ‘Summa Halensis’ 
 
My first task in this book is to delineate the definition of early Franciscan thought that 
I will presuppose throughout the text. This is no easy task, because the boundaries of the 
early Franciscan school can be extended to include numerous thinkers who worked roughly 
before the time Bonaventure’s career flourished in Paris, between around 1257-74, some of 
whom contributed to the Summa Halensis.  
The production of this great work clearly distinguishes the Franciscan school at Paris from 
other Franciscan schools of thought at the time, the most academically active of which was 
based at the young University of Oxford.3 While English Franciscans and Franciscan 
confreres like Robert Grosseteste were certainly engaged in intensive scholarly work during 
the period of the Summa’s authorship, the Franciscan school at Oxford did not produce any 
text that could be likened in size or scope to the Summa Halensis.4  
Although the study of the English Franciscan school is certainly worthwhile in its 
own right, and there are many lines of comparison with the Parisian school to be drawn, 
consequently, the focus of this volume will remain on the early Franciscan school at Paris, 
                                                        
3 A.G. Little, ‘The Franciscan School at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century,’ Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 
19 (1926), 803-74. Michael Robson (ed.), The English Province of the Franciscans (1224-1350) (Leiden: Brill, 
2017). 
4 James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Richard Southern, Robert 
Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). Daniel 
Callus, Robert Grosseteste: Scholar and Bishop (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955).  
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which was truly the hub of theological activity at this time. First and foremost among the 
Parisian Franciscans was Alexander of Hales (1184-1245), an Englishman who undertook his 
education in Paris and likely assumed a chair in theology in 1220-1.5 From this time, 
Alexander appears to have taught Franciscan students in Paris, who did not have a school of 
their own until around 1231. In 1236, Alexander himself joined the Franciscan order, perhaps 
after realizing that the theology he had developed to that time resonated deeply with the ethos 
of the Franciscan students for whom he was responsible.6  
When he joined the order, Alexander secured for the Franciscan house of studies the 
permanent chair that he occupied in the theology faculty, a post he either passed on to his 
chief collaborator, John of La Rochelle, in 1241 or held independently of John’s status until 
1245, when both passed away. At this time, Odo Rigaldi took over the post of regent master 
of the by then well-established Franciscan school in Paris and was himself succeeded by 
William of Melitona.7 
At his death, Alexander left behind him a large body of work, including a 4-volume 
Gloss on Lombard’s Sentences, completed prior to 1227;8 3 volumes of disputed questions 
                                                        
5 Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi (Quaracchi: Collegii S 
Bonaventurae, 1951-7), vol. 1, 56-75. According to the prolegomena to Alexander’s Gloss, Alexander was an 
Englishman born in Hales Owen, now in Shropshire, around 1185 to a fairly well-off but not noble rural family. 
He died at age 57 in Paris on 21 August 1245. After studying the arts in Paris, he became a master of the arts in 
1210 and in the same year began teaching at Paris. Around 1215, he began to study theology, becoming a regent 
master around 1221-1. 
6 Keenan B. Osborne, ‘Alexander of Hales,’ in The History of Franciscan Theology (St Bonaventure: The 
Franciscan Institute, 2007).   
7 Adam Jeffrey Davis, The Holy Bureaucrat: Eudes Rigaud and Religious Reform in Thirteenth-century 
Normandy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).  
8 Victorin Doucet, ‘A New Source of the ‘Summa Fratris Alexandri,’ Franciscan Studies 6 (1946), 403-417. As 
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dating from before he became a friar (‘antequam esset frater’);9 as well as disputed questions 
dating from after he became a friar (‘postquam esset frater’), some of which have recently 
been edited, but many of which remain in need of an edition.10 For a long time, Alexander 
was also credited with the so-called Summa fratris Alexandri (‘Summa of brother 
Alexander’) or Summa Halensis, though we will soon see that the question of this text’s 
authorship is rather more complicated than such a straightforward attribution would lead us to 
believe.11   
Although developed over a long career, Alexander’s ‘basic theological positions 
remained quite constant throughout his authentic writings.’12 That said, they exhibit some 
unevenness in style. While the disputed questions provide relatively substantial analyses of 
Alexander’s views on a limited set of issues, the Gloss works systematically through many 
key theological questions raised by Lombard and Alexander’s contemporaries. Such Glossae 
                                                        
Doucet notes, the critical edition of Alexander’s Gloss was produced between 1951-7; the Gloss itself was 
probably written after 1222 and completed before 1227.  
9 Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae ‘Antequam esset frater’ (Quaracchi: Collegii S 
Bonaventurae, 1960). 
10 Alexandri di Hales Quaestiones disputatae quae ad rerum universitatem pertinent (Bibliotheca Franciscana 
Scholastica medii aevi, XXIX), ed. H. M. Wierzbicki (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventure, 2013). Alexandri di 
Hales Quaestiones disputatae de peccato originali (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica medii aevi, XXX), ed. 
H. M. Wierzbicki (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventure, 2013). Alexandri di Hales Quaestiones disputatae de 
peccato veniali et de conscientia (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica medii aevi, XXXII), ed. H. M. 
Wierzbicki (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventure, 2013). Alexandri di Hales Quaestiones disputatae de lapsu 
angelorum ac protoparentum (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica medii aevi, XXXI), ed. H. M. Wierzbicki 
(Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventure, 2015). 
11 Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (Quaracchi: Collegii S 
Bonaventurae, 1924-48).  
12 Keenan B. Osborne, ‘Alexander of Hales,’ 21. 
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would usually provide only terse comments about points originally raised by Master Peter 
Lombard about whose work we will learn more soon. However, Alexander goes further in 
seeking to develop some of his own theological positions. Still, he does so in a cursory style 
and does not always provide significant detail on the topics he covers. This is likely because 
his Gloss is based upon student lecture notes that were not corrected later by Alexander 
himself.  
While we know very little about the life and career of John of La Rochelle, he was 
certainly a prolific author.13 His first work appears to have been the Summa de vitiis, 
followed by the Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae (c. 1233). John’s 
Summa de anima (1235-6), the Summa de articulis fidei, the Summa de praeceptis, and 
Summa de sacramentis all appear to have been completed before Alexander entered the 
order. John also seems to have authored extensive biblical commentaries and sermons, not all 
of which are extant. While Alexander and John were undoubtedly the dominant figures in the 
early Franciscan school at Paris, we can count among them a number of others—mostly their 
students and successors—who also played a significant role in the school’s early formation. 
These include the aforementioned Odo Rigaldi, William of Melitona, and even the early 
Bonaventure, who credits everything he has learned and written to his ‘master and father’, 
Alexander of Hales in the prologue to the second volume of his Sentences Commentary.14  
Although these and other early Franciscan scholars hold many key ideas in 
common—on how to prove God’s existence, for instance—they also contributed different 
intellectual abilities and emphases.15 For instance, John clearly entertains many philosophical 
                                                        
13 John of La Rochelle, Summa de Anima, ed. J.G. Bougerol (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 12.  
14 Bonaventure, Commentaria in quattuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi: in librum II (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2011), Prologue, Lib II, d 23, a 2, q e (II, 547).  
15 Scott Matthews, Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition: Anselm's Argument and the Friars (Aldershot: 
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and legal or moral questions that do not appear to preoccupy Alexander. For this reason, the 
personal writings of such authors do not provide the optimal basis for determining whether 
the early Franciscan school had adopted a cohesive doctrinal core. By contrast, the Summa 
Halensis codifies a comprehensive account of all the main matters philosophical and 
theological that were debated in the day. This text was used in the education of gifted 
Franciscan novices at least through the time of Bonaventure and Duns Scotus.16 
While Alexander gave his name to the project and apparently oversaw it, recent 
scholarship has confirmed that the text was a collaborative effort on the part of John of La 
Rochelle and other members of the early Franciscan school as well. As one author has noted, 
the project may have started out as an effort to turn Alexander’s personal writings into a 
Summa, but since there were many questions which Alexander’s work did not address, a 
team effort became necessary to fill in the gaps, and in the process of doing so, a larger, 
coherent system was borne which exhibits the ingenuity and originality of its authors, above 
all, Rochelle.17 
The Summa in question, the first three volumes of which were prepared between 
1236-45, consists of four massive volumes, which the English Franciscan Roger Bacon, a late 
contemporary of the Summists, sarcastically described as ‘the size of a horse’.18 The first 
                                                        
Ashgate, 2001). 
16 Bert Roest, A History of Franciscan Education (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 126. 
17 Kevin Patrick Keane, ‘The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness in the Trinitarian Theology of the Summa 
Fratris Alexandri’ (PhD, Fordham University, 1978), 19. 
18 Roger Bacon, Opus Minus, in Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera hactenus inedita I, ed. by J.S. Brewer (London, 1859), 
326: et adscripserunt ei magnam Summam illam, quae est plusquam pondus unius equi, quam ipse non fecit sed 
alii. Et tamen propter reverentiam adscripta fuit et vocatur Summa fratris Alexandri et si ipse eam fecisset vel 
magnam partem (and they ascribed to him [Alexander] that large Summa, which weighs more than a horse, 
which he did not write but others did. And nevertheless, it was ascribed to him out of reverence and called the 
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volume primarily treats the nature of God, both one and Triune. The second volume is 
divided into two sub-volumes, which respectively cover creation and human nature, and evil 
and sin. The third volume deals with the Incarnation, moral life, and grace and faith. The 
fourth volume—as yet not critically edited—addresses questions pertaining to the 
sacraments.19  
The critical edition of the first two volumes was prepared in the College of St 
Bonaventure in Quaracchi between 1924-30.20 The critical edition of the third volume was 
prepared under the oversight of Victorin Doucet under the auspices of the same institution 
and was published in 1948. In the Prolegomena to that volume,  the product of research 
conducted between 1931-48, Doucet assessed the work conducted by the editors of the first 
two volumes, publishing his analysis in English in a series of articles detailing ‘The History 
of the Problem of the Summa.’21 As Doucet notes here, the editors of the first two volumes 
                                                        
‘Summa fratris Alexandri’ as if he himself had written the better part of it). Amanda Power, Roger Bacon and 
the Defence of Christendom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
19 Several editions of the Summa Halensis exist, but the first truly critical edition was that of the Quaracchi 
editors, Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica, which was completed 
between 1924-48. The other editions are as follows: Venice (1474-5); Nuremberg (1481-2); Papia (1489); 
Lyons (1515-6); Venice (1575-6); Koln (reprint of Venice, 1622). For a full list, see, Irenaeus Herscher, ‘A 
Bibliography of Alexander of Hales,’ Franciscan Studies 5 (1945), 434-54. The fourth volume can be found 
online in the Renaissance edition: 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=ucm.5316866248;view=1up;seq=3;size=150. 
20 Barbara Faes de Mottoni provides a helpful reconstruction of the work of the Quaracchi editors before Doucet 
in, Bonaventura da Bagnoregio: Un itinerario tra edizioni, ristampe e traduzioni (Edizioni Biblioteca 
Francescana: Milano 2017). 
21 Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II Summa Fratris Alexandri,’ Alexandri de 
Hales Summa Theologica (Quaracchi: Collegii S Bonaventurae, 1948); idem., ‘The History of the Problem of 
the Summa,’ Franciscan Studies 7 (1947), 26-41, 274-312.   
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operated on the assumption that Alexander of Hales was the sole author of the Summa, 
despite a growing body of evidence to the contrary.  
Among this evidence was the testimony of Roger Bacon, who claimed that others 
besides Alexander had a hand in writing the Summa.22 Also relevant was the completion 
between 1882-1902 of the critical edition of Bonaventure’s oeuvre, which revealed that some 
minor sections of the Summa were derived from the writings of Bonaventure himself.23 
These writings are found in the fourth volume of the Summa, which had not been finished by 
the time of the deaths of Alexander and John in 1245. The evidence for this is the Bull De 
Fontibus Paradisi (1255) in which Pope Alexander IV declared Alexander of Hales the 
author of the Summa and ordered William of Melitona to complete the work that remained 
after his death, a task in which Bonaventure and Odo Rigaldi appear to have provided 
minimal assistance.24  
As for the earlier volumes, Doucet and his team of editors determined on the basis of 
both writing style and content that volumes 1 and 3 were written by an author they called 
‘Inquirens’, most likely John of La Rochelle.25 An unknown author called ‘Considerans’ 
appears to have assembled volume 2, which bears the mark of Alexander’s influence more 
than volumes 1 and 3, though it also draws extensively on John’s work, most notably, his 
                                                        
22 Roger Bacon, Opus Minus, 326.   
23 Jacques G. Bougerol, ‘The School of the Minors in Paris,’ in Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure 
(Chicago: Franciscan Press, 1964), 13-21. In volume 4 of the Summa, the section on De perfectio evangelica 
was likely written by Bonaventure between 1253-6.  
24 Robert Prentice, O.F.M., ‘The De fontibus paradisi of Alexander IV on the Summa Theologica of Alexander 
of Hales,’ Franciscan Studies 5 (1945), 350-1. 
25 Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena in librum III,’ 360-1; cf. idem, ‘The History of the Problem of the Summa,’ 
310-11.  
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Summa de anima and Summa de vitiis.26 In the course of their researches, Doucet and his 
team made the important discovery that, with the exception of two tractates inserted at the 
very end of volume 2.1 by William of Melitona, these three volumes were not subjected to 
any later corrections, additions, or subtractions.27 This would seem to indicate that the initial 
three volumes were perceived at the time as a relatively cohesive and complete whole that 
was ready to withstand the scrutiny of an expert readership from 1245.28  
Further support for this suggestion can be found in manuscript evidence which 
illustrates that the first three volumes of the Summa Halensis were employed as a primary 
source in the decade intervening until the fourth volume’s completion in 1256.29 This was not 
the only Summa of the period to be utilized as a coherent body of work despite the fact that 
its final sections were missing. Many Summists of the period left incomplete Summae at their 
deaths, including Philip the Chancellor, Roland of Cremona, and even Thomas Aquinas. 
They could hardly help but do so given the ambitious scope of the projects they undertook, 
which were aimed at the mastery of all relevant material, rather like the Gothic Cathedrals for 
which the period became famous. In no case was the incompleteness of such texts taken as a 
reason to avoid or delay their study. This was no less true of the Summa Halensis.  
Although this Summa inevitably bears the marks of multiple authors, such as minor 
inconsistencies in style between Inquirens and Considerans, it nonetheless presents a 
                                                        
26 Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena in librum III,’ 367. 
27 Ibid., 334-7. SH, Volume 1, De missione visibile, 514-18; Volume 2: De corpore humano, 501-630; De 
coniuncto humano, 631-784.  
28 Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena in librum III,’ 133 
29 Victorin Doucet, ‘The History of the Problem of the Summa,’ 296-302. 
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coherent intellectual vision.30 Neither the later editors of this text nor I myself have been able 
to detect a single substantial doctrinal contradiction within its pages. Of course, questions 
remain concerning its authorship, some of which will not be possible to answer until further 
critical editions are produced, especially of Alexander’s ‘postquam esset frater’ questions and 
other works by John of La Rochelle, many of which are being edited as part of the European 
Research Council project this author is directing between 2017-2021. The availability of 
these works would make it possible to determine if and how they provided the basis for 
certain sections of the Summa. While the questions of authorship are certainly of historical 
interest, however, they do not negate the internal and external evidence outlined above, 
which confirms the unity and integrity of the text.  
Put differently, the co-authored status of the Summa does not give cause or even an 
excuse that has been deployed in the past to refrain from researching it or to withhold 
judgment regarding its contents. To avoid its study on such grounds is ironically to 
contravene directly the manner in which the Halensian Summists intended their work to be 
received, namely, as the product of a joined-up school of thought, in which the role played by 
individual contributors were clearly too negligible to be worth mentioning. As Etienne Gilson 
writes, it is precisely because ‘its component fragments are all borrowed from Franciscan 
theologians belonging to the same doctrinal school’ that the Summa exhibits a ‘unity of 
inspiration’ and ‘remarkably illustrates what may be called the ‘spirit of the thirteenth-
century Franciscan school of theology at the University of Paris. Even as a collective work,’ 
                                                        
30 The coherence of the work has been emphasized by Elisabeth Gössmann in Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte: 
Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis (Alexander von Hales) (München: Max Hueber, 1964). 
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Gilson elaborates, the Summa Halensis ‘has a distinctive signification,’31 precisely insofar as 
it is the indicator of the ‘collective mind’ of the early Franciscan school.  
That is not to deny that the works of the Summa’s individual authors provide 
important background to the study of this text, or that these works extend the boundaries of 
early Franciscan thought, as the Summa outlines it. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that 
such works do not themselves offer the holistic vision into which they were integrated in the 
Summa Halensis, which achieved far more than any one author could on their own. Though 
there is clearly more to the study of early Franciscan thought than the study of this text, 
consequently, I have chosen the Summa as a starting point for research on the school, for the 
sake of establishing the main points on which the contributors broadly agreed and which they 
most wanted to pass on to later generations of Franciscans.  
In this connection, I focus primarily on the theology of the Summa, that is, the 
sections in the work that treat primarily of God and our knowledge of him in his own right. 
These topics are covered mainly within volumes 1 and 3. Although my discussion of the 
theological material in the Summa will be heavily informed by its account in volume 2 of the 
relationship between God and the world, the status of creation and of the human person, these 
are more ‘philosophical’ topics, which inquire into the status of beings other than God. Thus, 
it seems appropriate to reserve a more in-depth study of their details for another volume. 
What remains to be considered now is the historiography of the Summa, that is, the history of 
its interpretation in modern times. 
 
The Historiography of Early Franciscan Theology 
 
                                                        
31 Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 327-
31, quote from 327. 
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This history is relatively brief, largely because the questions surrounding the 
Summa’s authorship, which have been addressed above, have long downplayed the 
significance of the text to the history of thought. Another reason for the Summa’s neglect has 
also been mentioned already, namely, the common perception that early Franciscan thought 
constitutes a relatively unoriginal effort to ‘systematize’ the longstanding intellectual 
tradition of Augustine in order to assert his authority at a time when Aristotle’s recently re-
discovered major works were rapidly rising in popularity.32 Prior to the appearance of the 
Summa’s critical edition, scholars such as Franz Ehrle and Etienne Gilson had already 
described early Franciscan thought along these lines on the basis of the already available 
edition of Bonaventure, whose early intellectual formation was fostered by the Summa 
Halensis.33 In his Prolegomena, consequently, Doucet simply reiterated the by then common 
opinion that: 
 
The significance of the Summa Halensis consists in this, namely, that both its 
philosophy and theology collate the tradition of Augustine, and are ordained to its 
defense, even though Aristotle was on the rise. Thus, it is universally and rightly seen 
as the foundation of the Augustinian-Franciscan school in the thirteenth century.34  
                                                        
32 Ignatius Brady, ‘The Summa Theologica of Alexander of Hales (1924-1948),’ Archivum Franciscanum 
Historicum 70 (1977), 437-47. 
33 Franz Ehrle, Grundsätzliches zur Charakteristik der neueren und neuesten Scholastik (Freiburg im Breisgau: 
Herder, 1918) was among the first to label early Franciscans ‘neo-Augustinians’. Etienne Gilson followed suit 
in his voluminous works, including his History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random 
House, 1955), as did other leading medievalists like Bernard Vogt, in ‘Der Ursprung und die Entwicklung der 
Franziskanerschule,’ Franziskanische Studien 9 (1922). 
34 Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena in librum III,’ 88: sed momentum, ni fallimur, Summae Halensianae in hoc 
consistit, quod Omnia elementa, theologica scilicet et philosophica, huius traditionis augustinianae in ea 
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This opinion continued to be perpetuated in some form by the major scholars of 
scholasticism in the early twentieth century, including not only Gilson and Ehrle, but also De 
Wulf, Mandonnet, and Grabmann. Following Gilson, many have credited Bonaventure with 
articulating in a mature form the ‘Augustinian-Franciscan’ system laid down by Alexander 
and his colleagues. As a result, Bonaventure has come to be regarded as the chief 
representative of early Franciscan thought, and the significance of his predecessors has been 
largely disregarded.35 Even Bonaventure, however, has suffered relative neglect, owing to his 
perception as an immature counterpart to his Dominican contemporary Thomas Aquinas, and 
to his great Franciscan successor, John Duns Scotus.36  
In the effort to accommodate the Aristotelianism of the day, Scotus is said to have 
rejected or at least radically revised many of the ‘Augustinian’ positions of his predecessors, 
in ways that anticipated the rise of modern theology and philosophy. As the first truly pivotal 
medieval Franciscan thinker, Scotus has become the focal point for scholars working on the 
Franciscan school. As noted above, Bonaventure takes second place, given the relative 
unoriginality of his thought—and that of his generation—by comparison to Scotus and his. 
For the same reason, the study of Bonaventure’s thought has seemingly been taken to suffice 
in terms of the study of the early Franciscan school as a whole.  
                                                        
colliguntur, ordinantur atque defenduntur Aristotele licet iam invadente. Quare et merito fundamentum Scholae 
augustino-franciscanae saec. XIII communiter salutatur. 
35 Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St Bonaventure (Chicago: Franciscan Press, 1965). See also A-M. 
Hamelin, ‘L’école franciscaine de ses débuts jusqu’a l’occamisme,’ Analecta medievalia Namurcensia 
(Louvain: Nauwelaerts,1961). Christopher Cullen, Bonaventure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
36 This perception has been perpetuated most famously by Maurice de Wulf, Medieval Philosophy: Illustrated 
from the System of Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1922).  
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For this reason, it is no surprise that only a handful of books and articles have been 
written on the Summa Halensis or its supposed authors since the study of scholasticism 
gained momentum in the late nineteenth century. The situation is starting to change, as new 
research is produced on specific topics in the Summa that acknowledges its nuances. This 
research is cited at appropriate places within the chapters of this book and on the 
bibliography. Also worth mentioning are two volumes on the Summa Halensis which the 
present author has edited on the basis of papers delivered at a series of conferences she 
organised in 2018, with financial support from the European Research Council.37 
These two volumes represent the first coherent and semi-comprehensive body of 
secondary literature on the text which takes recent advances in research into consideration. 
As for research conducted by earlier generations, most of this treats relatively detailed and 
even obscure topics in early Franciscan thought, and does not therefore provide a general 
assessment or re-assessment of the school’s scholarly objectives or identity.38 With some 
notable exceptions, any general studies that do exist tend to perpetuate longstanding 
assumptions about its relative unoriginality in what are ultimately only brief analyses of the 
early Franciscan school.39  
                                                        
37 These volumes are forthcoming with Brill in 2019/20.  
38 Michael W. Ashdowne, The Development of the Notion of Satisfaction in the Theology of Redemption from St 
Anselm to the Summa Fratris Alexandri (Rome: Gregorian University, 1964). Franciso Martinez Freseda, ‘La 
doctrina de la plenitud de la gracia de Cristo en la Summa Halensis,’ Antonianum 4:4 (1979), 622-80. Timothy 
J. Johnson, ‘The Summa Alexandri Vol. IV and the Development of the Franciscan Theology of Prayer,’ 
Miscellanea Francescana 93 (1993), 524-37.  
 39 Leone Veuthey, ‘Scuola Francescana: Filosofia, teologia, spiritualia,’ in Maestri Francescani 7, ed. Lorenzo 
de Fonzo (Rome: Miscellanea Francescana, 1996). Antonio Poppi, Studia sull’etica della Prima Scola 
Francescana (Padua: Centro Studi Antonini 24, 1996). Leonardo Sileo, ‘I primi maestri francescani di Parigi e 
di Oxford,’ in Storia della teologia nel medioevo, ed. G. d’Onofrio (Casale Monferrato: Piemme, 1996), 645-97. 
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In fairness, there is some basis for the claim that the Summa relies heavily on 
Augustine. As the Prolegomena to the third volume of the Summa confirm, the Summa text 
cites over 100 works by the Bishop of Hippo, with 4814 explicit and 1372 implicit 
quotations. In total, these quotations account for more than half of the quotations in the 
Summa. While some quotes are derived from spurious works, a large number of the 
references are genuine. That stated, a similar percentage of quotations from the Sentences of 
Peter Lombard, to say nothing of other early scholastic works, also consist of texts by 
Augustine. This raises the question what it means to be an ‘Augustinian’ or to quote 
Augustine or any other authority in the early scholastic period. That is the question I will 
address at the end of this chapter on the basis of the following discussion of the scholastic 
context of the Summa Halensis.  
 
The Scholastic Context  
  
 The origins of medieval scholasticism have been variously located depending on how 
scholasticism itself is defined.40 In the most basic sense, scholasticism can be understood 
simply to entail the use of reason or logic in explicating matters of faith. This basic form of 
scholasticism gained in popularity near the end of the tenth century, which witnessed a 
                                                        
A notable exception is James A. Weisheipl, ‘Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron—A 
Note on Thirteenth-Century Augustinianism,’ in Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays, ed. Francis J. 
Kovach and Robert W. Shahan (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 239-60. 
40 Martin Grabmann traced the origins of early scholasticism all the way to late antiquity in his famous Die 
Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode, 2 vols (Freiburg i.B.: Herder, 1909-11). Others identify a more formal 
beginning with Anselm, such as Richard Southern, St Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972).  
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revival of interest in the available works of Aristotle, principally his Organon or logical 
works, along with Porphyry’s Isagoge.41 Most of these texts had been translated in the sixth 
century by Boethius, who also produced commentaries on most of them, and on Cicero’s 
Topics, along with his own treatises on syllogisms, definitions, and logical analysis.42  
  An especially noteworthy proponent of early scholasticism was Anselm of 
Canterbury, who made it his mission to underline the profound logic of the Christian beliefs 
that God is ‘the supreme good, needing no other yet needed by all others for their being and 
well-being,’43 and indeed that he is as Triune and Incarnate.44 Famously, Anselm invoked 
either ‘necessary’ or ‘fitting’ reasons for beliefs about God, and his Incarnation in particular. 
While the Incarnation is in some sense necessary if we parse it in an appropriate way, for 
example, creation, while a contingent or freely willed act of God, is nonetheless fitting in 
terms of his character. 
As sophisticated as Anselm’s reasoning in these respects was by comparison to many 
of his monastic forebears, it did not yet equate in formal terms to the methodology that would 
soon gain momentum at the impetus of Peter Abelard (1079-1142). Abelard and others like 
him represented part of a growing class in the twelfth century of independent scholars who 
were not associated with a monastic or cathedral school. Their rise to power was facilitated 
by the growth of towns and of an urban middle class, which required a basic level of literacy 
for work in various trades and crafts.  
                                                        
41 G.R. Evans, Old Arts, New Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
42 John Marenbon, Boethius (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 17ff. That stated, some of Boethius’ 
translations did not survive into the Middle Ages and were translated anew in the twelfth century. 
43 F.S. Schmitt, S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich 
Fromann Verlag, 1968), prologue to the Proslogion. 
44 See Anselm’s Monologion on the Trinity and his Cur Deus Homo on the Incarnation.  
 18 
While education was previously the prerogative mainly of those being groomed for 
monastic life or positions of power in the church, the independent masters catered to this new 
market of laypeople who could increasingly afford to pay them. These independent masters 
competed vigorously for students and thus for salaries that were often won over in the end by 
those who gained the greatest reputation for scholarly acumen and charisma. In this regard, 
Abelard enjoyed stunning success.45 His work represents a milestone in the development of 
scholasticism, not least because of his efforts to formalize a method for using reason in 
exploring matters of faith.  
In his Sic et non, most significantly, Abelard listed many quotations from key patristic 
authorities which seemed to argue both ‘for’ and ‘against’ different theological 
perspectives.46 His purpose in preparing this work was evidently to produce a resource for 
reasoning through apparent contradictions in authoritative sources. Although he seems to 
have operated on the assumption that seemingly opposing viewpoints could in fact be 
reconciled, at least in a way that was consistent with his own theological commitments, 
nevertheless, some of Abelard’s critics, above all, Bernard of Clairvaux, believed that his 
way of opening authoritative opinions up to debate challenged the authority of authorities in 
ways that might eventually lead impressionable students to give up on the faith.47  
                                                        
45 On the scope of Abelard’s influence, see D.E. Luscombe, The School of Peter Abelard (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969).  
46 Marcia L. Colish, ‘Peter Abelard and His Followers,’ in Peter Lombard, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 47-52. 
47 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, vol. 3: The Growth of Medieval Theology 600-1300 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978), 223ff. 
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In voicing this view, Bernard gave expression to a concern that had dogged the 
growing interest in dialectic throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries.48 Although the 
controversy continued, even into the early thirteenth century, Abelard’s work inaugurated 
something like a point of no return in the trend towards reasoning about matters of faith, 
which would only gather momentum subsequently. In that sense, Abelard laid the 
foundations for the discipline of ‘theology’, which is in fact a Greek term that appears for the 
first time in Latin in Abelard’s writings.49 From his time, consequently, the discipline 
continued to develop rapidly as other more comprehensive compilations of authoritative 
citations were prepared to facilitate theological inquiries.50  
The most famous of these is the four books of Sentences by Peter Lombard, 
completed around 1150, with a final revision being finished between 1155-57.51 This work 
was unique for the way it cogently organized thoroughly-researched authoritative quotations, 
containing key patristic and Scriptural opinions (‘sententiae’), according to theological topics 
                                                        
48 On earlier debates over dialectic, see T.J. Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996). 
49 On Abelard, see John Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction 
(London: Routledge, 2007).  
49 G.R. Evans, Old Arts, New Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
Peter Abelard, Theologia scolarium, Petri Abaelardi opera theologica: Corpus christianorum continuatio 
mediaevalis XIII, ed. E. M. Buytaert and C. J. Mews (Turnhout: Brepols, 1987). 
50 Nancy Spatz, ‘Approaches and Attitudes to a New Theology Textbook: The Sentences of Peter Lombard,’ in 
The Intellectual Climate of the Early University (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1997), 27-52. On 
page 29, Spatz discusses other compendia besides Abelard’s Sic et non (1121-2), including the anoynymous 
Summa Sententiarum (c. 1138-41), and the Sentences prepared by Gilbert of Poitiers (c. 1140s), Robert Pullen 
(c. 1142-4), Robert of Bologna (c. 1150), and Robert of Melun (c. 1152-60). 
51 Philipp Rosemman, Peter Lombard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Marcia L. Colish, Peter 
Lombard, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1994).  
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such as God (vol. 1), creation (vol. 2), redemption (vol. 3), and sacraments (vol. 4), where 
many earlier scholarly works revolved around the narrative of the Bible. In organizing 
citations according to these categories, Lombard became one of if not the first to impose a 
‘systematic’ structure on questions of faith.  
After Lombard, we witness a proliferation of works that are based in some way 
around this structure and indeed exhibit their own structuralizing tendencies. For instance, 
Peter of Poitiers and Praepositinus wrote Summae of sorts around 1168-70 and 1206-10, 
respectively. Though these works did not comment on the Sentences directly, they 
incorporated many of its main divisions and were otherwise based loosely upon Lombard’s 
model.52 In addition to these Summae, the Parisian scholar-turned-Cardinal Stephen Langton 
(c. 1150-1228) wrote an actual commentary on Lombard’s Sentences between 1206-7.53  
Where most Glossae—Alexander’s being something of exception—would have 
offered only terse remarks intended primarily to explain the teachings of the Lombard 
himself, Langton’s commentary set out to develop his own theological vision within a 
broadly Lombardian framework. Langton is also credited with having divided the Bible into 
the chapters that are still used today. Just prior to the appearance of Langton’s 
Commentary—more specifically, in 1200—the University of Paris came into semi-formal 
                                                        
52 Nancy Spatz, ‘Approaches and Attitudes to a New Theology Textbook,’ 29. Early Summae were based 
loosely on the Sentences and incorporated its main divisions but did not comment on the text per se: examples 
include Peter of Poitiers (c. 1168-70) and Praepositinus (c. 1206-10). 
53 Riccardo Quinto, ‘Stephen Langton,’ in Medieval Commentaries of the Sentences of Peter Lombard, ed. 
Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 49. See also Philipp W. Rosemann’s account of Langton in, The 
Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard’s Sentences (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 55-
60. 
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existence when King Philip II of France issued a charter that represents the first extant grant 
of privileges to masters who had gathered in the city.54  
In 1215, the guild of masters were formally recognized and statutes laid down to 
endow them with specific rights and privileges proper to their status as a universitas 
magistrorum et scolarium.55 These rights, which were reinforced by Pope Gregory IX in the 
1231 bull Parens scientarum—the so-called ‘magna carta’ of the University of Paris—
solidified the work that had been done by independent masters in Paris from the latter half of 
the twelfth century and gave new momentum to efforts to standardize the pedagogical 
practices and method education deployed there.56 
As is well known, Alexander of Hales deserves a great deal of credit for these 
developments, and indeed for institutionalizing Lombard’s systematized approach to the 
articles of faith, and thus the discipline of theology overall. Alexander produced his own 
Gloss on the Sentences—only the second of its kind—between 1220-1.57 Between 1223-7, 
                                                        
54 Gordon Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (London: Wiley, 
1968), 28. See also the classic by Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, vol 1: 
Salerno-Bologna-Paris (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1895). 
55 See Nathalie Gorochov, Naissance de l’université: Les écoles de Paris d’Innocent III à Thomas d’Aquin (v. 
1200-v. 1245) (Paris: Honoré Champion 2016). Palemon Glorieux, Repertoire des maîtres en theologie de Paris 
au XIIIe siècle, 2 vols (Paris: Vrin, 1933-4). Ayelet Even Ezra, Ecstasy in the Classroom: Trace, Self, and the 
Academic Profession in Medieval Paris (New York: Fordham University Press, 2018). 
56 Spencer Young provides an excellent introduction to what he calls the Parens scientarium generation in, 
Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris: Theologians, Education and Society, 1215-1248 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). See also Ian Wei, Intellectual Culture in Medieval Paris: 
Theologians and the University c. 1100-1330 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Richard W. 
Southern, in Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe, 2 vols (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995-2001), 
describes the transition from monastic to scholastic pedagogical practices.  
57 On Alexander’s role in developing the Sentences Commentary tradition, see Nancy Spatz, ‘Approaches and 
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moreover, he grouped the many chapters of its four books into a smaller number of 
distinctions. This facilitated his efforts to employ the Sentences, in addition to the Bible, as a 
basis for his lectures and disputations in the university. 
Initially, English scholars like Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon opposed this use 
of the Sentences as a textbook for teaching, on the ground that it might undermine the 
authority of the Bible, or at least the priority the Bible was given in terms of the morning 
lecture timetable. Nevertheless, Alexander persevered in establishing the Sentences as a 
central fixture of university theological education by the 1240s.58 Furthermore, he advocated 
writing on the Sentences as the condition for gaining the title of ‘master in theology,’ the 
medieval equivalent to a doctoral degree. As a result of his efforts, the practice of 
commenting on the Sentences that began in the 1220s became a normal part of university 
tradition by the 1230’s and 40’s. Increasingly, moreover, authors of these commentaries 
offered more elaborate theological reflections than can be found in the terse remarks on 
authoritative opinions of the early Glossa.59  
 In some cases, Sentences commentaries formed the basis for more extended 
theological Summae, which started to be written in a more concerted way.60 The most 
significant Summae of the period include the Summa de bono (c. 1230) by Philip the 
Chancellor (c. 1160-1236) and the Summa aurea (1220-5) of William of Auxerre (d. 1231), 
                                                        
Attitudes to a New Theology Textbook,’ 27-52. Philipp W. Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 60-
70. 
58 Nancy Spatz, ‘Approaches and Attitudes to a New Theology Textbook,’ 31. 
59 Marcia L. Colish, ‘The Sentence Collection and the Education of Professional Theologians in the Twelfth 
Century,’ in The Intellectual Climate of the Early University: Essays in Honor of Otto Grundler (Kalamazoo: 
Western Michigan University, 1997), 1-26. 
60 Marcia L. Colish, ‘From the Sentence Collection to the Sentence Commentary and the Summa: Parisian 
Scholastic Theology, 1130-1215, in Studies in Scholasticism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 1-29. 
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who themselves did not write Sentences Commentaries. These texts represent a significant 
development beyond earlier efforts of a similar nature. While they appropriate many 
questions and a systematizing drive from Lombard, they also exhibit marked creativity in 
terms of the way questions are organized within a broader framework of the author’s 
devising.  
 Although such Summae represent a significant moment in the emergence of the genre 
of theological writing, they could not ultimately rival the Summa Halensis in terms of the 
scope and magnitude of the project undertaken. As Ayelet Even-Ezra has shown in the chart 
below, the number of questions the Summa addresses far exceeds other major Summae of the 
period like that of Praepositinus of Cremona and William of Auxerre, and this chart does not 
even capture the number of questions that are delineated within those questions.61 The sheer 
size of the Summa explains why a team was required to complete the text. As will be 
demonstrated below, its goals were far more ambitious than one or even two scholars—John 
and Alexander—could fulfil on the basis of a lifetime’s worth of work. 
 
 
                                                        
61 Ayelet Even Ezra, ‘The Organizing Principles of the Summa Halensis,’ in Early Franciscan Thought: Sources 
and Context, ed. Lydia Schumacher (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).  
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While some of the questions posed by the Summa were drawn from previous 
writings, including Lombard, and earlier contemporaries like Philip and Auxerre, many of 
them were presented by the Summa either in a new form or for the first time. In this regard, 
the Summa’s interaction with the recently translated works of Aristotle and his Arabic 
interpreter Avicenna had a significant role to play. These authors introduced the West to a 
host of philosophical questions that the Summa became the first major systematic theological 
text to incorporate extensively. By the time of Bonaventure, these questions were taken for 
granted and thus their sources tended to be less explicitly acknowledged.  
Since Bonaventure has been the focus of past research on the early Franciscan 
intellectual tradition, consequently, the extensive influence of Arabic sources particularly on 
the formation of Franciscan thought has been greatly overlooked. The main reason for the 
mushrooming size of the Summa is precisely this, namely, that it expanded the scope of 
theological inquiry to include philosophy, particularly as learned from Avicenna.62 That said, 
the arrangement of the questions it posed—philosophical or otherwise—and the structure of 
the text was in many ways unique. The authors of the Summa situated existing and new 
debates within their own larger conceptual framework. 
In doing so, Alexander of Hales and his colleagues produced what can undoubtedly 
be described as the first great Summa of a period that quickly became known for its vast 
theological syntheses. This text served as a model for many of the great Summae that were 
composed by subsequent authors both in structural, methodological, and conceptual terms. 
The example it offered of bold, creative and structured thinking encouraged other authors to 
                                                        
62 As William J. Courtenay has shown, it would later become common for theologians to pursue philosophical 
inquiries, ‘Philosophy in the Context of Sentences Commentaries,’ in Il Commento filosofico nell'occidente 
latino (secoli XIII-XV), ed. G. Fioravanti, C. Leonardi, and S. Perfetti (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 445-67. 
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engage in similarly expansive and original projects. Moreover, the topics for debate and 
conversation that it introduced continued to preoccupy and animate successors for 
generations.  
By way of illustration, it is worth noting the extent to which this Summa influenced 
Thomas Aquinas, who only began work on his magisterial Summa Theologiae twenty years 
after the Summa Halensis was itself completed. As a comparison of these two Summae 
confirms, Aquinas adopted many topics that had first been introduced in the Summa. Such 
topics include his famous ‘Five Ways’ to prove God’s existence, his treatment of natural and 
eternal law, and the structure of his account of the soul.63 While Aquinas situated these topics 
within his own frame of reference, which reflected doctrinal positions that differed greatly 
from the Summa’s on many points, his reliance on them in formal terms is often very 
apparent.64  
As such an early model for theological and philosophical inquiry, the Summa 
inevitably does not exhibit the same level of polish and sophistication that can be found in 
later scholastics texts. At times, for instance, its conclusions and opinions are clearly stated, 
but in other cases, the Summa’s own position is somewhat ‘buried’ in an unexpected part of 
the text, such as a reply to an objection, rather than in the main body of the response to the 
question the text addresses. For a scholar approaching this work for the first time, it can take 
a while to discern the contours of the Summa’s arguments, and it can be tempting to jump to 
the conclusion that the Summa simply rehearses arguments from earlier authorities when in 
fact it does much more.  
                                                        
63 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae De anima, ed. Bernardo Carlos Bazán (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 
1996). 
64 See for example Beryl Smalley, Studies in Medieval Thought and Learning from Abelard to Wyclif (London: 
The Hambledon Press, 1981), 121-21l. 
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In addition to the topics for discussion the Summa codified, the text appropriated an 
unprecedentedly broad range of sources. As we have already seen, it charted the way forward 
for the appropriation of newly discovered Greco-Arabic sources, which will be discussed at 
greater length in chapter three. At the same time, it paid homage to classic sources like 
Augustine, Ambrose, Boethius, Gregory the Great, Hilary of Poitiers, and other early 
Christian thinkers. Along with these, the Summa includes references to more recently 
recovered Greek patristic sources like Pseudo-Dionysius, John of Damascus, and Gregory of 
Nyssa. Also remarkable is its manner of incorporating many eleventh and twelfth-century 
works, some of which, most notably Anselm, had otherwise been largely neglected to that 
time.65  
As regards this period, it is worth mentioning not only Anselm but also Bernard of 
Clairvaux, Richard of St Victor and the aforementioned contemporaries like William of 
Auxerre and Philip the Chancellor, who remain important dialogue partners throughout the 
Summa. Not surprisingly, the Summa also draws heavily on Scripture, and in particular, the 
widely circulated Glossa ordinaria. This was the standard edition of the Vulgate Bible at the 
time, which also included a collection of marginal glosses from the Church Fathers.66 From 
the Carolingian period to the fourteenth century, the Glossa was treated as the standard 
commentary on Scripture, although the most popular version of it in our period was credited 
to the school of Anselm of Laon c. 1120.  
 There are a number of reasons why the authors of the Summa may have set out to 
compose such a vast compendium of sources and questions. At one level, there was a need 
for an up-to-date version of the kind of work that had been composed by Peter Lombard, who 
                                                        
65 Scott Matthews, Reason, Community and Religious Tradition, 54. 
66 E. Ann Matter, ‘The Church Fathers and the Glossa Ordinaria,’ in The Reception of the Church Fathers in the 
West, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 83-111. 
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endeavoured to assemble in an orderly fashion the source-texts and topics that were widely 
discussed at the time, although he did so with much theological creativity. The Summa 
likewise aimed to encompass not only longstanding but also cutting-edge sources and 
questions, which had become popular in the generation since Lombard’s time. Through 
teamwork, the Summists ensured that no conceivable matter of contemporary theological or 
philosophical significance was left out. In this regard, volume 2.2 is particularly interesting 
for the way it seeks exhaustively—more exhaustively than any work to date—to catalogue all 
conceivable forms of sin that a person might commit.67 This volume reveals not only a 
systematizing drive amongst the Summists but also their concern to provide a theological 
text, at least one part of which was relevant to the work of hearing confessions and 
administering corresponding acts of penance.   
 Although the Summa is devoted in part to cataloguing key texts and themes of interest 
in the day, its objectives were clearly broader and more ambitious than simply to compile the 
most comprehensive set of sources and questions to date. For instance, it was likely 
undertaken at least in part for the sake of showcasing exceptional creativity and intellectual 
prowess of early Franciscan intellectuals, not to say their superiority to the secular university 
masters who were opposed to the growing role they played in the life of the university.68 This 
opposition was due not least to the fact that the teaching offered by the mendicants posed a 
threat to the seculars’ quest to attract students and thereby maintain a sufficient salary.  
                                                        
67 Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale au XIIe et XIIIe siècles, vol. VI (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1960), 
207-11). 
68 The quarrel is treated by Yves Congar, ‘Aspects ecclésiologiques de la querelle entre mendicants et séculiers 
dans la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle et le début du XIVe,’ Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen 
Âge 28 (1961), 35-151.  
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In 1229-31, the conflict came to a head after a series of riots broke out amongst 
students during a festival. In an effort to restore order, queen regent Blanche of Castille 
dispatched soldiers who killed and wounded some of the students. In protest, the university 
suspended lectures and ordered all teaching in the city to cease for the foreseeable future. The 
entire body of university masters and students subsequently dispersed to other centres of 
learning in Europe, with the exception of the mendicants, who had been granted a status 
independent of the university by the Pope.69 The strike was eventually resolved, and the 
university’s members returned to Paris in April of 1231, when a number of papal directives 
were issued, in particular, the bull Parens scientarum, which established the university’s 
rights and independence of the city and especially the cathedral.  
By the time these directives came into effect, however, the Dominicans in particular 
had already gained the upper hand on the Parisian educational scene. Although the 
Franciscans did not have a school of their own in the period of the ‘great dispersion’, the 
Dominicans opened the doors of theirs not only to their own novices but also to a broader 
clientele, including students who had remained in Paris after the strike. By charging very low 
fees, they colonized education in the city to an extent that made it difficult for the masters to 
recover their student base—and their salaries—on their return.  
The tensions were exacerbated by the fact that the mendicants—first the Dominicans 
and later the Franciscans—gradually took over key chairs in the university faculty of 
theology, which then became a permanent possession of the relevant religious order. During 
the great dispersion, for instance, then Bishop William of Auxerre appointed the Dominican 
Roland of Cremona to a chair which he was not required to return in 1231. Thus, the chair 
eventually passed to a Dominican successor, Hugh of St Cher. Around the time of his 
                                                        
69 Bert Roest, A History of Franciscan Education, 53. 
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appointment, Roland’s master John of St Giles, an existing chair in theology, assumed the 
Dominican habit without relinquishing his chair, bringing another chair into the order. 
Alexander of Hales did likewise when he joined the Franciscans in 1236.  
While the mendicants held three chairs by this time, they had come to occupy twelve 
of the fifteen chairs that had been established by 1253, when another strike occurred with 
which the mendicants did not comply.70 The intense controversy that ensued was only 
eventually resolved by papal fiat in 1257. In the midst of this controversy, it is no surprise 
that Pope Alexander ordered William of Melitona to complete the Summa Halensis in 1255 
and to enlist all the help he needed from other leading Franciscan scholars. The goal of the 
Pope in so doing was surely to put an end to fabricated charges of heresy that were designed 
de-legitimize their involvement in the university by placing their orthodoxy and scholarly 
credentials on full display. The competition for chairs, for students, and for academic prestige 
was fierce.  
The race was on to see which school of thought could prevail under the intellectual 
demands of the time, and the Franciscans sought to prove themselves apt to the challenge. 
Yet theirs was no mere lust for power. As recent research has shown, a scholarly reputation 
was quickly becoming the litmus test for religious, social, and political credibility overall, 
given the rising levels of literacy.71 In that sense, the preaching, ministry, and popular 
influence of the Franciscans depended heavily upon their ability to prove their worth as 
academics. This is something they arguably did in abundance with the Summa Halensis, 
which took advantage of Alexander and perhaps even more so, John’s, scholastic 
achievements to set the stage for the further development of the burgeoning discipline of 
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systematic theology. 
 
The Scholastic Method  
 
This Summa, like the Sentences commentaries that preceded it, employed a more 
advanced form of scholastic method that Abelard had earlier formulated. This method, also 
invoked in lectures and disputations, involved delineating arguments both for (‘pro’) and 
against (‘contra’) a given position. While these arguments were sometimes unattributed or 
‘self-made’, they were other times drawn from a range of authoritative sources, from which 
brief quotations or opiniones were extracted. After marshalling these arguments, the author 
presented his own solution or response (solutio/respondeo) to the question, defending one or 
the other side of the argument. In this regard, he generally invoked further authorities or 
glossed those already quoted. Finally, he delivered a response to each of the objections or 
points raised—whether by an authority or by himself—in connection with the other side of 
the argument (ad objecta).  
For scholars steeped in the tradition of source-research, this argumentative strategy 
can give the impression that scholastic thinkers actually endorsed or opposed the views of the 
authorities they cited in either the ‘pro’ or ‘contra’ sections of a given article and especially 
in the solutio or respondeo section. Thus, a medieval thinker who quotes, say, Augustine in 
positive terms is often supposed to be more or less ‘Augustinian’ on the topic under 
consideration. However, this way of thinking about scholastic texts is quickly problematized 
by the study of the texts themselves.  
In the Summa Halensis, for example, there are many cases in which a source is used 
in inconsistent or even contradictory ways that bespeak a relative disregard for the accuracy 
of its interpretation. An introductory question in the Summa on the knowledge of God 
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contains 70 references to Augustine, who is by far the most quoted authority in this section; 
34 of these references are to Augustine’s ep. 147 and often to the same passages from it. 
Interestingly, these selections are used in both the ‘pro’ and ‘contra’ as well as ‘respondeo’ 
and ‘ad objecta’ sections. By thus placing Augustine in an argument with himself, the 
Summists clearly did not intend to interpret or bolster Augustine’s own views but use him as 
a cipher for their own efforts to consider different sides of a matter on which they ultimately 
sought to present their own position. The use of Augustine in this instance performed what 
we might describe as a purely dialectical function.  
While the Summa uses a similar strategy in treating other questions, its method is far 
from uniform, even in its invocation of one and the same authority across different contexts. 
In outlining the doctrine of the Trinity, for example, the Summa takes great care fairly 
accurately to represent good portions of Richard of St Victor’s De Trinitate, as part of an 
effort to appropriate his doctrine of the Trinity. In another context, it offers a scathing critique 
of philosophers like Aristotle and Avicenna who failed to articulate a doctrine of the 
Trinity.72 At the same time, however, we will discover in a further chapter that the Summa 
imported many of Avicenna’s positions in metaphysics and psychology into its own 
framework, often under the name of other authorities like Augustine. This was in keeping 
with a broader tendency to read ideas from one authority into the writings of another who for 
whatever reason was regarded as ‘more authoritative’. 
 These examples and many more suggest that the Summists, like other scholastics at 
the time, were just as inclined to subject authorities to criticism, revision, eisegesis, 
distortion, or manipulation, as they were faithfully to employ them. But to what end? 
According to Marcia Colish, ‘the biggest reason for their appeal to authorities was to marshal 
                                                        
72 SH, Vol. 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C3 (n. 10), 18.  
 32 
support from them for their own campaigns.’73As we have seen, the means they employed to 
these ends varied considerably. While there are some clear cases in which scholastics came 
out for or against a source whose contents are fairly accurately represented, there are many 
others in which authoritative quotations are simply used as ‘proof texts’ for personal 
opinions, without much regard for whether the authority in question actually held those 
opinions. The practice of proof-texting was facilitated by works like Lombard’s Sentences, 
which wrenched authoritative sententiae from their original context.74  
That is not to say that scholars at the time were necessarily unfamiliar with that 
context. A learned theologian like Alexander of Hales was likely well-acquainted with the 
works he cited, even though he and others at the time may have relied on compendia like the 
Sentences or even on memory as a more convenient point of reference. Whether or not a 
scholar was deeply familiar with his sources, however, the point of invoking them was not to 
restate them but to innovate by means of them. This does not mean that scholars at this time 
exhibited no regard for tradition. As Scott Matthews notes, the key to innovation for them 
‘involved the interpretation of sources provided by tradition: they had to ‘find themselves’ 
within those sources.’75  
In doing so, they inevitably extrapolated conclusions that far surpassed those that can 
be found in the authorities themselves. But as Mary Carruthers has insightfully observed, 
authorities in this period were not authors but texts, and texts are not static entities but 
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materials to be interpreted and digested by a reader.76 In turn, the interpretation of the 
medieval reader, which was ineluctably designed to suit specific occasions or address specific 
questions, became part of the meaning of the text, ‘which was in a continual process of being 
understood, its plenitude of meaning being perfected and completed.’77 As Carruthers notes, 
it is precisely the fact that the text generates further texts that renders it authoritative.78 By 
giving new meanings of their own devising to authoritative quotations, in summary, 
scholastics believed themselves to be furthering the tradition rather than undermining it 
altogether.  
In the example given above, for instance, it is obvious that the Summists would not 
have dared to devise a new theory of the knowledge of God without finding some way to 
situate their views within the larger, if loosely defined, tradition or stream of thought that is 
traceable to Augustine, the chief authority on the matter. In this regard, their strategy was 
evidently to illustrate that there are a number of ways to parse Augustine’s account and 
thereby to lend credibility to their own. A similar method is discharged when it comes to the 
Summists’ use of Anselm, whose arguments for God’s existence and the necessity of the 
Incarnation, among others, are creatively turned to new ends.  
What we learn in such cases is that scholastics often developed their ideas in 
conversation with authorities who stood for a cause or represented a tradition of thought with 
which they wanted to associate themselves, or which they wanted to champion in a new way, 
in order to legitimize their own thinking. This certainly seems to be the case with the 
Summa’s use of Dionysius and Richard of St Victor, which allowed them to locate 
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77 Ibid.  
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themselves with reference to the growing mystical and affective strand of the faith. The 
reason Augustine was so popular was that he was regarded as the founder and chief 
proponent of the longstanding and trusted intellectual tradition. To quote him was to situate 
oneself on the right side of Christian intellectual history.  
As these examples indicate, authoritative support was paramount for making one’s 
own case for a particular claim. At the same time, however, the case itself was always more 
than the sum or function of its sources. In fact, it was the product of a deliberately innovating 
thinker or school of thought. As Colish reiterates, the scholastics ‘were not mere compilers 
who just recapitulated patristic authorities. Rather, they emerge as theologians with definite, 
independent and sometimes partisan views.’79 They appealed to authorities in order to defend 
their own positions, first and foremost.  
An especially noteworthy by-product of this approach was that scholars at the time 
tended to become associated with the authorities they commandeered, so that their opponents 
would ordinarily name those authorities rather than their contemporaries when responding to 
their views. For example, Thomas Aquinas famously rejected a version of Anselm’s 
argument which was clearly the version developed by his Franciscan counterparts. In cases 
where there was no obvious authority to name, an opponent would simply go by the name of 
‘quidam’, or ‘a certain man’.80 Evidently, it was not considered polite to name opponents 
personally.  
Whatever the reason, the practice of using ‘codenames’ for colleagues has led to a 
great deal of confusion on the part of modern readers, who are primed to take the texts at face 
value. But this is precisely the method of reading which the analysis above has established as 
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inadequate to the interpretation of scholastic texts. As we have seen, these texts presuppose a 
complex attitude towards authorities that manifests in sophisticated and diverse forms of 
argument that are ultimately tailored towards the end of advancing a personal or party 
intellectual agenda. In this light, we must reconsider the common scholarly assumption, 
mentioned previously, that early Franciscans had no other aim than to ‘systematize’ 
Augustine. 
 
Augustine’s Authority and Innovation in Early Franciscan Thought 
 
In appealing extensively to Augustine’s authority, I have noted already that 
Franciscans were not alone. As a good deal of recent research has shown, many of the major 
authors in the medieval period, to say nothing of other periods, positioned their work in some 
way with reference to Augustine, the unquestionable ‘authority of authorities’.81 Thus, 
Anselm, Hugh of St Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and 
even Aquinas, have all been described in some way as ‘Augustinians’.82 As the foregoing 
analysis would lead us to expect, however, these thinkers imported Augustine into their own 
frames of reference, supplementing his work with other sources with their own goals in mind. 
In the process, they tended to generate remarkably different and sometimes even 
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incompatible ‘Augustines’, watering down significantly the idea of what an Augustinian even 
is. 
What, then, does it mean to be an Augustinian in the middle ages? The quest for a 
common denominator is likely to produce very little in the way of agreement on specific 
doctrinal issues. However, it does highlight the widespread acceptance of a broadly Christian 
Neo-Platonic outlook in which all things proceed from or rely on God and reflect or seek him 
in their turn. Although this outlook could manifest in a range of strands and forms, traceable 
even to thinkers other than Augustine, it turned at the most basic level on a top-down view of 
the world in which God himself is the basis for all things that exist and indeed for our 
knowledge of them.  
In this connection, there was a common notion linked to Augustine that all knowledge 
starts from within: God impresses his image on the soul, and it is on this basis that we know 
him and everything else that he had made. Whether Augustine himself advocated the exact 
form of inside-out thinking that has been attributed to him is certainly open to question, as I 
have argued elsewhere.83 Yet there are other reasons why we should think twice before 
assuming that medieval thinkers were working with the ‘real Augustine.’ As I will elaborate 
in the next chapter, his reception in this period was heavily mitigated by the wide circulation 
of spurious works that have almost no bearing on Augustine’s own thinking. When it comes 
to developing a theory of knowledge and knowledge of God, for example, virtually all of the 
heavy lifting in the Summa Halensis is accomplished through the invocation of the pseudo-
Augustinian De spiritu et anima, which was probably written in 1161 by a Cistercian monk 
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Archer of Clairvaux to his colleague Isaac of Stella, although questions of authorship—single 
or otherwise—have been debated.84 
As I will elaborate in the chapter on philosophical context, the fact that this text had 
much in common with the work of Avicenna partly explains why theologians at the time, 
above all, Franciscans, apparently felt justified in using his work to parse some of 
Augustine’s more opaque claims. The incorporation of Avicenna was precisely what allowed 
them to extend their theological inquiries to include more detailed questions about natural 
philosophy and human nature, without at once undermining their belief that all knowledge 
comes somehow from God.  
This top-down way of thinking differed quite significantly from the approach Aquinas 
would develop a generation later, partly under the inspiration of Aristotle.85 Admittedly, 
Aquinas remained broadly indebted to Neo-Platonism insofar as he believed all things come 
from and return to God. On this basis, he ultimately argued that faith is necessary for the 
perfection of knowledge, insofar as it establishes the divine source and end of what we know 
and thus in some ways reconfigures how we see it. Nevertheless, he did not regard faith as 
essential to knowledge as such. In his opinion, human reason is perfectly capable of 
exploring the world and even inferring God’s existence on the basis of what is accessible to it 
in the empirical world.  
For obvious reasons, Aquinas’ method could not help but seem blasphemous by the 
conservative lights of his Franciscan contemporaries, for whom the impossibility of knowing 
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anything apart from divine aid and initiative was axiomatic. Because the works of Aristotle 
remained relatively untouched during the Summa’s generation, however, the factions 
between Dominicans and Franciscans over bottom-up versus top-down ways of thinking had 
not yet fully emerged. In fact, there was considerable harmony between Dominicans like 
Hugh of St Cher and Guerric of St Quintin and Franciscans like Alexander of Hales and John 
of La Rochelle.86  
The same is true of William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor and Alexander of Hales, 
before he became a friar, all of whom the Summa quotes extensively. When we consider the 
work of this generation, in all its diversity, we also notice a remarkable synergy. This can 
arguably be traced to the broadly top-down outlook that motivated much scholarly work at 
the time. Although this outlook was to some extent common currency in the day, this book 
will evidence how Franciscans elaborated it in a unique and more mature way that cannot be 
found in any of their immediate predecessors or contemporaries. In this regard, we should not 
assume that their only motivation was to assert the legitimacy of their participation and even 
their primacy in the university context and in the world of intellectual and spiritual authorities 
more generally. 
Their reasons for developing such an extensive intellectual system may have had 
something to do with their distinctive Franciscan spirituality, which appears to have 
resonated deeply with the major ideological trends of the time. This would certainly explain 
why Alexander of Hales—who was at the cutting edge of those trends—found it natural 
ultimately to join the Franciscan order—and to bring his many scholarly accolades with him. 
Whether there is any direct connection between the philosophical and theological positions 
early Franciscans developed and the spiritual and ministerial vision of Francis of Assisi is 
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naturally difficult to determine, not least because the authors of the Summa itself do not 
mention any specific reasons or motivating factors underlying the authorship of the text.  
Nevertheless, I will show in subsequent chapters that there are many cases where we 
can at least identify compatibilities between the vision and persona of Francis, which will be 
described in the next chapter, and the scholarly positions the Summists formulated. Of 
course, the Summists themselves do not make explicit connections between their religious 
ethos and their intellectual tradition. This is because it was not in the nature of the Summa 
genre or university practice more generally to refer to the religious or other movies for 
writing.  
As Bert Roest has shown, however, the Franciscans were steeped in the ethos of their 
tradition in their day-to-day lives, and so we should not be surprised let alone question 
whether they brought their spirituality to bear in everything they did.87 Whatever the role 
Francis may have played in the development of early Franciscan thought, there is no doubt 
that the first Franciscan scholars worked from a desire to formulate a distinctly Franciscan 
scholarly identity at a time when there were many resources that lent themselves effectively 
to doing so.88 The goal in other words was to lay down a Franciscan intellectual tradition for 
the very first time. 
Here, it is worth recalling that the Summa Halensis was ultimately authored entirely 
by Franciscans. The exclusively Franciscan authorship of the Summa—at a time when there 
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was very little evidence of the tensions between Franciscans and Dominicans that would later 
arise—serves to confirm that a certain style of top-down thinking was starting to become 
unique to the Franciscan school. As one author puts it, Franciscans at this time ‘were thinking 
like a community, not merely as a group of scholars who happened to be working at the same 
institution.’89  
The partial purpose of this work is to deconstruct the ‘Augustinian’ label that has long 
been tagged to the Franciscan school to downplay its significance and to show in the case of 
specific doctrines how early Franciscans harnessed a wide range of sources, not least 
Augustine, to the end of articulating and defending an intellectual tradition all their own.90 
Far from a mere rehearsal of prior tradition, the Summa in which they achieved this feat 
provided a basis for the formation of future Franciscans who in many cases merely built on 
and extrapolated the implications of the foundations it laid.  
In light of its distinguished provenance, we might conclude that theirs was one of the 
most innovative and influential intellectual systems of all time. This system entails a unique 
theological vision, theistic proof, and an account of the divine nature, the Trinity, 
Christology, Incarnational and moral theology, which I will delineate in detail after the 
following two chapters which will respectively elucidate the Franciscan and philosophical 
contexts in which these doctrines were conceived.  
                                                        
89 Scott Matthews, Reason, Community and Religious Tradition, 72. 
90 Jacques Bougerol makes this point about Bonaventure’s Franciscan use of the Victorines, Dionysius, 
Augustine, etc. in, ‘The Church Fathers and Auctoritates,’ 334. See also Bert Roest’s valuable deconstruction of 
Franciscan Augustinianism in chapter five of Franciscan Learning, Preaching and Mission c. 1220-1650 , 
‘Franciscan Augustinianism: Musings about Labels and Late Medieval School Formation,’ 111-31. Francois-
Xavier Putallaz also queries the validity of the ‘Augustinian’ label for Bonaventure and later Franciscans in his 
Figures franciscaines de Bonaventure a Duns Scot (Paris: Cerf, 1997).  
 
 41 
 
 
  
 42 
2. THE FRANCISCAN CONTEXT 
 
Since modern research on the Franciscan school first started to gather momentum in 
the late nineteenth century, scholars have debated the so-called ‘Franciscan Question’, that is, 
the question as to which sources provide the most reliable picture of Francis of Assisi and 
early Franciscan life.91 The answer to this question is decisive for determining whether the 
early developments in the order that facilitated its institutionalization were ultimately 
consistent with the original vision of Francis or led to its perversion. One of the most 
significant of these developments involved the establishment of educational programmes.  
As we have already seen, the composition of the Summa Halensis was part of a larger 
effort to get early Franciscan education off the ground and indeed to assert the authority of 
Franciscan scholars in the university context. Thus, the question arises whether the Summa 
itself was part of a larger process of departing from Francis’ original vision for his order, or 
whether it represents an authentic effort to lay down an intellectual tradition, whereby gifted 
novices and even seasoned scholars might be inducted into the Franciscan not to mention 
academic way of life.  
The present chapter will work towards an answer to this question by seeking to 
understand what was known or believed about Francis and the nature of the Franciscan 
mission during the period of the Summa’s authorship.92 For reasons that will soon emerge, 
                                                        
91 Many thanks to William Short OFM for helpful comments on this chapter. An excellent survey of the 
Franciscan Question is provided by Jacques Dalarun, ‘The Magic Circle of the Franciscan Question,’ in The 
Misadventure of Francis of Assisi, trans. Edward Hagman (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2002), 21-
58. See also the French version, Jacques Dalarun, Vers une résolution de la question franciscaine: La Légende 
ombrienne de Thomas de Celano (Paris: Fayard, 2007). 
92 Analecta Franciscana sive chronica allaque varia documenta ad historiam Fratrum Minorum spectantia, vol 
 43 
the texts that are most relevant for this purpose include the writings of Francis himself and 
the early biographies. Among Francis’ writings, the most significant are undoubtedly the 
various rules for the order that he had a hand in composing as well as his final Testament. As 
Duncan Nimmo has shown in his study of Franciscan history, there is little evidence that the 
saint’s other writings, which comprise only a very slim volume, were widely circulated at the 
time in question.93 Thus, they will not form the focus of this study.  
In addition to the Rule and Testament, I will examine the three official ‘Lives of 
Francis’ that Thomas of Celano was commissioned to write in 1228, 1232-9, 1244-7, 
respectively. By outlining the contours of these texts below and expanding upon the historical 
contexts in which they were written, I will expand on the Franciscan religious context in 
which the Summa Halensis was composed. Through these means, I aim ultimately to 
establish the Summa Halensis as part of an effort faithfully to work out Francis’ vision in new 
and more complex circumstances.  
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At the same time, I will provide a basis for efforts I will make in subsequent chapters 
to highlight connections between the Franciscan ethos and Franciscan thought. As noted 
already, highlighting the connections between the example of Francis and early Franciscan 
thought will be part of my strategy for showing that, far from a mono-dimensional textbook 
of ‘Augustinian’ thought, the Summa engages a wide range of sources in the effort to fashion 
a wholly innovative and in many respects distinctly Franciscan intellectual tradition.  
 
The Writings of Francis in Context 
 
The Franciscan order began as a counter-cultural response to the trends of society at 
the time. In contrast to the growing phenomenon of urban development, Francis initially 
called his followers to work and preach in the countryside, far from the troubles and 
temptations of the city. Where city-dwellers sought to accumulate wealth that had previously 
been available only to the elite, Francis shunned all possessions and above all, money. In 
every sense of the term, he sought to defeat the wisdom of this world with the foolishness of 
God.  
This strategy served him well in the early years of the order’s existence, when the 
brothers were only twelve in number and had reasonably few needs to speak of. On attaining 
this size in 1209, Francis and his followers travelled to Rome from their native Umbria to 
offer Pope Innocent III an oral presentation of the rule they observed, which evidently 
attained his verbal approval.94 Although this rule does not survive in a written form, 
historians hypothesize that it contained a core vision outlining the friars’ intent literally to 
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emulate the example of Christ, by giving up everything to identify with the poor, as Christ 
did for the human race; to work in exchange for daily provisions and to refuse money and all 
forms property, including permanent housing; to serve and give away whatever might be 
asked of them by others; and ultimately to call those they met to repent of worldly 
preoccupations in similar ways.95   
As time went on, this original Franciscan ideal of evangelical poverty was refined and 
elaborated. A key moment in this process occurred in 1215 when the fourth Lateran Council 
decreed that all new religious movements without a written Rule should adopt or revise an 
existing rule. Although the Franciscans were technically subject to this mandate, Francis 
emphatically rejected the Rules of Augustine, Benedict, and Bernard of Clairvaux, insisting 
on his call to a unique form of life. Because of the earlier approval he had received for it from 
Innocent III, which was later confirmed by Honorius III, however, Francis was evidently 
exempted from the Lateran mandate and permitted to uphold his evolving rule. This enjoyed 
official recognition even though an official rule for the order was only published in 1223.96 
By this time, the order had grown to include up to 5,000 members—largely 
uneducated laymen who were attracted by Francis’ charismatic message; by 1260, 
approximately 30,000 friars were likely enlisted.97 The sheer size of the order meant that 
Francis’ ideal of begging from day to day for food and shelter could no longer be observed in 
a way that would not intrude on the friars’ mission to preach repentance and serve the poor 
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and downtrodden of society.98 The friars needed some form of housing, and thus, property, to 
avoid becoming an undue burden to benefactors and to have a site from which to minister. As 
became increasingly clear, moreover, their ministry itself could not easily be conducted 
outside the towns, where the needs for repentance and charitable service were most urgent.  
In order to serve in these ways, new members of the order, both lay and learned, 
required training, which in turn necessitated books and other educational resources. What 
soon became clear was that the rule needed to be rewritten in a way that allowed for the 
order’s ministry to continue in sheer practical terms. In this connection, Francis had willingly 
acknowledged early on his inability to manage an order that exceeded the size of the initial 
brotherhood. While insisting on maintaining certain standards for himself, he may have 
realised if not explicitly stated that his personal ideals were impractical and even 
incompatible with the thriving of his friars on a larger scale. In 1220, consequently, Francis 
abdicated his power over administrative matters to Brother Peter Caetani, to his vicar Brother 
Elias, and his own appointee as Protector of the order, Cardinal Ugolino.  
The abdication took place at the so-called ‘chapter of the mats’, a general chapter of 
the order, which became known for the way the friars made dwellings out of woven reed 
panels around the Portiuncula, a church that had become their base. At this chapter, the rule 
came up as a central topic for discussion. As recent scholarship has shown, the original forma 
vitae had been subject to numerous additions, not subtractions, after 1209, and the voices that 
weighed in on its formulation during this period included many in addition to from Francis.99 
Although Francis had strictly speaking relinquished his right to determine the structure of his 
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order, his followers nonetheless deferred to him as the order’s founder when it came to re-
defining the terms of the order’s existence.  
In the text of 1221, therefore, Francis exercised his prerogative to reiterate his earlier 
bans on the ownership of property, money, books, and dwellings. Notwithstanding his 
apparent willingness to permit the order’s structures to be adapted to the needs of growth, he 
obviously struggled to re-frame his vision in a more practicable way that seemingly departed 
from ideals to which he still held himself accountable. For reasons that are not entirely clear, 
however, the rule of 1221 did not become the official rule. The rule that was approved or 
bullata in 1223 is a shorter and much more polished version of the 1221 rule that was likely 
prepared with the involvement of Ugolino and Francis’ vicar, Brother Elias. It remains the 
official rule of the order to this day.100 
Similar to the previous two rules, the rule of 1223 called would-be friars to give all 
their possessions to the poor and commit to a life of absolute poverty, humility, and 
simplicity, never accepting money or any possessions in a literal attempt to follow the 
example of Christ. The main substantial difference between this rule and that of 1221 
concerns the fact that the former does not mention the use of books, although it re-iterates the 
command not to accept property. Additionally, the sanctioned rule makes only one statement 
about learning, namely, that those who do not know their letters should not be anxious to 
acquire them on entering the order, but should focus instead of the ministry of prayer. Later 
on, Francis’ final Testament added in this connection that everyone who enters the order with 
a trade should continue to practice it, including clerics and academics. 
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Although the 1223 rule does not depart significantly from Francis’ own stated wishes, 
the very fact that that his rule of 1221 was supplanted has led scholars like John Moorman to 
conclude that Ugolino and Elias deliberately misplaced or concealed and re-wrote the 1221 
text in an attempt to shape the order in ways Francis would not have approved, presumably 
after the model of the more academic Dominicans.101 In this regard, Moorman followed the 
lead of Paul Sabatier, whose biography of Francis in 1902 instigated a new wave of interest 
in Franciscan studies.  
In this biography, Sabatier teased out a multi-faceted thesis according to which efforts 
on the part of the Pope and clerically-minded friars to institutionalize the order ultimately 
corrupted Francis’ original vision. In this regard, Franciscan clerics were supposedly 
motivated not only by a desire to increase the power and prestige of the order but also, by the 
same token, to render it more useful in imposing the moral and pastoral reforms of Lateran 
IV, which the Roman Curia had little other means for successfully enacting at the time. 
Sabatier’s basic thesis, no longer taken seriously by most scholars, has also been elaborated 
by other major Franciscan historians, such as Raphael Huber and more recently, Duncan 
Nimmo.102  
In contrast, the recent research of Raoul Manselli, Giovanni Micolli, Jacques Dalarun 
and others has cast ‘the drama of Francis as an episode in the eternal conflict between ideals 
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and the pressures of reality, rather than the result of a conflict between the Roman Curia and 
his [Francis’] original proposal.’103 According to these authors, Francis’ original purposes 
were not undermined by leaders in his own order who disregarded them. The order simply 
struggled for a time, as any large and rapidly growing institution would, to translate vision 
into reality. As noted above, Francis was clearly aware of the tensions between ideal and 
reality that his followers encountered, and of his own inability to resolve them. Through 
reliance on and even submission to others, he committed himself to the resolution of those 
tensions, even while maintaining a certain lifestyle that was important for his own 
conscience.  
This is evidenced by the final testament Francis wrote before he died.104 Here, the 
‘little poor man’ witnesses ‘to the personal call he had received to model his life on the 
Gospel and briefly characterized the apostolic life as he had it written in the Rule.’105 As 
Francis explains, he and his early followers made no claim to learning and refused to accept 
any property. After reminding his brothers how early members of the order had lived, Francis 
urged them to be content with poverty, not to seek privileges or concessions from the Roman 
Curia, even to preach, and to preach only with the permission of local bishops, to honour 
theologians and priests, and not to add any gloss or interpretation to the rule.  
By some accounts, this testament was Francis’ way of expressing dissatisfaction with 
recent developments towards the institutionalization of the order and the ways in which the 
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Roman Curia, not least the Pope, was intervening to make this possible. As Rosalind Brooke 
aptly observes, however, the testament is exactly that, namely, a brief account of Francis’ 
personal calling and efforts to remain faithful it until his very end. In short, it contains 
Francis’ autobiography, rather than a survey of the ideal he prescribed for his followers.106  
This is confirmed by the fact that the text fails to mention Francis’ main prescriptive 
not to accept money. If anything, Francis’ admonition at the end of his testament to adhere to 
the rule of 1223 entails implicit consent to the revisions his administrators had made to his 
own prescriptions. It suggests that Francis ‘saw no essential difference between the various 
redactions of the rule’,107 which was ultimately perfected by those who were more competent 
to finalize its contents. In deferring along these lines to more learned friars, it could be 
argued, Francis decisively embodied Franciscan humility and left his followers to do the 
same, by finding new ways to organise the order in accordance with his founding principles. 
An exceptional example of this humility concerns his willingness to accept the 
introduction of education into the order during his own lifetime. After 1223 and before his 
death, Francis wrote to Anthony of Padua, asking him to teach theology to the friars, 
provided this did not conflict with their ministry and prayer. This request clearly indicates 
that Francis was not opposed to learning in the order, notwithstanding the rather ambivalent 
statements about it in the rule, which indicates that friars should not own books other than 
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those necessary for their office, or pursue learning they did not already possess it.108 Such 
statements seem to suggest that in the early 1220s, the question of how to educate novices 
without prior training had not really arisen in the order. Although Francis soon came to 
appreciate the importance of learning to his order’s ministry, the rule does not pro-actively 
prescribe or prevent it, precisely because it was not originally part of Francis’ mission. 
The eventual rise of learning the order was likely precipitated in part by the reality 
that the very condition of the order’s existence at a time when the church was sharply 
curtailing the activities of lay and thus largely unlearned initiatives was some baseline level 
of orthodox belief and teaching.109 Above all, however, it was introduced by clerical 
members, who started joining the order early on, bringing with them the benefit of prior 
theological training. These members appear to have co-existed relatively peacefully with the 
predominantly lay and unlearned members of the order, who gained informal education 
during the early years as and when they could from the likes of Anthony or others, who were 
not necessarily Franciscans.  
Such ad hoc instructors included Alexander of Hales, who held a chair at the 
University of Paris in the 1220s and permitted friars to attend his lectures.110 In 1224, 
Franciscans acquired the first of their own lectors when four English scholars at the 
University of Paris joined their ranks, namely, Haymo of Faversham, Simon of Sandwich, 
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Bartholomeus Anglicus, and Simon Anglicus. The development anticipated the official 
creation of the office of lector in 1227-8, which saw the instalment of Franciscan lectors in 
study houses around the Franciscan world.  
By this time, the notion of Franciscan education had achieved a level of intelligibility 
that was lacking in the first days of the order’s existence. The friars were set to become a 
learned order, of the kind their Dominican counterparts had envisaged from the beginning. 
That is not to say that they simply ‘copied’ the Dominican model as some have supposed.111 
The pathway to education is one they forged in their own way, and as we will discover over 
the course of this book, to their own ends. In this connection, Sabatier, Moorman, Nimmo, 
and the like have advanced the claim that a growing class of literati in the order staged an 
overthrow of the so-called zelanti, some of whom had known Francis and were passionate 
about preserving his original lifestyle. After Francis’ death in 1226 particularly, their rise to 
power, aided by the Roman Curia, supposedly led to the demise of the original ideal of 
absolute poverty, humility, and simplicity.  
However intriguing, this interpretation of the situation is not borne out by historical 
fact, and in particular, a request the friars collectively presented to Ugolino—now Pope 
Gregory IX—to issue a bull in 1230, namely, Quo elongati, that qualified the rule in ways 
that allowed them formally to remove all obstacles to education and their institutionalization 
more generally.112 This bull stated that Franciscans were thenceforward permitted to make 
use of properties, including books, that were strictly speaking owned by certain emissaries or 
‘spiritual friends’ (nuntii) of the order. At the request of the friars in 1245, Pope Innocent IV 
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issued the further bull Ordinem vestrum, which permitted them to hold possessions and 
money not only for ‘use’, per Quo elongati, but also for ‘convenience’.  
This bull additionally transferred the ownership of all ‘Franciscan’ property from the 
friars’ donors or representatives directly to the Holy See, giving the Franciscans complete 
independence in terms of the way they used money and goods. In 1260, Bonaventure 
permanently lifted the privileges entailed in this bull in order to counteract their abuse by 
some friars. What remained in force, however, was another decree the friars had requested of 
the Pope in 1230, which rendered Francis’ Testament, especially its command not to gloss 
the rule, non-legally-binding for the friars. In acquiescing to this request, Gregory IX freed 
the friars from any formal responsibility to live in the state of absolute dispossession about 
which Francis reminisces in this context.  
With legal obstacles removed regarding the establishment of convents, study houses 
and other organizational structures, the order of the 1230’s entered a period of significant 
academic development. In Paris, this development was facilitated by the move of the 
Franciscans in 1231 from the humble accommodation they had previously occupied outside 
of Paris into the grand Couvent des Cordeliers, a gift from King Louis IX of France, which 
burned down in 1580.113 Thus established in Paris, the Franciscan academic cause was soon 
advanced further when Alexander of Hales entered the order in 1236, starting work 
immediately on the Summa Halensis, which was widely disseminated in both Franciscan and 
non-Franciscan study libraries and extensively consulted at least through the time of Duns 
Scotus.114  
In addition to this text, Alexander along with John of La Rochelle, Odo Rigaldi, and 
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Robert of Bastia co-wrote a commentary on the rule, clarifying questions that friars around 
the Franciscan world had raised with reference to it. The team was commissioned to 
undertake this task by Haymo of Faversham, the first Parisian master to serve as minister 
general of the order, a role he filled between 1240-44. After its completion in 1241-2, this 
commentary of the four masters (Expositio quatuor magistrorum) was evidently circulated to 
all the Franciscan provinces, which is suggestive of its extensive influence.115 What is notable 
about this commentary is that it makes no mention of the question of studies within the order. 
Instead, it focuses almost exclusively on the importance of observing the strictures of 
absolute poverty according to the terms of Quo elongati, advising friars not to pursue 
excessive privileges and relaxations beyond those already instated.  
In these respects, the commentary serves to indicate that the question of learning had 
become separate from the question of poverty over the course of the order’s early history. To 
be poor, humble, and simple was not to be unlearned but to pursue learning and other aspects 
of Franciscan life in a way that observed the principle of absolute poverty, as qualified by 
recent papal decrees. The upshot of the rule commentary, in summary, is that learning had 
been integrated into the friars’ self-understanding and vocation to such an extent that the 
viability of Franciscan education was not even in doubt during this time. In fact, Franciscan 
scholars from the Halensian Summists onward ultimately determined that, insofar as devotion 
to Christ in the Franciscan manner is the key to acquiring wisdom regarding all things that 
exist through him, learning is essential to the Franciscan lifestyle, and indeed, the Franciscan 
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outlook essential to all valid learning.116  
According to Senocak, this ‘new Franciscan identity, essentially a combination of 
absolute poverty and learning, was in many ways a unique product of the thirteenth 
century.’117 The early Franciscan self-understanding is articulated most memorably in 
Bonaventure’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum, which was written in 1259 to affirm the place of 
studies in achieving Franciscan ends. Far from questioning the legitimacy of learning in 
relation to the Franciscan ideal of absolute poverty, this text establishes incontrovertibly that 
friars of this period saw it as indispensable to achieving the sort of perfection Francis 
prescribed.  
In keeping with this vision, Haymo of Faversham instituted a new policy in 1241 to 
admit to the order only friars who were learned or otherwise ‘useful’ to the order and 
exemplary in some way. There are a number of reasons why Haymo may have instigated this 
significant change in the recruitment strategy of the order, setting the stage for the eventual 
replacement of its lay population with more prestigious members, especially academics. The 
first and most fundamental reason was that education lent a level of authority to the friars, 
which was becoming essential to effective ministry in this period. 
As noted previously, levels of literacy and education were rapidly rising amongst the 
general populace at the time. Although Lateran IV imposed reforms that called the secular 
clergy—those who were not members of religious orders—to rise to the challenge of 
interacting with a more learned laity, the success of this effort was marginal. The newfound 
intellectual and social freedoms they enjoyed combined with the relative moral and 
intellectual ineptitude of the clergy engendered new levels of disregard for the authority of 
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church.118 As a matter of fact, the growth of the university, especially at Paris, and the 
scholastic form of theology, had given rise to a new type of authority, namely, that of the 
university masters. Without a voice in this sector, the friars and other ministers lacked 
credence and leverage in the wider world. 
A similar principle applied within the church itself, where able minds were needed 
not only to serve as lectors, ministers, preachers, and confessors, but also to engage in 
negotiations on Rome’s behalf with secular clergy, monks, and even secular rulers.119 As 
members of an elite class that could competently serve in these respects, respected academic 
friars quickly came to be regarded as a sort of ‘scholarly branch’ of the Roman Curia: the 
arbiters of intellectual and even spiritual power.120 Their role in ecclesial and church-state 
affairs became so essential that Senocak postulates that the relative decline or eclipse in this 
period of other religious orders, such as the Benedictines and Cistercians, may be attributable 
to their lack of scholarly status by comparison to their mendicant counterparts. 
Not surprisingly, success bred success for the friars, insofar as their scholarly 
reputation tended to attract high-flying university academics, who in turn drew in students, 
who sought to study under the most prestigious masters of the day. The attraction of the 
Franciscan order for students was further enhanced by the prospect of a free education, for 
which considerable funding would otherwise be required—funding which some families 
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simply did not possess or did not want to devote to an education in theology, which was not 
always perceived as the most useful career path.121 In light of these considerations, it is not 
difficult to see why the Franciscans moved so swiftly not only to establish internal 
educational structures for the training of novices but also to create pathways to higher 
education in theology, and even to academic positions in the universities. Their involvement 
in the university ultimately proved key to gaining the followers and the voice that would 
allow them to further Francis’ mission in the contemporary society.  
 
The Biographies of Francis in Context  
 
In the midst of the historical developments described above, the Franciscan order 
witnessed the proliferation of biographical material, which significantly formed the 
perception of Francis at the time. Foremost amongst these biographies is the life of Francis 
that Pope Gregory IX commissioned Thomas of Celano to write around the time of the saint’s 
canonization in 1228. Although Thomas joined the order relatively early in its history—
perhaps in 1215—and was among its first learned members, not much is known about his life 
except that he does not appear to have interacted with Francis extensively and therefore based 
his account primarily on the testimony of witnesses.  
Nevertheless, the life Thomas completed in 1229 evidences his skill as a literary 
craftsman, amply suited to the task of depicting the character of Francis. As a papal initiative, 
this life was intended to promote the memory and emulation of Francis not only within the 
order but also within the Church as a whole.122 The idea was to capitalize in the best sense of 
the term on the recently departed saint’s charisma for the purpose of inciting spiritual 
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renewal. In this regard, Thomas provides what is undoubtedly the most complete and reliable 
account of Francis’ life, consisting in three books which respectively describe his conversion 
and the early development of the order; his experience of receiving the stigmata or wounds of 
Christ towards the end of his life;123 and his canonization.   
Similar to other medieval legends, Celano’s life sought to depict the saint as a saint 
and therefore did not shy away from references to the supernatural and the miraculous. That 
is not to say that its hagiographical and canonical nature undermines the historicity of the key 
moments in Francis’ biography that Celano recounts, however. Although narrating historical 
events whether to do with the life of Francis or the early fraternity was not his main purpose, 
‘Thomas still presents a Francis situated in real places and connected to his concrete 
historical contemporaries including early followers.’124 Following Francis’ canonization, 
there was a need for new liturgical texts, to celebrate Francis especially on his feast day of 4 
October—and the eight days following it—and at other relevant points in the year.125  
In 1230, consequently, Thomas drew on his first life to produce an abbreviated 
version for use within the celebration of the divine office, called the Legend for Use in the 
Choir. Shortly thereafter, Julian of Speyer completed a similar text based on Celano 1, which 
was better suited to public reading during meals and gatherings of friars.126 After Julian, other 
such accounts were produced for use in the feast day office, which was celebrated differently 
from friary to friary or from church to church, such that many different liturgical variations 
on Francis’ story were soon produced.  
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Another Celano biography has only recently been discovered; I will call it Celano 
3.127 The careful reconstruction of this long-lost text has evidenced that it was written for the 
exclusive use of the friars in the liturgical context. Most certainly, it was written between 
1232-9 during the period when Elias was minister general of the Franciscan order, indeed, 
likely in the first years of his rule. Elias was deposed in complete disgrace in 1239 for his 
abuses of power, partly through the initiative of Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, 
and Haymo of Faversham.128 Thus, it is no surprise that Franciscans endeavoured to erase all 
memory of his reign, and of the special affection Francis had for him, to the point of blessing 
him uniquely on his death-bed.129 
Although it was destroyed in infamy, Celano 3 displays certain unique features that 
render its significance ongoing. First of all, it provides a concise summary of the key events 
in the saint’s life that were outlined in Celano 1. Because of the period of its authorship, 
moreover, it uniquely details certain historical events that had not transpired by the time 
Celano 1 was completed, most importantly, the translation of Francis’ body to the newly-
constructed Basilica in Assisi on 25 May 1230.130 As Dalarun notes in his introduction to 
Celano 3, however, ‘the principal uniqueness of the rediscovered life is its thirty-three new 
posthumous miracles,’131 which recount how devotion to Francis or contact with relics led to 
immediate healing for many seriously ill persons.  
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Another significant emphasis of this work concerns Francis’ love for animals, and in 
particular, his habit of treating them as though they possessed reason. The references to 
creation in this and other works by Celano suggest that Thomas had access to Francis’ 
famous ‘Canticle of Brother Sun’ (1225), which exalts the Lord who makes himself known 
through the sun, moon, stars, wind, air, water, fire, and earth. From his narratives, we can 
also infer that he knew Francis’ Admonitions, a collection of brief words of advice that the 
saint offered to others at different points in his life.  
At the general chapter of the order in 1244, the minister general of the order—then 
Crescentius of Jesi—asked Thomas to write what has been known until now as the second 
life of Francis. As we have seen above, circumstances had changed significantly between 
1228 and 1244, by which time the order had been firmly established as a learned institution 
and questions had arisen about how to undertake academic pursuits in keeping with the rule, 
on which Alexander and his colleagues had commented in 1242. In this historical context, the 
reason for the new commission was certainly not to contest the Franciscan life as it had come 
to be understood, but simply to re-iterate more emphatically the principles of poverty and 
charity to which Francis intended his followers to adhere, throughout changes in 
circumstance.132 
 With this objective in view, Crescentius invited friars around the world, especially 
those who had known Francis, such as his three main companions, Leo, Rufino, and Angelo, 
to submit stories about experiences with the saint, which would inevitably be lost after the 
passing of the first generation of friars.133 By ordering Thomas to commit these stories to 
writing, Crescentius sought to preserve Francis’ legacy for future generations of friars. Where 
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Thomas’ first life offered relatively complete coverage of the high points in Francis’ 
biography, consequently, this life gives only a brief summary of his biography in a first book, 
which is followed by a much lengthier second book that gathers a vast range of anecdotes, 
which are organized under different headings.134  
Some of these headings bespeak Francis’ unwillingness to accept property, books, and 
above all money, giving a clear window into the way of life he founded. Others illustrate his 
love of creation, and his gifts for intuition, prophesy, and human relations, setting him up as a 
model for relations amongst the friars and between the friars and the world. The text is 
heavily based, indirectly and directly, respectively, upon several earlier texts called the 
Anonymous of Perugia (1240-1) and the Legend of Three Companions (1241-7).135 Both of 
these texts contain material sent to Crescentius in 1245 in response to his summons.136  
The Anonymous traces the growth of the order from the early fraternity of Francis into 
a significant religious movement.137 While forty percent of the material is drawn from Celano 
1, sixty percent is new and focuses on the fraternity more than on Francis himself. The 
Legend of Three Companions draws about a third of its material from Celano 1, a third from 
the Anonymous, and a third from an unknown source for knowledge of Francis.138 It served 
possibly along with other testimonies from friars as the primary basis for Celano 2. Although 
Thomas did not complete his book until 1247 and thus after the main period of the Summa’s 
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authorship, it will factor into the present study, precisely because the material on which it was 
based was already either published in some form or circulated around the order during this 
time. Indeed, the remarkable feat Thomas achieves in this life is to capture the spirit of the 
order as it manifested itself during the time the Summa was being written.  
That said, the Celano biographies have featured significantly, along with the Rule and 
Testament, in debates about the ‘Franciscan Question’. These debates have been intensified 
by longstanding confusion over the dating of the various biographies of Francis mentioned 
above. The confusion can be traced in many respects to Sabatier, who published a work 
called the Mirror of Perfection after publishing his Life of Francis. While Sabatier cites the 
Mirror as one of the early biographies of Francis, Theophile Desbonnets showed in a 
philological study published in 1988 that this work actually dates to 1318.139 In this study, in 
fact, he provides for the first time a complete list of all medieval hagiographic sources about 
Francis with their dates. Even before the invaluable discoveries of Desbonnets, however, 
Sabatier’s dating had already been problematised by Ferdinand Delorme. In his 1922 edition 
of the Assisi Compilation, he shows that the Mirror draws heavily on this text, which is based 
upon stories prepared in response to Crescentius between 1244-60, but which was actually 
composed around 1311.140 
 In collating these stories, the Compilation re-interprets them through the lens of 
controversies that arose in the early fourteenth century between the so-called ‘Spirituals’, 
who insisted upon the strict, literal observance of the original rule, and those later dubbed 
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‘Conventuals’, who called for relaxations.141 Members of both parties—which eventually 
split—were accustomed to the organizational and educational structures that were firmly 
established by this time. However, they debated intensely the acceptance or even abuse of 
certain additional privileges, which were excessive even by the standard of established 
norms. For example, some friars had taken to receiving personal book donations, which held 
considerable monetary value.  
As part of a campaign to curb friars who sought to profit from their status as friars, 
pro-Spiritual writers waxed nostalgic about the order’s original purity and sought re-capture a 
pristine Francis. In keeping with their polemical purposes, they were prone to exaggerate 
some of the historical realities, such as Francis’ opposition to learning or 
institutionalization.142 This was not because they envisaged a future in which education and 
organisation would be abolished in the order, but for the rhetorical effect of emphasising the 
grossness of any abuses of the benefits that Franciscans had come to enjoy. The 
hagiographical material which emphasizes most strongly Francis’ rigidity regarding practical 
matters can be found in the later works already mentioned, including the Assisi Compilation 
and the Mirror of Perfection, as well as the work of the Spiritual leaders Ubertino of Casale 
and Angelo Clareno, in particular, the latter’s History of the Seven Tribulations of the Order 
of Brothers Minor.143  
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Although Sabatier did not know the Compilation, or for that matter, the Anonymous, 
his belief about the early authorship of the Mirror led him to conclude that the divisions it 
describes belonged to the time around and immediately following the life of Francis himself. 
As Neslihan Senocak has illustrated, Sabatier therefore instigated a tendency retrospectively 
to read Celano and other early texts in the light of the fourteenth-century controversies.144 
Thus, scholars like Moorman and Nimmo have since portrayed early Franciscan efforts to 
structure and educate the order as perversions of its original mission.  
For his part, Dalarun stresses that the philological questions relating to the early 
biographies of Francis have all now been answered. The dates of these texts have been 
confirmed. Thus, the Franciscan Question regarding the earliest and most reliable version of 
those texts has been resolved. As a result, it is now possible clearly to differentiate—as 
Senocak has done recently—between the historical situation of the friars in the thirteenth 
versus the fourteenth centuries. While earlier Franciscans did inquire how best to observe the 
rule in its qualified form, they did not encounter the level of abuse—or extreme reactions 
against abuses—that began to emerge after their lifetime. For this reason, the biographies 
written during this period are not designed to counteract those abuses.  
The most significant among these were of course the lives of Francis by Thomas of 
Celano, which were sanctioned by the order, and in at least one case, the papacy, and upon 
which all other reliable lives at the time were built. These lives along with all others in 
existence by that point were however ordered to be destroyed by the general chapter of Pisa 
in 1266. This mandate followed on from the previous chapter at Norbonne in 1260, where the 
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then Minister General Bonaventure was commissioned to write an official life of Francis that 
would replace all prior legendae, a task Bonaventure completed between 1262-3.145  
Ultimately, it remains something of a mystery as to why the order would request a 
new legend from Bonaventure, let alone destroy all the others.146 Yet the reasons that can be 
marshalled do not necessarily imply that there was something in the Celano biographies that 
was deemed necessary to erase from the institutional memory of the order. Indeed, one likely 
motivation for the new legend was simply to provide a more consistent picture of Francis and 
his way of life than can be inferred from the many different versions that now existed. As 
noted previously, every church and friary produced a different choral legend by which to 
remember Francis or celebrate his feast day.  
The vast number of lives that resulted does not even include the writings, songs, or 
poems that were written under less official circumstances, many of which were far removed 
from the ethos of the order itself and so inevitably obscured the truth about Francis. As the 
number of inconsistent lives proliferated, the order seemingly needed to gain control on the 
portrait of Francis that circulated around the brotherhood, and indeed around the world. There 
was also an urgent need for a unified picture of Francis in the face of the charges levelled 
against the friars by the seculars, which were described in the previous chapter. Thus, the 
mandate to destroy all existing lives to which the Celano lives also tragically fell victim.  
In producing a more unified portrait of the founder, however, Bonaventure relied 
heavily on the biographies that were officially sanctioned by the order. Most of his material 
derives from Celano 1, which he synthesizes with the other Celano biographies, and to a 
lesser extent, Julian of Speyer’s rendition of this text. In addition to his Major Legend, which 
was to be read during meals, he wrote a Minor Legend for liturgical celebrations, that is, for 
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reading during the recitation of the office in the choir, or the area near the altar in a church. 
Considering Bonaventure’s sources, the obliteration of the Celano legends cannot be taken to 
suggest that Franciscans regarded them as dubious. Rather, it reflects the perceived need for 
unity and order in the depiction of Francis, and a rather extreme approach to achieving it.  
With that established, we can turn at last to the discussion of the Celano lives 
themselves. As the officially commissioned lives of the order and those upon which many 
other major lives are based, these texts are arguably the most relevant and reliable for an 
attempt to reconstruct the perception of Francis that prevailed during the period of the 
Summa’s authorship. For the sake of painting the most coherent picture possible of the 
general perception of Francis across the period in question, I will integrate my account of the 
three Celano lives below, bearing in mind the key differences between them that have been 
highlighted above. 
 
Thomas of Celano’s Biographies of Francis  
 
Like many accounts of saints’ lives, the lives of Celano start out with a description of 
the relatively decadent life Francis led before his conversion, as the son of a comparatively 
wealthy cloth merchant. A series of supernatural encounters and a serious illness led him to 
call his former way of life into question. One particularly significant experience which 
Celano describes as crucial to Francis’ conversion probably occurred some time in 1206, 
when Francis was riding near Assisi and encountered a leper on the road.  
Although he naturally abhorred lepers, Francis was overwhelmed by compassion for 
the suffering of his fellow man, whom he suddenly recognized as his equal. Thus, he 
dismounted from his horse and kissed the leper. On turning to mount his horse again, Francis 
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looked around and realized the leper had miraculously disappeared.147 In his Testament, 
Francis himself cites this experience as a turning point in his life, after which he was 
governed by a concern not only to serve the poor and downtrodden but even to identify with 
them in their poverty by giving up his own possessions. 
As he sought direction on his new spiritual journey, Francis went frequently to pray at 
the ruined church of St Damiano outside Assisi. While praying one day, he suddenly heard 
the crucifix above the altar command him to ‘go and rebuild the ruined house of God’ three 
times. ‘From then on,’ Celano writes, ‘he could not hold back his tears, even weeping loudly 
over the Passion of Christ, as if it were constantly before his eyes.’148 Thus, Celano tells a 
further story of a time when Francis randomly opened a Bible and landed directly on the 
story of the passion. When he opened the book time and again, it automatically turned to the 
same place. To Francis’ mind, this was a sign of his calling to a life of identification with 
Christ’s passion or suffering, which was a source of life to others.   
While Francis initially took the mandate of the crucifix literally, and began physically 
to reconstruct the church at St Damiano, he later heard a sermon at the Chapel of Santa Maria 
degli Angeli, also called the Portiuncula, which changed his direction.149 The sermon about 
Matthew 10:7-10, where Jesus calls his disciples to preach the gospel, and take nothing with 
them, finally solidified Francis’ mission, which was thereafter to live in complete poverty, 
humility, and simplicity, out of literal obedience to the words and example of Christ. As the 
condition for joining his order, consequently, Francis required would-be friars to renounce all 
possessions—with the exception of a tunic and a breviary—and give them to the poor.150 
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In the early days of the order’s existence, Francis and his followers wandered around 
Umbria, working for food and shelter wherever they could and preaching repentance as they 
went along. This lifestyle was consistent with Francis’ commitment to a type of poverty that 
did not simply involve the relinquishment of personal property, as in the case of other 
religious orders of the past, but also the renouncement of communal property, down to food 
provisions, that would be held by the brotherhood from day to day. When their number 
reached that of Christ’s brotherhood, namely, twelve, Francis and his brothers determined to 
clarify their role as servants of the church. With the help of the Bishop of Assisi, they 
received an audience with Pope Innocent III, who eventually sanctioned Francis’ simple 
rule.151 In keeping with this rule, Celano recounts, Francis’  
 
Chief object of concern was to live free from all things that are in the world, so that 
his inner serenity would not be disturbed even for a moment by contact with any of its 
dust. He made himself insensible to all outside noise, gathering his external senses 
into his inner being, and checking the impetus of his spirit, he emptied himself for 
God alone.152 
 
In this regard, Francis showed complete contempt for his own body, at least insofar as 
it was inclined to sin, referring to it as an enemy or ‘Brother Ass’153, the source of desires that 
could only become inordinate and distract him from God. To curb such desires, he refused all 
comforts, even when he was ill.154 As a result of directing ‘toward heaven his notable spirit, 
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which desired only to be dissolved and be with Christ,’155 ‘his spirit dominated the flesh 
which willingly followed him in all that he had done.’156 Thus, Celano writes that Francis 
was characterized by complete purity of heart or singularity of will and desire.157  
Although he despised the temptations of the body and worldly goods, Francis 
paradoxically exhibited a profound appreciation for nature. In every work of the divine Artist, 
Celano states, Francis  
 
Praises the Artist; whatever he discovers in creatures, he guides to the Creator. He 
rejoices in all the works of the Lord’s hands, and through their delightful display he 
gazes on their life-giving reason and cause. In beautiful things, he discerns Beauty 
Itself; all good things cry out to him: ‘the One who made us is the Best.’ Following 
the footprints imprinted on creatures, he follows his Beloved everywhere. Out of them 
all he makes for himself a ladder by which he might reach the Throne.158 
 
‘Due to the special love of the Creator with which he loved all creatures,’159 Francis  
 
preached to the flowers, forests, trees, and stones as if they were capable of reason. 
Crops and vines, the splendours of the field, plans of the garden, earth and fire, air 
and wind, he reminded them all with the sincerest purity to love the divine and urged 
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their willing service. Finally on account of their single principle [God] he called all 
creatures by a fraternal name.160 
 
Whether animate or inanimate, consequently, Francis addressed all beings by the 
name of ‘brother’ or ‘sister’.161 By virtue of being God’s creatures, Francis insisted, these 
beings share equally in a ‘single principle’162 and thus a ‘universal fraternity’163 that renders 
every one no matter how lowly a distinct reflection of the divine that is worthy of our utmost 
care and respect. In their own turn, Celano relates that creatures responded to Francis in 
remarkable ways.164 Indeed, ‘wild beasts recognized the affection of blessed Francis’ piety 
towards them as if they enjoyed reason.’165 On one famous occasion, for instance, Francis ran 
eagerly towards a flock of birds, which to his surprise did not fly away, but patiently listened 
to his sermon, which commended them to glorify their creator.166  
Although Francis showed great compassion for the lowliest of creatures, Celano 
emphasises that ‘the charity of Christ made him more than a brother to those marked with the 
image of the Creator,’167 namely, other human beings. In light of Christ’s death on the cross 
for humankind, Francis considered it his absolute priority to live a comparable life of 
complete self-sacrifice for the benefit of the those human beings who were most in need of 
Christ’s love. While Francis showed no favouritism, insisting that God loves the poor as 
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much as the rich, Celano states that he nonetheless loved the souls that loved Christ with a 
special love.  
That is why he so admired the doctors of sacred theology, whom he saw as sharing 
one office with him.168 Even so, Francis taught that great clerics must on some level abandon 
their learning in order to enter his order, as possessions of all kinds conflict with the humility 
through which Christ is most effectively imitated.169 At very least, he insisted in Celano 2 
that charity always take priority over study, such that any study should be ordered to facilitate 
a spirit of prayer and devotion. As Bert Roest notes, the internal evidence consistently 
suggests that Francis—who likely enjoyed a basic level of education himself—was not 
opposed to learning in principle, but simply urged his friars not to love studies for their own 
sake but for the sake of wisdom.170  
In this connection, Celano 2 states that Francis ‘taught that in books, the testimony of 
the Lord, not value, should be sought, and edification rather than elegance. Nevertheless, he 
wanted few books kept, and these were to be available to the brothers who needed them.’171 
Similarly, he insisted that the friars live in simple places, without much by way of furniture. 
He was even known to tear down houses that he considered too lavish for the friars.172 The 
friars were further permitted to own only one garment, and Francis himself was known for 
the way he often gave his own robe away or tore it in two for the sake of clothing one poorer 
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than himself.173 In addition, the friars were not allowed to hold ecclesial offices.174 Above all, 
Francis barred them from accepting money, to the extent that he would severely chastise 
those who even touched it.175 As Celano summarizes, Francis longed for poverty in all 
respects with all his heart, as it was especially dear to the Son of God, who gave up 
everything for the benefit of his creatures.  
 Because the saint was free from cares for worldly things, and because he had brought 
his bodily desires into subjection, his mind was pure and free to consider heavily things.176 
Indeed, Francis ‘was often suspended in such sweetness of contemplation that he was carried 
away above himself and experienced things beyond human understanding.’177 Thus, ‘through 
unceasing prayer and frequently contemplation, he reached intimacy with God in an 
indescribable way.’178 As Celano elaborates: 
  
He sought this [intimacy] diligently and devoutly and longed to know in what manner, 
in what way, and with what desire he would be able to cling more perfectly to the Lord 
God according to his counsel and the good pleasure of his will. This was always is 
highest philosophy. This was the highest desire that always burned in him as long as he 
lived.179 
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 Through intimacy God, Francis gained access to the source of all knowledge and 
wisdom. As Celano writes: 
  
Although this blessed man was not educated in scholarly disciplines, still he learned 
from God wisdom from above, and, enlightened by the splendours of eternal light, he 
understood Scripture deeply. His genius, pure and unstained, penetrated hidden 
mysteries. Where the knowledge of teachers is outside, the passion of the lover 
entered.180  
 
Because of the love that connected him to the wisdom of God, Celano elaborates that 
Francis was capable of prophesying what would happen to others and of knowing their 
thoughts.181 He was able to explain difficult questions to doctors of sacred theology—
including Dominicans—to bishops, and cardinals, and even the pope, who sought him out for 
his wisdom and bold preaching.182 On account of his intuitive connection with God, 
moreover, he never needed to think in advance about what he would preach or say to an 
audience. ‘Sometimes he prepared for his talk with some meditation, but once the people 
gathered he could not remember what he had meditated about and had nothing to say.’183 Nor 
did he have to read even Scripture regularly. Once he read a passage, it was burned onto his 
heart.  
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Thus, ‘his memory took the place of books.’184 His prayers for others were immediately 
fulfilled, and his words were so powerful that even their second-hand communication could 
move an audience.185 Because of his deep love for God, in summary, Francis enjoyed a direct 
‘line’ to God that rendered him a multi-faceted mouthpiece of the divine. By Francis’ own 
testimony, this line came through identification with the poor, crucified Christ who 
impoverished or sacrificed himself completely for the good of humanity.186 Because of the 
connection with God through Christ that Francis maintained throughout his life, he was 
ultimately rewarded with an experience of union with God, just two years before his death. 
This experience followed his famous vision of the enflamed six-winged seraph nailed 
to a cross, which occurred during a period of intense prayer on Mt Alverna, a place of retreat 
that had been donated to the friars. While one pair of the seraph’s wings extended above his 
head, two stretched outwards, and two were wrapped around the seraph’s body.187 As the 
order of angels that represent the love of God, the seraphim come closest to God, whose most 
fundamental feature is Love itself. Thus, the wings arguably represent the means through 
which the visionary like Francis might achieve seraphic proximity to and even union with 
God. These means might be supposed to include the knowledge of God, the surrounding 
world, and the self and all it knows, which are represented by the three pairs of wings.  
As Francis’ seraphic vision illustrates, however, such forms of knowing serve as means 
through which God manifests his love only to those who are filled with the all-consuming 
love of God—symbolized by the fiery appearance of the seraph—that was expressed most 
fully in Christ’s sacrifice on the cross. Thus, Francis was rewarded for his devotion to and 
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emulation of the crucified Christ, through which he acquired such profound understanding 
not only of God himself but also of all things, by the ultimate opportunity to encounter divine 
Love itself. After this vision, which, in Celano’s words, provides ‘evidence of the grandeur of 
a special love’,188 Francis was marked with the five stigmata or marks of Christ’s 
suffering.189  
These confirmed his perfect conformity to the passion of Christ, which culminated in 
his cross, the ultimate symbol of the Lord’s willingness to suffer and sacrifice himself for the 
good of his creation.190 Following his stigmatization at Alverna, Francis became increasingly 
ill and within two years had died. At the point of his death, Celano tells us, the nails of the 
cross actually appeared in his hands and feet, while blood poured from his side.191 The signs 
of martyrdom for which Francis had always longed finally appeared. Far from any ordinary 
martyrdom, however, that of Francis rendered him an alter Christus,   ‘who reflects the 
image of the One, co-equal with the Father…who cleanses us all from sin.’192 After the 
example of both Christ and Francis, consequently, Celano exhorts his readers to exhibit pure 
intentions in all things, seeking to please God alone in everything through upright actions.193 
 
Conclusion 
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Thus concludes Celano’s account of Francis’ life, which, together with Francis’ own 
writings, provides a basis for understanding the picture of Francis’ person, vision, and values 
that was prevalent at the time of the Summa’s authorship. In elucidating the historiography of 
these biographies, as well as the Franciscan Rule and Testament, I have sought to clarify that 
Francis’ rather ambivalent statements about learning partly reflect the fact that scholarly 
activities were not originally part of his vision. They do not imply that such activities were 
inconsistent with that vision in the last analysis. To the contrary, the study of the context of 
early Franciscan thought undertaken above illuminates how scholarship emerged relatively 
naturally in the early thirteenth century as a key component of achieving Franciscan 
perfection.  
The chief product of that scholarship in this period was of course the Summa Halensis, 
which can as such be interpreted as a legitimate and crucial undertaking in relation to the 
overall mission of the Franciscan order. In specific, it represents a concerted and collective 
effort to forge a distinct theological and philosophical identity, which was aligned with 
Franciscan principles and values. This scholarly identity afforded the Franciscans a resource 
for training new generations of Franciscan novices. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
importantly, it provided an intellectual basis for their participation in the life of the 
university, where diverse renderings of theological and philosophical topics were constantly 
debated.  
By founding an intellectual tradition in the Summa, in summary, Franciscans proved 
themselves capable of functioning at the highest eschelons of the intelligencia, albeit in a way 
that was true to their own characteristic vision and values. In the chapters that follow, I will 
explore possible correlations between that vision and those values and early Franciscan 
thought, in particular, the ideas developed in the Summa Halensis. First, however, I will 
proceed in the next chapter to evaluate one of the main resources the Halensian Summists 
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employed in the development of their intellectual system, that is, the work of the Arab 
scholar Avicenna.  
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3. THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT  
 
In many accounts of Western intellectual history, the emergence of scholasticism is 
closely associated with the recovery of Aristotle’s major philosophical works, which had 
been unavailable in the West in the earlier middle ages.194 Actually, Alexander of Hales and 
the Halensian Summists have often been hailed as the first to incorporate Aristotle, though 
these claims have not really been substantiated by textual research. The purpose of this 
chapter is to demonstrate that Aristotle was far from the only or even the most predominant 
philosophical influence during the great Latin translation movement, which spanned the 
century between 1150-1250.195  
In addition to Aristotle, this movement saw many works by Arabic scholars translated 
into Latin. My account of these translations immediately below will reveal the extent to 
which the Islamic scholar Avicenna in particular influenced early Franciscan thought and 
indeed the school’s reading of Aristotle. In order to identify the areas of Avicenna’s influence 
over the course of the book’s chapters, I will provide a description of the key aspects of his 
thought that were studied at the time. In closing, I will revisit the thesis, initially proposed by 
the great medieval scholar Etienne Gilson, that the early Franciscan adoption of Avicenna 
was vital to the school’s project of systematizing Augustine. 
 
The Translation Movement  
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 Over the course of the eleventh century, all the major works of Aristotle became 
readily available through a series of religious Crusades, which saw the West recapture some 
key Islamic political and intellectual strongholds, in particular Sicily, Italy, and Toledo, 
Spain.196 In the same instance, Western thinkers came into contact with a wealth of material 
by Arabic scholars, whose Classical Age began around the eighth century, and who were 
therefore more experienced at engaging with Aristotle’s work. Most importantly, Latin 
scholars gained access to the major writings of Avicenna (d. 1037), who was the most prolific 
and prominent Islamic philosopher and theologian known in the West at the time. Although 
Avicenna is sometimes described as a ‘commentator’ on Aristotle, this term needs to be 
carefully qualified.197  
 Admittedly, Avicenna framed many of his theories with reference to Aristotelian 
arguments. He even named the major treatises in his massive Book of the Cure after works by 
Aristotle, such as De anima, Physics, and Metaphysics, none of which were incidentally 
named by Aristotle himself. Nevertheless, Avicenna developed an approach to these topics 
that is markedly original, and in many cases opposed to the plain reading of Aristotle’s texts. 
With good reason, therefore, Latin thinkers regarded Avicenna as a primary source in his 
own right and as a philosopher as worthy as esteem as Aristotle himself. This is confirmed by 
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the fact that Avicenna’s writings are never found together with Aristotle’s in the medieval 
manuscript tradition, as would normally be the case with mere commentaries.198  
Between 1152-66, Toledo-based scholars led by Dominicus Gundisalvi or 
Gundissalinus produced a highly influential Latin translation of the doctrinal core of 
Avicenna’s Book of the Cure (al-Shifa), in particular, its tractates titled, De anima, 
Metaphysics, and Physics (I-III, 1).199 Gundissalinus also produced a number of his own 
works which compiled ideas from Avicenna, first and foremost, as well as thinkers like the 
Spanish Jew Costa Ben Luca and the Arab Christian Avicebron, thereby mediating the work 
of these thinkers to the Latin West.200 According to Amos Bertolacci, a pioneer of scholarly 
inquiry into the Latin reception of Avicenna, ‘the translators of the Sifa intended to provide 
Western scholars with a commentary on Aristotle’s works.’201 This was not a commentary in 
the strict sense, but a sort of expert guide to the same philosophical matters Aristotle himself 
considered. Through these translations, early scholastic thinkers came into possession of 
those of Avicenna’s writings that were relevant to work in theology and philosophy.  
In contrast, Aristotle’s major writings were introduced to the West in fits and starts. 
By 1160, James of Venice, a man of Greek origin, had translated Aristotle’s De anima and 
Physics.202 But his Nicomachean Ethics circulated in multiple and mostly partial forms prior 
to Robert Grosseteste’s translation in 1240-3, as did his Metaphysics, at least before the early 
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thirteenth century.203 By 1210, in fact, two Latin versions of the latter text were available: the 
so-called Metaphysica vetusissima by James of Venice included up to chapter four of book 
four. The second, anonymous translation—or Anonyma sive Media—probably produced in 
the late twelfth century, included the first eleven of the twelve books in total, though it did 
not start to be circulated widely until the mid-thirteenth century.204  
In his periodization of Avicenna’s reception, Bertolacci observes that Avicenna’s 
major works, not least his Metaphysics, were simply taken as substitutes for those of Aristotle 
in the late twelfth century. Possibly, they were even circulated under Aristotle’s name.205 The 
situation did not change dramatically, however, when the Aristotelian works like Metaphysics 
and De anima that were most relevant to scholastic inquiry became readily available in the 
thirteenth century. While Aristotle’s works were now regarded as the main texts on 
philosophical matters, Avicenna nonetheless continued to offer a ‘privileged way of access to 
Aristotle’s work and its main tool of interpretation.’206  
For this reason, figures like Robert Grosseteste, William of Auvergne, Roland of 
Cremona, Roger Bacon, and the Halensian Summists tended to read Aristotle through the lens 
of Avicenna. In some cases, they simply cited Aristotle when actually quoting Avicenna.207 
As Lesley Smith confirms, ‘a citation of Aristotle might mean either a genuine text or an 
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opinion of Avicenna or even a pseudonymous work’ in this period.’208 There are a number of 
possible reasons for the ongoing dependence on Avicenna over Aristotle in what Bertolacci 
identified as the second phase in Avicenna’s reception, which was marked by the joint 
consideration of Aristotelian and Avicennian works.  
In the first place, we have seen, Avicenna had been introduced and subsequently 
interpreted in the second half of the twelfth century as the key to interpreting Aristotle, or 
even as a substitute for Aristotle. Although Aristotle’s personal works eventually came to the 
fore of scholarly discussion, the reluctance to engage with them apart from intermediaries 
proved difficult to discard. As Etienne Gilson notes in his discussion of Alexander of Hales: 
‘his work seems to belong to a time when no collective theological effort was yet being made 
in order to assimilate the newly discovered Aristotelian world’.209 
Among the many hindrances to reading Aristotle in this period was the lack of a 
consistent and totally correct translation of the Aristotelian corpus. As is well known, Latin 
scholars in the late middle ages did not generally have a high level of proficiency in Greek—
and in most cases, they had no knowledge of it at all—owing partly to severed ties with 
Byzantium in 1054. Although the widespread ignorance of Greek may not have impacted on 
the quality of the translations that specialists produced, it undermined at very least the general 
scholarly ability to gauge that quality with confidence. Thus, Roger Bacon believed that 
‘unspecified flaws in the Latin versions of Aristotle gave him license to attribute to Aristotle 
any doctrine which he felt that the philosopher must have taught.’210  
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By contrast, the Latin translations from Arabic were produced by scholars who were 
highly conversant in Arabic. From at least the tenth century, Latins had travelled to Spain in 
order to study texts not otherwise available to them. Thus, a population of Arabic-speaking 
Christians grew up in Muslim territories over time. When these fell to the West in 1185 
through the Crusades, consequently, there was already a body of indigenous experts available 
to make translations into Latin. The result was a higher level of confidence in the Avicennian 
translations and a corresponding tendency to project Avicenna’s ideas on to Aristotle in one 
way or another. Such flagrant misreading of Aristotle was not altogether deliberate, however. 
For the understanding of Aristotle at the time was highly confused by the wide circulation of 
spurious works.211 In particular, the popular Liber de causis, translated by Gerard of Cremona 
in Toledo around 1170, was falsely attributed to Aristotle and was only recognized by 
Aquinas in 1268 as a Neo-Platonic amalgam of Proclus’ Elements of Theology.212  
The so-called Theology of Aristotle was in fact a ninth-century Arabic adaptation of 
Plotinus’ Enneads 4-6. Although it was not translated into Latin until 1519, it affected Latin 
thought nonetheless, insofar as Islamic scholars like Avicenna commented on it as part of the 
Aristotelian corpus and felt constrained because of it to reconcile Aristotle and Plotinus.213 
Another work that contributed to the confusion was the De spiritu et anima, which was 
commonly attributed to Augustine, above all, by early Franciscans like Alexander of Hales. 
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In a fascinating article on the topic, G. Théry shows that already before 1246, Albert the 
Great had rejected the notion in his Sentences Commentary and in other works that the text 
was by Augustine. He attributed it instead to a Cistercian called ‘William’.  
Although some of his later writings do attribute passages from the text to Augustine, 
this is not an indication that Albert changed his mind about the authorship. Rather, it reflects 
his awareness of the fact that there are some authentic extracts from Augustine within the 
work, which is ultimately a mis-mash of different sources, that is not itself the product of 
Augustine’s hand.214 As evidence of this, Albert noted that the text is not mentioned in 
Augustine’s famous Retractationes, where the Bishop reflects at the end of his life on 
everything he has written.215 This evidence would have been available to early Franciscans as 
well, which serves to suggest, as Théry insists, that they maintained the attribution of 
Augustine in spite of evidence to the contrary, in an effort to advance their own scholarly 
agenda.  
In many respects, early Franciscans were trying to reclaim the recently recovered 
works of Aristotle in a way that could be passed off as consistent with Augustine’s teachings. 
The De spiritu et anima, if it was by Augustine, formed the optimal link between his work 
and the Avicennian texts they wanted to use to interpret Aristotle.216 In response to the 
rejoinder that Albert and Thomas Aquinas also quote the De spiritu et anima, Théry points 
out that they do not do so affirmatively, but only in order to respond to their Franciscan 
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counterparts, who quote the text endlessly.217 Like his teacher, Aquinas rejected the 
Augustinian provenance of the text.  
As noted above, the contents of these and other works were quite compatible with 
Avicenna’s own outlook, which was ‘open to Neoplatonic accretions in psychology and 
metaphysics, despite its strong Aristotelian basis in logic and natural philosophy.’218 Indeed, 
Arabic-speaking scholars like Avicenna had long enjoyed access to the Neo-Platonic 
curriculum into which Aristotle had been incorporated between the third and sixth 
centuries.219 In this context, Aristotle’s writings were studied in preparation for reading Plato, 
with whom Aristotle was believed to be largely in agreement.220 As a result, Aristotle’s 
thought was skewed in a way that eventually became the common understanding of most 
Muslim authors. These authors, not least Avicenna, in turn passed their perception of 
Aristotle on to Latin scholars, who tended genuinely to believe that it was correct, even when 
it contradicted the obvious meaning of Aristotle’s own texts.221 Plato’s remained almost 
totally unavailable until the Renaissance. 
The broadly Neo-Platonic sympathies the scholastics had adopted by indirect means 
played an important role in their initial reception of Aristotle. By necessity, early thirteenth 
century scholars were adapting to the idea of basing their writings and debates around 
systematic theological themes and not only the Bible. Still, they hesitated to pursue natural or 
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philosophical explanations such as they found in Aristotle, which did not ultimately 
presuppose the authority of Scripture and the faith. In this context, the philosophy of 
Avicenna was appealing precisely because of its religious nature.222 As a Neoplatonist of 
sorts, he presented a sort of ‘top-down’ way of thinking in which all things come from, 
depend upon, and in turn reflect God, although his way of construing this top-down 
relationship was highly idiosyncratic.  
At another level, Avicenna provided a model that was lacking in the Christian 
tradition for the sort of comprehensive philosophical and theological work that was quickly 
becoming the chief ambition and hallmark of scholastic thought. In that sense, Avicenna gave 
Latin scholastics the tool they needed not only to systematize a way of thinking that was 
Augustinian in the loose sense of the term but also to pay lip service to the idea of 
appropriating philosophical inquiries and indeed Aristotle’s philosophy in a way that was 
compatible with and even advanced their efforts to attribute primacy to theological 
considerations.  
Although the habit of reading Aristotle in terms of Avicenna became common from 
the turn of the thirteenth century, it was hindered and complicated by the condemnation of 
Aristotle’s writings in 1210 and again in 1215, which prohibited lecturing albeit not private 
reading of Aristotle.223 These condemnations, in which Avicenna’s works were probably 
implicated, came into effect only at Paris, and were likely supported by the university 
theologians who were concerned about growing interest in Aristotle amongst members of the 
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arts faculty.224  
The sympathies underlying this opposition were deeply conservative. They had to do 
with the perceived threat Aristotelian thought posed to traditional Christian doctrines such as 
the Trinity and creation ex nihilo. On account of these concerns, there is very little evidence 
of direct engagement with Aristotle, even through Avicenna, around the time of the 
condemnations, for instance, in the works of Stephen Langton and contemporaries such as 
Peter Comestor, Godfrey of Poitiers, Robert de Courcon, and Peter the Chanter.225  
Rather quickly, however, circumstances changed dramatically. Even scholars like 
William of Auvergne (b. before 1290, d. 1249), Bishop of Paris from 1228-49, who was 
critical of Aristotle and Avicenna on topics like the eternity of the world and God’s freedom 
in creation, became attracted to Avicenna’s broader religious-philosophical perspective. 
William quickly recognized this as compatible in many respects with his own Christian 
worldview, which is developed most memorably in his Magisterium divinale et sapientale.226 
As works like this evidence, the actual opposition to Aristotle—or the number of those who 
believed his thought to be heretical—had quickly dissipated. Although lecturing on Aristotle 
and related works was forbidden, it is clear that theologians were reading these works from 
about 1220 onwards.227 When Pope Gregory IX renewed the condemnation in 1228, 
consequently, it largely fell on deaf ears. By 1231, therefore, Gregory revoked his ban, and 
the reading of Aristotle that was already happening began publicly to flourish.  
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Once again, however, this reading was deeply colored by the reading of Avicenna, at 
least until William of Moerbeke, a colleague of Thomas Aquinas, translated anew or revised 
earlier Aristotelian translations from the 1250-60s. The impetus behind this request was 
evidently the assumption that earlier Latin translations had been influenced by Averroes who 
was regarded at this time as the source of philosophical and theological errors that needed to 
be uprooted.  
After these translations appeared—and Thomas started to identify spurious works—
scholars began to engage with Aristotle on his own terms and to realize the stark contrast 
between his thought and that of Avicenna. Their efforts in this regard were helped 
considerably by Michael Scot’s translation of Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle in the 
1220s and 30s.228 These were commentaries in the strict sense of the term that were designed 
to facilitate, and encouraged, the close study of Aristotle. Although some of the first 
references—and there is only one—to ‘the commentator’ can be found in Philip the 
Chancellor, it evidently took some time, well into the 1240s, before Latin thinkers truly 
began to grasp his project, perhaps owing to their limited grasp of Aristotle.  
The Summa Halensis provides good evidence of this in that references to Averroes are 
relatively few and do not bear substantially on the Summa’s doctrinal positions.229 A 
particularly fascinating phenomenon regarding Averroes can be discerned in parts of Summa 
volume 2.1 which were added after 1255, when Averroes would have been much better 
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known.230 By this time, in fact, the title of ‘the Commentator’ had come to refer almost 
exclusively to Averroes, who was now regarded as the privileged interpreter of Aristotle’s 
works. In its own discussion, however, the Summa reserves this title for Maximus Confessor, 
whose commentary on Dionysius had been available since Eriugena translated it and was 
known to the earlier Summists.  
While one can only speculate about motives, the Franciscan use of the term 
‘commentator’ for anyone other than Averroes may serve to indicate an already brewing 
Franciscan disenchantment with Aristotle and especially an Averroestic reading or him, such 
as is expressed most powerfully in Bonanture’s Hexameron. Albeit subtly, the later added 
sections of the Summa offer a sort of referendum on the preoccupation with Aristotle that had 
come to dominate in the second half of the thirteenth century. For their part, the Franciscans 
forged their tradition in the quarter of the century, which was a time when scholars were 
released from the condemnations that dogged the first quarter, not to from the ignorance of 
Aristotle that plagued the twelfth, but continued to read him through a thoroughly Avicennian 
perspective.  
While many thinkers at the time drew heavily on the work of this Persian philosopher, 
the Franciscans were the most prominent school of thought to do so and did so most 
extensively. This would seem to suggest that there was something about his manner of 
thinking that resonated with their own scholarly charism. In short, there was a happy 
coincidence between the Franciscan intellectual identity and the thought of Avicenna. The 
philosopher’s influence, while apparent, is clearly less pervasive in the work of William of 
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Auvergne, whose attraction to Avicenna has already been mentioned; and it must be carefully 
qualified in the writings of the first great Dominican scholar, Albert the Great.231  
Although Albert quotes extensively from Avicenna, who remained the leading 
philosophical authority during Albert’s early career, he became increasingly preoccupied 
with his pioneering effort to make all of Aristotle’s works intelligible to the Christian world. 
As is well known, he began to do so under considerable opposition in Paris in the 1240s and 
continued his efforts in Germany in the 1250s and 60s in an increasingly hospitable 
intellectual environment.232 Further developing the approach of his master, Thomas Aquinas 
made limited and critical use of Avicenna, pursuing instead his affinity for Aristotle, which 
he often read through Averroistic lenses. In this regard, however, Thomas Aquinas proved 
exceptional. The wider trend in thirteenth-century theological scholarship, dominated by 
Franciscans, was to prefer the ‘pious’ Avicenna over the ‘atheist’ Averroes, even after the 
turn to Aristotle had occurred.233  
Eventually, the dichotomy became a major point of contention between the two 
parties. In fact, Aquinas paid dearly for his progressive proclivities, which were implicated in 
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the 1277 condemnation of Averroist Aristotelianism.234 In the meantime, the Franciscans and 
their sympathizers experienced a revival of explicit interest in Avicenna. Thus, it remains to 
consider the high points of Avicenna’s thought that were initially drawn into their tradition 
by the authors of the Halensian Summa, often without explicit acknowledgement, starting 
with his Metaphysics and then turning to his De anima.  
 
Avicenna’s Thought 
 
Metaphysics 
 
Avicenna’s Metaphysics turns on a fundamental distinction between necessary and 
possible being.235 What is necessary, on his account, is what actually exists.236 By contrast, 
what is possible or contingent merely possesses a potential to exist that can only be realized 
or rendered necessary through the causality of another.237 Although they cannot be found in 
the real world, such possible existents may exist in the mind—as when I imagine something 
that is not the case.238 First and foremost, however, they exist in what Avicenna calls the 
‘Giver of Forms’.239 While this Giver is effectively the sub-lunar world’s creator, Avicenna 
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does not equate it with God, on the ground that direct contact with diverse creatures would 
undermine divine unity. Instead, he locates the Giver as last in a series of celestial 
intelligences that emanate from God in a way that allows for increasing multiplicity, and 
ultimately, contact with material creation.240  
Notwithstanding its sub-divine nature, the Giver functions like the mind of God which 
contains the forms after which all finite things that do and could exist are modeled.241 In that 
sense, the conceptual content of the divine mind is infinite.242 In this connection, Avicenna 
elaborates that the forms in the mind of God subsist conceptually in the fully realized or 
totalized way that is proper to God himself. When a form is instantiated in the real world, 
consequently, it conforms completely to the divine model after which it is patterned. This 
conformity is brought about by the Giver, who bestows the property or perfection of 
existence to a given essence, causing it to subsist in reality—not merely conceptually—as he 
does in act. 
In affirming this shared mode of being, Avicenna upholds a univocal understanding of 
the relationship between creatures and the God who is ultimately responsible for creation.243 
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On his account, the difference between the two poles of being comes down to the fact that 
God is the one on whom all forms rely for their existence, while he relies upon none but 
himself for his own. Although both are immutable—and thus not subject to growth or 
development—Avicenna does not deny that creatures change. In order to explain how change 
occurs, he develops a version of substance dualism in which every being possesses two main 
substantial forms.  
The first is the form of a soul, whether vegetative, as in plants, sensitive, as in 
animals, or rational, as in human beings.244 This form predisposes the being in question to 
assume a second, bodily form, which Avicenna calls the ‘form of corporeality’. This form is 
derived from what Avicenna calls ‘prime matter,’245 which has yet to be formed into an 
actually existing being of a particular kind. Although prime matter does not exist in its own 
right unless it is joined to forms, it creates the necessary potential for their instantiation. As 
such, it underlies all created beings in a way that testifies to their interdependence and indeed 
to their dependence on the one that gave them being in the first place.  
On instantiation in prime matter, the substantial form of the soul becomes predisposed 
to assume forms of another sort, namely, accidental forms or properties, to do with quality, 
quantity, location, relation, and so on.246 Although these forms are not capable of existing 
independently of the subject in which they inhere, they nonetheless possess a sort of esse or 
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thing-hood in their own right. In that sense, accidental forms multiply the number of forms in 
any given subject, without proliferating subjects themselves. At any given time, a being is 
what it is by virtue of the unique ‘bundle’ of substantial and accidental forms that it 
possesses.  
Any change in the constitution of the bundle results from the coming or going of an 
accidental form, which transitions in the process from potential to actual or necessary 
existence. Although change on this showing might seem to precipitate constant shifts in 
identity, Avicenna insists that the soul preserves the unity of a being throughout 
reconfigurations of the constellation of accidental forms that attach to it at any given time. On 
the assumption that God alone is able to bestow the perfection of existence to a form or 
essence of any kind, Avicenna describes changes, no matter how minute, as instigated 
directly by God as efficient cause.247 Thus, he concludes that created beings merely represent 
the occasion for divine activity.248  
This understanding of change differs significantly from that of Aquinas, who 
advocates the unicity theory of form that can be found in Aristotle rather than the plurality 
theory of Avicenna.249 According to this theory, as Aquinas presents it, living beings possess 
only one form, namely, the soul. This form is not separate from that of the body but instead 
entails embodiment, apart from which the soul in his view has no means of self-expression. 
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For Aquinas, in fact, soul and body—form and matter—represent two inseparable aspects of 
one phenomenon, namely, a living being. When a form is instantiated on this account, it 
possesses an as-yet-unrealized potential to become a certain kind of being. Through change, 
this potential is actualized.  
In this connection, Aquinas allows that accidents contribute esse to beings, as that by 
which beings come to exist in new and improved states. However, these accidents are 
numerically identical to the subject in which they inhere and do not possess an esse or 
‘thinghood’ that multiplies the forms that constitute the composite itself.250 Here, 
consequently, the comings and goings of accidents do not signify a movement into being or 
non-being of forms that can only be imparted by God, as per the Avicennian theory. They 
only denote the natural development of the being into a fuller or more mature instance of a 
single substantial form. While God as the initial giver of form is indirectly responsible for 
this development, Aquinas denies that he is the direct agent of every creaturely activity. Such 
activities fall under the purview of creatures themselves, which enjoy a capacity for 
autonomous movement that is nonetheless attributable to divine gift. 
  
Psychology 
 
Avicenna’s metaphysics complements and is complemented by his psychology or 
theory of knowledge. Avicenna speaks of three levels or modes of knowledge that cooperate 
to facilitate human knowledge of the world. The first is sense perception, or the ‘external 
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sense’, which includes the abilities to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch.251 The second faculty 
is that the imagination, which entails five internal senses.252 The first of the internal senses is 
the common sense. The common sense receives all of the empirical data that is transferred to 
it from the five external senses.253 It apprehends the objects of those senses exactly as they 
have been perceived. On this score, Avicenna states that the common sense coordinates the 
different qualities or aspects of its object so as to render it a cohesive whole. Without it, 
Avicenna affirms that the mind would only be able to see the forms that comprise different 
objects individually. For example, it would see hardness, roughness, brownness, woodenness, 
and so on, instead of a tree. 
Although the common sense represents sense objects in a cohesive way, it is unable to 
do so past the moment of perception. Thus, the retentive imagination preserves the memory 
of sense objects after the external senses have lost contact with them. The images stored in 
the retentive imagination are transmitted to the compositive imagination in animals and the 
cogitative faculty in humans. This faculty makes it possible to separate the particular forms 
that constitute any given being, to recombine forms that have been separated, and formulate 
images of things that have not yet been experienced or that may not even exist. 
The next faculty of estimation assigns positive or negative connotations to the objects 
that have been apprehended. It identifies things as helpful or as dangerous, for instance, and 
thus transforms the images of objects into what Avicenna calls ‘intentions’. These intentions 
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 97 
enable a sheep, for example, to anticipate that a wolf on the horizon is dangerous and run for 
safety.254 According to Avicenna, an intention is the final product of external and internal 
sensation: the perfect image of an object that has been encountered through experience. 
Although the intention enables what Avicenna calls the ‘animal soul’ to consider objects 
independently of their material instantiations, he stresses that these objects are still known as 
particulars at this phase in the cognitive process.  
While the intention provides an essential basis for the process of abstracting 
universals that apply to all particulars of a kind, consequently, that process remains to be 
completed by those that possess a rational and not only an animal soul.255 To this end, 
intentions are stored in the fifth and final faculty associated with the internal senses – the 
memory – where they are made available to the rational soul. According to Avicenna, there 
are two ‘faces’ to the rational soul: a theoretical and a practical.256 The theoretical face is 
turned upwards toward the realm of universal forms, while the practical face is turned 
downwards. It uses the universals acquired by the theoretical faculty to deal with matters 
pertaining to bodily life. 
Although the theoretical intellect obtains from the memory the intentions – ultimately 
based on sense perceptions – that provide the material for its operations, Avicenna stresses 
that it does not require the body or any of the senses in order to perform its proper 
operations.257 Thus, the theoretical faculty is utterly disconnected from the body and could 
only be hindered by interference from the body. Any relation to the body can only be 
mentioned with reference to the practical faculty. This argument for a rather strong form of 
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mind-body dualism is further reinforced by the ‘flying man’ illustration that Avicenna 
introduces in the context of the De anima as well as elsewhere in his writings.258  
In presenting this thought experiment, which has been compared to Descartes’ famous 
cogito ergo sum (‘I think therefore I am’), Avicenna wonders if a man who was created 
flying in the air and who could not therefore feel his body would still affirm the existence of 
his rational soul. The philosopher insists that the ‘flying man’ would indeed do so, because 
his inability to feel his body has no bearing on and poses no hindrance to his ability to sense 
with his mind. In positing that the rational soul is effectively detachable from the body, 
Avicenna argues implicitly for the immortality of the soul, that is, for the mind’s ability to 
survive after the death of the body.259 
Following this discussion, Avicenna explains how the theoretical faculty abstracts 
universals.260 By his account, there are four intellects involved in abstraction, or better, four 
phases in the process of procuring an abstract concept.261 The first three create the potential 
for obtaining such a concept; as such, they constitute the ‘potential intellect’. The last is the 
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stage in which the abstract concept is actually acquired; for this reason, it is called the 
acquired intellect. The first intellect is called the material intellect (intellectus materialis). 
Avicenna likens it to the primitive intellectual state of human beings before they reach the 
age of reason, or more concretely, to the potential an infant has eventually to learn to write. 
When the soul reaches the age of reason, the material intellect receives what 
Avicenna calls ‘primary intelligibles’, which are analogous to the knowledge of the principles 
of writing, such as the letters of the alphabet or the proper use of writing instruments, which 
heighten the human person’s potential to write.262 The primary intelligible forms or innate 
concepts that are possessed by what is now called the habitual intellect (intellectus in habitu) 
correspond to certain properties that are ‘transcendental’ or common to all beings. First and 
foremost, and thus also ‘first known’ (primum cognitum) among these is the property of 
being or ‘existence’, which is in Avicenna’s account the very subject of metaphysics.263 After 
all, existence is the one property that is common to all states and sensible objects of our 
experience.264  
This property is determined by two others, namely, ‘thing’ and ‘necessary’. These 
respectively denote what a thing is, or its ‘essence’ and that it actually possesses the property 
of ‘existence’. In some passages, Avicenna also mentions ‘one’ as a property, which further 
highlights that any given thing is what it is in virtue of being one thing as distinct from 
another.265 In enumerating these transcendental properties of all beings, it has been argued 
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that Avicenna gave metaphysics or ‘first philosophy a new and comprehensive structure.’266 
That is not to say that his transcendental thinking was altogether unprecedented. As Jan 
Aertsen observes in his study of the transcendentals in the Middle Ages, ancient philosophers 
like Plato, Aristotle, and Boethius had also referred to transcendentals in terms of the most 
basic metaphysical principles that can be identified in all things.  
According to Plato, these principles ultimately reduce to the Form of the Good; for 
Aristotle and Boethius respectively, however, they are best likened to the convertible notions 
of ‘being’ and ‘one’ or ‘being’ and goodness’.267 Although such properties are attributable to 
all natural realities, many thinkers in antiquity and the Middle Ages further associated them 
with a transcendent or divine source of all reality. This is particularly true of Christian 
thinkers like Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius and Anselm, who respectively regarded 
transcendentals like goodness, beauty and truth as, first and foremost, names for God.  
While these thinkers gestured towards what Aertsen calls a ‘philosophy of the 
transcendent’, they nevertheless did not yet devise anything like Avicenna’s transcendental 
philosophy. This was distinguished by the substitution of being or existence for God, which 
was previously the main subject of metaphysics, a move that completely reconfigured the 
shape and goals of the discipline, as we will see in the section below on theology. With good 
reason, therefore Aertsen claims that Avicenna inaugurated a ‘second beginning of 
metaphysics’268  
The epistemological dimension of Avicenna’s doctrine was also wholly innovative. 
Whereas transcendentals previously performed an exclusively metaphysical function—as the 
most fundamental principles by which beings are what they are—we have seen that Avicenna 
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insisted on a correspondence between the orders of being and knowing. In his account, 
consequently, the transcendentals and especially Being—rather than empirical beings or even 
God—constitute the first objects of the intellect, which give the mind power to know beings.  
This doctrine of ‘first known’ concepts or ‘primary notions’ (prima intentiones, 
primae conceptionae, prima intelligibilia) simply cannot be found in Aristotle, even though 
the philosopher advocated the idea of ten categories of being.269 Without such primary 
notions as existence, essence, necessity, and unity, Avicenna insisted, there would be an 
infinite regress in our efforts thus to demonstrate the nature of the things we know, and 
certainty in knowledge would never be obtained. As this suggests, Avicenna saw the 
transcendentals, above all, being, as the essential basis for understanding one being as distinct 
from another. For him, in other words, they are not themselves the objects of knowledge or 
universal concepts that will result from abstraction, which Avicenna calls ‘secondary 
intelligibles’.270  
Instead, they serve as means or guides in the process of abstraction, which involves 
stripping an intention of all its particularizing features or material determinations (location, 
time, shape, and so on), so as to seize conceptual hold of the essence that is at the core of the 
intention. Through this process, the mind arrives at the bare reality behind the intention and 
thus grasps the abstract or disembodied concept that constitutes the secondary intelligible 
form: the universal concept.271 For this purpose, Avicenna insists that only one intention is 
needed. This is because created beings fully instantiate the models after which they are 
patterned. As a result, all that is required to perceive the ‘thing in itself’ is to remove the 
attachments that obscure what it is as a bare being.  
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Whenever the mind perceives the thing in itself in this way, Avicenna affirms that it 
makes contact with the essence as it subsists in the Giver of Forms. In this context, the Giver 
goes by the name of the ‘Active Intellect’, which is the one and only intellect that is always in 
act and thus constantly knows all things as they are.272 According to many scholars of 
Avicenna, the mind makes a connection with the Active Intellect not so much because it 
actively formulates its own concepts but simply because it rids itself of the material 
distractions that inhibit its ability passively to receive knowledge of things in their 
disembodied or completely abstract form, that is, in the form in which the Active Intellect 
always knows them.273  
What is proper to human beings on this account is merely the tripartite passive 
intellect. The only time the human mind can rightly be called active is when it gets in touch 
with the Active Intellect by purging itself of the material distractions that prevent it from 
making that connection in the first place. In that sense, human beings are not the agents of 
their own cognitive acts but merely represent the occasion for the divine cognition. Strictly 
speaking, they do not possess individualized active intellects but are guided towards 
knowledge by the Active Intellect itself, working through the primary intelligibles in what is 
at best a cooperative effort or shared concursus.  
In his work on Avicenna’s De anima, Dag Hasse takes issue with this common 
interpretation of Avicenna on abstraction, stressing that intellectual forms are derived from 
imagined forms, or intentions, which are squarely of the mind’s own making.274 These 
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imagined forms already go a long way towards disposing the soul to receive the intellectual 
forms that emanate from the Active Intellect. The Active Intellect merely serves as a medium 
for the mind’s attainment of a thought constructed largely of its own accord. Thus, it is 
incorrect in his opinion to say that the human mind does not engage in abstraction.  
In concluding this discussion of abstraction, it is worth noting some key ways in 
which Avicenna parts ways with Aristotle’s work on this topic. As is well known, Aristotle 
considered it to be axiomatic that all knowledge begins with the senses. In his account, the 
imagination makes images (phantasmata or sense species) of its empirical objects, which are 
stored in the passive intellect.275 This intellect is so called because the mind does not usually 
have much control over the experiences that come to it from the outside, which will end up 
being its resources for intellectual cognition.  
The knowledge of a singular entity described above is contrasted with the act in 
which the agent intellect infers a universal concept or intelligible species on the basis of 
multiple images of related things. The intelligible species – an idea or universal – is stored in 
the possible intellect or memory, where it can be drawn upon in future efforts to make sense 
of new experiences. Through new experiences, conversely, the mind expands and revises the 
original species.  
So construed, abstraction is an on-going process of forming and reforming ideas on 
the basis of many different experiences. On this showing, consequently the senses and the 
intellect remain in constant communication, albeit through the mediation of the imagination. 
Here, there is no hint of the dualism that characterizes the account of Avicenna. In defining 
abstraction as the event by which the human mind receives the disembodied form of an object 
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from above rather than formulating it through the operations of human reason, Avicenna 
completely redefines the Aristotelian idea of abstraction.276  
The abstract concept as Avicenna understands it is ultimately preserved by the 
effective intellect (intellectus in effectu), which is the third of the potential intellects and thus 
technically prior to the fourth and active intellect. The philosopher likens the effective 
intellect to the state of one who has learned to write and has written in the past but is not 
presently doing so. Although the secondary intelligible idea itself is not retained, the 
connection to the divine that is needed to access it is. Thus, the mind can automatically re-
make the connection whenever it pleases, as opposed to going through the whole process of 
acquiring the abstract concept again. Here, Avicenna observes that knowing is analogous to 
sight, because we stop seeing an object when it disappears, but see it again whenever it is 
brought anew to our attention. 
For many, the process of connecting with and receiving from the Active Intellect is 
laborious and lengthy; it requires a great deal of practice and instruction. For those who 
possess what Avicenna calls the ‘sacred intellect’, however, it is a virtually effortless.277 The 
sacred intellect—the highest form of prophet-hood—allows those who possess it to bypass 
the phases of potency in knowledge and maintain an almost constant connection with the 
Active Intellect, which affords immediate insight into the meaning of all things. According to 
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Avicenna, this capacity for intuition can be either inborn or enhanced throughout life through 
rites of purification like prayer.  
In addition to this prophetic power, Avicenna mentions two others that are of 
interest.278 The first is based in the imaginative faculty, which separates and combines sense 
data. In some persons, this faculty is so powerful—and the soul’s connection with the divine 
so strong—that it is capable of producing visible and audible apparitions during waking life, 
as when Francis of Assisi witnessed the crucifix above the alter at San Damiano chapel come 
alive and call him to rebuild the ruined house of God. Another form of prophesy Avicenna 
mentions is based in the power of the will, which through its close connection with higher 
principles and complete control over the impulses of its own body becomes capable of 
affecting external bodies and the surrounding environment through a sheer act of the will and 
without any physical contact. Those with this power may heal the sick from afar or, in the 
case of Francis, command a flock of birds to listen to a sermon. Although Avicenna does not 
seem to think a single person need possess all these three prophetic powers in order to 
possess any of them, the attainment of all three is certainly a possibility. 
 
Theology 
 
As mentioned above, Avicenna defines being or existence as the subject of 
metaphysics.279 In doing so, he parts ways with Aristotle and other Arabic scholars, 
especially the slightly later Averroes, who described God as the subject of metaphysics, a 
view later adopted by Thomas Aquinas. Avicenna objected to this position on the grounds 
that it implies that God’s existence is either presupposed in metaphysics and proven in a prior 
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science, namely, physics, or not proven at all. In his opinion, however, God’s existence 
cannot be demonstrated through physics, or cosmologically, since what is corporeal does not 
lead to a conclusion about an incorporeal cause of all existence; nor is it self-evident, since 
God is by definition unknowable.  
On this basis, Avicenna concludes that proof for God—while not the subject of 
metaphysics proper—is the object of its quest regarding the nature of being.280 To 
demonstrate this, he appeals to the modal metaphysics outlined above. In specific, Avicenna 
notes, there are clearly many things that are possible through themselves. After all, we see 
how many of them have been made necessary or actual through another in the real world. On 
his account, the whole or sum total of these actually existing things exists precisely through 
the beings themselves. As such, therefore, it cannot exist through itself. Instead, it must exist 
through another, which subsists outside the whole. Since all possible existents are included in 
this whole, the external entity in question cannot be possible in itself but rather something 
that exists necessarily, through itself.281 
This is how Avicenna proves the reality of the Necessary Existent.282Although he 
employs a common strategy for doing so throughout his many writings, scholars have noted 
that his most significant work, namely, the Book of the Cure, presents the argument in a 
rather disparate form, which must be pieced together from books I and VIII especially—the 
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books that deal in the most concerted manner with the question of the NE. Though reflection 
on things possible in themselves and necessary through another serves as the catalyst for 
inferring that there is a NE, Avicenna insists that his is not a cosmological argument but one 
that succeeds through the workings of the mind alone, independent of sense experience.283  
As shown above, his proof for a Necessary Existent simply extrapolates the 
implications of the innate ideas of necessity and existence. Because existence is included in 
the very definition of what it means to be the NE, Avicenna infers that we cannot not know 
that the NE exists.284 Naturally, we can think of things possible in themselves as not actually 
existing, or in terms of essence without existence; for example, there is nothing about 
humanness that demands instantiation in a specific human. However, Avicenna emphatically 
denies that the same is true of the NE precisely because its essence is to exist through itself. 
The only way to fail to appreciate the reality of the NE is to willfully reject the truth. 
In Avicenna’s account, the proof for a NE is at once a proof for a first efficient cause 
of creation.285 As we have seen, the first proof turns on showing that things possible and in 
themselves and necessary through another cannot ultimately explain their own existence. 
Only a necessary existent can do so. Apart from this being, there would be an infinite regress 
of causes that are possible in themselves but necessary through another—which is 
impossible.286 Thus, the chain of causes must ultimately terminate at the NE, on which the 
realization of all possible beings, whether corporeal or incorporeal, depends in the last 
analysis.  
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Avicennian and Franciscan Thought 
 
In a landmark series of articles, as well as in some of his major works, the leading 
medievalist Etienne Gilson called attention cursorily to Avicenna’s influence on early 
Franciscan thought.287 In particular, he argued that early Franciscans adopted a ‘doctrinal 
complex’ from Avicenna, which included the plurality theory of forms, and a top-down 
philosophy involving the doctrine of God as Agent intellect.288 With the exception of the 
latter, however, Gilson regarded the early Franciscan appropriation of Avicenna as part of, 
and highly conducive to, the broader effort to systematize Augustine.289 Thus, the story of 
Avicenna’s influence on the school has become part of a narrative that ultimately downplays 
its significance in the history of thought.  
In this light, it is no wonder that the early Franciscan reception of Avicenna has been 
largely neglected ever since. While scholars at times will gesture towards it, as in the case of 
Walter Principe’s multi-volume study of the hypostatic union in the early thirteenth century, 
they do not generally pursue any line of investigation that leads to clearer understanding of 
the precise ways in which early Franciscans were and were not influenced by Avicenna. The 
relevance of attending to the Avicennian background has been overlooked for another reason, 
namely, that early Franciscans including Bonaventure do not always cite Avicenna explicitly.  
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As the discussion above established, however, the lack of overt references does not 
necessarily signify the absence of any influence. For the Summists and their contemporaries 
exhibit a marked tendency to ascribe Avicennian views to Aristotle, Augustine, to say 
nothing of other authorities. For this reason, it will be one goal of some of the further 
chapters of this book to confirm the precise nature and extent of Avicenna’s influence, and its 
relationship to the many other sources of the Summa Halensis. In the process of doing this, it 
will become obvious from the sophisticated intellectual moves the Summists make that their 
Avicennian leanings do not simply generate a system inspired by Augustine. What the 
Summists place on offer ultimately amounts to far more than even the appropriation of 
Avicenna could have made possible, namely, a system of their own invention. 
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4. THEOLOGICAL VISION  
 
In addition to Arabic philosophers like Avicenna, Latin thinkers working in the late 
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries gained better access to Greek Christian authors like 
Pseudo-Dionysius and John of Damascus. The works of these authors laid a much stronger 
emphasis on the mystery and unknowability of God than can be found in the Western 
tradition dominated by Augustine, who argued along with other Latin Fathers like Hilary of 
Poitiers and Gregory the Great that God is present to the soul in a way that anticipates a 
direct vision of him in the life to come.290 In their eagerness to master new sources, Western 
scholars in the late twelfth century incorporated references to the inadequacy of human 
knowledge to God without always parsing their meaning sufficiently in terms of what can be 
positively known about God, whether now or in the life to come.291 
By the early thirteenth century, the question remained largely unanswered as to how 
exactly the mind can aspire to the vision of God in heaven in the way Peter Lombard for one 
continued to affirm.292 However, the problem did not come to a head until rising interest in 
Avicenna in the 1230s began to expose the inherent conflict between the cherished Western 
belief in a beatific vision and Greek negative theology, albeit a somewhat exaggerated 
version of it.293 As we have seen, Avicenna taught that the best we can achieve in terms of 
knowing God is a connection with the Active Intellect, which is not fully divine and by some 
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accounts is nothing but a supreme creature. The Aristotelian solution was no better insofar as 
it posited a union with the knower and the known that blurred the distinction between God 
and creatures, leading to a form of pantheism that had already been condemned in 1210.294  
In vastly under and over-underestimating the prospects of an ultimate beatific vision 
of God, these theories drew attention to the need for philosophical arguments explaining its 
possibility. In their quest to meet this need, scholars in this period such as William of 
Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, Guerric of St Quintin, and Hugh of St Cher all sought to 
clarify in some way how God is both known and unknown in the coming life.295 Their 
solutions respectively posited that we will see God ultimately only through a likeness, 
through intellectual creatures, under some other guise than his essence, or not at all.296 
Notwithstanding his initial proposal, William, then Bishop of Paris, ultimately recognized 
such solutions as unsatisfactory in terms of allowing a genuine encounter with God himself. 
As an impetus to resolve the matter conclusively, William formed a small theological 
commission, including Alexander of Hales, which condemned 10 propositions, the first of 
which rejected the claim that the divine essence will not be seen by human beings at any 
point.297 The actual focus of this condemnation, though not named, was likely John 
Chrysostom, whose homilies on the Gospel of John had been translated by Burgundio of Pisa 
                                                        
294 Bernard Blackenhorn, The Mystery of Union with God: Dionysian Mysticism in Albert the Great and Thomas 
Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 101-10.  
295 Simon Tugwell, Albert and Thomas, 51.  
296 Henri F. Dondaine, ‘L’objet et le ‘medium’ de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIIIe 
siècle,’ Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 19 (1952), 60-130.  
297 Marie-Dominique Chenu, ‘Le dernier avatar de la théologie orientale in Occident au XIIIe siècle,’ in 
Mélanges Auguste Pelzer: études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale de la scolastique médiévale offertes à 
Auguste Pelzer à l'occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversiare (Louvain: Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1947), 
159-81. 
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between 1171-3 and who advocated the condemned position most famously and most 
clearly.298 Following the condemnation, the authors of the Summa, among others, worked 
hard to counteract negative theology with positive claims about the knowability of God, 
which came to represent the linchpin of the Summa’s theological vision.  
In an introductory article on this topic, Augustine is by far the most quoted authority, 
with 75 quotations, 5 from pseudo-Augustinian works, and 34 to Augustine’s ep. 147, 
otherwise known as the ‘Book of the Vision of God’ (De videndo Dei), which contains what 
is possibly Augustine’s most significant and focused writing on the beatific vision. By 
invoking this text repeatedly, the Summa clearly situates itself on the side of the Western 
tradition that affirms the possibility of knowing God, not least in the life to come. When it 
comes to developing the contours of its account, however, the Summa ironically turns to 
Avicenna to resolve the problem to which the reading of his very work had given rise.  
As I will demonstrate in this chapter, Avicenna’s doctrine of the transcendentals 
offered the tools the Summists needed to explain how the soul knows God in this life in a 
way that anticipates the possibility of knowing God in the life to come. Although the 
Summa’s initial discussion makes much of its allegiance to Augustine, consequently, its 
substantial claims are presented in a completely innovative, Avicennian, and distinctly non-
Augustinian way that ultimately seems to lend itself to expressing the experience of Francis 
of knowing God and reality and to the affective and practical vision by which he lived. These 
aspects of this vision will be considered after the discussion of the transcendentals below.  
 
                                                        
298 György Geréby, ‘Hidden Themes in Fourteenth-Century Byzantine and Latin Theological debates: 
Monarchianism and Crypto-Dyophysitism,’ in Greeks, Latins and Intellectual History 1204-1500, ed. Martin 
Hinterburger and Chris Schabel (Leuven: Peeters, 2011), 195. See also Riccardo Saccenti, Un Nuovo lessico 
morale medieval: il contributo di Burgundio da Pisa (Aricca: Aracne, 2016).  
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A Transcendental Vision 
 
Although Avicenna provided the fundamental building blocks for the transcendental 
vision of the Halensian Summists, his insights did not come to them without an intermediary. 
The key figure in this respect was Philip the Chancellor, whose Summa de Bono codified a 
Christian version of the theory that influenced the Summists significantly.299 Though he 
preserved the primacy that Avicenna had attributed to being, Philip jettisoned the Persian 
philosopher’s account of ‘one’ and thing’ as the main qualities or first determinations of 
being and turned instead to Latin sources which identified them with unity, truth, and 
goodness. As he understands them, these three notions respectively account for the efficient, 
formal, and final causation of beings. In turn, this three-fold causality is traceable to God, and 
in specific, to the members of the Triune God, that is, the Father, Son and Spirit, 
respectively.300  
Thus, Philip subsequently elucidates the relations amongst these primary notions, 
insofar as they mimic the relations amongst the persons of the Godhead. Finally, he spells out 
their relation to the highest, divine, good, as well as that good’s relation to created goods. 
Here, Philip was undoubtedly motivated by a desire to refute the Cathar heresy, which 
posited a good God as the creator of spiritual being and an ‘evil’ God as the creator of 
                                                        
299 The first to point out Philip’s originality was Henri Pouillon, in ‘Le premier traitç des propriétiés 
transcendentales, La Summa de bono du Chancelier Philippe,’ Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 42 (1939), 
40-77. 
300 Antonella Fani, ‘Communissima, trascendentali e Trinità: da Filippo il Cancelliere alla prima scuola 
francescana,’ Il Santo: Rivista Francescana de storia dottrina arte 49:1 (2009), 131-54.  
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matter.301 Such dualism posed a considerable threat to orthodoxy at the time, and in 
particular, to the Christian notion that God created all things good. Thus, the rationale for 
Philip’s defence of the good in the Summa de bono and his larger efforts to construct a 
transcendental theory to ground his affirmation of goodness. 
Following predecessors who had engaged in transcendental thinking, Philip nowhere 
uses the term transcendens in his writings and instead refers to what he calls the common 
properties (communissima) or first intentions (primae intentiones) of beings. Nevertheless, he 
offered the first systematic account of the transcendentals in the Latin West and thereby laid 
the foundation for further scholastic work on this topic. As the first attempt at Christian 
transcendental theory, however, Philip’s ‘account bears the marks of a first draft; it is rather 
terse and sometimes little explicit.’302 Thus, it remained for later thinkers, above all, the 
authors of the Summa Halensis, to give a full-fledged account of the transcendental notions 
that Philip had codified.303  
The point of departure for the Summa’s discussion of the transcendentals is the 
epistemological dimension of Avicenna’s account. In this regard, the Summa unabashedly 
claims at the outset that ‘being is the first object of the intellect,’304 quoting Avicenna as its 
explicit source. This being, we will discover, is ultimately God.305 Whereas Avicenna 
                                                        
301 Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor to Francisco 
Suarez (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 112.  
302 Ibid., 128. 
303 The anonymous Tractatus de transcendentalibus entis conditionibus, ed. Dieter Halcour, in Franziskanische 
Studien 41 (1959), 41-106, was for a while attributed to Bonaventure but this authorship has proven uncertain. It 
seems to be an excerpt from the Summa Halensis, elaborated by a student of Alexander of Hales.  
304 SH Vol 1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C1, Respondeo II (n. 72), 113: Dicendum quod cum sit ens primum intelligibile eius 
intentio apud intellectum est nota (Avicenna, Meta I.6); cf. Vol 2.1, In1, S1, Q1, C2 (n. 2), 3. 
305 Vol. 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, C2, Ar2, Solutio (n. 352), 522: Deus sicut efficiens, primum 
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identified ‘one’ and ‘thing’ as the first determinations of being, however, the Summa takes up 
Philip’s notion that the transcendental properties of being primarily include unity, truth, and 
goodness. In the Summa, however, these properties do not merely characterize beings. They 
also count as innate concepts of the mind, which respectively make it possible to identify any 
given thing as one, or indivisible in itself and distinct from other beings; as true, or 
intelligible in terms of what it is; and good, or fit for a certain purpose.306 Thus, being is the 
most fundamental concept, from which unity, truth, and goodness subsequently unfold at 
decreasing levels of fundamentality.307 
In relation to the soul, the Summa elaborates, these basic concepts are respectively 
ordained to the memory, understanding, and the will—a psychological triad that the Summa 
derives from Augustine.308 While memory is the faculty that retains the picture of what a 
thing is as distinct from or related to others, intelligence is what perceives the truth, and the 
will is what loves or approves what is good.309 Together, the Summa contends, these three 
concepts form the image of God, and indeed, the Triune God, on the mind. They enable 
memory, understanding, and will, respectively to recognize the Father as the efficient or 
generating cause of unity, the Son as the formal or exemplar cause of truth, and the Spirit as 
the final or purpose-giving cause of goodness in beings. While non-rational beings are what 
the Summa describes as mere ‘vestiges’ of the Trinity insofar as they exhibit unity, truth and 
                                                        
eius nomen est ens. 
306 Vol 1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C2, Respondeo (n. 73), 114-5: The nature and relationship of unity, truth, and goodness; 
cf. Vol 1, Tr3, Q2, M1, C2, Respondeo (n. 88), 140.   
307 Vol 1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C2, IV (n. 73), 116. 
308 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr 1, S1, Qu3, T1, C5, Ar6, Solutio (n. 341), 414: Memory, understanding will; cf. Augustine, 
De Trinitate X. 
309 Vol 1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C2, Respondeo (n. 73), 114-5: Unity, truth, and goodness in the memory, understanding 
and will.  
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goodness, only rational beings are capable in virtue of their innate knowledge of being and its 
transcendental properties, that is, the image of God, to understand other beings in relation to 
their efficient, formal, and final cause.310  
According to the Summa, this image renders every human being an ‘express 
likeness’311 of God, that is, a genuine expression of Godself outside himself. As such, the 
human mind or soul, while not made of the substance of God himself, involves a nonetheless 
immediate and intimate connection with God. As we will discover, this provides a basis for 
correctly understanding realities as he does and for at once discerning him to be the efficient, 
formal, and final cause of unity, truth, and goodness in beings, respectively. In explaining 
what this discernment involves, the Summa stresses that the transcendental concepts do not 
represent the objects of human knowledge as such but rather the means by which objects of 
experience are rendered intelligible. Precisely because the transcendentals are known prior to 
experience, however, the Summa elaborates that they cannot themselves be known through 
anything anterior to themselves. 
Thus, the knowledge of the transcendentals can only be triggered by experience itself, 
which allows us to draw inferences about what is one, true, or God either by abnegation or 
from effects to a cause.312 In the mode of abnegation, the Summa states that the 
transcendentals are known in terms of formal qualities that diametrically oppose those of 
                                                        
310 Vol 1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C2, Respondeo (n. 73), 114-5: Father, Son and Spirit as efficient, formal, and final cause 
of unity, truth, and goodness in creatures.  
311 Vol 2.1, In1, S2, Q1, M2, C3, Contra 1 (n. 36), 46: Imago est expressa similitudo. See also the rest of the 
chapter on the distinction between a vestige and an image; cf. Vol 2.1 (n. 322), 391: we are the image of the Son 
who is the image of God; Vol 2.1 (n. 337), 409-10: the image of God is only in humans; Vol 2.1 (n. 343), 417: 
the image of God is immediately related to God. 
312 Vol 1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C1, Respondeo II (n. 72), 113: Knowledge through abnegation or effects. 
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empirical objects. Where the latter are finite, temporal, and so on, the transcendentals and 
their divine source are infinite and eternal. As effects of a cause, natural realities testify on 
the one hand to the infinite and eternal being that is their source: that is, they bespeak their 
relationship to the divine and thereby, his existence. By the same token, however, they give 
insight into his nature through a finite lens.  
Here, the Summa strongly affirms here the possibility of a direct and positive or 
‘kataphatic’ knowledge of God through creatures.313 In doing so, it repudiated the stance of 
the Greek Christian thinkers who denied that human beings can gain insight into God under 
any circumstances. While the Summa would be the first to insist that God in his totality 
cannot be captured by the human mind, it asserts the mind’s ability to grasp God’s presence 
in a partial but nonetheless positive way through the things God has made.314 To illustrate 
how, the Summa observes how a line leading to the centre of a circle touches the centre but 
does not circumscribe it. Although its circumference alone can do this, there is a conceivably 
infinite number of lines which can lead to the centre and touch on it in some way.  
In a similar fashion, the created intellect is like a line leading to the centre, or the 
divine substance, insofar as it traces creatures to their divine source and captures an aspect of 
that source at the point of converging with it. The difference between God and a normal 
sphere, as Alan of Lille affirms, is that ‘God is an intelligible sphere, whose centre is 
                                                        
313 Jacob W. Wood, ‘Kataphasis and Apophasis in Thirteenth Century Theology: The Anthropological Context 
of the Triplex Via in the Summa fratris Alexandri and Albert the Great,’ The Heythrop Journal 57 (2016), 293-
311  
314 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, Q2, C1, Solutio (n. 36), 59: Apprehension vs. comprehension, citing Augustine, De 
videndo Dei 9.21 and Ad Paulinam; cf. Vol 1 (n. 8), 16: to see an aspect vs. comprehend a whole. 
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everywhere and his circumference is nowhere.’315 Thus, the possible means of knowing him 
finitely are ultimately infinite. After all, there are infinite possibilities for finite beings in the 
mind of God who is as Damascus called him, a ‘sea of infinite substance.’316  
As we have seen, the key to gaining a finite glimpse into the infinite God is adherence 
to the ‘inner light’ of transcendental knowledge.317 When explaining how this light operates 
in a treatise on human knowledge, the mechanics of Avicenna’s psychology come into play. 
In this regard, the Summa adopts almost completely the Arab philosopher’s theory of 
external and internal senses that produce an image or ‘intention’ regarding sense experiences. 
This was not uncommon in a day when this was the most sophisticated and advanced account 
of sensation on offer.318  
When it comes to the theory of the intellect, however, things become more 
complicated. As Dag Hasse has noted, Avicenna’s psychology met with a strong indigenous 
                                                        
315 Alan of Lille, Theologiae Regulae (PL, 210), 7: Deus est sphaera intellibilis, cuius centrum est ubique 
circumferentia nusquam. 
316 Vol 1, Tr Intro, Q2, M3, C2, Respondeo 2 (n. 21), 32; John of Damascus, De fide I.9. 
317 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, C4, Contra 2 (n. 90), 146: Veritas est lux interior. See also Respondeo 2: veritas 
prima lux interior dicitur…est vis animae interior…quantum ad suam essentiam, attingit omne quod est, sicut 
ponit Augustinus (In Ion 2.1.19) exemplum de caeco posito in sole, quod praesens est ei lux, ipse tamen absens 
est ab illa. Ita ipsa summa sapientia, quae est prima veritas, omni iniquo praesens est, quamvis ipse absens 
(The first truth is called an interior light, and it is the interior power of the soul. Its essence extends to all that is, 
as Augustine posits in the example of a blind man who is placed in the light so that the light is present to him, 
but he is absent from the light. In this way, the highest wisdom, that is, the first truth, is present to every sinner 
even though they are absent from the light).  
318 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T1, M1, C2 (n. 355), 432: Avicenna on the five external senses; Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, 
S2, Q2, T1, M2, C1 (n. 357), 434-5: Avicenna on the internal senses, including estimation (n. 359), 436.  
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tradition for classifying intellectual functions.319 Augustine, John of Damascus, Aristotle, and 
numerous others all elaborated schemata for explaining the work of the mind. Thus, the 
Summa’s aim for mastery obligated its authors to run through the other possibilities 
available. Because of the confusion surrounding Aristotle and Augustine at this time, what is 
ultimately offered by the Summa is a reading of the two thinkers that is distinctly Avicennian 
in nature, and which is often justified by appeals to De spiritu et anima.320  
Although somewhat convoluted, this strategy was far from unusual at a time when 
Avicenna’s conceptualization of the intellect’s work carried so much sway, and yet there 
were other schemata to which it somehow had to be terminologically reconciled.321 As Hasse 
writes, the success of Avicenna’s doctrine of four intellects ‘was based less on quotations of 
his terminology—the scholastic terminology of intellects follows its own paths—but on the 
criteria given by Avicenna for the distinction between the intellects. These criteria and the 
                                                        
319 Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West (London: Warburg, 2001), 189-91. Avicenna’s 
doctrine of four intellects was hugely influential in the West not so much through terminology but in terms of 
the understanding of how the intellect works. 
320 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T1, M1, C1, Solutio (n. 368), 447-8: Aristotle’s account of three intellects, namely, 
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functions they define ensured that the theory survived for a long time as a coherent 
doctrine,’322 not least in the Franciscan school. 
For its part, the Summa follows Avicenna in describing the work of abstraction itself 
as a matter of stripping a form of material and accidental elements to behold the object, as it 
is presumably known by God.323 On this score, it states: if this ‘intelligible species’ i.e. a 
species that ‘is entirely and absolutely abstracted from corporeality, is understood as it is, it is 
understood only by an intellectual power that is entirely and absolutely detached from the 
body and from the corporeal mass.’324 Through precisely this species, we acquire knowledge 
of the finite way in which the infinite God manifests himself in a creature. Again, we do this 
through a certain ‘habit of the finite to the infinite’, namely, the innate knowledge of the 
transcendentals, whereby finite things capture the infinite not as it is but finitely.325  
                                                        
322 Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna’s De anima, 191. 
323 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, Respondeo 2 (n. 368), 387: Secundum intellectum fit abstractio speciei a 
materia (The intellect makes an abstraction of the species from matter). Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T1, M1, C1, 
Solutio 2 (n. 354), 431: Intellectus convertit se ad formas abstractas a materia, sensus autem convertit se ad 
formas in materia (The intellect conforms itself to the forms abstracted from matter, however the sense turns 
itself to the forms in matter). Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q2, C4, Ad objecta 3 (n. 90), 146: Esse sensibilis, ut iudicatur 
et accipitur sensu, semper apprehenditur cum conditionibus materiae; veritas autem eius apprehenditur absque 
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any condition of matter and therefore only by the intellect or mind). 
324 Vol 1, Tr Intro, Q2, M1, C5, 4 (n. 12), 21: Species omnino abstracta et absoluta a corporeitate si intelligitur 
sicuti est, non intelligitur nisi a vi intellectiva omnino absoluta a corpore et expedita a mole corporea. 
325 Vol 1, Tr Intro, Q2, M3, C2, Respondeo 2 (n. 21), 32: Et sic est accipere aliquam habitudinem finiti ad 
infinitum, non ut est in se, sed ut est finiens (And so we accept a certain relation of the finite to the infinite, not 
as he is, but as he is limiting all things).  
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Because of these transcendentals, the mind is able to gain a glimpse of God’s unity, 
truth, and goodness, through the limited unity, truth, and goodness of a natural being.326 As 
the Summa puts it, these two forms of unity for instance are ‘co-comprehended’, albeit the 
one in terms of the other.327 This comprehension arguably corresponds to Avicenna’s 
secondary intelligible or abstract object, which can be distinguished from the primary 
intelligibles or transcendentals. According to the Summa, these are stored in the memory and 
applied at the impetus of the will for the sake of completing an act of abstraction, the product 
of which is stored in the memory in turn. Thus, the Summa distinguishes between what it 
calls the innate versus the acquired memory, the first of which preserves the knowledge of 
the transcendentals, and the second of which preserves the concepts of objects abstracted 
with the help of the transcendentals.328 
                                                        
326 Vol 1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C1, Respondeo II (n. 72), 113.  
327 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, Ad objeca 1.c (n. 2), 4: Dicunt enim divinam substantiam aliquid 
cointelligendo, nullam autem rei compositionem circa ipsum principium designando (Attributions refer to the 
divine essence by way of co-understanding something, i.e. a creature, with it). 
328 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, C5, Ar7, Respondeo (n. 342), 415: Est memoria innata et acquisita. Memoria 
veritatis innata est principium intelligentiae et voluntatis: est enim sicut dictum est vis conservativa similitudinis 
primae veritatis impressae a creatione et secundum hoc memoria attribuitur Patri, intelligentia Filio, voluntas 
Spiritui Sancto. Memoria vero acquisita primae veritatis potest considerari duobis modis, quia quantum ad fieri 
aut quantum ad esse. Quantum ad fieri naturaliter procedit acquisita memoria ex intellectu et voluntate: et 
secundum hoc intellectus, qui est generans veritatem, attribuitur Patri, voluntas, quae est genita, Filio, 
memoria, ex utroque procedens, Spiritui Sancto. Quantum ad esse vero, memoria veritatis acquisita potest esse 
principium veritatis intelligentiae et voluntatis (The innate memory of the truth is the principle of understanding 
and will: for as is said, it is the power that conserves the likeness of the first truth that is impressed from 
creation. And in this way, memory is attributed to the Father, intelligence to the Son, and will to the Holy Spirit. 
The acquired memory of the first truth can be considered in two ways, insofar as it acts or insofar as it exists. 
Insofar as it acts, acquired memory naturally proceeds from the [operation] of the intellect and will. Thus, the 
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According to the Summa, such acts of abstraction can be completed without the co-
operation of the body, once an intention or image of a natural object has been produced by 
the external and internal senses. In this regard, the Summa upholds a quasi-Avicennian form 
of body-soul dualism in which the soul acts as a ‘mover’ for the body which it can ultimately 
survive without in a purely spiritual form. As ‘a sailor substantially is separate from his ship, 
as he moves the ship and is thereby accidentally moved by it, so the soul in its substance is 
divided from the body, and if it is moved, it is only accidentally so; therefore, the soul is a 
substance beyond the body.’329 This dualism was mistakenly believed to be compatible with 
an Augustinian viewpoint, insofar as it was represented in the spurious De spiritu et anima.330 
For a while, it was also attributed to Aristotle, on the basis of an distorted version of his 
famous sailor/ship analogy in the De anima II.1. 
                                                        
intellect, which is what generates truth, is attributed to the Father, will, which is the cause of what is generated, 
to the Son, and memory, which proceeds from both, to the Holy Spirit. As regards its essence, the acquired 
memory of truth is the principle of truth of understanding and will). 
329 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, II Respondeo b (n. 321), 386: Sed nauta secundum substantiam dividitur a 
navi, cum movet navim et secundum accidens movetur; ergo anima secundum substantiam dividitur a corpore, 
et si movetur, secundum accidens movetur; ergo anima est substantia praeter corpus. Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, 
T2, C1, Ar2, Solutio (n. 345), 420: anima rationalis coniungitur suo corpori ut motor mobili. Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, 
S1, Q3, T2, C1, Ar3 (n. 346), 421: the union of body and soul. Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T2, C2, Solutio (n. 
348), 423: Est enim quoddam intelligere non dependens aliquo modo a corpore (For there is some 
understanding that is not dependent in any way on the body).   
330 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, Respondeo V (n. 321), 387 (Quoting De spiritu et anima): Anima est spiritus 
intellectualis, rationalis, semper vivens, semper in motu bonae malaeque voluntatis capax (The soul is an 
intellectual spirit, rational, always living, always in motion, capable of both good and evil will). Vol 2.1, In4, 
Tr1, S1, Q1, C2, II (n. 321), 385 (quoting De spiritu et anima 1): Anima est substantia quaedam rationis 
particeps, regendo corpori accomodata (The soul is a substance which participates in reason, 
accommodated/suited to ruling the body). 
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Although the Summa relies heavily on Avicenna’s psychology, it does not do so 
uncritically. One significant way in which the Summa’s account of the intellect breaks new 
ground has to do with the doctrine of the Agent Intellect. In some ways, the Summa solves 
the problem in Avicenna of a merely mediated vision of God by linking God and the Active 
Intellect. On this account, the mind connects with God whenever it tunes in to the 
transcendentals that are the condition of possibility for knowing all things. Although God is 
the giver of these transcendentals, through a sort of natural interior light or illumination, the 
Summa seems to part ways with Avicenna over his tendency to conflate the divine and 
human agent intellects, although other Franciscans both before and after the time of the 
Summa went so far as to affirm that God is the agent intellect, including John of La 
Rochelle.331 For the Summists, by contrast, human cognition is not a matter of the divine 
intellect operating on behalf of the mind. Rather, it is a function of the mind’s own operation 
with the help of the transcendentals given by God. Thus, the Summa concludes that ‘it is not 
necessary to posit an agent intellect that is separate in substance, as physical light is separate 
in substance from sensible things. For this same spirit [the agent intellect] has in itself a 
certain natural light, by reason of which it is capable of the act of understanding.’332 
 In affirming this, the Summa endeavours to circumnavigate the self-contradictory 
notion that natural acts of cognition can only be accomplished through supernatural aid. 
Though it takes considerable strides towards affirming the integrity of the human intellect in 
this way, the immediate connection to God it posits through the transcendentals left the 
                                                        
331 John Pecham, Roger Marston, Roger Bacon, John of La Rochelle. See Etienne Gilson, ‘Roger Marston: un 
cas d'augustinisme avicennisant,’ Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 8 (1933), 37-42.  
332 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T1, M2, C2, Ar2, Solutio (n. 372), 452: Nec oportet ponere intellectum agentem 
separatum in substantia ab ipsa anima, sicut lux in sensu separata est in substantia ab ipso sensitivo. Est enim 
ipse spiritus in se habens lumen quoddam naturale, ratione cuius habet actum intelligibilium.  
 124 
relationship between the divine and human intellects rather too close for comfort in the 
estimation of later generations of Franciscans. In particular, John Duns Scotus followed a 
series of immediate Franciscan predecessors in denouncing the notion that the 
transcendentals are a sign of the image of God or of his illumination. He instead declared the 
innate knowledge of being and its properties as completely natural powers of the mind, which 
instil it with the ability to grasp realities in correspondence to their models entirely of its own 
accord.333 In his view, this was the only way to avoid insinuating that the human intellect is a 
defunct creation which is unable to perform its natural operations without divine aid.  
That said, Scotus would agree to some extent with his predecessors that divine 
intervention is required to know matters pertaining to God himself, at least matters of 
revelation. For their part, the Summists believed that the human agent intellect could only 
strictly speaking operate properly with respect to things ‘below’ the mind, that is, non-
rational creation. When it came to things ‘next to’ and ‘above’ the mind, such as the self, 
angels, and God, the assistance of the divine Active Intellect was obviously needed, since 
God alone has the power to clarify his own nature and that of his image.334 Even their claims 
                                                        
333 See Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 194-201. 
334 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T1, M2, C1, II (n. 370), 450: Sint intelligibilia quaedam infra, quaedam iuxta, 
quaedam intra, quaedam supra, ut narrat Augustinus (De spiritu et anima 12); cf. Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T1, 
M2, C2, Ar2, Solutio (n. 372), 452. Some scholars nonetheless assert that John develops the theory that the 
Active Intellect is God, as he does in his own works. See John Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-
1350) (London: Routledge, 1987), 116. Others suggest that he accepts this doctrine hesitantly in the Summa: 
Margaret M. Curtin, ‘The Intellectus Agens in the ‘Summa’ of Alexander of Hales,’ Franciscan Studies 5 
(1945), 418-33. Leonard J. Bowman, ‘The Development of the Doctrine of the Agent Intellect in the Franciscan 
School of the Thirteenth Century,’ The Modern Schoolman 50 (1973), 251-79. Gilson, Grabmann, and 
VanSteenberghen argue that he makes it part of the soul; cf. Dag Hasse, Avicenna’s De Anima, 216.  
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about the natural knowability of ordinary creatures ‘below’ the mind were however made 
with a considerable caveat, which I will explore below in treating the affective dimension of 
the Summa’s theological vision, that is, the aspect of it that is concerned not merely with the 
knowledge but the love of God. 
In closing this section firstly, it is worth noting how the innate knowledge of the 
transcendentals relates to the condemnation of 1241. As we have seen, this knowledge forges 
an immediate or intuitive connection with God that facilitates correct knowledge of things in 
the world in relation to God. In doing so, however, it simultaneously lays the groundwork for 
a direct vision of him in the life to come.335 For when the things of this world pass away, the 
transcendentals which currently allow us to gain a direct if limited vision of God through 
creatures will make it possible for us to gain a direct vision of God in himself.336 This vision 
will likewise be limited, insofar as contact with the infinite, according to Boethius, always 
occurs in the mode of the knower, which is finite, rather than in the mode of the thing known, 
which in this case is God.337 Though the ultimate vision of God will not be exhaustive or all-
encompassing, consequently, it will be nonetheless immediate and real, in just the way 
Augustine allegedly envisaged. 
 
An Affective Vision 
  
For the Summa, however, there are conditions on the acquisition of knowledge, above 
all, of God, at all phases in human existence. The conditions pertain to what the Summa 
                                                        
335 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1 S1, Q2, T1, M1, Solutio (n. 322), 390: Anima non est de Deo sed est creata de nihilo (The 
soul is not created from the substance of God but from nothing).  
336 Vol 1, Tr Intro, Q2, C5, Contra c (n. 12), 22. Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, Q2, C2 (n. 37), 61: The beatific vision. 
337 Vol 1, Tr Intro, Q2, M1, C1, Ad objeca 4 (n. 8), 16. 
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describes as an ‘upright’ will that is turned first and foremost towards God (sursum) instead 
of towards the world (deorsum).338 As we will see, this overriding love for God is what opens 
access to the transcendentals in the first place. In affirming this, the Summa deployed a 
further strategy for escaping the 1241 condemnation, which involved appealing to strand of 
the Dionysian tradition, proffered by the likes of William of St Thierry and Thomas Gallus, 
that was somehow unscathed by it.339 This tradition integrated claims about the impossibility 
of knowing God fully in this life with the notion that we can know God only by loving him. 
While the Summa certainly applies this principle to things that stand above and next to the 
soul, it also ultimately affirmed its pertinence to knowing things below the soul which cannot 
after all be rightly understood except in terms of their divine cause. 
In explaining how love affords knowledge that is otherwise unattainable, the Summa 
offers an interpretation of Augustine’s doctrine of superior and inferior or higher and lower 
reason, which likely draws more inspiration from Avicenna’s distinction between the 
theoretical and practical intellects, given the extent, illustrated above, to which the Summa 
adopts other aspects of Avicenna’s psychology.340 For the Summa, superior reason is the 
locus of the image of God and thus of the transcendentals that constitute it.341 The person 
who loves God therefore enjoys ready access to the knowledge of the self as his image and 
                                                        
338 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T1, C6, Ad objecta 3 (n. 343), 417. 
339 Simon Tugwell, Albert and Thomas, 53. 
340 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, T1, C6, Ad objecta 3 (n. 343), 417. Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M2, C4, Respondeo (n. 17), 
28: Superior pars est ad contemplandum Deum et aeterna, inferior ad contemplandas creaturas et temporalia. 
Ad superiorem pertinet sapientia, ad inferiorem scientia (The superior part [of reason] contemplates God and 
eternal things, the inferior part, creatures and temporal things. Wisdom pertains to the superior part, science to 
the inferior). 
341 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T1, C5, A6, Solutio (n. 340), 413: Proprie loquendo imago dicitur secundum 
superiorem partem (Properly speaking the ‘image’ refers to the superior part [of reason]). 
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thus to the transcendentals themselves. As a result, they cannot help but obtain correct 
knowledge of the finite things they know, and thereby catch a limited glimpse of their infinite 
source.342 As the Summa elaborates, ‘vestiges lead to the one of whom they are 
vestiges…insofar as they have beauty from that which is supremely beautiful and 
delightfulness from the highest object of delight.’343   
When the mind loves things other than God first and foremost, by contrast, it ceases 
to know itself as his image and becomes ignorant of the transcendentals which are the 
conditions for genuine knowledge.344 This loss of access to the resources of superior reason 
has a profound effect on the capacities of lower reason, which is exclusively ordered towards 
material goods and is in no way able to apprehend the form of a thing abstracted from matter 
on its own.345 For this reason, lower reason operating of its own accord is unable accurately 
to know lower goods in light of the higher principles of unity, truth and goodness, and thus to 
discern the way in which they are vestiges of God.346 In the words of the Summa, we cannot 
help but err when we ‘consider these things in terms of their beauty or delightfulness, not 
referring them to God from whom they have these qualities.’347  
                                                        
342 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T1, C5, A6, Respondeo II (n. 342), 415. 
343 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, C7, Solutio (n. 40), 49: Alio vero modo in quantum habent pulcritudinem a summe 
pulcro et delectabilitatem a summe delectabili: et secundum hunc modum vestigia manuducunt ad illam cuius 
sunt vestigia. 
344 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q2, T2, C2, A3, Solutio (n. 365), 442.  
345 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C1, Ad objecta 5 (n. 8), 16. 
346 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T2, C2 (n. 388), 465. 
347 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, C7, Solutio (n. 40), 49: Contingit enim eas considerare ratione plucritudinis sive 
delectabilitatis quae est in eis, non referendo illam ad Deum a quo habent: et secundum hunc modum est 
occasio erroris (For when things are considered in accordance of their beauty or delightfulness, and are not 
referred to the God from whom they have these properties, this is the occasion for error). 
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The lower reason has a natural tendency to become detached from higher reason 
along these lines, precisely because the body and soul are fundamentally different substances 
which tend downwards and upwards respectively.348 As the Summa is quick to point out, 
however, the corresponding ‘inability to know truth and avoid falsehood’349 does not result 
from losing the mind’s status as the image of God. This image can never be effaced or varied 
in any way, as that would imply a defect or inconsistency in God himself and in his ability to 
make himself knowable to human beings.350 Through excessive preoccupation with things 
other than God, rather, the mind merely becomes unaware of God and the transcendental 
power he gives to know all things. As the Summa concludes, consequently, there is never ‘a 
defect on the part of the thing [known], but there is a defect on the part of our intellect,’ 
which lacks the resources to ‘draw a conclusion as to what is true.’351  
                                                        
348 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, b (n. 320), 384: Cum enim alia corpora animalium sint inclinata ad terram 
naturaliter, corpus humanum est naturaliter erectum ad caelum (For while the bodies of other animals are 
naturally inclined to the earth, the human body is naturally erect towards the heavens). 
349 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M3, C1 (n. 96), 154: falsity. Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, C2, A2, Solutio (n. 98), 156: 
Est intellectus rectus et non rectus. 
350 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M3, C2, 4 (n. 21), 32: Cum anima nata sit ad intelligendum primam veritatem, non est 
defectus ex parte eius; sed lux divina semper est ei praesens (Also, since the soul is naturally capable of 
understanding the first truth, there is no lack on the part of the soul; however, the divine light is always present; 
therefore, the soul sees it always and with no intermediaries). 
351 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C3, Ad tertium (n. 10), 19: Non est ergo defectus ex parte rei, sed est defectus ex parte 
rationis conferentis, id est intellectus nostri, qui non potest ipsum medium invenire et inventum conferre ad 
concludendum veritatem.  
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Although it is almost impossible to avoid succumbing at some point to the warring 
tendencies of lower reason, the Summa notes that the ‘innate habit’352 of the transcendentals, 
that is, the image of God, which is obscured through sin can also be ‘infused’ again by 
grace.353 Such grace consists in the free movement of God’s will, which summons us in love 
to conform our wills to his by seeking to love him above all else. When we respond to this 
summons, the image is reawakened and transformed into God’s likeness. More specifically, 
access to the transcendentals on higher reason—and the knowledge of God—is restored.354 
At this point, the general presence whereby his image exists innately in all minds becomes a 
special presence in the mind where the image is graciously re-infused.355 
As we have seen, this image is impressed in the same way in all, lest it be subject to 
any variation or deterioration, which is improper to God himself. Thus, the success of human 
knowledge is not attributable to an individual’s innate capacity for knowing but to the will of 
the knower and the extent to which it is conformed to God in love. Those who cultivate a 
desire for God more than anything else gradually purge themselves of all carnal affections 
and die to the world.356 In this way, they forswear all hindrances to accessing the riches of 
                                                        
352 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, M1, C2 (n. 369), 449: A parte superiori per illuminationem sive a principio datam 
quae dicitur cognitio innata (From the superior part of reason, by means of illumination, or what is given from 
the beginning, [there is a cognitive power] which is called innate cognition). 
353 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M3, C5, Respondeo (n. 24), 36: innate vs. infused habit. Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, T3, M2, 
C1, Solutio (n. 50), 77: Cum se habet anima per conformitatem ad Deum in similitudine expressa, dicitur Deus 
inhabitare in ipsa per gratiam (When the soul through conformity to God has an expressed likeness to him, God 
is said to inhabit it through grace). Quoting Augustine De praesentia Dei; Ad Darandum; ep. 187, 6.19.  
354 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q3, T1, C5, Ar4 (n. 339), 411: Likeness versus image. 
355 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, T3, M2, C1, Ad objecta 1 (n. 50), 77. 
356 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C5, Ad objecta 1-4 (n. 12), 22: Etiam nunc, in quantum Dei Sapientiam, per quam 
facta sunt omnia, spiritualiter intelligimus, in tantum carnalibus affectibus morimur, ut mortuum nobis hunc 
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wisdom and knowledge that the transcendentals offer and put themselves in the optimal 
position to gain insight into the world and thereby to God. As the Summa quotes Augustine 
in affirming: ‘blessed are the pure in heart because they will see God.’357  
In the past, scholars have tended to identify the voluntarism of early Franciscans—
their emphasis on a righty ordered will as the key to knowledge—as an offspring of genuine 
Augustinianism. However, recent research has shown that it grew up only as a result of the 
influence of Arabic texts and translations in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries.358 The 
radical disparity between the early Franciscan and Augustinian positions on the will becomes 
decisively clear in the Summa’s account of the free will (liberum arbitrium).359 For the 
Summa, as for Augustine and many scholastics following him, liberum arbitrium is 
comprised of both reason and will, where liberum refers to the freedom of the will or 
voluntas, and arbitrium to the deliberations of reason.360  
While Augustine saw the exercise of free will as a matter of both faculties co-
operating, however, the Summa insists that decisions as to how to deploy reason are 
ultimately taken by the will. As such, the will rather than reason takes the lead in directing 
                                                        
mundum deputantes (Even now we die to carnal desires to the extent that we understand in a spiritual way the 
Wisdom of God through which all things have been made, so that we consider this world for/to us as dead). 
357 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C1, Respondeo (n. 8), 16: citing Augustine ep. 147, 15.37, Si quaeris utrum possit 
Deus videri, respondeo: potest. Si quaeris unde hoc sciam, respondeo: quia in veracissima Scriptura legitur 
(Matt. 5:8): beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. 
358 James A. Weisheipl, ‘Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron—A Note on Thirteenth. 
Century Augustinianism,’ in Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays, ed. Francis J. Kovach and Robert W. 
Shahan (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 239-60. 
359 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C4, Contra a (n. 405), 482.  
360 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M1, C1, Contra a (n. 390), 468.  
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their joint operations.361 For the Summa, moreover, the human will, like that of the divine, is 
entirely unconstrained: it is characterized by the flexibility (flexibilitas) to prefer either good 
or evil.362 This view represents what is perhaps the Summa’s most significant departure in the 
doctrine of the will from Augustine and later figures like Anselm and Aquinas, who argued 
that the will is fundamentally ordered to the good. In their view, to will evil is strictly 
speaking not to will at all because it is to opt for something which ultimately enslaves our 
desires and constraints our freedom of choice.  
As one author has noted, the early Franciscan perspective on the will represents a 
rather extreme take on the position of John of Damascus, perhaps mediated by John Blund, 
which is nonetheless elaborated in an entirely original way by the Summa.363 ‘Looking at 
John of Damascus’ account shows us that he does not construe choice as inherently a choice 
between two options, the good and the evil.’364 In keeping with the custom at the time, the 
Summists pay lip service to the traditional Augustinian position, noting that God made us 
with a good will and ordered the will properly and originally towards the good. As beings 
                                                        
361 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C3, Ar2, Respondeo (n. 398), 476: Libertas arbitrii principaliter est ex parte 
voluntatis. Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar1, Ad objecta 1 (n. 3), 6: Bonum et malum reducuntur ad unum 
principium, scilicet voluntatem (good and evil are reduced to one principle, namely the will). Cf. Ad objecta 2, 
5. 
362 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M1, Respondeo (n. 389), 467: Liberum arbitrium secundum quod est flexibile 
ad bonum et malum sit in creatura rationali. Cf. Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, C3, Ad objecta 2 (n. 36), 46: Nam 
creatura intellectualis naturaliter vertibiliis est in bonum et in malum. 
363 Denise Ryan, ‘An Examination of a Thirteenth-Century Treatise on the Mind-Body Dichotomy: Jean de la 
Rochelle on the Soul and its Powers’ (PhD Thesis, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2010), 173.  
364 Michael Frede, ‘John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom,’ in Byzantine 
Philosophy and its Ancient Sources, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 63-95.  
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that differ from him in nature, however, humans are changeable (vertibile) in ways that allow 
in principle for disregarding his intents.365  
On this basis, the Summists infer that both before and after the fall, liberum arbitrium 
was characterised by the ability to vacillate between good and evil. Although God originally 
created us in the hope that we would choose the good, we by possess by nature the 
fundamental capacity to consent or refuse to do so. The freedom of the will has always been 
absolute. The logical corollary of this account is that merit is accumulated on the basis of the 
preferences of the will or voluntas. Because we have complete freedom to choose between 
good and evil, in other words, what stands us in good stead is to choose the good. On this 
basis, the Summa affirms that post-lapsarian knowledge is superior to the knowledge Adam 
had of God through creatures before the fall.366  
In some sense, the Summa admits, Adam’s knowledge was superior to ours insofar as 
his capacity to know God through the world was not yet obscured by the failure of the will to 
which he would soon succumb. Nevertheless, the prospects for merit are greater now than 
they were before the fall, when love for God and the knowledge that came along with it was 
essentially automatic. This is because a deliberate and difficult movement of the will is 
                                                        
365 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M1, Ad objecta 1 (n. 389), 467: Deus est voluntate bonus et fecit hominem ad 
imaginem suam, quod fecit eum voluntate bonum, quia creatura cum sit ex nihilo vertibilis est et ita 
oppositionem habet ad necessitatem quia necessitas est ex parte perfectae potentiae et ita solum in Deo, non in 
creatura cum ibi sit defectus potentiae, et ideo non sequitur quod si Deus est necessario bonus quod homo 
existens ad imaginem eius sit necessario bonus (God is by will good and made humans in his image, such that 
he made them with good will. Because creatures are from nothing, however, they are changeable and thus not 
necessitated [in the good], because necessity belongs to the perfect power that is only in God, not in creatures 
where there is a defect of power. Thus it does not follow that if God is necessarily good that humans in his 
image are necessarily good). Cf. Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, C2, Ar1, Pr3 (n. 395), 474. 
366 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M2, C5, Ar1, Respondeo (n. 18), 29. 
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presently required to obtain sound knowledge.367 Although sin was certainly not a good in its 
own right, consequently, the Summa insists that God made something good of it through the 
opportunity it afforded human beings meritoriously, if laboriously, to exercise the free will 
needed to regain recourse to the truth.  
The more merit is acquired through the appropriate orientation of the will towards 
God, the more uninhibited the mind’s access to the truth becomes.368 The natural image of 
God in humans becomes an increasingly clear likeness to God’s own self.369 By the same 
token, the human mind becomes better attuned to seeing the traces of the divine that can be 
found in the world. In that sense, it grows in intimacy with God to the point of being able to 
encounter him directly, in the way Francis did when he received the stigmata toward the end 
of his life. This famous episode is most famously recounted in Bonaventure’s Itinerarium 
mentis in Deum. Here, Bonaventure explains how Francis’ cognitive connection with God 
enabled him to discern the love and wisdom of God in all things, and to do so with such 
consistency that his knowledge ultimately gave way to an ecstatic union with God himself.  
While the Summa does not lay out the pathway to God which Francis traversed so 
clearly as Bonaventure, the basis for the Seraphic Doctor’s vision of ‘the mind’s journey into 
God’ is already available there. After all, the Summa clearly explains how the conformity of 
the will to God heightens the chances of experiencing him in ways that exceed the natural 
capacities of reason and give a glimpse of him in his essence, which is simply Love. Thus the 
Summa quotes John 14:21: ‘the one who loves me will be loved by my father, and I will love 
him and manifest myself to him.370 Further echoing Augustine’s De videndo Dei, the Summa 
                                                        
367 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M2, C5, Art2, Respondeo (n. 19), 29.  
368 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M7, Solutio (n. 416), 490.  
369 Vol 2.1, In4, Tr1, S2, Q3, T3, M4, C1, Respondeo (n. 407), 484-5.   
370 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C1, Ad objecta 2 (n. 8), 16.  
 134 
concludes that the invisible God can make himself known in exceptional ways to those whose 
wills are fully conformed to him, when he wills to do so.371  
The kind of special revelation in question can take one of a number of forms. In the 
first place, the Summa speaks of Moses who allegedly saw God’s ‘backside’.372 Here, God 
appeared not in his own form but in a natural form or figure. Thus, the vision of Moses of 
Mount Sinai is described as a vision of the imagination or of the body, which represents 
something that is in principle natural through an intelligible species that in fact is imparted by 
God rather than extracted from experience in the world.  
There is another kind of vision, purely intellectual, which was experienced by the 
Apostle Paul, who had a vision of God in which his mind seemed to be abstracted from the 
body. Such an experience is generally reserved for the beatific vision, since the vision of God 
as he is, abstracted from the body, requires that human beings are no longer weighed down 
by their own bodies.373 However, it has been enjoyed by a few holy men like Paul and 
presumably Francis on Mount La Verna.374 Although the precedent for these two types of 
vision, imaginative and intellectual, is found primarily in the biblical tradition, there are some 
possible links with Avicenna’s discussion of prophesy, particularly when it comes to the 
vision of the imagination, such as Francis experienced when he witnessed the crucifix speak 
to him at the St Damiano altar. More evident however is the influence of Avicenna’s first 
form of prophesy, which is based on the knowledge of the transcendentals and the insight 
into reality they provide a person who is always attuned to the Active Intellect, in this case, 
God, through a rightly ordered will.  
                                                        
371 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C1, Ad objecta 1 (n. 8), 16: Citing Augustine, ep. 147, 6.18.  
372 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C4, Respondeo (n. 11), 20-1. 
373 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C5, 4 (n. 12), 21. 
374 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C5, Contra b (n. 12), 21. 
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There are many examples of this kind of prophesy which can be found in the life of 
Francis, who is said to have shown remarkable insight into matters moral, spiritual, and 
practical, regarding which he had no formal training. This insight in all cases derived from 
the intuitive connection with God that he enjoyed on account of the full conformity of his 
will to God. While such volitional conformity is the means of knowing not only God but also 
anything whatever, such knowledge we have seen is also designed to give us contact with 
God whether through creatures or through other revelations with God that increases our level 
of intimacy with him: and the prospects of a special vision of him. Thus, love is the 
beginning and the end of knowledge on the Franciscan understanding. The practical purpose 
of theology in the Summa, as I will explain below, is to cultivate that love and so facilitate 
our restoration to God’s image and likeness, that is, salvation. 
 
A Practical Vision 
 
In the scholastic period, it was becoming common practice in theological treatises to 
begin with a discussion of the status of theology as a science or field of inquiry. In fact, the 
Summa Halensis was among the first to do so, aside perhaps from Roland of Cremona, 
largely under the impetus of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, which was increasingly 
becoming a topic of discussion in the 1240s.375 The purpose of that text in large part is to 
outline the conditions for determining whether any sphere of inquiry meets the criteria for a 
genuine ‘science’.376 As usual, however, the Summa’s own approach to the topic may have 
                                                        
375 C.R. Hess, ‘Roland of Cremona’s Place in the History of Thought,’ Angelicum 45 (1968), 429-77, 453. See 
‘Quid sit subiectem theologiae,’ in Summae Magistri Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P. Liber Primus (Bergamo: 
Umberto Midali, 2015-7), 22-4. 
376 B. Niederbacher and G. Leibold (eds.), Theologie als Wissenschaft im Mittelalter: Texte, Übersetzungen, 
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been informed by Avicenna’s distinction between speculative and practical knowledge, as it 
seems particularly concerned to determine which kind of knowledge theology entails.  
At the outset, the Summa states that the purpose of theology is to articulate revealed 
truths received ‘from God’, thus teaching us what we should believe ‘about God’, thereby 
leading us ‘towards God’.377 While the first two functions of theology are speculative in 
nature, the latter raises the question as to how exactly theology achieves the practical feat of 
inspiring piety or devotion to God.378 Although the Summa leaves the answer to this question 
to some extent unclear, the working assumption of the text seems to be that speculative 
theology, or efforts to explain the nature and work of God, incite awe and love at his efforts 
on our behalf, first through creation and above all through our restoration or salvation. In 
elucidating these matters, theology inspires ‘fear and love at God’s justice and mercy’379, 
which in turn move us to the practice of our faith.380 
                                                        
Kommentare (Münster: Aschendorff, 2006). Christian Trottmann, Théologie et noétique au XIIIe siècle (Paris: J. 
Vrin, 1999). U. Köpf, Die Anfänge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie im 13. Jhr. (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1974). 
377 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C2, Ad objecta 1-4 (n. 2), 5. Boyd Taylor Coolman, ‘On the Subject Matter of Theology in 
the Summa Halensis and St Thomas Aquinas,’ The Thomist 79 (2015), 439-66.  
378 See a superb article on this topic by Oleg Bychkov, ‘The Nature of Theology in Duns Scotus and His 
Franciscan Predecessors,’ Franciscan Studies 66 (2008), 5-62. Stephen Dumont, ‘Theology as a Science and 
Duns Scotus’s Distinction Between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,’ Speculum 64:3 (1989), 579-99. Angelo 
Marchesi, ‘La teologia come scientia practica nella Lectura Oxoniensis e nella Ordinatio di G. Duns Scoto,’ in 
Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy (Helsinki: The Finnish Society for Missiology and 
Ecumenics, 1987).   
379 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C2, Contra f (n. 2), 5. 
380 Mikolaj Olszewski, ‘Beginning of the Discussion of Practical or Theoretical Character of Theology: The 
Positions of Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, and Giles of Rome,’ Studia Mediewistyczne 
34-35 (1999-2000), 129-46.  
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This is particularly true of theological discussion concerning the person and work of 
Christ, which receives a great deal of attention in the Summa. Without Christ, we would not 
know God or how he intends—and Christ enabled—us to live. On this basis, the Summa 
concludes that ‘theology is a science about the divine substance that must be cognized 
through Christ in the course of his work of restoration or salvation.’381 The term ‘theology’ in 
this context, as in many others at the time, is employed interchangeably with the phrase, 
‘Sacred Scripture’.382 The purpose of Scripture in the Summa’s account is not merely to 
recount stories of individual lives but in doing to so to disclose universal principles regarding 
how we should understand God and live in light of this understanding.383  
On this account, consequently, theology performs a related function of inferring those 
principles, especially from the stories about Christ, who teaches us how we should think 
about God and operate in light of this understanding. In this regard, theology differs in a key 
way from other sciences, the purpose of which is to ‘perfect our cognition by way of 
[knowing] truth.’384 By contrast to such ordinary sciences, we have seen, the pursuit of 
understanding in theology is orientated primarily to ‘perfect the soul by way of affection, 
moving it towards the good through the principles of fear and love’385 for God. In short, 
theology ‘instructs the soul in those matters that pertain to salvation.’386 
                                                        
381 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C3, Respondeo (n. 3), 6: Theologia est Scientia de substantia divina cognoscenda per 
Christum in opere reparationis. 
382 C.R. Hess, ‘Roland of Cremona’s Place in the History of Thought,’ 460. 
383 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C1, Ad objecta 1 (n. 1), 2. 
384 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C2, Solutio (n. 1), 2. 
385 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C2, Solutio (n. 1), 2: Theologia igitur, quae perficit animam secundum affectionem 
movendo ad bonum per principia timoris et amoris. 
386 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C4, Ar1, Respondeo (n. 4), 8.  
 138 
Whereas ordinary sciences are properly so-called, consequently, the work of theology 
is more appropriately and mainly described in terms of the pursuit of wisdom. After all, 
wisdom does not entail the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake but for the purpose of 
human betterment or indeed salvation. Theology, therefore, is wisdom rather than science, 
‘for it consists rather in virtue and practical efficiency than in contemplation and 
[speculative] knowledge.’387 While science ‘operates by way of grasping truth through 
human reason, [wisdom] operates by way of eliciting the affection of piety through what is 
divinely inspired…by way of precepts, examples, admonitions, revelation and prayer, 
because it is these things that are appropriate for eliciting the affection of piety.’388 The main 
example and revelation is again that of Christ, and the main precept or admonition is of 
course the way that he taught us to live, which might be why moral questions, like 
Christological ones, consume a great deal of attention in the Summa Halensis.  
In a subsequent turn of the argument, the Summa makes this initially surprising claim: 
‘that which is known through divine inspiration is more truly known than that which is 
known through human reasoning. Therefore, since knowledge in theology is divinely 
inspired, it is a truer science than other sciences.’389 At face value, this assertion may seem 
implausible, given that the object of theology is inaccessible to the human mind, whereas the 
objects of human reason are often empirical and thus manifestly knowable.390 What then is 
                                                        
387 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C4, Ar2, Ad objecta 2 (n. 5), 9: [Haec scientia] magis enim consistit in virtute et efficacia 
quam in contemplatione et notitia. 
388 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C4, Ar1, Ad objecta 2 (n. 4), 8. 
389 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C1, Contra a (n. 1), p. 2: Quod cognoscitur per divinam inspirationem verius scitur quam 
quod per humanam ratiocinationem...ergo, cum cognitio theologiae sit edita inspiratione divina...verius est 
scientia quam veterae scientiae. 
390 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M3, C5, Respondeo (n. 24), 36. 
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the basis for the claim that theological knowledge is more certain than ordinary knowledge? 
The answer to this question implicitly returns to the matter of the transcendentals, which 
provide the basis for all knowledge, both of the world and of God.  
As we have seen, these concepts can only be bestowed by God through a sort of 
natural or general illumination. After sin, they are re-awakened through a special illumination 
given to those who willingly accept them as grace. Since what comes from God above and 
thus from outside our cognitive reach is the basis for all true and certain knowledge of reality, 
it is intrinsically more certain than any knowledge of reality itself. By the same token, 
proving an effect through a cause is a more certain approach than proving a cause through an 
effect, because the cause is the basis for the effect rather than the other way around.391  
This is the ground on which the Summa advances the claim that, ‘the way of knowing 
through inspiration is more certain than the one through human rational thought. Also, what 
is known from the testimony of the Spirit is more certain than what is known from the 
evidence gathered from creatures.’392 Because our access to the transcendentals, received 
through divine inspiration or illumination, is by way of love, it follows that: what is known 
by way of taste or affection is more certain than what is known by way of sight or rational 
thought.393   
 
Therefore, since the way of sacred Scripture is the way of knowing through 
                                                        
391 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M3, C4, Ad objecta 3 (n. 23), 35. 
392 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C4, Ar2, Contra a (n. 5), 9: Certior est modus sciendi per inspirationem quam per 
ratiocinationem. Item, certius est quod scitur testimonio spiritus quam quod testimonio creaturarum. 
393 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q2, M3, C4, Ad objecta 3 (n. 23), 35: Est certitudo secundum speculationem intellectus, quae 
est per modum visus, et est certitudo secundum sensum affectus, quae est per modum adhaerentiae, voluntatis 
scilicet vel amoris.  
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inspiration, from the testimony of the Spirit, and by way of taste, while in other 
sciences the way of knowing is through rational thinking, from the evidence gathered 
from creatures, and by way of sight, it is clear that the way of knowing in theology is 
more certain than in other sciences.394  
 
 With these words, the Summa completely overturns any presumption regarding the 
superiority of knowledge of visible to invisible things. At the same time, it implicitly 
undermines any approach to theology which does not assume its own affective and practical 
orientation. What it achieves in summary is the subjection of all knowledge to the wisdom 
which is attained by ‘the pure in heart’. When it turns to treat its precise understanding of 
what a ‘pure life’, that is, to delineate the precepts of a Christ-like or moral life, it becomes 
clear that the kind of piety the Summa has in mind—both as the precondition and product of 
theological knowledge—is distinctly Franciscan in its character.  
 Not surprisingly, for instance, the question of poverty or property ownership proves 
central to the Summa’s understanding of what it means to follow Christ. As Christ gave up 
the glories of heaven to come to earth, so the Summa insists that we must abandon everything 
we have in order to live as he designed. This is done most perfectly in the way of the friars, 
who literally own nothing. But it can also be accomplished in a more limited way by the laity 
who donate all superfluous goods beyond those needed for bare survival to the poor.395 
According to the Summa, any failure to do this was out of line with Christ’s example and 
                                                        
394 Vol 1, Tr Int, Q1, C4, Ar2, Contra a (n. 5), 9: Cum ergo modus sacrae Scripturae sit modus sciendi per 
inspirationem per testimonium Spiritus, per modum gustus, in aliis vero modus sciendi per ratiocinationem, 
per testimonium creaturae, per modum visus manifestum est quod certior est modus sciendi in Theologia quam 
in aliis scientiis. 
395 Vol. 3, P2, I4 Tr2, Q3, T3, C4, 909. 
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thus unjust as it is to receive benefits beyond one’s lot, which is usury.396 The reason for this 
is that almsgiving is the means God has ordained for us to be cleansed from sin and, as noted, 
to imitate Christ.397  
 This is just one of a number of ways that the Summa reveals to its reader that the 
practical result of theology which it envisages is one that looks very much like the Franciscan 
lifestyle, whether lay or professional. Other examples include loving enemies, which the 
Summa insists is far more meritorious than loving friends, because the sacrifice involved in 
loving enemies is so much greater.398 This example in particular harks back again to that of 
Christ, who came to serve those who were not like him and could not benefit him but whom 
he alone could benefit. The principle of complete self-sacrifice as the standard of love—for 
God or anyone—always looms large and informs the Summa’s understanding of what the 
text means by the ‘affection of piety.’ Clearly, this is not just any affection but one that takes 
the form of physical and practical self-sacrifice similar to that of Francis and indeed Christ 
himself.  
 Such affection is fostered by following yet another precept, whereby we are instructed 
to cultivate simplicity of intention, forsaking all cares and desires of the body in order to 
focus on loving God.399 While the Summa does not explicitly prescribe in this context the 
sorts of self-denial and spiritual focus that Francis advocated and practiced, it is not difficult 
to imagine that this is the kind of thing it had in mind. When interpreted in the light of such 
moral precepts, theology at its best, and as the Halensian Summists understand it, is evidently 
designed to feed back into and further Franciscan practices and the Franciscan charisma. 
                                                        
396 Vol. 3, P2, In4, Tr2, Q3, T3, M1, C1, Ar2, 907: Utrum necessarium an superfluum praecipiatur dari. 
397 Vol. 3, P2, In4, Tr2, Q3, T3, C5, 910-11: Quare eleemosynae specialiter attribuatur omnia mundare.  
398 Vol. 3, P2, Inq 4, Tr2, Q3, T4, C4, 920: Utrum maius sit diligere amicos quam inimicos. 
399 Vol. 3, P2, In4, Tr2, Q4, M2, C1, 930-3: On simplicity of intentions.  
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Thus, it is no wonder that the Summa concludes that it would be a contradiction in terms to 
pursue the science of theology and fail to observe its moral precepts. Since the whole aim of 
theology is practical, to theologize in a vacuum would defeat the purpose.400 
 
Conclusion  
 
In many respects, the theological vision of the Summa Halensis is a matter of 
historical accident. As Simon Tugwell writes: 
 
The attempt to provide a viable epistemological account of how we know God had 
apparently reached an impasse in the 1240s, and had in the process brought negative 
theology into a certain disrepute; the only way that was unaffected was one which 
posited a non-intellectual way of knowing God by love which by passed rather than 
settled the epistemological problem.401 
 
In the wake of the 1241 condemnation, the Summists capitalized on the pro-
Augustine atmosphere and cultivated strongly kataphatic persuasions that steered entirely 
clear of the supposed dangers of negative theology. They incorporated this approach into the 
affective methodology that remained unscathed by the condemnation and thereby elaborated 
its epistemological dimension extensively for the first time. At the time and under the 
circumstances, this must have seemed like a monumental intellectual feat and a remarkable 
solution to a longstanding and central problem in the theological tradition. For the 
Franciscans themselves, however, it was arguably much more than that. In light of what has 
                                                        
400 Vol. 3, P2, In4, Tr2, Q4, M3, C2, Ar2, 938-9: Utrum praedicator teneatur facere quod dicet. 
401 Simon Tugwell, Albert and Thomas, 55.  
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been outlined above, one cannot help but perceive a convenient coincidence of historical 
accident and Franciscan ethos.  
While the affective-practical vision of the Summa was in one sense the ultimate 
solution to the religious-epistemological problems of the day, it also gives expression to some 
of the most cherished spiritual values of the order itself. The notion of an innate knowledge 
of the transcendentals—and ultimately God—corresponds nicely for instance to the 
celebrated intimacy Francis enjoyed with God. This intimacy afforded him a special ability to 
appreciate every aspect of God’s creation. The kataphatic element of the Summa’s vision 
certainly encapsulates, therefore, even if by accident, the attitude of a man who sought to find 
a trace of God’s love or a footprint of the divine in creatures great and small.  
The notion of an affective ‘way in’ to such knowledge, as already noted, is also highly 
consistent with Francis’ remarkable learning, despite his lack of formal theological training. 
As his early biographer Thomas of Celano writes: 
 
Although this blessed man was not educated in scholarly disciplines, still he learned 
from God wisdom from above, and, enlightened by the splendours of eternal 
light…his genius, pure and unstained, penetrated hidden mysteries. Where the 
knowledge of teachers is outside, the passion of the lover entered.402  
 
As Celano elaborates elsewhere, Francis always stressed that learning is not an end in 
its own right but a means to loving God. To construe the speculative work of theology as 
ultimately possessing a practical orientation towards facilitating that love certainly does not 
seem like an accident in that light. The authors of the Summa clearly wish to convey that the 
                                                        
402 C2, 314-15. 
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intellectual cogency of their theological system has the power to inspire affection for its 
divine object, and the cultivation of that affection, in turn, is the motivation for inquiry. 
While those who pursue knowledge for its own sake attend to reality as if from the outside, 
love for God who is the source of all reality gives wisdom or insight into all things, not least 
God. This is what waits to be discovered in the next chapter on theistic proof.  
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5. THEISTIC PROOF 
 
Since the late medieval period, Anselm of Canterbury has been heralded in the West 
as the first proponent of the so-called ontological argument for God’s existence. This kind of 
argument purports to provide proof for the reality of God, which is derived from the very 
definition of God as the supreme being. As such a being, ontological arguments presume, 
God must possess all perfections—including the perfection of existence. Thus, one need only 
think about what he is to know that he exists. In that sense, ontological arguments are purely 
rational: they have no other source than human reason. Over the centuries, philosophers have 
formulated many different versions of this basic argument; however, most of them are framed 
with reference to a broader tradition of thought that supposedly began with Anselm.403 
Although Anselm’s work has garnered considerable attention in the late medieval and 
modern periods, it was largely neglected in the century between his death and the beginnings 
of the University of Paris in the early thirteenth century. A few other precedents 
notwithstanding, Alexander of Hales and the authors of the Summa Halensis were the first 
extensively to appropriate and popularise the work of Anselm, not least, the famous argument 
which can be found in chapters 2-3 of his Proslogion. In writings completed both before and 
during the period of the Summa’s authorship between 1236-45, these first Franciscan 
                                                        
403 Variations on an ontological argument have been offered by Norman Malcolm, ‘Anselm’s Ontological 
Arguments,’ The Philosophical Review 69:1 (1960), 41-62. Graham Oppy, Ontological Arguments and Belief in 
God (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1967). Alvin Plantinga The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). 
Charles Hartshorne, Anselm's Discovery: A Re-Examination of the Ontological Proof for God's Existence (La 
Salle, IL: Open Court, 1965). Rene Descartes, fifth meditation in Discourse on Method and The Meditations, 
trans. F. Sutcliffe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). Gottfried Leibniz, New Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, trans. A. Langley (New York: Macmillan, 1709/1896).  
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intellectuals developed a common approach to reading Anselm’s argument which is 
expressed most fully in the Summa itself.404 As this suggests, early Franciscans functioned 
‘as a community, and not merely as a group of scholars who happened to be working at the 
same institution.’405  
In this case as in so many others, moreover, the Summa Halensis stands as the clearest 
expression of their collective mind. When articulating their uniquely Franciscan perspectives, 
we have learned that the Halensian Summists tended to quote authorities not merely as a 
matter of unequivocal endorsement but with a view to locating their own opinions within 
larger traditions or streams of thought which could legitimize them. The example of the 
Summa’s appropriation of Anselm’s argument is no exception to this rule. As I will 
demonstrate in this chapter, the Summa’s version of Anselm’s argument represents a 
significant development beyond Anselm’s own iteration.406 In order to bolster this claim, I 
will start by examining Anselm’s argument, attending carefully to the pastoral or pedagogical 
objectives he outlines in his 26-chapter Proslogion. This discussion will cast doubt on the 
claim that the famous argument can be interpreted in exclusively ontological terms.  
Following this, I will analyse the sources in addition to Anselm that inform the 
Franciscan interpretation of his argument. These sources include Avicenna, whose celebrated 
proof for the necessary existent is the closest forerunner of which I am aware for what is 
                                                        
404 Scott Matthews, Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition: Anselm's Argument and the Friars (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2001), 46-80, especially 62. 
405 Scott Matthews, Reason, Community, and Religious Tradition, 72. 
406 In his own way, Jean Chatillon has demonstrated this in his ‘De Guillaume d’Auxerre à saint Thomas 
d’Aquin: l’argument de saint Anselme chez les premiers scolastiques duxième siècle,’ Spicilegium Beccense I 
(Paris, 1959), 209-31, especially 226-7. See also Anton Pegis, ‘The Bonaventurian Way to God,’ Mediaeval 
Studies 29 (1967), 206-42, especially page 211.  
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known today as the ontological argument. As a perceived associate of the Augustinian 
tradition, Anselm was not immune to an Avicennian interpretation. This interpretation 
became possible through the mediation of the twelfth-century mystical theologian Richard of 
St Victor, who was perhaps the first to assess Anselm’s argument without reference to the 
broader context of the Proslogion.  
By de-contextualising Anselm’s argument, Richard established a precedent which 
later allowed early Franciscans to attribute something like Avicenna’s argument to Anselm, 
albeit without acknowledgement, in what was ultimately an argument of their own invention. 
This Franciscan version of the argument is the one to which Thomas Aquinas likely, and 
famously, objected, in objecting to what he referred to as Anselm’s argument. At the same 
time, this rendition of the argument is closer to the one that is associated with Anselm’s 
legacy to this day. Through the Summa Halensis and its authors, consequently, it is fair to say 
that the West was introduced for the first time in intellectual history to what has come to be 
known as Anselm’s ontological argument.  
 
Reading Anselm’s Argument 
 
In recent years, a growing body of literature has cast doubt on the notion that Anselm 
offered nothing but an ontological argument for God’s existence such as we understand it 
today, whether to foster faith seeking understanding in believers or to persuade non-believers 
to believe. While this is not the place to explore that literature in full, I do want to consider 
some textual evidence which supports an alternative reading, starting with the argument from 
chapter two itself, which can be stated as follows:407 
                                                        
407 Lydia Schumacher, ‘The Lost Legacy of Anselm’s Argument: Rethinking the Purpose of Proofs for the 
Existence of God,’ Modern Theology 27:1 (2011), 87-101.   
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God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived (i.e. the supreme being). 
It is better to exist in reality than in the mind alone.  
God is whatever it is best to be.  
Therefore, God exists in reality as well as in the mind.  
 
In formulating this argument, Anselm asserts unequivocally that all who apprehend 
the definition of God as supreme being must affirm that he exists. After all, God is whatever 
it is best to be, and existence in reality is better than existence in the mind, rather like the 
existence of wealth is superior to the mere thought of possessing it. On this basis, Anselm 
goes on to argue in chapter three that those who apprehend the meaning of the word ‘God’ 
cannot logically deny that he exists. As chapter four elaborates, it is only possible for the fool 
to say in his heart, ‘there is no God’, insofar as it is possible in principle to think a thought 
that does not bear on reality. 
So construed, Anselm’s argument could in fact be construed as an ontological proof 
for God’s existence. The fact that his own detractor Gaunilo interpreted it as such suggests 
that it was indeed ripe for consideration in this way, and Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo indicates 
that he was aware of and accepted that. Nevertheless, the broader context of the Proslogion 
summons us to read the proof in a different light. The text begins with a prayer in which 
Anselm professes his inability to know God and pleads with God to restore in him the image 
of God that is effaced by sin.408 When referring to this process of renewal at later points in 
the text, Anselm notably continues to operate on the assumption that God himself remains 
                                                        
408 Proslogion, Prologue.  
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altogether unknowable, insofar as the divine nature exceeds the spatio-temporal constraints of 
human knowledge.409  
Thus, the restoration Anselm has in mind does not reinstate knowledge of God in his 
own right but an ability to reflect the image of a God who never ceases to know himself as 
highest good, in the only context possible for human beings, namely, that of ordinary 
knowledge and life. What is restored, in other words, is an ability to think and act in reality in 
keeping with the belief in God as ‘highest good’ that is held in the mind. The exercise of such 
an ability has a highly significant effect when it comes to assessing objects and circumstances 
in the world. For the knowledge that God alone is absolutely significant prevents persons 
from ascribing too much significance to these matters and thus from perceiving them in ways 
that are inconsistent with reality, and a personal ability to flourish therein. In sum, the 
knowledge of God checks the human tendency to engage in the sinful patterns of thinking 
and acting whereby the image of God is effaced. By the same token, it replaces them with 
patterns of appreciating things for what they really are, as God made them to be.410  
In that sense, the knowledge of God that Anselm perceives as realistically attainable 
is a knowledge of things other than God, assessed in the light of faith in his absolute 
significance. By Anselm’s account, this ‘mediated’ knowledge of God can only be gained 
progressively, as the eyes of the mind gradually re-adjust to the vision of the world in God’s 
light, just as physical eyes must become accustomed to brighter levels of light.411 So 
                                                        
409 Proslogion 1, 13, 16. 
410 See compatible readings of Anselm in Scott Matthews, ‘Anselm and Tradition,’ in Reason, Community, and 
Religious Tradition, 1-14. Lydia Schumacher, ‘The Lost Legacy of Anselm’s Argument,’ 87-101. Robert 
Sokolowski, ‘Beginning with St Anselm,’ in The God of Faith and Reason (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1995), 1-11. 
411 Proslogion 26. 
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conceived, Anselm’s argument is ultimately a resource for bringing a professed belief in God 
to bear in reality, and thereby for cultivating a habit of seeing the world in the light of faith. 
In doing this, believers gradually conform to the image of a God who always thinks and acts 
in the knowledge of his supreme goodness.412 At the same time, Anselm concludes in the 
final chapters of the Proslogion that they become ready to gaze upon the reality of God 
himself in the life to come.413  
This ‘pedagogical’ way of interpreting Anselm’s argument as a ‘formula’ of sorts for 
applying belief in God is borne out by many passages in the wider text of the Proslogion that 
tend to be neglected on the standard reading. In chapter two itself, for example, Anselm 
provides an illustration as to how his argument is meant to function. More specifically, he 
notes that, ‘when a painter plans beforehand what he is going to execute, he has the picture in 
his mind, but he does not yet think that it actually exists, because he has not yet executed it. 
However, when he has actually painted it, then he both has it in his mind and understands that 
it exists because he has now made it.’ As a mental picture provides a painter with the 
resource needed to transform that picture into a reality, so this illustration confirms that 
Anselm’s argument is a tool that for allowing belief in God to form and transform ordinary 
thoughts and actions.  
In keeping with the ancient tradition of spiritual exercises, consequently, Anselm 
seemingly delineates a sort of ‘practical syllogism’ through which we may apply the belief 
that that God is ‘whatever it is best to be’ in assessing the worth of objects and circumstances 
we encounter in the world. By these means, we ensure that God does not merely exist 
notionally in the mind but also plays a vivid part in our dealings with reality. This is arguably 
what Anselm has in mind when he claims that ‘existence in reality is better than mere 
                                                        
412 Proslogion 13-21. 
413 Proslogion 24-6. 
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existence in the mind’, namely, that it is better to operate in reality like God exists than 
simply to say that one believes that he does, and act as if he does not.  
While it is clearly foolish on Anselm’s view to deny that God exists altogether, it is 
likewise foolish nominally to acknowledge his reality as the supreme being and then fail to 
live in accordance with what is professed to be true. In short, it is foolish because it is 
inconsistent and thus irrational, not to say hypocritical. So construed, Anselm’s argument 
provides a remedy against hypocrisy because it facilitates an increase in the consistency 
between the belief Christians profess or hold in the mind about who God is as the sole being 
of absolute significance and the way they live in reality. Insofar as its application reveals the 
difference belief in God makes to the way we understand everything that is not God, it may 
be said to provide a sort of ‘personal proof’ for the reality of God. To make both believers 
and through them, unbelievers aware of this difference is arguably what Anselm’s project of 
faith seeking understanding is all about.  
 
The Sources of the Summa’s Proof 
 
Although Anselm’s argument thus interpreted is not wholly lacking in potential to 
reinforce belief in the reality of God, a reading of his whole Proslogion refutes the notion that 
it does nothing but deliver the sort of ontological proof for God’s existence that it has long 
been supposed to provide. How then did such a reading of his thought emerge? To answer 
this question, we must look not only to the sources of early Franciscan thinkers, who were the 
first in the West not only to incorporate Anselm but also to defend a so-called proof for a 
necessary existent. As noted in the chapter on philosophical context, this proof was one of 
Avicenna’s most celebrated contributions to the history of philosophy. In what follows, I will 
review briefly the contours of Avicenna’s argument, before examining the proof for the 
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necessary existence of one God, whereby Richard of St Victor paved the way for the 
Franciscan appropriation of Avicenna. 
The proof for the NE that Avicenna presents in his Book of the Cure, which is the text 
that Latin scholars at this time would have known, starts from encounters with possible or 
‘contingent beings’. These are beings that did not have to exist, and which cannot therefore 
be the source of their own existence, goodness, truth, or whatever. The existence of such 
beings suggests that there is a further being through whom they exist, which is itself the cause 
of its own existence and which is necessary in that sense. In Avicenna’s account, this proof 
engenders the further conclusion that there cannot be an infinite chain of beings that cause 
one another, but that there must be an initial, uncaused cause at which they all terminate. 
Though reflection on things possible in themselves and necessary through another 
serves as the catalyst for concluding that there is a NE, Avicenna insists that his is not a 
cosmological argument that infers the necessary existent from empirical realities.414 Rather, it 
is a purely metaphysical proof which can be worked out simply through rational reflection on 
what it means to be a necessary being that exists through itself and through which other 
things have their existence. Such a being cannot not exist, insofar as it is part of its definition 
to cause its own existence. Since we are innately aware of what it means to be a necessary 
being, moreover, we cannot fail to know this being not only as the cause of itself but also of 
everything else.  
On this showing, contingent beings do not so much prove the reality of God as trigger 
the latent awareness of the one through whom they have their existence, who in turn exists 
through himself.415 That stated, it is a matter for debate whether and to what extent an 
                                                        
414 Avicenna, Meta., I, 3. 
415 Anton Pegis, ‘The Bonaventurian Way to God,’ 216, quoting Etienne Gilson, La philosophie de saint 
Bonaventure, 2nd ed., (Paris, 1943), 108: ‘All knowledge comes from prior knowledge, and the apparently 
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Avicennian proof has something in common with ontological arguments let alone the one 
attributed to Anselm. While both arguments move from the definition of God to his reality, 
this only establishes them as members of the same species or genre, not as argumentative 
twins.416 Those who specialise in Avicenna will be better placed to address this debate, which 
is not the primary focus here. The main goal in the present context is instead to trace how 
early Franciscans came to project Avicenna’s proof for the necessary existent on to Anselm.  
For this purpose, we must turn to the argument for the necessary existence of one God 
that Richard of St Victor offers in the first chapter of his De Trinitate, the overarching project 
of which is to establish the necessity of God’s unity and ultimately Trinity. One of the key 
assumptions underlying Richard’s project is that, ‘we do not hold anything more firmly than 
that which we grasp by a resolute faith.’417 Although this assumption may seem counter-
intuitive, since God subsists beyond the reach of human experience, Richard seems to think it 
holds true in an objective sense, insofar as God is the source of all beings, and thus the only 
being that must exist.  
Since ‘it seems utterly impossible that things that are necessary lack of a necessary 
reason,’ Richard further argues, there must be not only plausible but also necessary reasons 
for the things we believe about God.418 Here, he borrows a distinction between ‘necessary’ 
and ‘fitting’ reasons that Anselm had invoked in explaining why God became man, and 
                                                        
immediate and primitive recognition of the contingent supposes the prior knowledge of the necessary. Now the 
necessary is nothing other than God; human intelligence, therefore, experiences the fact that it already possesses 
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416 Peter Adamson, ‘From the Necessary Existent to God,’ in Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 170: ‘proving the existence of a necessary existent is different from 
proving the existence of God,’ and neither Avicenna nor the Franciscans seemingly intend to do the latter. 
417 Richard of St Victor, DT I.2. 
418 Ibid., IV. 
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which notably does not feature in his Proslogion. In the chapter where Richard deploys such 
reasons, I have noted, the belief at issue is the oneness of God—and the corresponding 
impossibility of positing more than one God. Richard’s argument for divine unity turns on a 
preceding argument in favour of divine necessity.  
In this regard, Richard notes that everything that exists must either exist from eternity 
or in time and must receive its being out of another or from itself. On this basis, he concludes 
that a being, such as God, that is from eternity must also be from itself, because nothing that 
is eternal is preceded by and thus derived from another. By contrast, creatures which exist in 
time necessarily come from God rather than from themselves.419 Precisely because God is a 
being who derives from no other, Richard further argues, there cannot be more than one God, 
otherwise there would be multiple beings that do not come from another. However, the sheer 
existence of multiple beings would suggest that one came from the other, which entails a 
contradiction.420  
Although Richard does not quote the Proslogion or any other source explicitly in 
developing these arguments—a practice quite common in this type of writing and also used 
by Anselm—he makes implicit reference to Anselm in affirming that ‘it is essential that 
something supreme should exist,’ and ‘we define as supreme over all things, that of which 
nothing is greater, nothing is better. Without a doubt, the rational nature is better than the 
reasonless nature. It is indispensable, then, that a rational substance be supreme above 
everything.’421 As he later posits, ‘divine knowledge cannot conceive anything on the 
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intellectual plane more perfect than God. Even less, then, human understanding can imagine 
something greater and better than God.’422 
In this context, it seems clear that Richard imports the main claims Anselm makes in 
chapter two of his Proslogion into his own argument for the necessary existence of a singular 
being that is ‘from itself’ and is, as such, from eternity. By the same token, Richard removes 
Anselm’s argument from the broader context of the Proslogion, jettisoning the rest of the 26-
chapter text in what has now become a relatively common practice. In doing so, he set the 
stage for the Halensian Summists to go a step further and deploy Anselm’s argument not 
merely to defend a proof for the necessary existence of one God but the necessary existence 
of God in himself, along the lines of Avicenna. The justification for this conflation was 
already seemingly provided by Richard when he invoked Anselm’s ‘necessary reasons’ to 
argue that there is only one God. In what follows, we will see how the Summa brings its 
sources together while moving beyond them in an innovative way. 
 
The Proof for a Necessary Existent  
  
The very first question addressed in the Summa Halensis, after introductory material 
on the status of theology as a science and the nature of knowledge of God, inquires whether 
God exists necessarily, or is a necessary existent. The very fact that this question, not 
previously posed in a scholastic text of which I am aware, is posed here is quite striking. It is 
hard to imagine that the question could have occurred to the Franciscans in a vacuum: they 
found it in their inheritance of Avicenna. The Summa’s answer to this question is itself 
delivered across two main sections of the text. The first argues that the divine substance 
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exists by necessity (quod necesse est divinam substantiam esse). The second contends that 
God cannot be thought not to exist (quod non potest cogitari Deum non esse). As a matter of 
fact, however, the first article presents five main arguments why God necessarily exists.  
Although most readers today tend to associate the idea of delineating ‘five ways’ to 
prove God’s existence with Thomas Aquinas, the Summa Halensis was the first text to 
implement this approach, with arguments taken from the notions of being, causality, truth, 
goodness, and eminence.423 The first way of proving the necessary existence of God, from 
being or existence, is elucidated with reference to arguments from Richard of St Victor, 
largely rehearsed above, which assert that all things that are or could be either existed from 
eternity or began to be in time, and have their being either from themselves, or from another 
that exists of its own accord.424  
On this basis, Richard distinguishes between four different ways in which a being can 
exist, namely, from eternity and from itself; neither from eternity nor from itself; from 
eternity, but not from itself; or from itself but not from eternity. According to Richard, the 
last option is impossible: nothing is able to exist from itself and not from eternity, else there 
would have been nothing to bring into existence all that began to exist and continues to exist 
in time. By the same token, something had to exist from eternity and from itself to give 
existence to other things. In the account of the Summist, this ‘something’ is the divine 
substance.  
 The second, closely related, way to prove the necessity of the divine, namely, from 
causality, takes an insight from John of Damascus as its point of departure. According to 
John, all that exists is either caused or uncaused, that is, created or uncreated. But all that is 
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causable is changeable; that is to say, it moves from non-being into being. But nothing can 
cause itself. Therefore, there must be an uncaused substance, namely, God.  
The third way, concerning truth, refers primarily to Anselm’s De Veritate. There, 
Anselm writes that if truth had a beginning or an end, then even before it began to be true, it 
would have been true that truth did not exist at some point in time. After truth comes to an 
end, moreover, he writes that it will be true that ‘there is no truth’. Since truth cannot 
therefore exist or even cease to exist unless there is truth, truth exists eternally, and the truth 
is God.  
The fourth way, from goodness, turns specifically to Anselm’s most famous rendering 
of his argument in Proslogion 2, in order to affirm him as the supreme good that is the source 
of all goods. As such a good ‘than which nothing greater can be conceived’ (TTWNGCBC), 
he exists not only in the mind but also in reality, because existence in reality is better than 
mere existence in the mind, and God is whatever it is best to be. Only such a good can give 
rise to others. In elaborating this interpretation, fascinatingly, the Summa acknowledges that 
its reading of Anselm is not based directly on his main text, but is to some extent eked out of 
his reply to Gaunilo. There is as clear an admission as one could hope for that the Summa’s 
understanding of Anselm was not necessary the primary one that Anselm intended.  
The fifth way, from eminence, draws on Anselm’s Monologion 4, with a 
corroborating quotation from Richard of St Victor, which calls attention to the fact that there 
are degrees of being, in which higher grades of being serve as causes for those that are lower. 
As the Summa observes, these causes cannot regress infinitely but must terminate in an 
ultimate cause. On this basis, the Summist concludes with Anselm that there is a super-
eminent being, which is superior to all other natures, and is ranked inferior to none. And this 
is God.  
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 In summary, there are five ways to establish the necessity of the divine being. The 
first does so by appealing to the necessity of an eternal being that can give rise to temporal 
beings; the second, to something uncaused and unchanging that can engender things that are 
caused and changing; the third, to an eternal truth that is the condition of possibility for all 
finite truths, even the truth that truth may begin or end; the fourth, to a good that is the source 
of all goods; and the fifth, to the necessity of a super-eminent being that supersedes all grades 
of finite being.  
At face value, these five ways might seem like cosmological ways of the sort 
provided by Thomas Aquinas. After all, they infer the existence of God on the basis of 
empirical things that are temporal, caused, true, good, and exist at inferior grades of being. In 
the second article of the Summa’s discussion, however, it becomes clear that such a bottom-
up approach to establishing the divine reality is not what the Summists have in mind. Here, 
the Summa follows the precedent set by Richard of St Victor in his De Trinitate to remove 
Anselm’s argument from the broader context of the Proslogion. For his part, we have seen, 
Richard deployed this argument to argue for the necessity of one God. 
In the Franciscan account, by contrast, the argument for divine necessity becomes an 
end in its own right. That is not to suggest that the Summists actually entertain doubts about 
God’s existence. This would have been highly unlikely at the time. Rather, they seek to give 
a reasoned explanation for the belief in God that they take to be true. This explanation turns 
on the assumption that our knowledge of God is prior to that of anything else: we possess it 
before we even encounter things in the world. This is because the human mind is the image 
of God and is, as such, ‘naturally directed…toward that being in whose image it exists.’425 As 
Anton Pegis has noted, this is a very strong interpretation of what John of Damascus meant 
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when he insisted that all human beings enjoy an innate knowledge of God, namely, that if 
God is the light of reason, we cannot help but know God.  
For these Franciscans, God’s image is the locus of our capacity not only to know God 
himself but also to know all the things in the world that he has made. We cannot know the 
world before we know him because we have no recourse to true understanding of reality 
without aid from the one who made it. At the background here is the doctrine of the innate 
knowledge of the transcendentals which the Summa also adapts from Avicenna. According to 
the Franciscan version of this doctrine, we have an innate knowledge of being and its first 
determinations, which makes it possible for us to comprehend beings accurately in their own 
right and thereby in terms of the way they reflect their creator.  
When we reflect on God as the very source of such cognitive powers, or on ourselves 
as his images, consequently, we cannot help but know him as necessarily existent. We alight 
upon a proof for God’s existence that is purely rational or based solely upon sources derived 
from the human mind itself. These are the very resources through which we can draw the 
further inference that God must exist on his own terms. As he is the source of our being, the 
Summa reasons, he must likewise be the source of his own. In confirming this, the Summa 
restates Anselm’s argument as follows: God is whatever it is best to be; that than which no 
better can be conceived; the supreme being. Since existence in reality is better than existence 
in the mind or imagination only, God necessarily exists. 
This conclusion does not apply to any being other than God, the Summa echoes 
Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo in affirming, insofar as beings besides God have a beginning and 
end in time and can therefore in principle be thought not to exist.426 While it is possible for 
this reason to think of such beings in abstraction from the question whether they actually 
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exist, God cannot be regarded as non-existing, precisely because the definition of his being is 
to exist through himself, or to exist necessarily, and so to be one through whom other beings 
exist, insofar as they do so.  
Once God has been established as self-subsistent along these lines, he can be further 
recognized as the one through whom all other things exist, are good, and so forth, with the 
help of the five ways. We can see God as the Supreme Being that is reflected in created 
beings; the Cause of what is caused; the Good that is in ordinary goods, the supreme Truth 
that is in truths, and so on. The innate knowledge of God which we access either through 
reflection on ourselves or himself is the key to discovering his presence in the world, albeit 
finitely, but in a nonetheless direct or univocal way as we will discover in the next chapter.  
In the aforementioned respects, we can discern how creatures testify to his reality, not 
so much by establishing it on empirical grounds as by triggering the awareness of him that is 
always present in the mind as his image. As Etienne Gilson put it, the proofs from creatures 
are proofs on this understanding because ‘they set in motion intelligible notions that imply 
the existence of God.’427 Thus, he goes on to say, ‘it is only in appearance that our reasoning 
takes its origin in the recognition of sensible data.’428 Since we have an innate idea of God, 
the sensible world will never aid us in constructing it; it can only offer us the occasion to 
recover it.’429  
So construed, the five ways are clearly founded on one purely rational or ontological 
way of proving God’s existence. This can itself take two forms, depending on whether we 
reflect on God in his image or in terms of who he is in himself. In affirming this, incidentally, 
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the Summa anticipates Bonaventure’s three-pronged approach to proving God’s existence on 
the basis of God’s interior image, the world, or the very definition of God: what is inside, 
outside, or above the self.430 As we have seen, all these ways are founded on the innate 
knowledge of God as the one through whom we ourselves possess our characteristic powers: 
who is closer to us than we are to ourselves and is therefore not unknowable by us. This 
knowledge in turn enables us to see that he exists in himself—his essence is his existence, as 
scholastics put it—and that he is as such the giver or existence to all things which testify to 
his reality in turn. 
There is only one way we can fail to recognise God’s existence in any of the 
aforementioned ways. In illustrating this point, the Summa distinguishes between knowledge 
insofar as it pertains to the knower versus the object known. In his own right, as the object 
known, God cannot be thought not to exist. To understand the meaning of the word ‘God’ is 
after all to understand that he cannot not exist: that the perfection of existence is part of what 
it means for him to be the supreme and self-subsistent being through whom all other beings 
have their being.  
As knowers, however, we may refuse to acknowledge that we subsist through one that 
it self-subsistent: that the divine being is the very condition for our existence. In denying this, 
we inevitably become ignorant of the testimony to God’s existence that derives not only from 
the self as his image but also from creatures and from reflection on the very meaning of the 
term ‘God’, which entails existence by definition.431 According to the Summa, this is what 
Anselm means when he allows that the fool may say in their heart, ‘there is no God’: not that 
God can be objectively regarded as non-existent, but that we can refuse to accept his place in 
our lives, as the source of our life, our powers, and of all things.  
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This is what is at stake in a further distinction the Summa draws between 
understanding of a thing in universal or particular terms, or in terms of its universal but not 
its proper reason. As the Summa notes, many individuals understand that beatitude is 
happiness. While they therefore understand what beatitude is in universal terms, they may 
still believe that it specifically consists in wealth, honor, or other worldly goods. Thus, they 
may fail to appreciate what beatitude is in proper terms, and so to grasp that it turns on the 
vision of God. By the same token, idolaters recognize God in universal terms, as the principal 
and omnipotent being, but overlook what he is in proper or specific terms, elevating false 
images or false gods as objects of worship. In this way, they give to something that is not 
God a place that he alone should have in our lives.  
The only way to overcome the ignorance of him that results is through repentance 
from sin, which restores recourse to the innate knowledge of God through which we can 
know that he exists in the three main ways. When we accept that he alone can satisfy the 
conditions for our own and all possible forms of existence, as a matter of fact, we cannot 
actually avoid acknowledging that God is self-subsistent, and, as such, necessarily exists. As 
we have seen, the basic argument that underlies this conclusion is similar to that of Avicenna: 
it starts from the innate assumption that all things that exist, including the self itself, must do 
so through a being that exists through itself and is necessary in that sense.  
In order to draw this type of argument into the Christian tradition of thought, the 
Summists project something like Avicenna’s proof for a necessary existent on to Anselm by 
removing chapters 2, not to mention 3 and 4, of the Proslogion from its larger context. In this 
regard, they followed the example of Richard of St Victor, who had done something similar 
previously in order to establish that there is necessarily only one God. The further de-
contextualisation of Anselm’s discussion of ‘necessary reasons’ to support this conclusion 
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arguably lay the groundwork for the Summists later to read Avicenna’s proof into a text by 
Anselm that simply does not contain anything exactly like it.  
Although the Summa is indebted to such sources, its proof for God’s necessary 
existence is clearly more than the sum or function of them. As in other cases of scholastic 
thought, the Summists worked with their own objectives in mind and turned their sources 
precisely to that end. What they produce as a result is an argument the exact form of which 
cannot be found in any of the authorities they employ, including Anselm. That is not to 
suggest that the Summists or even Richard mishandled Anselm’s writings or any others in 
recasting their meaning. As we have seen, the manipulation of sources was standard and even 
required practice at a time when the accepted way of thinking creatively and innovatively 
involved locating personal opinions within larger, if loosely defined traditions or streams of 
thought, elaborating and even redefining them in the process.  
In the case of the first Franciscans, this is precisely what happened with Anselm’s 
Proslogion. By excising chapter two from this text and recasting it as a proof for the 
necessary existent, the Summists bequeathed to subsequent thinkers an understanding of 
Anselm that has dominated in some capacity ever since. As far as the Western tradition is 
concerned, consequently, the Franciscans, not Anselm, must be regarded as the real 
innovators of Anselm’s ontological argument. In closing, therefore, it is worth considering 
exactly what may have motivated the early Franciscans as Franciscans to articulate a theistic 
proof in this novel manner. 
 
The Franciscan Nature of the Proof 
 
Although the authors of the Summa do not elaborate explicitly on the motivation for 
their work, it stands to reason that their intent was at least in part to articulate philosophical 
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and theological positions that were consistent with the spiritual ideals of the order’s founder, 
Francis of Assisi. This would have been necessary for survival in their institutional home at 
the University of Paris. Furthermore, it was essential to training up the next generation of 
Franciscans in a distinctly Franciscan way of thinking. This generation included the likes of 
Bonaventure, who claims to have learned all his good ideas from his Parisian Franciscan 
teachers, first and foremost, Alexander of Hales.  
For these founders of the Franciscan school of thought, Avicenna’s argument was not 
only conveniently accessible, but also particularly well suited to capturing the example of 
Francis of Assisi. Famously, the saint maintained a constant consciousness of God’s presence 
that gave him insight into the way all creatures testify to their Creator. In a description of the 
Franciscan argument, Scott Matthews affirms that ‘it is this teaching above all that 
fundamentally expresses Francis’s experience of God, as immanent within the nature and 
intimately related to the soul.’432 
According to the Franciscan tradition of thought, we have seen that the ability to 
know God in these ways can never be lost, even in the wake of sin, lest God be charged with 
failing to render himself eminently knowable to all human beings. By this account, 
consequently, sin simply makes us ignorant of the knowledge of God we nonetheless always 
possess. As such, it is a defect of the will to exhibit the love of God that opens up access to 
the knowledge of God, not a defect on the part of the intellect as regards the knowledge of 
God himself. By leading us to love things other than God more than God, in summary, sin 
obscures our intuitive awareness of God. 
For the early Franciscans, this awareness of God can only be restored through the 
rekindling of the will to love God and thereby to regain immediate access to the innate 
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knowledge of him that was never lost. In addition to explaining and holding Franciscans 
accountable to maintain the intuitive, personal connection with God that Francis enjoyed, this 
way of putting things may have been designed to assert the legitimacy and even primacy of 
Franciscan thought at a time when the very idea of a Franciscan intellectual tradition was 
being called into question both within and outside the order, by those who believed 
intellectual pursuits to be incompatible with Francis’ intentions for his followers. 
By positing love—and undoubtedly a Franciscan understanding of it—as the ‘key’ to 
knowledge not only of God but also, through him, of everything else, the Summists implicitly 
declared that a Franciscan attitude, and even a Franciscan lifestyle, is the means to all true 
knowledge, of the world, the self, or God. In turn, they suggested that such knowledge is 
constitutive of the Franciscan perspective and Franciscan lifestyle.433 In this way, they 
refuted objections to a Franciscan intellectual tradition at the level of that tradition’s own 
development. By the same token, the Summists codified an approach to natural theology that 
would become a fixture not only in the later Franciscan intellectual tradition but even, 
arguably, in modernity. 
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6. DIVINE NATURE 
 
The doctrine of God remains one of the most fundamental and significant areas of 
early Franciscan innovation, not least under the influence of Avicenna. Since Augustine, 
medieval thinkers in the West had largely identified ‘simplicity’ as the most fundamental 
feature of the divine nature. Thus, the doctrine of divine simplicity, now frequently referred 
to as ‘classical theism’, had been propounded by such noteworthy figures as Hilary of 
Poitiers, Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas, who articulated this 
doctrine in its mature form.434 Against the otherwise relatively continuous Western tradition 
of thinking about the general nature of God, this chapter will demonstrate that the Summa 
Halensis developed a second and separate line of thought on the matter.  
This new tradition stressed God’s immensity or infinity where the preceding one had 
emphasized his basic simplicity. In doing so, I would argue, it instigated a fundamental shift 
in the way of conceiving the nature of God that correlated strongly to Francis’ own 
theological outlook.435 In order to substantiate this claim, I will start by offering an overview 
of the unique structure of the early Franciscan doctrine of God and its historical sources and 
context. This analysis will highlight the respects in which early Franciscan theologians 
appear to have departed from or developed past traditions in treating the nature of God, under 
the influence of the recently encountered Greek Christian tradition.  
In a second part of the chapter, I will briefly outline the traditional teaching on divine 
simplicity, as advocated by Augustine, by way of a foil that will throw into relief the 
innovativeness of the early Franciscan doctrine of divine immensity, which I will then treat in 
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more detail. This analysis will give considerable weight to the claim that the authors of the 
Summa were not mere followers of Augustine’s tradition. To reinforce this point, I will then 
show how John Duns Scotus developed their intuitions about divine infinity to render them 
more consistent. Finally, I will reiterate my suggestion that the early Franciscan doctrine of 
God as immense served to paint a picture of God as Francis of Assisi understood him.   
 
The Summa’s Doctrine of God and its Sources 
 
The treatise on the One God that follows immediately on the introductory material in 
the Summa Halensis consists of six tractates. The first covers the necessity or essentiality, 
immutability, and simplicity of the divine in a mere 13 pages; the second deals with divine 
immensity in nearly 60 pages; the third covers the unity, truth, and goodness of God in 
almost 100 pages; the fourth, fifth, and sixth sections deal with God’s power, knowledge, and 
will, respectively, in approximately 200 further pages. The coverage of some of these topics, 
such as divine immutability and simplicity as well as divine power, knowledge, and will, is 
relatively unremarkable. These topics are dealt with in Lombard’s Sentences.436 Moreover, 
they are treated albeit in more disparate fashion in the works of Augustine and Anselm, not to 
mention Aquinas.  
 Far more extraordinary is the primacy given to divine necessity and the amount of 
space devoted to the discussion of the so-called ‘transcendentals’ of unity, truth, and 
goodness. While these doctrines have been considered in the last two chapters, the present 
chapter is concerned with the equally unusual phenomenon of the Summa’s dealing with the 
doctrine of divine immensity, a term early scholastics used interchangeably with infinity, 
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both of which imply absence of measure or limit.437 Prior to the twelfth century, very few 
references to the notion of divine infinity can be found in Latin writings, as a search through 
the volumes of the Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, and the Patrologia Latina confirms. 
In his brief treatment of the matter, Peter Lombard cites Hilary of Poitiers, as below:438 
 
But God is a living Force, of infinite power, present everywhere and nowhere absent, 
and manifests his whole self through his own, and signifies that his own are naught 
else than himself, so that where they are he may be understood to be himself. Yet we 
must not think that, after a corporeal fashion, when he is in one place he ceases to be 
everywhere, for through his own things he is still present in all places. 
 
Similar references to divine infinity can be found in several other passages of Hilary’s 
De Trinitate, which is the leading source next to Augustine, not least for Lombard, on the 
doctrine of divine simplicity. The common refrain of these passages is that God is infinite in 
the sense that ‘nothing contains him, and he contains all things.’439 For Hilary, and indeed for 
Lombard, this proximity-in-distance from creatures is first and foremost a sign of God’s 
presence in the world, which is manifest in all that he creates and upholds.440 This tendency 
to link divine infinity with divine presence was subsequently adopted by other key figures in 
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the early medieval tradition like Isidore of Seville, whose discussion of divine omnipotence 
echoes that of Hilary:441   
 
The immensity of the divine greatness is such that we understand him to be inside 
everything, but not enclosed [in it]; outside everything, but not excluded [from it]. He 
is inside in such a way that he holds everything together; he is outside in such a way 
that he includes all things by the uncircumscribed immensity of his magnitude. Thus, 
his exteriority shows that he is the creator. But his interiority proves that he governs 
everything.  
 
As this quotation re-confirms, the doctrine of divine immensity provided a way for 
Latin thinkers to affirm the simultaneous immanence and transcendence of God with respect 
to all created things. While the ubiquity of God’s presence in creation was perhaps a logical 
outworking of divine simplicity in their understanding, it was arguably only one of any 
number of attributes that could be derived from that doctrine. In short, it was not necessarily 
central in the manner of divine simplicity itself. This situation appears to change dramatically 
in the twelfth century as a result of the popularization of the works of numerous Greek 
Christian authors, above all, the sixth-century author, Pseudo-Dionysius. In the ninth 
century—by 862 to be exact—John Scottus Erigena had translated the complete works of 
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exteriorem, ut incircumscripta magnitudinis suae immensitate omnia concludat. Per id ergo, quod exterior est, 
ostenditur esse creator; per id vero quod interior, gubernare omnia demonstratur. Ac ne ea quae creata sunt 
sine Deo essent, Deus intra omnia est. Verum ne extra Deum essent, Deus exterior est, ut omnia concludantur 
(There are 8 references to divine immensity in total in the Sententiae).  
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Pseudo-Dionysius into Latin, along with the Ambigua of Maximus the Confessor and the De 
imagine (De hominis opificio) of Gregory of Nyssa.442 
To accompany Maximus’ work, Eriugena composed a commentary of his own on 
Dionysius’ Celestial Hierarchy, which became part of the Dionysian corpus that was 
available to later thinkers, as well as his personal masterpiece, the Periphyseon.443 Although 
this work was condemned in 1225 and was not cited subsequently as a result of its apparent 
promotion of pantheism, it continued to exert influence on Latin thinkers through Honorius 
Augustodunensis, who produced a precis of Eriugena’s magnum opus in his own Clavis 
Physicae.444 In this work and the others mentioned above, we have seen, Latin thinkers 
encountered a much stronger emphasis on the mystery and unknowability of God than can be 
found in the Western tradition.445 Like Augustine, Latin Fathers such as Hilary of Poitiers 
and Gregory the Great held that God is present to the soul in a way that makes him somehow 
knowable in this life and also anticipates a direct vision of him in the life to come.446  
The contrasting Greek emphasis on God’s incomprehensibility stemmed from a firm 
belief in the ‘immeasurability’ (immensurabilitas) of God, to which one finds frequent 
references throughout the Dionysian Latin corpus. This is certainly also true of the De fide 
                                                        
442 The form in which the Dionysian corpus was available is indicated by Henri F. Dondaine, Le corpus 
Dionysien de l’Universite de Paris au XIII siècle (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e letteratura, 1953), 124. In addition 
to the tradition of Eriugena, Nyssa existed also in an earlier translation by Dionysius Exiguus; see Philip Levine, 
‘Two Early Latin Versions of St. Gregory of Nyssa's περὶ κατασκευης ἀνθρώπου,’ Harvard Studies in Classical 
Philology 63 (1958), 473-92. 
443 Antoine Côté, L’infinité divine, 40. 
444 P. Lucentini, Honorius Augustodunensis: Clavis Physicae (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e letteratura, 1974).  
445 Antoine Côté, L’infinité divine, 35.  
446 Simon Tugwell, Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 41; cf. Antoine 
Côté, L’infinité divine, 34-5. 
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orthodoxa of John of Damascus, which was first incorporated extensively by Peter 
Lombard;447 and which is the most frequently invoked scholastic source on the relation of 
infinity and incomprehensibility aside from Dionysius.448 In such sources, the immensity—
also referred to as the infinity—of God is not simply a property of the divine presence, but a 
central property of God himself.449 As Dionysius and Damascus came into wider circulation 
in the twelfth century, this centralization of infinity began to grip the imagination of thinkers 
like John Sarrazin (fl. 1140-70), who produced a new translation of Dionysius, and Hugh of 
St Victor (1096-1141), who spearheaded the scholastic tradition of commentating on his 
works. In a commentary on Dionysius’ Celestial Hierarchy, for instance, Hugh of St Victor 
affirms this relationship in his comments on divine immensitas, which cannot be captured by 
the human mind.450 While the doctrine of immensity is not the main focus of Hugh’s 
theology, it seems to enter through him, among others, onto the theological scene, recurring 
in a number of Hugh’s other writings, including his great De sacramentis fidei.  
The initial introduction of immensity by these means evidently proved a considerable 
inspiration to Hugh’s successor, Richard of St Victor (d. 1173), who in turn influenced 
Alexander of Hales’ account of God in the Glossa.451 In his De Trinitate, Richard bemoans 
the fact that he finds in the Western tradition no fully satisfying, purely rational explanation 
as to how God can be both one and three, even though he finds that the Tri-unity of God is 
                                                        
447 Jacques-Guy Bougerol, ‘The Church Fathers and the Sentences of Peter Lombard,’ in The Reception of the 
Church Fathers in the West, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 113-64, esp. 133-7.  
448 Antoine Côté, L’infinité divine, 44.  
449 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 2. The connection between infinity and incomprehensibility 
comes from Macrobius, Hermes Trismegistus, Chalcidius, Dionysius, Eriugena.  
450 Hugh of St Victor, Summa Sententiarum (PL 176, 972D-973A); cited by Antoine Côté, L’infinité divine, 23.  
451 Alexander of Hales, Glossa I, XIX, p. 373.  
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constantly affirmed on authoritative grounds. As a result, Richard sets out to provide such an 
explanation, which he subsequently works out entirely in terms that can be accessed by 
reason.452 In this regard, he initially seeks to defend the claim that God is one.453 Here, the 
doctrine of divine immensity quickly comes to the fore of his discussion, albeit in the wake of 
an argument for the necessary existence of only one God.  
To support his claims, Richard postulates three possible modes of being, seemingly 
drawn from the work of John Scotus Eriugena, whose interest in Greek thought is well 
known, and whose translation of the Dionysian corpus would have been the one of several 
available translations which Richard would likely have consulted.454 These modes of being 
are: from eternity and deriving its existence from itself; neither from eternity nor from itself; 
or from eternity but not from itself. According to Richard, a fourth possibility—the opposite 
of this last one—is impossible, because there cannot be any being that is not from eternity but 
which is nevertheless from itself, lest there have been a time when nothing existed that could 
have given rise to the existence of other things.  
In Richard’s account, two such non-identical beings cannot exist, otherwise one 
would be superior to the other, and would not therefore be the most powerful being.455 On the 
basis of this four-fold distinction, consequently, Richard concludes that a single, supreme 
being, both eternal and from itself, necessarily exists. To bolster this conclusion, he invokes 
                                                        
452 Richard of St Victor, De Trinitate: texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, ed. Jean Ribaillier (Paris: 
J.Vrin, 1958). See also the version of De Trinitate, in Patrologia Latina, vol. 196, ed. J.P. Migne (Paris, 1855), 
III.I, 115. Translation by Ruben Angelici. Richard of St Victor: On the Trinity (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2011).  
453 DT, I.V, 
454 DT, I.VIII; cf. John Scotus Eriugena, Divisione I.1, 441b. 
455 DT, I.XIV. 
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Anselm’s famous argument and thereby appropriates it for the purposes of defending divine 
necessity, in a way the Franciscans take up in their own discussion of this matter.456  
In this context, Richard further contends that since God is infinite in terms of his 
eternity, he must also be infinite as regards his greatness.457 That is to say, he is immense—
there is no measure to his goodness, which cannot be comprehended. As such a being, God is 
immutable: he cannot deteriorate or improve, since his greatness is unsurpassable.458 Once 
again, Richard insists, there can only be one immense being, otherwise there would be 
multiple beings that cannot be comprehended by others, and each would be superior to the 
others, which entails a contradiction.459  
Such a supreme being cannot lack any desirable attributes: his definition is to be all 
that is good.460 In that sense, Richard follows a longstanding tradition, upheld by Anselm, 
which posits an identity of God’s essence and his attributes.461 According to this tradition, 
God is or is the definition of the properties he has—he has them in their fullness—whereas 
creatures simply have those properties in limited or qualified ways. God is whatever it is best 
to be. As such, he is one thing, and simple, not subject to the complex components or 
alterations that characterize his creatures.462  
Thus, Richard concludes his discussion of divine infinity in an attempt to reconcile it 
with simplicity. The shift worth noting here is the then still relatively novel tendency to 
                                                        
456 DT, I.XI. 
457 DT, II.V. 
458 DT, II.III. 
459 DT, II.VI. 
460 DT, II.XVI. 
461 DT, II.XVIII. 
462 DT, II.XX. 
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describe infinity along with simplicity as a central feature of the divine essence or nature, not 
merely a property of the divine presence. A similar approach can be detected in the work of 
Richard’s later contemporary, Alan of Lille (1128-1202/3).463 For Alan, both doctrines 
reinforce the unknowability of God—simplicity, as regards God in his own right, and 
infinity, as regards his reach into the world as the efficient cause of all things who is thereby 
in them through his essence (essentialiter).464 In the latter respect, Alan became famous, not 
least among the Halensian Summists, for introducing the West to the ancient adage first 
attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, according to which ‘God is an infinite sphere, whose 
center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere.’465 According to Alan, who 
replaces the term ‘infinite’ with ‘intelligible’:  
 
Creation is called the centre because, as time compared to eternity is like one 
moment, so creation compared with God’s immensity is a point, or the ‘centre’. The 
immensity of God, then, is called a ‘circumference’, because it ‘circumscribes’ 
everything by arranging it in some way, and [because] it embraces everything under 
his immensity. There is however a difference between a corporeal and an intelligible 
sphere: that corporeal spheres have an immobile centre but a moving circumference; 
by contrast, an intelligible sphere gives movement to everything because God remains 
stable.466 
                                                        
463 E. Sweeney, Logic Theology and Poetry in Boethius, Anselm, Abelard and Alan of Lille (Pagrave McMillan, 
2006), 129. 
464 Antoine Côté, L’infinité divine, 19.  
465 Karsten Harries, ‘The Infinite Sphere: Comments on the History of a Metaphor,’ Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 13:1 (January 1975), 5-15. 
466 Alan of Lille, Regulae Theologicae (PL 210), VII. Deus est spaera intelligibilis, cuius centrum ubique, 
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After Alan, efforts continued to link simplicity and infinity as key features of the 
divine. Over time, however, infinity came increasingly to the fore of theological inquiry, at 
least in the Franciscan tradition. The Dominican contemporaries of the Summists tended to 
take the more traditional line of linking divine infinity to the doctrine of divine presence, 
while giving primacy to God’s simplicity.467 This brings us to a discussion of the Franciscan 
doctrine of infinity, which I will contrast in the first instance with the traditional doctrine of 
divine simplicity, as articulated by Augustine. 
 
The Summa Halensis on Divine Infinity 
 
In his De Trinitate, Augustine explains the doctrine of divine simplicity by offering 
examples of things that are not simple.468 As he notes, bodily substances are not simple 
because they are comprised of parts which are subject to accidental changes, that is, changes 
in the properties of shape, color, etc. In his view, even the human soul is composed of parts in 
                                                        
circumferentia nusquam. Centrum dicitur creatura, quia sicut tempus collatum aeternitati reputatur momentum, 
sic creatura immensitati Dei comparata, punctum, vel centrum. Immensitas ergo Dei circumferentia dicitur, 
quia omnia disponendo quodam modo omnibus circumfertur, et omnia infra suam immensitatem complectitur. 
Haec etiam alia differentia inter spaeram corporalem, et intelligibilem, quia spaerae corporalis centrum 
immobile, circumferentia mobilis; in spaera intelligibili contra, quia Deus ‘stabilis manens dat cuncta moveri’ 
(this last phrase is a quote from Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy III, 67). 
467 Antoine Côté,‘Guerric de Saint-Quentin et le problem de l’infinite divine,’ in Les philosophies morales et 
politiques au Moyen Âge, t. III (Ottowa: Legas, 1995), 1132-48. R McCaslin, ‘Divine Infinity in Some Texts of 
Hugh of St Cher,’ The Modern Schoolman 42 (1964), 47-69. 
468 DT, VI.6.  
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the sense that it is present throughout the body, while not located at any one place in the 
body, and it is subject to changes in thoughts or feelings.  
By contrast to embodied beings, God is incorporeal and thus invisible. As such, he is 
not composed of parts.469 For the same reason, he is not changeable, given that change 
implies an alteration in the accidents or properties that are attributed to a substance or entity 
and a corresponding adjustment in the shape or size of its component parts. Thus, he cannot 
become wiser or more merciful, or become just where he previously was not. In fact, all of 
the properties that can be associated with him are not attributed to him as accidents, which 
are subject to alteration, but to his substance. As many medieval authors famously quipped, 
in attempting to summarise the tradition of Augustine and Anselm, ‘God is what he has: his 
essence is his accidents’.470 Once again, this means that God is whatever it is best to be, and 
is always completely so. To sum up: God always completely is what he is, which is the 
essence and source of all that is good.  
As noted already, the Franciscan Summa treats the idea of divine simplicity, albeit in 
a mere four pages, in a section on the essentiality or necessity, immutability, and simplicity 
of God. Although the placement of this discussion just prior to that of divine immensity does 
suggest a certain deference to longstanding tradition, the Summa’s approach to the question 
of simplicity represents quite an unusual theological departure. The account here focuses on a 
conceivable threat to the possibility of a simple God, namely, the Christian assertion that God 
subsists in multiple persons, which could be taken to imply that God is composed of parts and 
therefore fails to count as simple.471 
                                                        
469 DT, V.1-2. 
470 DT, VI.7. 
471 Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (Florence: Quaracchi, 1924), 
Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr 1, Qu 3, Ch 1, Ad 2 (n. 31), 50.  
 177 
With this threat in view, the Summist insists that the three persons in God do not 
undermine divine simplicity, because they do not represent diverse substances but rather 
diverse modes of relation in God, which actually enact his simplicity. In supporting this 
contention, the Summist appeals to Richard of St Victor, who is the key authority for early 
Franciscan Trinitarian theology. In his De Trinitate, Richard argued that a plurality of 
persons does not detract from the unity of the divine nature, just as a plurality of 
substances—specifically, body and soul—does not detract from the unity of a human 
person.472 For early Franciscans, consequently, the doctrine of divine simplicity is less a 
statement about the fundamental nature of God than a ground-clearing exercise, whereby they 
illustrated that their belief in the Trinity can be reconciled with the unity of God.  
When it comes to determining the most basic attribute of this one God, the early 
Franciscans turn—straightaway from the discussion of simplicity—to elaborate on the 
immensity of God. For all practical purposes, consequently, they appear to have substituted 
immensity for simplicity as the defining feature of the one God. Thus, it remains to consider 
what the founding fathers of the Franciscan school have to say about the immense nature of 
the divine. The first chapter of the first part of this discussion inquires whether the divine 
essence is infinite, as Greek fathers like Dionysius and Damascus affirm.473 Here, the Summa 
notes that the terms ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ imply quantity. However, God is not a being that 
can be quantified in terms of shape or size, like creatures.474  
                                                        
472 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr 1, Qu 3, Ch 2, Respondeo (n. 32), 52. 
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In order to affirm God’s infinity, consequently, the Summa distinguishes between two 
ways of understanding quantity: dimensionally and in terms of character.475 Obviously, God 
is not infinite in dimensional terms, because he is not a physical being. When it comes to 
dimensionality, he is infinite simply because he is not finite. As regards his character or 
nature, however, he is infinite, because he is the cause and end of all that exists or could 
exist; he is that which ‘finishes’ or makes them complete.476 On this basis, the Summa 
concludes that he is infinite so far as he is ‘not included in all things but fills them.’477 The 
only sense in which he can here be regarded as finite is the Aristotelian one, which defines 
infinity as a lack of order or completion and thus as an imperfection.  
 
Infinity and God’s Knowledge 
 
After establishing that God, while not finite in any but the Aristotelian sense, is the 
source of all finite beings, the Summa raises the question of the relationship between the 
infinite and the finite, first and foremost, in the mind of God. Here, it signals its intent, 
inspired by Avicenna, to recast the Greek Christian teaching according to which there is no 
commensurability of finite and infinite. This teaching sprang from a negative definition of 
infinity as that which lacks limits and cannot for this reason be traversed or captured by 
beings which possess them. By contrast, Avicenna presented a more positive account of 
infinity as ‘a quantity or something possessing a quantity such that anything you take from it 
                                                        
475 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr 2, Qu 1, Ch 1, 54-7. SH, Tr 2, Qu 1, Ch 1, Ad objecta 1 (n. 34), 56; Citing Augustine’s De 
quantitate animae 3 (PL 32, 1037).  
476 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr 2, Qu 1, Ch 1, 54-7. SH, Tr 2, Qu 1, Ch 1, F (n. 34), 55.   
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you also find something of it different from what you took and you never reach something 
beyond which there is nothing of it.’478  
Following Avicenna, if implicitly, the Summa describes what is infinite as follows:479 
 
Since there is no end to the divisions that can be made in continuous things, we say 
that such things are divisible unto infinity or infinite in division. Likewise, because 
there is no end to numbers that can be added one to another, we say that number is 
infinite in addition. Similarly, place is said to be finite or infinite with regard to 
circumscription, and time is finite or infinite in duration. 
 
Although the Franciscans like Avicenna deny that the infinite so construed can ever 
be fully exhausted or traversed, their rendering of his view seems to suggest that the infinite 
is populated by innumerable possible realities which subsist in a positive sense. In this 
regard, they may have been influenced by the longstanding Neo-Platonic tradition, 
represented not only by Damascus and Dionysius but also by the Liber de Causis, which 
defines the divine being as infinite.480 Along the lines of this tradition, the Summa posits an 
infinite number of ideas for things in God.481 While this might seem to imply that the mind of 
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God is subject to multiplicity, the Summa asserts the orthodox position that there is only one 
proper object of God’s knowledge, namely, God himself.482  
As the cause of all created realities, however, the Summa echoes Dionysius in 
affirming that ‘God knows all things in himself.’ On this basis, the Summa states that the 
divine ideas or exemplars are one and the same with the essence of God.483 That does not 
mean that creatures as exemplata are one with his essence, however, for they are in him only 
as their cause.484 This means that they are capable of conveying an aspect of his essence 
without actually instantiating his very substance. As different means of signifying who God 
is, the divine ideas are obviously subject to plurality.485  
However, this plurality does not subsist on the side of the divine cause but on the part 
of that which can be caused.486 As the Summa states, a ‘plurality in the essences of things 
exemplified does not entail a plurality in the essence of the exemplar: for there is no plurality 
there.’487 The analogy that the Summa invokes to explain this phenomenon is that of a point 
or centre of a circle, at which many lines terminate. ‘For as all straight lines leading from 
anywhere to the circumference terminate in one point, which is the centre, so by a certain 
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analogy, all things which are in the world, tend to one end, which is called the end of 
ends.’488    
Although the centre serves as the end of the conceivably infinite lines that derive from 
it, and comprehends them by its circumference, it remains nonetheless one in its own right, 
and not circumscribed by any line in particular. This illustration—adapted from Pseudo-
Dionysius—is the means the Summa employs time and again to explain how God’s unity is 
preserved, even while he knows all things or indeed includes multiple persons. By this 
account, it is more perfect to know many through one than many through many or one 
through one, because such knowledge requires a greater feat of unification.489 Since whatever 
is best is attributed to God, this is the way in which he invariably knows.490 More 
specifically, he knows himself in terms of his own nature. By the same token, we have seen, 
he knows creatures not in terms of their natures but in terms of himself as their cause.491  
That is not to say that he only knows beings in a more distant or mediated way than is 
possible for human beings who abstract universal concepts on the basis of sense experience. 
As the artificer of all things great and small, God knows every single creature in individual or 
singular terms, precisely because he knows them not through the senses or an abstract 
concept but through the ideal or model that is himself.492 On some level, the Summa notes, 
the knowledge of God also includes the knowledge of evil. To explain how so, the Summa 
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distinguishes between simple knowledge and a form of knowledge that entails approval. 
While God does not know evil in the second way, he is aware of it in the first.493  
This does not mean that God is the cause of evil, because evil entails a privation of 
what should exist, and God is only the cause of what exists.494 Though God is not therefore 
the cause of evil, he nonetheless allows it by giving human beings the freedom to choose or 
reject what is good. In doing so, he makes it possible for evil to be made good, not without 
qualification or simpliciter, but by reason of that which human beings elicit from evil 
circumstances.495 While evil is not good, useful, or expedient in itself, consequently, it can 
become good when it is ordered towards a good end by a human will that is conformed to the 
will of God, who is the cause of all good things.496 
On this showing, God is closer to creatures than they are to themselves, because he is 
the first principle of all, who holds all things together, and in whom all things live and move 
and have their being.497 In this connection, the Summa elaborates, God knows both things 
that do exist and that do not but could exist.498 This is because his knowledge extends as far 
as his power to exhibit causality and thus includes what has not yet been brought into 
being.499 Hence, God’s knowledge is infinite, as God himself is infinite, because he knows 
what he has not willed to create in addition to what he has created.500  
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That said, the Summa observes, his disposition or will to create is finite: God 
therefore possesses many ideas which are not instantiated, just as an architect possesses ideas 
for things he could but does not create.501 This affirmation reinforces the fact that there is 
always more to be discovered about God than what is evident in creation and emphasizes that 
creation is something God does not out of necessity but the freedom of his will.502 In short, it 
is important for avoiding pantheism, or the idea that God fully reduplicates his very self in 
the world, which had been strongly condemned since 1210.  
 
Infinity and God’s Power 
 
In a section on the immensity of divine power, the Summist elaborates on the 
distinction between the ideas God chooses and does not choose to instantiate. This discussion 
nicely illustrates how immensity has here become the central divine property from which 
others like divine power follow, rather than the other way around. In elaborating on the 
distinction, newly codified in the generation of the Summa, between God’s absolute versus 
his ordained power, he differentiates between what is possible de facto or in principle and 
what is possible de jure, that is, by will or permission.503  
While a human being is only able to do what is permissible without penalty—for 
instance, one may wish in principle to disobey laws without legally having scope to do so—
there is no difference between what is possible de jure and de facto for God, because he is the 
                                                        
501 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr5, S1, Q1, M3, C1, Respondeo (n. 168), 250-1. 
502 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, C5, A3, Solutio II (n. 122), 192. 
503 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr4, Q1, C2, Respondeo II (n. 135), 207; cf. Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, Q3, T3, C5, Ad ultimum (n. 
45), 70. William Courtenay, ‘The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages,’ in Divine 
Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy, ed. T. Rudavsky (D. Reidel Publishing, 1985), 243-69.  
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one who determines what is permissible or forbidden in the first place. On these grounds, the 
Summa concludes that God’s power is not limited by any factor. In short, it is absolute. 
Nevertheless, the Summa entertains conceivable arguments for limitations on God’s power, 
in the form of the following syllogism:  
 
1. At the initial moment of creation (A), God was either able to create all that can 
be created, or he was not.504  
2. If not, then his power is limited in creating.  
3. If so, then he is able to create everything creatable in A.  
4. But if God creates everything creatable in A, then he is not able to create 
anything after A, which implies that his power is limited by his initial action.  
 
In response to this line of reasoning, the Summist contends that the affirmation that 
‘God makes everything creatable in A’ does not necessarily imply that he is not able to create 
anything after A. For he only exhausts what he is able to do in the case of A, and even that 
limit is not essential to his nature but to the boundaries of A itself. After insisting that God’s 
action does not limit his immense power, the Summist goes on to bolster the more 
extraordinary claim that God’s power is not limited even by his own justice, goodness or 
wisdom. While God evidently does all things justly, because that is what he has ordained or 
willed to do, he is not unable to do anything unless it is just, because to attribute this inability 
to him would be to limit him.505  
In fact, he is able to do whatever he wills, whatever that may entail. One theologically 
surprising implication of this claim is that God is capable in virtue of his absolute power, or 
                                                        
504 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C1, I.1 (n. 140), 218. 
505 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C2, Ad objecta I.1-3 (n. 141), 220.  
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de facto, to damn those who are good and save those who are wicked. Although he declines 
to do this by his ordained power, he does not derogate his power in doing so. Rather, he 
illustrates the immutability of his ordained power which functions in keeping with the justice 
of his will. A related section further assesses what is possible for the divine power. Here, the 
Summist distinguishes between the usage of the term ‘possible’ de dicto or de re.506  
On his understanding, the de dicto application of a term refers to general categories of 
being rather than specific beings or states of affairs. By contrast, what is possible de re can be 
defined either as proper or characteristic of a thing (proprie) or as appropriated to it 
(appropriate). What is appropriated is made possible by a superior cause, but what is proper 
is possible by its inferior or intrinsic cause. While it is not possible, for example, for a virgin 
to conceive and a blind person to see in terms of an inferior cause, it is possible by way of a 
superior cause. Thus, such things are only possible unconditionally (simpliciter) where there 
is a superior cause, namely, God. 
 
Infinity and God’s Will 
 
The inferior causes or ideas God chooses to enact through this ordained power, that is, 
his unconstrained will, are imposed on prime matter.507 This is more fitting than God 
fashioning creation from his own substance, as if it were a material cause, which would result 
in pantheism.508 As we learned in the discussion of Avicenna, prime matter creates the 
potential for being. Precisely because it lacks form, however, it possesses no being in its own 
                                                        
506 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr4, Q2, M2, C2, Ad objecta III (n. 141), 221. See Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr4, Q3, C1, Respondeo (n. 
151), 230. 
507 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, Q1, C1, Ad objecta 5 (n. 34), p. 57; cf. Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, C2, Ar1, 2 (n. 116), 183.  
508 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, T1, M1, Solutio (n. 20), 31. 
 186 
right.509 Since what moves from a state of potency to actual existence can only come about by 
virtue of what is always in act, God rather than prime matter is the first principle of all 
creation.510 Through his work in this regard, creatures come to be comprised of two distinct 
substances or forms, better known as ‘substantial forms’.  
The first of these forms is the soul, which in the period of the Summa’s authorship 
was understood to be that part of any being, not just the human being, that determined its 
proper body. The second form was that of corporeality, which comes to exist on account of, 
and simultaneously with, the soul’s instantiation in prime matter.511 Through the impression 
of a soul in this matter, God was understood to transform nothing into ‘something’, which, 
while not the same as his essence, bears it nonetheless in the world. On this matter, the 
Summa invokes a longstanding tradition, stemming at least from Pseudo-Dionysius, and 
familiar to Hugh and Alan, of affirming that God is in things by essence, power, and 
presence, citing numerous sources in favour of this opinion.512  
While he is in things by essence insofar as he makes them to be what they are, he is in 
them by power in terms of the abilities he gives them, and by presence, through their 
                                                        
509 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3, 4 (n. 4), 11-13. 
510 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar3, 5, Ad objecta 4 (n. 4), 12-13. 
511 Vol 2.1, n. 347, Ad objecta 1-7, 422: Actus naturalis corporis completi in forma naturali, quae forma dicitur 
forma corporalis (The act of the natural body is completed in a natural form, which is called the form of 
corporeity); cf. 93, 7. Arthur Hyman, ‘Aristotle’s First Matter and Avicenna’s and Averroes’ Corporeal Form,’ 
in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1965).  
512 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, T3, M1, C2, I.a, b, c, II.1 (n. 46), 71; cf. De spiritu et anima 12; Pseudo-Dionysius, The 
Celestial Hierarchy 11; Richard of St Victor, DT II, 23; Anselm, Monologion 13. Peter Lombard also treats this 
topic in his Sent., distinctions 36-7, which cover the presence of things in God and God in things. Cf. Vol 2.1, 
In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, M1, C7, Solutio (n. 33), 43-4.   
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corresponding acts or operations.513 Since God is in things in these three ways, the Summa 
claims, it bears considering whether they exist in him in those three ways as well.514 Here, the 
Summist contends that things are in God by presence, because they are in his knowledge, and 
by power, because they are in him as their cause. However, creatures do not subsist in the 
essence of God, otherwise God’s existence would depend on that of creatures, which cannot 
give him being insofar as they depend on him for their own.515  
By virtue of this dependence, creatures are said to participate in God, whose being 
does not hinge on participation in other beings, for it is derived from himself.516 What it 
means thus to participate has already been hinted at above: it involves fully instantiating and 
thus corresponding to an idea in the mind of God, at the behest of God’s causal activity. Put 
differently, it entails ‘capturing a part’ of who God is’.517 That is not to say that God is 
composed of parts. For as we have already seen, the multiplicity in question does not exist on 
the part of God who is the infinite cause of all effects but on the part of the effects 
themselves, which bespeak his causal work in one way or another.518    
                                                        
513 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, T3, M1, C2, Solutio (n. 46), 72-3. 
514 Ibid. 
515 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, T3, M1, C4, II, Respondeo (n. 48), 75-6; cf. Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, C4, Ad objecta 4 (n. 
80), 131. 
516 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, T3, M1, C2, II.2 (n. 46), 72. 
517 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, C2, Ar2, 2 (n. 117), 184. Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, Ad objecta 5 (n. 105), 166.  
518 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, C2, Ar2, Ad objecta 2 (n. 117), 185: Dicendum quod divina bonitas in se ipsa 
simplicissima est nec habens partem et partem. Item, divina bonitas infinita est quantum ad effectus: unde si 
quaeratur quantum extenditur bonitas divina, non potest dici tantum; nam in infinitum extenditur; ideo bonitas 
divina non dicitur esse tanta, quia quantum ad effectus non est limitata nec in se ipsa…Quod ergo dicitur quod 
bonitas creata participat bonitatem increatam, hoc non est dicere quod bonitas increata dividatur per partes in 
 188 
This definition of participation chimes with the Summa’s discussion of the difference 
between the analogy or univocity of being.519 At an initial level, the Summa denies that the 
relationship between God and creatures is univocal, because this would supposedly require a 
complete correlation between the finite and the infinite, which is impossible. As the Summa 
reiterates, finite things only exhibit a partial correlation to the infinite, insofar as they mirror 
one of the divine ideas. Since they are proportional to the infinite in a limited way, the 
Summa concludes, their relationship to it must be analogous.  
Although the Summa thus rejects univocity, the ‘analogy of proportionality’ theory it 
puts forward instead is already much closer to the conception of univocity advocated by later 
Franciscans. For it allows that God and created forms exist in the exact the same—totalized 
or fully actualised—sense, albeit infinitely and finitely, respectively.520 So construed, all 
forms, great and small, stand in a direct if limited relationship to God and are in some sense 
equal and equally valuable in his sight. Though they all participate fully in him, the Summa 
acknowledges that they do so at different degrees of complexity, in keeping with different 
purposes. As this suggests, the Summa’s participatory scheme is also hierarchical. 
While vegetative and sentient beings, that is, plants and animals, are described on this 
scheme as ‘vestiges’ or ‘footprints’521 of God, because they make him known in some way, 
human beings are called ‘images of God’, because they are capable of knowing like God 
                                                        
singularibus bonitatibus creatis, sed hoc est dictum quod bonitas creata capit partem in effectu, quia haec capit 
istum effectum primae bonitatis, alia alium. 
519 Vol 1, Tr Intro, Q2, M3, C2, Respondeo (n. 21), 32. 
520 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, C4, Ad objecta (n. 31), 42. 
521 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, M2, C1, Contra a (n. 34), 44: Figurae pedis (footprint); cf. Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, 
Q1, M2, C2, 1 (n. 35), 45. 
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what creatures make known about their source.522 According to the Summa, these vestiges 
and images stand in a relationship of mutual inter-dependence which contests any notion of 
superiority or inferiority that might be attributed to the hierarchy.523 After all, there would be 
no means by which rational beings could discover traces of God in the world apart from 
vestiges which make him known. By the same token, vestiges would have no chance of 
consummation with their creator apart from the work of human beings to cognize them in 
relation to their divine exemplars.524 Although God in his absolute power could have created 
beings without any hierarchical variation, consequently, he did so in his ordained power for 
the betterment of the universe and all the beings that subsist within it.525  
As we have seen, these beings are comprised of two substantial forms—of the soul 
and of the body—that can technically exist independently of one another thought in this life 
they do not do so in practice. To explain how the soul-body composite undergoes change, the 
Summa introduces the Avicennian understanding of accidental forms, which are added to the 
substantial forms of soul and body and qualify them in different ways. While these forms 
enjoy the state of being (esse) or thinghood that is characteristic of substantial forms, they 
differ in that they cannot exist independently of the subject in which they inhere. Through 
their comings and goings, they allow creatures to undergo development, without 
compromising the individuality of distinctness of every form involved in the process. 
                                                        
522 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar2 (n. 4), Respondendum 1, 9. Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, C4, Contra b (n. 
36), 47; cf. pp. 48-9. Vol 2.1, In2, Tr3, S2, Q1, T2, C4, Solutio (n. 126), 172. 
523 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr2, Q5, C3, Ar2 (n. 94), 117. 
524 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr2, Q4, C3 (n. 88), 111-12. 
525 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q3, C5, Ar2 (n. 121), 191; cf. Ar3, Solutio I (n. 122), 192; Vol 2.1, In1, Tr2, Q5, C3, 
Ar2 (n. 94), 117: Utrum sine minoribus creaturis esset perfectum universum. 
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So construed, accidental forms multiply the forms in any given subject without at 
once multiplying subjects. At any given moment, consequently, a being can be described as 
the sum total or ‘bundle’ of substantial and accidental forms that constitute it. While the 
constant flux in the constellation of forms that comprise this bundle might seem to threaten 
the unity of the being, the Summa insists that this is preserved by the soul, which maintains 
the identity of a being over time.526 Ultimately, it is upheld by God, who is the only one 
capable of imposing a form, whether accidental or substantial, on matter. The significant 
upshot of this reality is that every single change that occurs in creatures is directly brought 
about by the divine action and thus the divine will.527 This might seem to suggest that the 
Summa leaves little room for secondary causality, whereby creatures who receive their 
powers from a primary divine cause are able effectively to employ them of their own accord.  
As we have seen in the earlier discussion of human knowledge, the Summa certainly 
leaves scope for autonomy; yet this is always enacted and upheld by the divine, to such an 
extent that creaturely actions cannot be envisaged which do not entail, at very least, some 
form of co-operation with God.528 In this regard, the Summa contends, all three persons of 
the Trinity are fully active.529 While the Father serves as the efficient cause of beings insofar 
as he gives them one form as opposed to another; the Son is the exemplar cause whereby 
beings become intelligible as one such thing; and the Spirit is the final cause through which 
beings possess a particular value or purpose.  
                                                        
526 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q2, M1, C1, Respondendum (n. 41), p. 50. Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q2, M1, C5, Solutio 
(n. 45), 54. Vol 2.1, In1, Tr2, Q2, T3, C1 (n. 63), 78. 
527 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr2, Q2, T3, C3 (n. 64), 81. 
528 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, C8 (n. 48), 56. Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, T1, C8, 4, Solutio (n. 20), 29-30. Vol 2.1, 
In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, T2, C2, Contra (n. 22), 34. 
529 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, T1, M1, C1 (n. 6), 14-15; cf. C2 (n. 7), 16. 
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Together, consequently, and thus as one ultimate or first cause, these Persons bring 
beings into being and render them vestiges not only of God but of a God who is Triune.530 As 
such vestiges, beings possess the transcendental properties of unity, truth, and goodness that 
result from being fashioned as one thing over another by the Father, rendered intelligible as 
such by the Son, and fit for a purpose by the Spirit; they also exhibit the qualities of mode, 
species and order, which relate beings to their first cause;531 and measure, number and 
weight, which Augustine inferred from his reading of Proverbs 11:21 to account for the 
natures creatures have in themselves.532 According to the Summa, there can be no more than 
three properties in each of these sets of properties, because the properties in question respond 
to a three-fold cause in the Trinity, who is the maker of all things, and therefore renders them 
vestiges of himself.533  
Whether by essence, power, presence; unity, truth, goodness; or any other triad, 
consequently, creatures testify to their participation in the Trinity. As the Summa nicely puts 
it, ‘the sensible world responds to an archetype, as an exemplum to an exemplar; but the 
archetype is God.’534 Moreover, it is only by understanding the exemplum in relation to the 
divine exemplar that we can understand it in the correct way. 535 Ultimately, therefore, the 
vision the Summa casts is one in which there is a correspondence not only between created 
realities and ideas in the mind of God but also between human and divine ideas. As we 
                                                        
530 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, C5, Respondendum (n. 38), 48; cf. C6 (n. 39), 48. Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, 
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535 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q1, C6, Respondendum (n. 32), 43. 
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learned in the fourth chapter, this correspondence on the part of the human mind is made 
possible by the innate knowledge of the transcendentals, which guide human thinking about 
empirical realities so as to ensure their accuracy in relation to God’s. In what follows, I will 
consider how this knowledge or things as God knows them relates to knowledge of God 
himself.  
 
Infinity and the Knowability of God 
 
Before the time of the Summa, the Western theological tradition had regarded divine 
infinity as a barrier to the knowledge of God. By transitioning from a Greek ‘negative’ to a 
more positive ‘Avicennian’ understanding of infinity, however, the Summa transformed the 
doctrine of divine infinity into a basis for positing a limited but nonetheless actual or one 
might say ‘univocal’ relationship between creatures and God. In doing so, it laid the 
foundation for showing how the human mind can know God in finite respects through 
creatures while acknowledging that he can never be known in full.536 The decisive move of 
the Summa Halensis, consequently, was to unhinge the doctrine of divine infinity from that of 
divine incomprehensibility and to render it the locus of some partial knowledge of God.537 
In doing this, the Summa solved the problem of divine incomprehensibility through 
the very means that had initially created it, namely, the notion that God is unknowable 
because he is infinite.538 The resolution of one problem however apparently generated 
another, namely, how to reconcile infinity and simplicity. As we have seen, authors working 
prior to the Halensian Summists were greatly preoccupied with this project and managed to 
                                                        
536 Antoine Côté, L’infinité divine, 58, 70. 
537 Vol, Tr Int, C2, M1, C6, Respondeo 2 (n. 13), 23. 
538 Vol, Tr Int, C2, M1, C6, Respondeo 2 (n. 13), 23. 
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avoid a conflict between the two doctrines by linking them both to divine incomprehensibility 
and remaining vague on the details as to how God can actually be known, not least in the life 
to come. The condemnation of 1241 stripped the Summists of the luxury of ambiguity and 
forced clarity on the nature of God’s knowability. In the process, it encouraged the Summa’s 
efforts discussed above to bring divine infinity more to the fore and to recast it as the basis 
for knowing the infinite through the finite.  
While the Summa is careful in developing its account to avoid insinuating that the 
infinite God is merely the positive sum total of his possible and actual finite expressions and 
emphatically denies repeatedly that he is composed of parts, it never clarifies how precisely 
the relationship between the divine unity and the created multiplicity can be maintained. The 
best it offers is the repeated insistence that God’s knowledge is one when referred to himself 
and multiplied to the point of infinity when referred to creatures: he has knowledge of all 
actual and possible beings but is more than all of that knowledge entails.539  
By positing some proportionality of the finite to the infinite, however, it suggests that 
there must be something in God or in his knowledge to which the finite corresponds. In order 
to uphold the notion that God is simple, however, the Summa declines to explain what this is. 
In the effort to attribute new primacy to infinity, consequently, the Summa leaves open and 
indeed exacerbates the problem of reconciling infinity and simplicity—or the complete 
transcendence of God in relation to the created order—that had been recognized already in 
the twelfth century. Within the Franciscan tradition, the problem was not fully resolved until 
John Duns Scotus, who invoked the notion of infinity in the context of developing his own 
doctrine of the transcendentals, which will be treated briefly below. 
                                                        
539 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q2, T1, C3 (n. 12), 10, Ad objeca 1: Scientia divina est rerum existentium, ut eorum 
quae sunt vel fuerunt vel erunt, et ita non possibilium tantum (The divine knowledge is of existing things, both 
those that are and were and will be, and not of possible things only).  
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John Duns Scotus on Divine Infinity  
 
Although Latin scholars from Philip the Chancellor forward developed distinct 
accounts of the transcendentals, being and its properties were not explicitly referred to as 
such until John Duns Scotus coined the phrase ‘scientia transcendentium’ or science of the 
transcendentals to describe his metaphysics.540 In his account of metaphysics or the ‘science 
of the transcendentals’, Scotus starts by arguing that being must be divided into finite and 
infinite, before being is divided into the ten categories listed by Aristotle, such as place, time, 
quality and quantity, all of which are attributable only to finite beings.541  
Thus, he makes explicit an apparent assumption of his Franciscan predecessors that 
being is what is common to the finite and the infinite. Aquinas objected to this construal, on 
the ground that being is what is common to the ten categories and thus to finite beings only. 
In his mind, any proposed commonality between finite and infinite would imply that God 
falls under the same genus or category as creatures, as though he were the greatest of all 
known beings rather than a being that transcends knowledge. Within his own frame of 
reference, however, Scotus preserves the otherness of God by dividing finite being into the 
ten categories only after dividing being itself into finite and infinite.542  
As a result of this maneuver, Scotus is able to affirm that all the properties that can be 
predicated of being before it is divided into finite and infinite are outside any genus or are 
                                                        
540 Ludger Honnefelder, ‘Metaphysics as a Discipline: From the Transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients to 
Kant’s Notion of Transcendental Philosophy,’ 59. John Duns Scotus, ‘Concerning Metaphysics,’ in Duns 
Scotus: Philosophical Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). Text taken from Opus oxoniense I.8.3. 
541 Duns Scotus, ‘Concerning Metaphysics,’ 2-3. 
542 Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 382-3 
 195 
transcendental. For this reason, they may be predicated univocally or in the same sense of 
both finite and infinite beings. When what Scotus calls the ‘coextensive’ transcendentals of 
being, unity, truth, and goodness, are said to pertain to God, consequently, they are infinite.543 
However, when they belong to creatures, they are finite. A similar principle applies to the so-
called disjunctive transcendentals which represent Scotus’ unique contribution to 
transcendental theory. These transcendentals, such as act and potency, necessity and 
contingency, prior and posterior, cause and caused, substance or accident, dependent or 
independent, absolute or relative, simple or composed, one or many, equal or unequal, all 
apply to Being in general, though one side of the disjunction always applies for obvious 
reasons to finite and the other to infinite being.544 
Although Scotus’ Franciscan predecessors simply conflated God with the Infinite 
Being that is innately known by mind and thus argued on the basis of reason alone that God 
exists, we have seen that Scotus himself rejects the notion that the first object of the intellect 
is anything but Being alone. In his view, the claim that Being ultimately is God suggests that 
the divine or supernatural aid is needed to undertake natural acts of knowing.545 This entails a 
contradiction in his estimation, insofar as it undermines the ability of human nature to 
perform its natural cognitive operations—something that a God who creates all things with 
integrity presumably would not do.  
Though Scotus does not immediately conflate Infinite Being with God, his 
affirmation of the univocity of being nonetheless allows him to argue relatively 
straightforwardly that the only candidate deserving of the title ‘Infinite Being’ is in fact 
                                                        
543 Duns Scotus, ‘De metaphysica,’ 3. Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought, 387, ff. 
544 A. B. Wolter, ‘The Disjunctive Transcendentals,’ in The Transcendentals and their Function in the 
Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St Bonaventure: Franciscan Institue Press, 1946), 128-63. 
545 Duns Scotus, ‘Concerning Human Knowledge,’ in Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings, 96-132. 
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God.546 After all, the very definition of the term ‘God’ is not to be constrained in the manner 
of finite beings but instead to be the source of them all, and thus, an Infinite Being. Since the 
relationship between finite and infinite being is univocal, therefore, all it takes to demonstrate 
that God exists is a radical act of abstraction from finite beings to the Infinite Being with 
which finite beings have being and other transcendentals in common.547  
This feat is facilitated by the innate knowledge of Being that all possess. Although 
Scotus’ rejection of the notion that this knowledge is of God entails a departure from the 
ontological argument of Scotus’ predecessors, he clearly advocates a closely related form of  
cosmological argument for the existence of God which involves a short and almost negligible 
step from the innate knowledge of Being to the knowledge of the divine Being. As we have 
seen, this step is made possible by an inference from finite beings, to which predicates can be 
applied in common with God insofar as they are applicable to being which is indifferent or 
prior to the division between finite and infinite.548  
In arguing along these lines, Scotus finally renders the work of his predecessors more 
consistent and doctrinally sound. As regards the doctrine of God as infinite in his own right, 
his most significant move pertains to his argument that being is common to what is finite and 
infinite. Only after being divided into these extremes does it take on the qualities of 
immanence or transcendence, respectively. Thus, he preserves the complete otherness of God 
not through the doctrine of divine simplicity but through a revised rendering of the early 
Franciscan doctrine of divine infinity.  
 
 
                                                        
546 Idem., ‘The Unicity of God,’ in Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings, 82-95.  
547 Idem., ‘The Existence of God,’ in Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings, 34-81. 
548 Idem., ‘Man’s Natural Knowledge of God,’ in Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings, 13-33. 
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Conclusion 
 
When laid out along these lines, the early Franciscan reasons for adopting the doctrine 
of divine immensity—not to mention the notion of an innate human knowledge of Being, 
which is clearly derived from Avicenna—can hardly be ignored.549 In perusing the 
biographies of Francis that circulated around this time, not to mention Francis’ own 
writings—most famously the Canticle of Brother Sun—what we find depicted is a man with a 
profound sense of the love of God that is poured out in creating and sustaining beings of all 
shapes and sizes—beings that reflect his love in turn. This was coupled with a deep feeling of 
responsibility to care for all creatures as individuals, regardless of their status, after the 
manner of the divine. On this theme, Celano recounts the famous legends in which Francis 
kisses a leper;550 calls both inanimate and animate creatures by the name of ‘brother’ or 
‘sister’;551 and even preaches to an attentive flock of birds.552 As Celano writes in more 
general terms, Francis saw in every work of the divine artist a reason to 
 
Praise the Artist; whatever he found in the things made, he referred to the Maker. He 
rejoiced in all the works of the hands of the Lord and saw behind things pleasant to 
behold their life-giving reason and cause. In beautiful things he saw Beauty itself. All 
things were to him good. ‘He who made us is the best’ they cried out to him. Through 
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his footprints impressed upon things, he followed the Beloved everywhere. He made 
for himself from all things a ladder by which to come even to his throne.553 
 
In light of this brief excursus on the early understanding of Francis, we can infer that 
the doctrine of divine immensity gave first-generation Franciscans a perfect resource for 
capturing the nature of the God as Francis envisaged it, and indeed for capturing Francis’ 
vision as to what it meant to imitate the life of the Son of God on earth: reducing ourselves to 
identify with, and find God, in all creatures, great and small. At the same time, the doctrine of 
divine infinity contributed to Franciscan efforts to assert the positive knowableness of God in 
the wake of the 1241 condemnations, even while affirming his absolute transcendence. 
Ironically, then, the Summists deployed a heavily Greek and Arabic tradition of thinking in 
terms of his infinitude to resolve a problem to which that tradition had given rise in terms of 
denouncing God’s knowability. In this case, as in the others that have been discussed, there 
was a happy coincidence between the accidents of historical context, the dominant sources 
and intellectual trends, and the needs and objectives of the Franciscan order regarding the 
perpetuation and advance of the Franciscan spirituality and mission. 
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7. TRINITY: CONTEXT  
 
In his magisterial history of Trinitarian doctrine, Théodore de Régnon defended the 
then novel thesis that the late middle ages witnessed the branching off of a new tradition of 
Trinitarian theological thinking from the previously relatively continuous tradition of 
Western Trinitarianism founded by Augustine.554 From this time forward, he contends, there 
were two main traditions of Western Trinitarian thought, including the original tradition of 
Augustine, which was carried forward by the likes of Anselm, Peter Lombard, and Aquinas, 
who expressed it in its mature form; and the new tradition, initially formulated by Richard of 
St Victor and later developed more fully by the Franciscans, who adhere to it to this day.555  
 Although some of De Regnon’s other theses have since come into question—most 
notably, his tendency to insist on the incommensurability of the Greek and Latin patristic 
Trinitarian traditions—his suggestions regarding the medieval development of the doctrine of 
the Trinity in the West have withstood the tests of time and further research.556 Under the 
inspiration of the completely innovative account of the Trinity formulated by Richard of St 
Victor, the first Franciscans developed this account in greater detail and popularized it. In 
doing so, they proffered a conception of the Trinity that is distinctly Western in many key 
respects. As we will see, for example, their theory employs a psychological model that has 
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commonly been associated with Western Trinitarianism. Moreover, it emphatically affirms 
the filioque, that is, the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son.  
 In other ways, however, obvious signs of what seems like a substantial Greek 
influence can be detected throughout the Franciscan account. For instance, this approach lays 
emphasis on the monarchical nature or primacy of the Father in the Trinity, and it defines the 
persons of the Trinity firstly in terms of their origins rather than in terms of their relations, as 
was common in the West. Most interestingly, it incorporates into its psychological model a 
social model such as has been associated more commonly with Eastern Trinitarian theology. 
In ways that are far from contradictory and that result in a wholly coherent and orthodox but 
nonetheless original account of the Trinity, consequently, the early Franciscans effectively 
found ways to marry some of the key Trinitarian insights and explanatory locutions of East 
and West.  
By these means, they highlighted the compatibility that arguably always existed 
between these two traditions: the fact that they represent two different means to the same end, 
as recent scholarship has shown. The purpose of the next chapter is to illustrate precisely how 
the Summists innovatively reconciled the psychological and social—or Western and 
Eastern—understandings of the Trinity, which became increasingly at odds in later medieval 
and modern times. However, the execution of this task necessitates a careful preliminary 
analysis and comparison of the relevant accounts of the Trinity. Thus, this first of two 
chapters on the Trinity in early Franciscan thought will begin with an analysis of the 
fundamentally Augustinian doctrine of the Trinity developed most fully by Aquinas. While 
the Summists themselves would not have recourse to Aquinas’ discussion, his account most 
effectively serves the rhetorical purposes of this chapter, insofar as it highlights most clearly 
and fully the key contours of the Western account that earlier Western thinkers from 
Augustine had advocated.  
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The discussion of Aquinas will be followed by a summary of the Trinitarian account 
of John of Damascus, who along with Dionysius was the primary Greek source available to 
and invoked by Latin thinkers at this time, and who is often supposed to have developed fully 
the early Greek account stated first and foremost by the Cappadocian fathers. Finally, I will 
describe Richard of St Victor’s doctrine of the Trinity, highlighting the way it seemingly 
marries key aspects of the Greek and Latin traditions. In a final section of this first chapter, I 
will outline the Trinitarian vision that can be identified throughout the Summa Halensis. 
Although the doctrine of the Trinity proper only appears towards the end of this volume, we 
have already seen how earlier sections anticipate this ultimate discussion through the 
proffering of various Trinitarian analogies.  
 
Thomas Aquinas on the Trinity 
 
In his Summa Theologiae, Bonaventure’s Dominican counterpart Aquinas (1225-
1274)—follows the tradition, well established by his time, of treating the doctrine of the 
Trinity in terms of the fact that it entails:557   
 
ONE God 
TWO Processions (generation, spiration) 
THREE Persons (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) 
FOUR Relations (paternity, filiation, spiration, procession), and 
FIVE Notions (innascibility, paternity, filiation, spiration, procession) 
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 In recent theological history, Aquinas has been accused of inappropriately separating 
deus unus from deus trinus, rendering the Trinity a mere theological after-thought. What I 
will show here, however, is that his account of these matters is designed to illustrate how the 
doctrine of the Trinity ultimately enacts the reality of the one God. For this purpose, it is 
arguably insufficient simply to affirm that God is one or simple. In order to demonstrate his 
ability to be such a being, the divine being must also be shown to be capable of knowing and 
communicating himself as such a being—to will to be and thus to act like the supreme being 
that he is. 
In his account, Aquinas explains how the doctrine of the Trinity upholds the unity of 
the divine being, knowledge, word, will, and action by undertaking to discuss the two divine 
processions, or ways of coming forth from the first principle of the Trinity, that is, God the 
Father. While the First person of the Trinity alone is innascible, not begotten or produced in 
any way by another, the Second person or the Son is believed to proceed from the Father by 
way of knowledge or intellect, because his relationship to the Father is like that of one known 
by a knower.558 
When the Father knows the Son, he is said to generate a thought of himself, that is, 
his image, or a word of self-expression.559 After all, God is simple and is as such the highest 
object of knowledge, such that his supreme knowledge as God can consist in the knowledge 
of nothing other than himself. Since the Father’s knowledge of the Son is therefore reflexive, 
it can be likened to self-knowledge. Thus, the Son can conversely be said to know and make 
known the Father in the very experience of being known by him. 
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On the assumption that a good withheld is not truly good, Aquinas argues that a good 
incapable of communicating itself along these lines could not be considered the highest good. 
Because the communication of goodness is an expression of love, Aquinas identifies love as 
the ultimate attribute of the Trinity in which the Father and the Son communicate God’s 
goodness to one another.560 This brings us to the role in the Godhead of the Holy Spirit, who 
proceeds from the Father and the Son not by way of intellect but by way of the will—or love 
and desire—for that which is known, namely, the Son by the Father, and the Father, in turn, 
by the Son.561 
In Aquinas’ account, the Father’s knowing of the Son and the Son’s knowing of the 
Father ultimately reflect their mutual desire to know one another, that is, God’s desire, 
consisting in the Holy Spirit, to know himself and make himself known as the highest good 
that he is. Since the Spirit is indicative of the Father’s will to make himself known in the Son, 
and the Son’s will to know and make known the Father, he is generally described as the 
‘Love’ or the ‘Gift’ exchanged between the Father and Son.562 As such, Spirit is spirated or 
breathed out by the Father and the Son (filioque), thus binding them in unity. 563  
Because this spiration enacts the knowledge shared by the knower and the known, the 
Spirit is said to constitute the very life or indeed the Spirit of the Trinity, which consists in 
honoring or loving God as the highest good or object of devotion and adoration, which he is 
known to be. On the ground that God is the highest object of love, who as God loves himself 
as much as he could possibly be loved, Aquinas stresses that God could not have created the 
world out of necessity, in order to complete himself or satisfy some need for love of his own. 
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Aquinas discredits this notion, by delineating a doctrine of the Trinity, which gives an 
account of God’s self-sufficiency to love himself, as the ultimate subject and object of 
love.564 
As the foregoing discussion of this doctrine suggests, an appeal to the processions of 
the Son and Spirit from the Father generates an account of one God who is truly worthy of 
the name ‘God,’ because it affirms the perfect correspondence between who God is, what he 
knows, what he communicates, what he wants, and what he does. This is the upshot of 
Aquinas’ affirmation that God is his act of understanding, such that whatever is understood 
by God is the very living or life of God, namely, that God always completely is what he is, 
which is to be and to know and to say and to desire and to do all that is good, or consistent 
with love.565 
Further support for this contention can be derived from a discussion of the four 
different types of relation, which characterize each of the three persons of the Trinity. These 
relations include: paternity, proper to the Father; procession, proper to both Son and Spirit; 
filiation, proper to the Son, who proceeds from the Father; and spiration, proper to the Spirit, 
who proceeds from the Father and the Son.566 According to Aquinas, each person is identified 
and distinguished by its mode of relation to the others. Thus, Aquinas speaks of the persons 
as subsisting in their relations or as ‘subsistent relations.’567 On this showing, the Son is the 
individual person of the Godhead he is because he proceeds from the Father and is the second 
source of the procession of the Spirit. 
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By contrast to the divine relations, which are essential to the being of the divine 
persons, human relations are accidental or contingent. That is to say, they are not necessary to 
the identity of human beings. This is contrary to what some scholars have supposed in 
arguing that subsistent relations are common to human and divine persons.568 Though human 
beings obviously depend on other human beings, are formed by their social situations, and 
require relationships to instigate the expression of their individual personalities and abilities, 
nevertheless they are ‘always more than the sum total of their relationships. ̕569 They are not 
defined or wholly constructed by their relations or social circumstances. Otherwise, it would 
be necessary to draw the absurd conclusion that a mother has no personal identity without her 
children, and those brought up in poverty can never overcome it, to take just two examples. 
The reason human beings cannot be reduced or limited to their relations in these ways 
concerns the fact that their personalities—which predispose them to relate to others—are 
limited. Although the human inability to relate fully to others renders it largely impossible for 
human beings to find complete fulfillment in their relationships, it has the advantage of 
rendering illegitimate any attempt inappropriately to constrict human beings in accordance 
with their relationships or communities of upbringing. As God is an unlimited being, by 
contrast, the three personalities that constitute his being are not subject to limitations, 
although they are distinct in their modes of relation. On account of this unlimited-ness-in-
difference, the three persons enjoy a capacity to relate to one another completely.570 Thus, 
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there is nothing about the Father that is not known by the Son in the Spirit, and nothing that is 
not known by the Son about the Father in the Spirit. 
For precisely this reason, the Father, Son, and Spirit, are described by Aquinas as 
‘persons’ in the fullest sense of the term. According to the traditional philosophical 
definition, a person is an ‘individual substance of a rational nature’ (hypostasis), where 
rationality presumably entails both the intellect that knows and the will that motivates the 
intellect to pursue knowledge.571 While this definition applies to human beings and to God, 
since both operate by means of intellect and will, the limited nature of human personalities—
which generates a limited capacity to relate to others—suggests that human beings only 
possess their personalities in a qualified or circumscribed sense which is not applicable to 
God.572 
Because God subsists in three persons who in distinct ways possess an unlimited 
capacity to relate to one another, by contrast, these persons can ultimately be said to stand in 
the one and only relationship that exists without remainder and thus to constitute the one and 
only being that is personal in the fullest sense of the term.573 In elaborating his understanding 
of the three persons’ subsistent relations, Aquinas points out that these are closely related to 
the persons’ varying origins, or ways of deriving if at all from one another.574 While the Son 
is said to be begotten by or to proceed from the Father, for instance, and thus to originate in 
him, who alone is unoriginate or unbegotten, the Spirit proceeds or originates from the Father 
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in the Father’s begetting of the Son, and from the Son in his own expression of the Spirit he 
receives from the Father. In treating the five notions of origin, namely, innascibility 
(‘ungenerateness’), paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession, that factor into his account 
of the Trinity, Aquinas writes that: 
 
The person of the Father cannot be known by the fact that he is from another; but by 
the fact that he is from no one. And thus the notion that belongs to him is called 
innascibility. As the source of another, he can be known in two ways, because as the 
Son is from him, the Father is known by the notion of ‘paternity;’ and as the Holy 
Ghost is from him, he is known by the notion of ‘common spiration.’ The Son can be 
known as begotten by another, and thus he is known by ‘filiation;’ and also by 
another person proceeding from him, the Holy Ghost, and thus he is known in the 
same way as the Father is known, by ‘common spiration.’ The Holy Ghost can be 
known by the fact that he is from another, or from others; thus he is known by 
‘procession;’ but not by the fact that another is from him, as no divine person 
proceeds from him.575 
 
As this account confirms, relation and origin do not differ significantly as principles 
that distinguish the persons of the Trinity for Aquinas. Though it is easy for this reason to 
conclude that neither takes priority as such a principle, Aquinas argues—contrary to the 
Eastern tradition at the time—that relation rather than origin should be regarded as the 
primary principle of distinction amongst the persons.576 He supports this claim on the 
grounds that distinctions ought to be based on intrinsic properties of persons, and relations 
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represent the intrinsic causes of the persons’ varying origins. From the consideration of these 
origins, it follows that the persons move eternally in directions appropriate to themselves, 
such that ‘the names which designate them designate the acts by which they are defined.5̕77 In 
performing their characteristic acts, the persons in their diverse ways contribute to and enable 
God’s overarching act of being the highest good there is, knowing, expressing, and loving 
himself as such. 
For this purpose, it seems clear that any more or any less than three persons would be 
inimical. In this case as in many others, Aquinas writes, the number three, which admits of a 
beginning, middle, and end, turns out to be the ideal number, which creates unity by allowing 
for a mediator—namely, the Son—between the extremes of Father and Spirit.578 Although 
the doctrine of the Trinity that Aquinas and many other Western thinkers endorse upholds the 
unity of God, it is important to stress that it does not go any further than the doctrine of 
divine simplicity in terms of giving access to the substance of the divine being. It only offers 
a more, indeed the most, elaborate ‘formal’ explanation of the kind of being God is.  
Whereas the doctrine of divine simplicity teaches us that God is a kind of being who 
is infinite, eternal, immutable, and omnipresent—and thus wholly incommensurable with the 
objects of our knowledge, which are complex, finite, temporal, changeable, and local, the 
doctrine of the Trinity adds to this account of the ‘known unknown’ an explanation of his 
ability to make himself known as such in virtue of his personal and relational nature. Though 
the doctrine of the Trinity can therefore be said to affirm to the fullest possible extent God’s 
ability to express himself as the simple and indeed self-communicating God monotheists 
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believe him to be, it is worth reiterating that the profound logic the doctrine consequently 
exhibits can only be perceived in retrospect of Christian revelation.579  
 
John of Damascus on the Trinity 
 
John of Damascus was a 7th/8th century thinker, who is recognized as one of the 
leading Fathers of the Eastern Orthodox church. Rightly, he has been credited with codifying 
the preceding Byzantine tradition in mature form.580 Perhaps his most significant and well-
known work, De fide Orthodoxa, translated into Latin in the twelfth century, was the main 
channel through which Latin thinkers gained access to the Greek tradition.581 In light of the 
tri-theistic controversy which had raged in the 6th century, he placed greater emphasis than 
his predecessors on the ultimate unity of the three persons of the Trinity under the monarchy 
or headship of the Father. In this connection, he advocated the coinherence or perichoresis of 
the three persons in one another, in what was his most original, if not entirely unprecedented, 
contribution to Orthodox theology.582 
In the most basic sense, the background of Damascus’ thought is the Council of 
Nicaea which established the three persons of the Trinity as homoousias or of one substance. 
In Greek thought ousia is a term used to denote a common nature or essence, or a universal 
                                                        
579 ST 1.32.1. 
580 Andrew Louth, St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002).  
581 As Louth notes in St John Damascene, 84-5, the fourfold division of De fide orthodoxa, was imposed upon it 
by Latin thinkers who sought to confirm its structure to that of their own Summae. In doing so, however, they 
rendered John’s text more systematic than he intended it do be. 
582 Andrew Louth, ‘Late Patristic Developments on the Trinity in the East,’ in Oxford Handbook of the Trinity, 
ed. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 148.  
 210 
category. For instance, all human persons share in human nature, which entails body and 
soul. By reason, or conceptually, consequently, they can be seen as similar, even though in 
actuality they are distinguished or individuated by personal properties which render them 
entirely separate hypostases.583 
In this vein, Damascus defines the ousia of God as a sort of ‘divine universal’, thus 
diverging significantly from the tradition of Augustine and Aquinas, for whom the divine 
essence is not a universal, but a singular. On this basis, Western thinkers deny that the Trinity 
can be compared to three persons all sharing in the universal nature of humanity. By contrast, 
the Damascene lays a much stronger emphasis on the distinction between ousia and 
hypostasis, on the discrete individuality of the hypostases over and against the general 
category represented by the ousia. In this way, he clearly distinguishes himself from the 
Western tradition, where the three persons constitute an individual—rather than a universal—
essence, such that persons and essence are effectively two sides of one coin.  
Although he construes the one God as a sort of ‘divine universal’, individuated by 
means of personal properties, he denies emphatically that the relationship between the 
individuals and the universal is the same as it is in the case of humans. First of all, the Father, 
Son and Spirit are totally identical in their essence: the fact that they share in a common 
nature is not just a matter of reason’s discernment. As a result, the properties that apply to the 
universal apply univocally to all three of them. That is to say, each of the three persons is 
divine in exactly the same sense, which is not the case for human beings, whose individual 
properties affect the way in which they instantiate human nature. 
While these individuating properties must be discerned in actuality in the case of 
human beings, the difference between the divine persons is one that is perceived only by 
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reason, which identifies the personal properties of Father, Son and Spirit in terms of their 
origins: unbegotten, begotten, or proceeding, respectively.584 Whereas, ‘with human beings, 
our common humanity is conceptual, the difference between individuals being real,’ in other 
words, ‘in the case of the Trinity, it is just the opposite: their distinct individuality is 
conceptual. In reality there is no separate individuality, but a complete co-inherence between 
the persons of the Trinity.’585 Since they differ only in their manner of existing—or in their 
origins—the three persons can ultimately be said to enjoy one and the same identity and thus 
to inter-penetrate or ‘have their circumincession one in the other without any blending or 
mingling and without change or division in substance.’586  
Whereas the Western church affirmed the unity of the three persons in a single being 
through the filioque, consequently, the Eastern church accomplishes this feat by insisting that 
the three individuals in the Trinity all fall under the same universal category, analogous to the 
way that Peter, Paul, and John all fall under the universal category ‘human’. This renders the 
persons identical in substance, and mutually related for that very reason, notwithstanding 
different modes of existence. In that sense, the same end is seemingly achieved by different 
but equally legitimate means in the East and the West. 
Where the West construed God as a single being or essence whose three persons are 
united through the procession of the Spirit from the Son as well as the Father, the East for the 
most part rejected the filioque. Instead, we have seen that it posited the unity and mutual, 
direct inter-relation of the persons through the notion of circumincession (Latin) or 
perichoresis (Greek), which emphasizes that individual entities or persons sharing in one and 
the same universal nature cannot help but abide equally in one another precisely because of 
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their shared nature. The advocacy of this position has led to the conclusion that the East 
advocates a ‘social’ more than a ‘psychological’ model of the Trinity such as is commonly 
found in Western thinkers like Aquinas.  
However, there are hints towards a psychological understanding of the Trinity, albeit 
somewhat underdeveloped ones, even in Damascus. At the start of his discussion of the 
Trinity, which follows his proof for the one God, Damascus insists that this God cannot be 
without a Word. In this regard, he follows Gregory of Nyssa, whose Catechetical Oration 
prologue and chapters 1-4 form the basis for the present and subsequent section of John’s 
discussion.587 Much like human speech, in proceeding from the mind, is not entirely distinct 
from it in its subject, although identical with the mind in substance, so Damascus argues that 
the Word of God is distinct from the Father from whom he has his subsistence, while at the 
same time exhibiting the same substance that can be found in God.588 This Word must further 
have a Spirit, in much the same way that human speech cannot be devoid of breath, which is 
nevertheless not of the human substance. As Damascus writes, it is this breath ‘which on the 
occasion of articulation becomes the vocal expression of speech.’589  
In a similar way, the Spirit of God ‘is associated with the Word and making the 
operation of the Word manifest.’590 As such, there is ‘a substantial power found in its own 
individuating personality, proceeding from the Father, coming to rest in the Word and 
declaring him.’591 From this point, Damascus moves into a discussion of the whole Trinity, 
starting with the Father, who alone is unbegotten, the first principle of the Trinity and all 
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things.592 His ‘power of begetting is the power to beget of himself, that is, of his own 
substance, offspring similar [and equal] to himself in nature,’593 namely, the Son. That said, 
his way of begetting is not like the human way, for ‘he begets without time and without 
beginning,’594 such that the Son is always begotten by and co-eternal with him. Thus, as 
Damascus writes, Father and Son exist simultaneously, as does fire with its light. 
Whereas the Son comes from the Father by generation, the Spirit comes by 
procession, ‘which is another manner of existence and is just as incomprehensible and 
unknowable as is the begetting of the Son.’595 On Damascus’ account, we know of these two 
forms of procession from the Father simply because they are revealed in Scripture. 
Nevertheless, the Damascene attempts to explain the difference between them with an 
analogy from Adam, who was unbegotten because he was formed by God, while his son Seth 
was begotten of Adam. Eve, however, was not begotten of Adam but proceeded from his rib. 
As a result, these three do not differ in nature, as they are all human, but only differ in their 
manner of coming into existence.  
According to Damascus, the Spirit is ‘the source of wisdom and life and 
sanctification,’596 governing both creation and deification in human beings. If the Son is the 
principle of God’s being and knowledge, consequently, the Spirit would appear to be the 
driving force behind his action—not dissimilar to the ‘will’ or ‘gift’ of God that is ascribed to 
him in the Western account. While my intention here is certainly not to obscure the 
differences between the Eastern and Western accounts, I hope to have illustrated that there is 
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more conceptual compatibility than is sometimes perceived between them. The differences 
are differences in method or approach to formulation, not necessarily differences in what is 
ultimately affirmed about the one God who subsists in three persons.  
Whereas the Greeks clearly define the individualizing properties of the persons in 
terms of their origins—whether unbegotten, begotten, or proceeding—representatives of the 
Latin tradition like Aquinas emphasize their relations, with notions of origin taking second 
place. While the latter prioritize a psychological model in which the human mind is the best 
analogy to the Trinity, moreover, the former stress a social model in which a community of 
persons all exhibiting human nature is the more fitting analog. Correspondingly, the filioque 
and circumincessio are respectively invoked for the sake of affirming the coherence and unity 
of the mind or society.  
These differences are not inconsequential, as is confirmed by medieval controversies 
between Greek and Latin Trinitarian thinkers, which led to their split in 1054. In particular, 
the filioque became a point of contention. As the West became increasingly insistent about it 
as a litmus test for orthodoxy following the split, scholastic disputations on the matter 
became increasingly vociferous, as can be seen in the work of Richard of St Victor and the 
Franciscan Summists, whose Trinitarian allegiances are otherwise in many respects as Greek 
as they are Latin. Regardless of the status of the filioque, the foregoing analysis suggests that 
it would be difficult legitimately to assert that the social and psychological models are 
incompatible.  
This has been the presumption of many modern advocates of ‘Social Trinitarianism’, 
who are generally quite forceful in their objections to psychological models of the Trinity,597 
which now struggle under the weight of such critiques. In this context, the early Franciscan 
                                                        
597 Jurgen Moltmann, Miroslav Volf, Paul Fiddes, Leonardo Boff, Catherine La Cugna, Colin Gunton. 
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development of Richard of St Victor’s doctrine of the Trinity holds considerable promise, 
because of the way it marries the key elements of Eastern and Western Trinitarianism in a 
single, streamlined approach, which is not subject to diverse methodologies that that often 
lead Greek and Latin thinkers to interact at cross purposes. Thus, it is to a discussion of 
Richard’s doctrine that I now turn.  
 
Richard of St Victor on the Trinity 
 
Richard of St Victor (d. 1173) was a master of biblical exegesis, contemplation, and 
Christian doctrine who spent his entire career at the Augustinian abbey of St Victor, which 
was founded in 1113 in Paris.598 In scholarly circles, he has garnered scant attention by 
comparison to his earlier contemporary Hugh of St Victor (d. 1141), not to mention other 
leading 12th century monastic thinkers, such as the Cistercian, Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-
1153). Admittedly, Hugh played a key role in forming the intellectual identity and project of 
the School of St Victor, which is known for placing the study of Scripture, doctrine, and 
indeed all sciences in the service of achieving contemplation.  
For this reason, Richard has been interpreted as an inferior to Hugh, who simply 
followed his master in many respects, even though Hugh likely died well before Richard’s 
arrival in Paris.599 In particular, Richard supposedly mimicked Hugh’s attempt to synthesize 
                                                        
598 F. Bonnard, Histoire de l’abbaye royale et de l’ordre des channoines réguliers de Saint-Victor de Paris, 2 
vols (Paris, 1904-7). Jean Chatillon, ‘Richard de St Victor,’ in Dictionnaire de spiritualité XIII.1 (Paris: G. 
Beauchesne, 1987), 593-654. Lydia Schumacher, ‘Richard of St Victor,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Scottish 
Theology, ed. David Fergusson and Mark Elliott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).  
599 Clare Kirschberger, Richard of St Victor: Selected Writings on Contemplation (London: Faber and Faber, 
1957), 15. 
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the longstanding tradition of Augustine, while mainstreaming the work of the sixth-century 
Greek thinker, Pseudo-Dionysius, whom scholars at this time believed to be a convert of St 
Paul and to whom they thus attributed nearly apostolic authority.600 In the following 
discussion of his doctrine of the Trinity, however, I will show that Richard is an innovative 
scholar whose influence was both lasting and momentous.  
In his magisterial De Trinitate, Richard takes up the task of demonstrating what is 
taken on faith concerning the Triune nature of God.601 While Richard previously pronounced 
such a demonstration impossible, he seems to have acquired a new confidence in the powers 
of reason by this likely relatively late point in his career.602 Here, Richard argues that 
necessary things which we believe concerning the nature of God cannot lack not only 
plausible but also necessary reasons, such as Anselm’s invoked in delineating the reasons for 
Christ’s Incarnation, even though faith is needed to understand those reasons, another idea 
stemming from Anselm, and Augustine even before him.603 
Although the Triune nature of God has long been affirmed on the basis of authority, 
Richard argues that such reasons have not yet been given. Since there are so few arguments 
in the writings of the Fathers from which conclusions about the rational basis for Trinitarian 
doctrine could be deduced, consequently, Richard states that he will have to complete his 
                                                        
600 Gervais Dumiege, Richard de Saint-Victor et l'idée chráienne de l'amour (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1952), 24-32. Marie-Dominique Chenu, La theologie au douzieme siècle (Paris: Vrin, 1976), chapters 5, 
7, 8, 13. 
601 Nico Den Bok, Communicating the Most High: A Systematic Study of Person and Trinity in the Theology of 
Richard of St Victor (d. 1173) (Paris: Brepols, 1996). Ruben Angelici, Richard of St Victor: On the Trinity 
(Eugene: Cascade Books, 2011).  
602 Clare Kirschberger, Richard of St Victor, 46. 
603 DT I.IV. Dale M Coulter, Per Visibilia ad Invisibilia: Theological Method in Richard of St Victor (d. 1173) 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2006). 
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study not according to scriptural or historical texts but simply through his own ingenuity and 
passion.604 While he certainly draws on authorities—nonetheless virtually never cited—it is 
obvious from this statement that Richard truly sees himself as building a rationale for 
orthodox belief from the ground up: as a thinker working independently from though not 
outside of tradition.  
Richard’s treatise consists of six books, the key arguments of which will be outlined 
below. The focus of the first book is on providing evidence for faith’s assertion that that there 
is only one God, while the second considers the attributes of God, especially his infinity or 
immensity.605 In the chapters of this book on theistic proof and the divine nature, we have 
already seen how he develops his arguments on these topics, and how early Franciscans 
appropriated them. After treating de deo uno in his first two chapters, Richard moves on—
seemingly after the pattern of Augustine—to cover de deo trino in the third book of his 
treatise.  
On the basis of his previous argument that the fullness of goodness consists in the 
supreme being, Richard argues that the supreme being must be one of love, since nothing is 
better than to give oneself in love. Indeed, a being would not be supremely good if it withheld 
the good it had from another, that is, if it withheld love. Since love requires to be aimed at 
another, there must be multiple persons in order for there to be love.606 Now divine love must 
be directed at someone of equal supremacy and dignity. Thus, there must be a second divine 
person who is equal in greatness to the first and who returns that person’s love in an equally 
supreme way.607  
                                                        
604 DT III.I. 
605 DT I.V. 
606 DT III.II. 
607 DT III.III. 
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That stated, Richard argues that ‘nothing is more precious and more admirable in 
reciprocal burning love than one’s desire for someone else to be loved in the same fashion by 
him who is supremely loved and by whom one is supremely loved. Therefore the witness of 
perfect charity love consists in desiring to share with someone else that love of which one is 
the object, without expecting anything in return.’608 That is to say, the perfection of love 
necessitates that the first two persons desire to share with a third person the love they 
reciprocally enjoy, and to share it with the same intensity and devotion with which they love 
one another.609 
This love is what Richard calls condilectio, or ‘co-love’, which arises ‘when a third 
person is loved by the two in harmony and with a communitarian spirit’610, that is, when the 
two persons affects are fused to become only one. On Richard’s argument, such love cannot 
exist when two people merely exhibit a reciprocal desire for one another, represented by a 
third—as in the traditional Western doctrine of the Trinity advocated by Augustine—because 
the love is here variously directed and requires a return for its fulfilment. The sort of love he 
has in mind alone achieves the level of perfection befitting of God, because it affirms that in 
the case of any of the three persons, the other two love he third in total harmony.611 Whereas 
Augustine seemingly took the psychological model of self-love as the foundation for his 
understanding of the Trinity, consequently, Richard proposes a communitarian or social 
model that seems analogous to the relationship of parents to a child—although he rightly 
foreswears all attempts to compare the relations amongst the members of the Trinity with 
human relations.  
                                                        
608 DT III.XI. 
609 DT III.XVIII. 
610 DT III.XIX. 
611 DT III.XX. 
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 After this discussion of the three persons, Richard proceeds in book four to inquire 
into the nature of divine personhood and how it can be reconciled with a single divine 
substance.612 To illustrate the relationship between substance and person, he asks his readers 
to imagine they see something from afar. In this case, he argues, we would ask, ‘what is 
that’? On coming closer, however, and seeing that the something is a person, we would then 
ask ‘who is that’? In other words, we would ask about an individual rather than a common 
property. Thus, Richard concludes that a substance is a property that is common to all things 
of a kind—a ‘something’ or a ‘what’, as it were. However, a person in his view implies 
‘someone’, a ‘who’, and thus an individual who is unique from all others by an 
incommunicable property.613  
Although Richard assents that all persons are substances of a rational nature, and 
share rationality as a common property, he denies that this has any bearing when it comes to 
determining a person’s proper nature or reality.614 On his account, this nature is defined in 
terms of a person’s existence, which is individual, rather than the essence or substance that is 
shared in common with other persons. By definition, then, multiple persons do not imply 
multiple substances. Thus, there is no contradiction between the single substance and three 
persons in God.615 For just as the plurality of substances in the human being—for example, 
body and soul, mortality and immortality, visibility and invisibility—do not destroy the unity 
of the person, so the plurality of persons does not destroy the unified substance of God.616 
                                                        
612 DT IV.IV. 
613 DT IV.VII.  
614 DT IV.VIII. 
615 DT IV.IX. 
616 DT IV.X. 
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To explain why this is so, Richard elaborates on what he means by personal existence. 
On his account, this is defined with reference to its nature and origin, which can vary either 
individually or at the same time.617 For instance, human beings differ both in terms of their 
individual natures and their origins, which consist in different reproductive acts. By contrast, 
there is no difference of nature amongst the divine persons.  ‘Since they possess an entirely 
single, identical and supremely simple being, it is not possible for them to differ from one 
another according to any qualitative distinction’.618  
Thus, Richard contends that the difference between the divine persons is entirely a 
question of their diverse origins. Whereas their common substance upholds certain common 
properties—such as wisdom, power, and love—their diverse origins underline what Richard 
calls their respective incommunicable properties, to which the Greeks referred as 
‘subsistence’ (hypostasis). For example, the Father is unoriginated, while the Son originates 
or proceeds from him.619 On this basis, he concludes that ‘a divine person is an 
incommunicable existence of the divine nature’.620 Furthermore, he queries the applicability 
of Boethius’ longstanding definition of a person as an ‘individual substance of a rational 
nature’ to the divine, on the grounds that the divine substance is not individual but entails 
three persons.621 
In book five, Richard turns to consider more carefully the properties of the individual 
divine persons and what distinguishes them from the others, particularly in terms of their 
origins. He starts by insisting that one person must exist by his own action and not someone 
                                                        
617 DT IV.XII. 
618 DT IV.XV. 
619 DT IV.XVI. 
620 DT IV.XXII. 
621 DT IV.XXI. 
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else’s, otherwise there would be an infinite regress of beings in the divinity.622 While it is an 
incommunicable property of the first person to derive from himself alone, it is a property of 
the beings that proceed from him to come from something other than themselves. In human 
beings, at least, such procession can occur in three main ways.623 That is to say, one person 
may proceed from another in a non-mediated, mediated, or both mediated and non-mediated 
way.  
For instance, both Isaac and Jacob proceeded from Abraham’s substance. However, 
Jacob’s procession was mediated through Isaac, his father, who as the son of Abraham 
proceeded from him in a non-mediated way. Likewise, Eve and her son Seth proceeded from 
Adam’s substance. But while the first of these processions was only non-mediated—insofar 
as Eve was created from Adam’s side—the second was at the same time mediated and non-
mediated, insofar as Seth was derived in a non-mediated way from his father Adam’s seed 
and in a mediated way from Eve, the mother who gave birth to him.  
In the case of the divine existence that precedes everything, Richard argues, it is 
necessary that a second proceed from this first being in a non-mediated way, otherwise that 
one would be destined to remain alone. That in turn would be inconsistent with the supreme 
love of the first, which requires that he generate a second who is worthy of his love on 
account of being equal to him in dignity.624 As noted previously, the perfection of these first 
two persons require that they co-love a third person in the same way they love one another.625 
While this person proceeds immediately from the first, insofar as the first is the initial source 
                                                        
622 DT V.III. 
623 DT V.VI. 
624 DT IV.VII. 
625 DT V.VIII. 
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of divine love, he also proceeds through the mediation of the second, because the immediate 
love of the second for the third initially comes from the first as well.  
As this suggests, Richard affirms the procession of the Spirit from both the Father and 
the Son (filioque) in keeping with the Latin tradition, but opposed by the Greeks, even while 
departing from a longstanding Latin tradition of defining the persons in terms of their diverse 
relations. In fact, Richard rejects this view in locating the difference between persons, along 
Greek lines, exclusively in terms of different origins. Thus, Richard contends that the first 
person ‘is characterized by the fact that he does not proceed from any other person but he has 
another one proceeding from him. The second person is characterized by the fact that he 
proceeds from another person and that at the same time he has another person proceeding 
from him,’ though not in the primary sense that belongs to procession from the Father 
alone.626 The third person proceeds from the first and the second persons, but does not 
himself give rise to another person but simply stands as the full expression of the co-love of 
the first two.  
In that sense, Richard asserts, the first person is characterized by a purely gratuitous 
or self-giving love; the second both gives and receives love; and the third is simply the object 
and reflection of divine love. On this showing, the relations of all three divine persons to one 
another are immediate, such that there is no purely mediated existence in the Trinity. If this 
were the case, it would not be possible for each of the three persons directly to love the others 
as he himself is loved: love would not achieve its perfection. Since three are required to 
achieve this perfection—and a fourth or further persons would introduce purely mediated 
relations which would destroy it—Richard concludes that there can be three and only three 
members of the Trinity.627 
                                                        
626 DT V.XIII. 
627 DT V.IX. 
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The sixth book continues the discussion of the two processions in God—
distinguishing further between them—subsequently commenting on the appropriateness of 
the names assigned to the three persons as individuals—such as ‘Unbegotten’ for the Father, 
‘Image’ and ‘Word’ in the case of the Son and ‘Gift’ and ‘Love’ in that of the Spirit. 
Although the entire text draws on both Latin and Greek traditions, and indeed represents a 
possible basis for convergence between what are often regarded as rival, Richard’s doctrine is 
exactly what he originally proclaims it to be: an invention that is independent of any 
conclusions that can be deduced from the Church Fathers or from Scripture, which is 
arguably one of the most creative and sophisticated in the history of Trinitarian theology. 
There is truly no precedent for it in the Christian tradition. 
 
The Trinitarian Vision of the Summa Halensis 
 
Although the doctrine of the Trinity is the last theological locus to be treated in the 
first volume of the Summa Halensis, which deals more generally with the doctrine of God, 
we have already discovered evidence of its Trinitarian vision throughout preceding sections, 
particularly the one on the transcendentals. In what follows, I will highlight retrospectively 
how the Summa’s unique Trinitarian vision already begins to emerge in these sections, 
through the discussion of certain divine attributes that can be ‘appropriated’ to specific 
members of the Trinity. Although properties like unity, truth, and goodness are properties of 
all three members of the Trinity in a general sense, insofar as they characterize the one God, a 
tradition sprang up in the twelfth century, and specifically, in the School of St Victor, of 
associating those properties in a specific sense with the person of the Trinity they seem most 
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to befit.628 This tradition was not without precedent in Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius and 
others, but it was instilled with new explanatory power by their medieval successors.  
As we have already seen and will now discover further, the early Franciscans not only 
adopted the doctrine of Trinitarian appropriations but took it to new lengths in what was 
ultimately an effort to identify vestiges or traces of the Trinity in all things, not least the 
human being. Although Augustine had certainly undertaken this effort in his own way, 
particularly in his De Trinitate, the Victorine project takes a new shape in the work of early 
Franciscans, whose metaphysical and epistemological positions were heavily informed by 
Avicenna and sources other than Augustine. As we have already seen, for example, the 
tractate on divine immensity discusses the existence of God in things.629  
In explaining how God is inside things, the Summist continues a longstanding, 
originally Augustinian tendency to affirm that God is in creatures by essence, power, and 
presence.630 He is in them by essence insofar as he causes them to be what they are, by power 
in terms of the abilities he gives them, and by presence, through their corresponding acts or 
operations.631 Although such claims may seem uncontroversial from an Augustinian point of 
view, the early Franciscans lent them depth and meaning that had been unknown to the 
Christian world hitherto. In Augustine, for instance, the primacy attributed to the doctrine of 
divine simplicity rendered God wholly other in his nature to creatures. On this account, 
creatures are ‘like God’ in that their unity of being renders them similar to him. Nevertheless, 
                                                        
628 Dominique Poirel, ‘Scholastic Reasons, Monastic Meditations and Victorine Conciliations: The Question of 
the Unity and Plurality of God in the Twelfth Century,’ in Oxford Handbook of the Trinity, ed. Gilles Emery 
and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 179-80. 
629 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, T3, M1, C1 (n. 45), 70-1.  
630 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, T3, M1, C2, I.a, b, c (n. 46), 71. 
631 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr2, T3, M1, C2 (n. 46), pp. 72-3. 
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they are fundamentally unlike him in their way of being simple—through a composition of 
parts, subject to development in time.  
The primacy the Summists attributed to the doctrine of divine immensity or infinity 
resulted in a rather different understanding of the relationship between God and creatures. 
While the Summist foreswears any quantitative concept of God, his conception of all 
individuals as corresponding to ideas in the mind of God nevertheless fosters a stronger sense 
that there is a direct correlation between divine ideas and individual instantiations. Here, 
creatures are unlike God only in the sense that they finitely capture some aspect of what he is 
infinitely. In this respect, however, the goodness and other qualities they exhibit can be 
related to his in a univocal way.  
This theme is further explored in the tractate on the so-called ‘transcendentals’, 
namely, unity, truth, and goodness, which has already been explored in both its metaphysical 
and epistemological dimensions at some length. As we have seen, unity is that on account of 
which created things can be regarded as indivisible, singular entities, that is, as one. 
Likewise, they can be assessed in terms of their very capacity to be discerned and thus known 
as ‘true’. Finally, the order or fitness for a purpose of a thing can be evaluated, and in that 
regard, it can be known as ‘good’.632 Such qualities respectively correspond to the efficient, 
formal, and final causality of the Father, Son, and Spirit respectively. These relations to God 
as efficient, formal, and final cause, whereby creatures are one, truth, and good, are said by 
                                                        
632 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr3, Q1, M1, C2, Respondeo (n. 73), 114-5: Secundum quod ens aliquod consideratur 
absolutum, ut divisum ab aliis et in se indivisum, determinatur per ‘unum’. Secundum vero quod consideratur 
aliquod ens comparatum ad aliud secundum distinctionem, determinatur per ‘verum’: ‘verum’ enim est quo res 
habet discerni. Secundum vero quod consideratur comparatum ad aliud secundum convenientiam sive ordinem, 
determinatur per ‘bonum’: ‘bonum’ enim est ex quo res habet ordinari.  
 226 
the Summist to be the source of mode, species, and order as well as measure, number, and 
weight in creatures. 
 Through the innate knowledge of such transcendental properties, human beings not 
only enjoy the status of images of God but also thereby acquire the ability to know beings in 
terms of the way in which they precisely if limitedly reflect God. This knowledge is possible 
because of memory, intelligence, and will, which respectively allow the mind to retain a 
coordinated—or unified—concept of the component parts of the being, as established by its 
efficient cause; to understand its truth in terms of its exemplar cause; and to love or approve 
of the goodness a being possesses through its final cause.633 According to the Summa, human 
beings are images rather than mere vestiges of God precisely because they like him possess 
power, knowledge, and will.634 Through such triadic locutions, the Summa weaves of vision 
whereby the Trinity can be found in all things, while all things by the same token gesture 
towards the Trinity. With this Trinitarian vision of the Summa Halensis in view, we turn now 
to assess its doctrine of the Trinity.  
 
  
                                                        
633 Vol 1, P1, In1, Tr 3, Q1, M1, C2, Respondeo (n. 73), 114-5: Item per comparationem ad animam triplicatur 
eadem determinatio. Nam esse rerum tripliciter comparatur ad animam: videlicet ut res ordinentur in memoria, 
percipiantur intelligentia, diligantur voluntate. Est igitur in ente quolibet a causa efficiente unitas, per quam 
ordinetur in memoria et servetur: memoria enim ea quae retinet secundum aliquam coordinationem relationis 
ad ‘unum’ et discretionem componit. Item, a causa exemplari est veritas in quolibet ente, per quam percipiatur 
ab intelligentia. Item, a causa finali est bonitas, per quam diligatur vel approbetur voluntate. 
634 Dominique Poirel, Livre de la nature et debat trinitaire au XII siecle', Le De Tribus Diebus de Hugues de 
Saint-Victor (Paris: Brepols, 2002); Poirel’s article in The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity, 178-90.  
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8. TRINITY: DOCTRINE  
 
In view of the background provided in the previous chapter, the present chapter will 
outline the Summa’s account of the Trinity, which can be found at the end of the Summa 
Halensis. This is succeeded only by a final treatise of approximately 250 pages on the divine 
names (de divinis nominibus) which further elaborates the Summa’s doctrine of God as three-
in-one.635 As one of the first treatises entailing a commentary of sorts on Pseudo-Dionysius’ 
The Divine Names, the presence of this treatise in the Summa signifies the attraction of the 
Greek Father to the early Franciscans.   
In addition to Pseudo-Dionysius, John of Damascus remains a key authority 
throughout the Summa’s discussion of the Trinity, along with Augustine and Richard of St 
Victor. Nevertheless, the references to Augustine primarily serve to confirm the conformity 
of the Summa’s doctrine to Western orthodoxy, particularly as regards the filioque and the 
psychological model. In its actual contours, this doctrine departs significantly from Augustine 
and exhibits commonalities with the model outlined by Damascus and above all, Richard of 
St Victor.  
That said, there are long stretches where the Summist is clearly speaking in his own 
voice, and it seems fairly evident that, whatever his influences, he is making the Victorine 
account his own and indeed transforming it into a specifically Franciscan doctrine.636 To see 
this, however, it will be necessary to follow the Summa’s line of Trinitarian argumentation 
                                                        
635 See Vol. 1, P2, 492ff.  
636 Maria Calisi, Trinitarian Perspectives in the Franciscan Theological Tradition (St Bonaventure, NY: 
Franciscan Institute, 2008). Russell L. Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Theology from Aquinas to Ockham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). J.T. Paasch, Divine Production in Late Medieval Trinitarian 
Theology: Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
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quite closely. This is what I endeavour to do in the following analysis. In developing a 
version of Richard’s Trinitarian account which is quite their own, the Summists divide their 
treatise on the Trinity into five sections or ‘questions’, which inquire into the plurality of 
persons, the truth of the persons, the number of the persons, their order, and their equality.  
The basis for the entire discussion—and the bulk of the Summists’ work on 
Trinitarian doctrine—is provided in the first question, which is itself divided into two ‘titles’, 
which respectively treat the generation of the Son from the Father and the procession of the 
Spirit from the Father and the Son. Interestingly, John of Damascus also began his account of 
the Trinity with sections on the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, before 
going on to answer further questions about the inter-relations of the persons. Whether the 
Summists deliberately sought to follow this pattern is difficult to say, but the resemblance in 
structure is striking. In any event, these two titles are the focus of the discussion below, 
which will be followed by a brief treatment of the key points that emerge from the sections 
on the truth and number and the order and equality of the persons.  
 
The Plurality of Persons in the Trinity 
 
The Generation of the Son 
 
At the start of this section, the Summist presents a number of arguments in support of 
the claim that the Son is eternally generated from the Father.637 Quoting the fiftieth of 
Augustine’s 83 Quaestiones, he writes: 
 
                                                        
637 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T1, C1 (n. 295), 414-18. 
 229 
‘From eternity, the Father was either able and willed to generate the son, or he did not 
will but was able, or he was not able but willed; or neither willed nor was able. If he 
willed and was not able, he was impotent. If he was able and did not will, he was evil. 
If he was neither able nor willed, he was both impotent and evil; but these things do 
not pertain to him.’638  
 
On this basis, the Summist concludes that God was able and that he willed, such that 
the Son was generated from eternity, and his generation is eternal. A further argument turns 
on the idea, formulated by Pseudo-Dionysius in his The Divine Names 4.1, that the good is 
self-diffusive by nature or essence. Indeed, it is the glory of the good to diffuse itself, for if 
we posit two goods, which are equal in all respects, where one diffuses its goodness and the 
other does not, the self-diffusive good would be more praiseworthy and better than the other 
that did not diffuse itself. Since a good withheld is not truly good, the definition of the good 
includes its self-diffusion,639 
Where there is the highest good, consequently, it is diffusive. Yet the highest 
diffusion is that than which a greater cannot be thought. However, no greater diffusion can be 
conceived than the one that is according to the whole substance of what is diffused. 
Therefore, the highest good necessarily diffuses itself according to its whole substance, and 
                                                        
638 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T1, C1, a (n. 295), 414: ‘Deus Pater ab aeterno aut potuit Filium generare et voluit; 
aut non voluit sed potuit; aut non potuit sed voluit; aut neque voluit neque potuit. Si voluit et non potuit: ergo 
impotens fuit. Si potuit et non voluit: ergo invidus fuit; sed ab eo relegata est omnis invidia. Si nec potuit nec 
voluit: impotens et invidus fuit; sed ista relegata sunt ab ipso.’ Relinguitur ergo quod potuit et voluit, et constat 
quod scivit; sed ad hoc quod causa rationabilis agat, non plura exiguntur nisi velle, posse et scire; ergo Filium 
ab aeterno genuit; ergo generatio aeterna est. 
639 Kevin Patrick Keane, The Logic of Self-Diffusive Goodness in the Trinitarian Theology of the Summa Fratris 
Alexandri. PhD, Fordham University (1978). 
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this kind of diffusion is naturally understood to occur in it. But the power of generating is 
nothing other than that power of diffusing one’s own substance so as to produce something 
similar in nature. Therefore in the highest being, this highest power is understood to exist 
from eternity, as the highest good exists from eternity.640 
On affirming this, the Summist acknowledges that some might object to his claim that 
the good is naturally or essentially diffusive. In response to this objection, he re-iterates that 
the perfection and nobility of the good involves communicating itself. Since everything 
perfect is attributed to the highest good, that good is self-communicating. As the highest 
good, moreover, it is capable of the highest level of communication. Yet the highest 
communication is that of a being’s whole substance rather than merely its qualities or 
attributes. Thus, the highest good communicates its whole substance. But to communicate its 
substance is naturally to produce something that is similar to itself, and this is nothing other 
than to generate. Therefore the highest good is necessarily understood to entail generation, 
and generation is eternal, because whatever is understood in the highest good is eternal.641 
                                                        
640 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T1, C1, b (n. 295), 414. 
641 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T1, C1, b (n. 295), 414-15: Si dicatur, quod haec ratio non procedit, quia in bono 
non intelligitur diffusio nisi ex consequenti, et non naturaliter vel essentialiter, in contrarium obicitur: de 
perfectione boni et nobilitate est communicare se ipsum; unde haec est laus boni; quidquid autem est 
perfectionis et nobilitatis boni attribuitur summe bono; ergo necessario in summo bono est sui ipsius 
communicatio; et cum ipsum sit summum, ergo summa communicatio. Magna autem communicatio est 
communicare sua vel suam qualitatem vel suum accidens; maior vero communicatio est communicare suam 
substantiam; maxima ergo et summa est communicare totam suam substantiam; ergo haec communicatio 
necessario est in summo bono; sed communicare suam substantiam ut simile producatur in natura, nihil aliud 
est quam generare; ergo necessario in summo bono intelligitur generatio; ergo generatio est aeterna, quia 
quidquid in eo intelligitur aeternum est. 
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In a further argument, the Summist observes that whatever pertains to nobility or 
perfection and power is attributed to God. Moreover, a power is more noble which is 
characterized by a more noble effect or act. But compared to all acts of power, he further 
argues, none is more noble than the act of an agent that naturally produces a similar agent. 
But this sort of act requires the power to generate. For an artificial power produces artificial 
things, not something similar in nature. By the power of generation, however, a substance is 
produced that is similar in nature, and this entails a more powerful production. Since we 
understand the noblest power to be in the highest power which is God, then God must have 
the power of generating, and that eternally.642  
While an imperfect generation requires a dual origin, namely, man and woman, a 
perfect generation has a singular principle. Therefore, since what is most perfect is attributed 
to the generation in God, there is in God a generation from the Father only.643 On the basis of 
these and other arguments, the Summist concludes that there is generation, and it is eternal. 
In support of this contention, he quotes Richard of St Victor’s De Trinitate I.9, which states 
that, ‘in created nature we read what we ought to think of the uncreated. Daily, we see how 
                                                        
642 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T1, C1, c (n. 295), 415: Communis conceptio animi est quod quidquid est nobilitatis 
et perfectionis et virtutis est Deo tribuendum; item, nobilior est virtus, quae habet nobiliorem effectum vel 
actum; sed comparando omnes actus virtutum, non est nobilior actus alicuius virtutis agentis quam ille quo 
producitur simile in natura ipsi agenti; sed virtus cuius est talis actus, scilicet producere simile in natura ipsi 
agenti, est virtus generativa et non alia: virtus enim artificialis producit artificiatum, sed non simile in natura; a 
virtute autem genrativa est productio substantialis, hoc est similis in natura, et haec est virtuosior productio; 
ergo inter virtutes omnes producentes aliquid nobilior est virtus generativa, quae habet producere simile in 
natura; sed quod est nobilitatis vel nobilioris virtutis non potest non intelligi in summa virtute et summa 
potentia, quae Deus est; ergo in summa virtute et potentia intelligitur virtus generativa; ergo generatio; ergo 
generatio aeterna est. 
643 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T1, C1, d (n. 295), 415. 
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by the operation of nature itself subsistence produces existence, and existence proceeds from 
[another] existence. Will the most excellent nature’s operation not be able to do this? Will 
that [higher] nature that has given the gift of fecundity to this nature, remain completely 
sterile in itself?’644 Thus, we attribute generation to it. 
 After establishing that there is generation in God, the Summist endeavours further to 
define generation in the divine.645 Although he admits that we do not have the power as 
human beings to specify the nature of eternal generation, which is a matter of faith, he insists 
that generation, according to the common definition, involves the production of a substance. 
However, this production can be understood in multiple ways, insofar as the substance 
produced can be similar or dissimilar in nature to the being that produces it. In the latter 
respect, production is equivocal, as in the case of things produced in the flesh. Whenever 
something is produced of one substance which is similar to it in nature, however, univocal 
generation is at stake.  
Even univocal generation can however occur in multiple ways, given that either a part 
or the whole of the original substance can be produced. When man begets man, for example, 
the production is partial. In the case of the divine being, exclusively, the whole substance is 
produced, because the divine essence is simple, and there is no part in it. Yet this production 
can occur in either a principal or a non-principal mode. It is defined according to the principal 
                                                        
644 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T1, C1, Respondeo (n. 295), 416: Confitendum verissime quod generatio aeterna 
est. Unde Richardus de S. Victore, in libro De Trinitate: ‘In natura creata legimus quod de increata pensare 
debeamus. Videmus quotidie quomodo naturae ipsius operatione subsistentia existentiam producit et existentia 
de existentia procedit. Numquid in illa superexcellenti natura operatio naturae nulla erit? Numquid natura illa, 
quae huic naturae fructus foecunditatis donavit, in se omnino sterilis permanebit?’ He also quotes John of 
Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa I.6, which states that it is impossible for God not to generate.  
645 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T1, C2, Solutio (n. 296), 419-20. 
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mode when a product is produced which has the power and property of producing another 
from itself. This is the way in which the Son proceeds from the Father, insofar as he has the 
power of producing another from himself, namely, the Holy Spirit.  
By contrast, the production of the Holy Spirit by the Son occurs according to the 
second, non-principal mode, because he is produced of the substance of God, but does not 
retain the property of producing another from himself. Therefore, the first product, namely, 
the Son, is generated; the other, which is the Spirit, comes forth by way of procession. 
Nevertheless, when we speak of the generation of the Son as principal, and the procession of 
the Spirit as non-principal, an inequality is not implied, but only a difference in properties. 
For to call something ‘first’ or ‘not first’ within the Godhead is not to designate priority or 
posteriority in time, but rather to designate an order of nature. From this, therefore, it is clear 
that generation in the divine pertains to the univocal production of something similar in 
nature in its entire substance according to the principle mode.646 
Next, the Summist inquires whether the capacity to generate or be generated pertains 
to the divine essence or to the persons.647  In answer to this question, he distinguishes 
between nature and the order of nature. On his account, ‘nature’ refers to the having of a 
certain essence, while order refers to the way in which it is possessed. For instance, the 
Father has his nature through himself; the Son, through the Father, by generation and thus by 
a principal mode of procession. The Spirit has his nature through spiration from both the 
Father and the Son, and thus through a principal mode of procession from the Father and a 
non-principal mode of procession from the Son. On this basis, the Summist insists that there 
is a three-fold mode of being in the divine, namely, quid, quis and quomodo. In the divine 
                                                        
646 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T1, C2, Solutio (n. 296), 419-20. 
647 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T1, C3, Ar1, (n. 297), 421-9. 
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being there is, respectively, there is the nature which is had, the having of the divine nature, 
and the mode of having, namely, the notion or habit or property, whereby one has the nature.  
While quid inquires into the common nature of the divine persons, quis considers the 
one having the nature under a discreet and incommunicable property, namely, the person or 
hypostasis in question. Quomodo attends to the mode of having the nature, namely, with a 
certain habit or order, such as generation, which is consequently called a condition or habit of 
the order of nature. In summary, then, quid concerns the divine essence; quis, a divine 
person, and quomodo, the notional habits which distinguish persons in terms of their varying 
points of origin or in terms of the ‘order of nature’. Thus, the Summist concludes that all 
names signifying the divine essence as quis est ‘pertain to a discrete and incommunicable 
property and signify notional habits, such as ‘to generate’ and ‘to be generated’, which are 
properly referred to persons. By contrast, names signifying the divine essence in terms of 
quid est signify a communicable essence which belongs to all three persons of the Trinity.  
 
The Procession of the Holy Spirit 
 
 After analysing the generation of the Son, the Summist goes on to consider the 
procession of the Holy Spirit.648 Initially, he presents a number of arguments to support the 
idea of this procession. First, he notes that the principle of diffusion in things is two-fold: by 
nature and by will. Since generation is the most perfect means of diffusion by nature, 
procession through love is the most perfect means of diffusion by will. However, the good is 
greater that diffuses itself according to both modes rather than just one or the other. Since 
what is most praiseworthy and perfect cannot be lacking in the highest good, which is God, 
                                                        
648 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, 438ff. 
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there must be diffusion of nature through the generation of the Son as well as a diffusion of 
the will or love through the procession of the Spirit.649  
 Another reason for the Spirit’s procession is this: the highest good is essentially 
diffusive or communicative, since a good withheld is not truly good. As therefore the 
diffusion or communication is twofold, namely, natural and gratuitous, there is a 
communication through the mode of generation as well as through the mode of gift, that is, 
the procession of love. For love is the first and perfect gift by which all things are properly 
given, and the one who gives his own love to another holds all things in common with that 
one. Likewise, what is not given from love is not properly given, for it is given rather from 
fear.650 
 A further reason for the Spirit’s procession is as follows: the highest goodness cannot 
be lacking in the highest love, because what is truly good gives itself, and that giving is an act 
of love. But the highest love entails that one loves another as one is loved oneself. Indeed, 
this love is highest because one wills for the other to be loved by another as one is loved 
oneself. Since what is most praiseworthy is attributed to the highest good, it is necessary to 
affirm that the highest good, in loving another as himself, wills that this one be loved by 
                                                        
649 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C1, a (n. 304), 438: Duo sunt principia diffusionis in rebus: natura et voluntas. 
Perfectissima autem diffusio naturae est illa quae est per generationem, perfectissima diffusio voluntatis est illa 
quae est per amorem sive per dilectionem: et haec est laus bonitatis in rebus; magis autem laudabile est bonum 
quod diffundit se secundum utrumque modum quam quod diffundit se secundum alterum tantum. Si ergo quod 
est laudabile et perfectum non potest deesse in summo bono: est igitur in summo bono, quod est Deus, diffusio 
generationis, quam consequitur differentia gignentis et geniti, Patris et Filii, et erit ibi diffusio per modum 
dilectionis, quam dicimus processionem Spiritus Sancti. 
650 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C1, c (n. 304), 438. 
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another as he himself is loved. But this cannot be the case where there are less than three 
persons. Therefore there are three persons, one being the Holy Spirit.651  
As the subsequent discussion confirms, procession by love is proper to the Spirit, 
since procession can be understood in two ways: either absolutely and precisely or with the 
super-addition of some mode of dignity or difference. The second mode is proper to the Son, 
whose procession cannot be understood without the super-addition of the dignity involved in 
proceeding according to the principal mode, whereby he proceeds from the Father even while 
another, that is, the Holy Spirit, proceeds from himself. This procession by a principal mode, 
we have noted, is called generation. Since the Spirit proceeds from the Son by a non-principle 
mode, however, he proceeds in the precise or absolute sense.652  
As the Summist later observes, this procession is through the mode of spiration or 
‘breathing’. On his account, spiration can be defined in two ways.653 Firstly, it can be 
imperfect, in cases where there is only a natural power which is pulsating and moving, as in 
the inhaling and exhaling of air by the human body. Secondly, spiration can be perfect, where 
the power of reason moves towards speech, as happens when the rational intellect generates a 
word which is a report of understanding, simultaneously spirating the spirit which is the 
vehicle of this word, as Damascus says in De fide orthodoxa I.7: ‘the word must have a spirit, 
and the Word of God is not more deficient than our word.’654  
This spiration can be defined according to the intention of the movement of love, 
because love or the desire to know is implicit in the understanding that is generated by the 
                                                        
651 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C1, e (n. 304), 439. 
652 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C2, Respondeo (n. 305), 441. 
653 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C3, Ar1, Respondeo (n. 306), 442. 
654 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C3, Ar1, Respondeo (n. 306), 442: Oportet verbum habere spiritum nec est 
Verbum Dei deficientius nostro verbo. 
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mind. Thus, just as spiration or breathing is the vital motion that sustains natural life, so 
spiration by love is the vital movement that sustains the power of the spiritual life, which is 
proper to the soul and by implication intelligence, which is the product of generation by the 
Son. This identification of the Spirit with love raises the question how love can be attributed 
to the whole Trinity, as indeed it is.655 In addressing this question, the Summist contends that 
love may be defined in a number of ways.  
On one level, it is called a delight in what is good simpliciter (complacentia boni 
simpliciter). So construed, it befits all three persons. On another level, however, it is called a 
free or liberal movement of the will to the good, through that power which is the will. In this 
way, it is appropriated to the Father, according to the reason Richard provides, which is that 
purely gratuitous (amor gratuitus) or self-giving love is appropriated to the Father.656 Insofar 
as it is considered as a liberal movement made possible by another, it is however associated 
with the Son according to Richard, who appropriates a love that is both received and given to 
the Son (amor permixtus). When however love is defined as exclusively from another, it is 
appropriated to the Holy Spirit, on the account of Richard, who attributes a purely receptive 
love (amor debitus) to the third person of the Trinity. 
As the above analysis suggests, love must be defined differently depending on the 
person of the Trinity in question. Some forms of love befit one person of the Trinity but not 
the others. Thus, love can be said to be both common to all three members in a general sense, 
as well as proper to individual persons in a more specified sense. While the whole Trinity 
wills the good, which is love, the Father is the moving principle (principium movens) of that 
love, the Son is the principle that is moved (principium motum), and the Spirit is the 
                                                        
655 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q4, C7, Solutio (n. 326), 479-80: On the way that the will is essentially a property of the 
whole divine being as well as a personal property of the Spirit. 
656 Richard of St Victor, DT V.16, 17, 19-20.  
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movement coming from the wills of the Father and the Son, namely, the gift or liberal 
emanation of their shared love or condilectio. Although love is attributed to the Father and 
the Son in a certain way, consequently, it is properly attributed to the Spirit. As Augustine 
says in De Trinitate VI.5, ‘there are three and no more: one loving (diligens) him which is 
from himself, another loving the one from whom he comes, and one who represents their 
love,’657  
As the shared love of Father and Son, the Summist further observes that the Spirit is 
the bond or nexus of their communion, and for multiple reasons.658 First because he is the 
love proceeding from the Father and Son commonly. Secondly because he comes from the 
Father and Son and is of one substance with them. Whence Augustine says in De Trinitate 
XI.19.37 that ‘the love by which the Father loves the Son and the Son the Father 
demonstrates the ineffable communion of both.’ Third, because he comes from the Father and 
Son through the habit and relation or notion which is their common spiration. Fourth because 
the Holy Spirit is the union or communion through which we are united to God and 
communicate the highest goodness of the divine good. 
In a corollary inquiry, the Summist addresses the question whether there is any mode 
of production in the divine beyond generation and procession.659 As stated previously, there 
                                                        
657 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C3, Ar2, Respondeo (n. 307), 445: Tria sunt et non amplius: unus diligens eum 
qui de illo, et alius diligens de quo est, et ipsa dilectio. 
658 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C3, Ar3, Respondeo (n. 308), 446. 
659 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C3, Ar4, Respondeo (n. 309), 447: Dicendum quod ibi est productio per modum 
rationalis, sed non aliud a productione naturali: in divinis enim non aptatur productio cuiuscumque naturae, 
sed naturae dignioris, quae est rationalis natura, quae est imago Dei. Nec dicitur ibi generatio secundum 
quemcumque modum, sed secundum quod intelligentia a mente procedit, quae est prima productio naturae 
rationalis. Et hoc patet per Augustinum, qui dicit generationem Filii per productionem intelligentiae a mente 
intelligi, et productionem Spiritus Sancti in productione amoris ab utroque, intelligentia videlicet et mente; sed 
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is a production through the mode of reason, but this is none other than a natural production: 
for the production in the divine is not adapted to just any nature, but a most dignified nature, 
which is the rational nature, or the image of God. Therefore, generation there is not said to be 
according to any mode whatever, but according to the way intelligence proceeds from the 
mind, which is the primary production of the rational nature. This is made clear by 
Augustine, who says in De Trinitate XV.7.12 that the generation of the Son is through the 
production of intelligence from the understanding mind, and the production of the Holy Spirit 
is in the production of love from both, namely, intelligence and mind. But the production 
through the mode of intelligence is a production through the mode of reason. This is clear 
because the production of the Son is the production of a mental word, which is the same as 
intelligence or understanding. Therefore, the production of nature and reason are the same, 
because in this case, the production is of the rational nature. 
Following this, the Summa addresses the highly controversial question whether the 
Spirit proceeds from the Father only or from both the Father and the Son. This question was 
at the time and still remains highly controversial amongst Greek and Latin or Eastern and 
Western thinkers. Although the Summist relies heavily on Greek thinkers like Damascus and 
Dionysius—also mentioning Gregory the Theologian in this context—throughout his section 
on Trinitarian theology, he rejects their position on this particular issue, in favour of the one 
he finds presented in the classic Western account of Augustine. In this connection, he 
distinguishes between two forms of procession.660 In one way, he writes, to ‘proceed’ is to be 
moved from one place to another by way of locomotion. In the second, procession consists in 
                                                        
productio per modum intelligentiae est productio per modum rationis—quod patet: quia productio Filii est 
productio verbi mentalis, quod idem est quod intelligentia—eadem ergo est productio naturae et rationis, quia 
est productio naturae rationalis. 
660 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C4 , Solutio (n. 310), 450.  
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the coming of the thing caused from a cause or the thing moved from the one moving. 
According to the first mode, procession requires two ends, namely, that from which and that 
in which; according to the second mode, it only requires one end, namely, something from 
which the procession occurs.  
According to the Summist, the second of these two modes can be attributed to the 
procession of the Holy Spirit. However, the Greek understanding of his procession is by 
locomotion. According to this mode, he does not proceed from the Son, because from this it 
would follow that he proceeds from the Son in the Father, which is not fitting, as the Father is 
the first principle and has nothing from the Son. But they have conceded that he proceeds 
from the Father in the Son, in which it is shown that he is the love of the Father for the Son 
and is even insinuated that the Son has being from the Father. But Latin thinkers translate the 
word ‘proceed’ in terms of the Spirit’s coming or procession as the thing caused by a cause. 
Whence they say that to proceed is to come from something, although it does not proceed to 
something, much like knowledge and love are said to proceed from the mind, although they 
are not understood to proceed to a new place. And according to this mode, Latin thinkers say 
that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son because he comes from both as 
love from knowledge and the mind.  
 In elaborating on the Spirit’s procession, the Summist appeals again to the authority 
of Richard of St Victor, and specifically to his contention that the highest love, which cannot 
fail to be understood as the highest good, necessarily proves the generation of the Son from 
the Father and is the reason of his generation. For where there is highest love, it is necessary 
that there is a person willing the good of the other, and that good is to communicate oneself 
fully, according to one’s whole substance. Likewise, the reason of the procession of the Holy 
Spirit is preeminent love.  
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As Richard writes: ‘since what is best cannot be lacking in the highest love, so it is 
not able to be lacking in what is preeminent; in love, however, what is preeminent is nothing 
other than to will the other to be loved as oneself.’661 ‘But as long as one is the sole person 
being loved by another, he alone enjoys the delights of this highest sweetness; similarly, even 
the other is deprived of participating in the highest joy as long as he does not have a shared 
lover (condilectus),’ or the ability to share his love with the first for a third. Thus, ‘if both are 
to be able to communicate delights of this sort [i.e., highest], it is necessary that they have a 
shared lover (condilectus),’662 or a third person they can love together in the same manner. 
This of course is the Holy Spirit.  
 As the Son is called the love (dilectio) from the Father, consequently, so the Holy 
Spirit is called their shared love (condilectio). Thus, we are evidently able to say, according 
to Richard, that as the reason of the generation of the Son from the Father is the highest 
dilectio, so the reason of the procession of the Holy Spirit is condilectio.663 For by reason of 
the highest dilectio which is understood in the person of the Father, there is the reason of 
generation. Moreover, the highest condilectio which is understood in the persons of the 
Father and the Son is the reason for the procession of the Spirit from them. Thus, Richard 
says: ‘when one loves another and is alone in doing so, there is dilectio, but not condilectio. 
When two mutually love each other, and the affection of the first is aimed at the second, and 
                                                        
661 DT III.11, quoted in Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C5, Respondeo (n. 311), 453: Sicut in summa caritate non 
potest deesse quod est optimum, ita nec potest deesse quod est praecipuum; praecipuum autem in vera caritate 
est alterum velle diligi ut se. 
662 De Trinitate III.15, quoted in Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C5, Respondeo (n. 311), 453: Quamdiu enim iste 
ab alio solus diligitur, praecipuae dulcedinis suae delicias solus possidere videtur; similiter et alius, quamdiu 
condilectum non habet, praecipui gaudii communione caret; ut autem uterque possit istiusmodi delicias 
communicare, oportet eos condilectum habere. 
663 DT III.19.  
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the affection of the second at the first and is, at it were, turned in various directions, there is 
love on both sides but there is not co-love. Co-love occurs when a third is loved by the two in 
harmony and collectively (concorditer et socialiter) so that the two persons’ affects are fused 
to become one because of the flame of love for the third.’664   
 
The Truth and Number of the Persons 
 
Following the discussion of the generation and procession of the Son and Spirit, 
respectively, in question one, question two briefly treats the truth of the persons.665 Here, the 
Summist invokes Richard of St Victor, who writes: ‘boldly, we claim that in God, we 
speak…about multiple persons and not about multiple substances because there, multiple 
persons have one and the same substance through different properties. Thus there is unity of 
essence according to the mode of being, because of one undivided being, and multiple 
persons because of multiple existences.’666  
                                                        
664 De Trinitate III.19, quoted in Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q1, T2, C5, Respondeo (n. 311), 453: Quando unus alteri 
amorem impendit et solus solum diligit, dilectio quidem est, sed condilectio non est. Quando duo se mutuo 
diligent et istius in illum, illius in istum affectus discurret et quasi in diversa tendit, utrobique quidem dilectio 
est, sed condilectio non est. Condilectio vero est cum a duobus diligentibus tertius concorditer diligitur et 
socialiter amatur et duorum affectus tertii amoris incendio in unum conflatur. Ex iis itaque patet quod in ipsa 
divinitate condilectio locum non haberet, si duobus existentibus tertia persona deesset. 
665 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q2, 455-8. 
666 DT IV.19, quoted in Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q2, Solutio (n. 311), 455-6: Fidenter fatemur personas in divinitate, 
secundum substantiam dictas, et substantiam significare et plures ibi personas et non plures substantias esse, 
quia sunt ibi plures habentes unum et idem esse indifferens ex differenti proprietate; itaque ibi est iuxta modum 
essendi unitas essentiae, quia unum indifferens esse, plures personae, quia plures existentiae. 
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For example, when I speak of the person of the Father, I speak of the one having the 
divine essence not from another and from whom others have the same essence through 
generation or spiration. When I speak of the Son, I speak of the one having the divine essence 
from another through generation and from whom another comes through procession. When I 
speak of the Holy Spirit, I speak of the one having the same divine being from others, 
namely, the Father and the Son, through procession. Therefore, there is the same essence in 
Father, Son and Spirit, namely, the divine essence, nevertheless through different and 
incommunicable properties.  
If therefore the being of a person is nothing other than to have the being of a rational 
nature from an incommunicable property, it is necessary to posit that the Father is a Person 
and the Son is a person and the Spirit is a person. Quoting Richard’s De Trinitate IV.8, the 
Summist insists again that a plurality of persons does not take away from the unity of the 
divine substance, just as a plurality of substances—mainly, the body and soul in human 
beings—does not detract from the unity of a person.  
 As the Summist elaborates in treating the number of the persons, this is because the 
persons of the Trinity are not enumerated simpliciter, thus creating numerous substances, but 
only according to differences in their points of origin or ‘order of nature’, which does not 
foster numerous essences but only numerous persons which enact that singular essence.667 
                                                        
667 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q3, C3, Solutio (n. 315), 462: Ideo solum est ibi numerus personarum sive Trinitatis et 
non numerus simpliciter, qui est differentium substantiarum, quia est solum secundum originis differentiam, 
quae non facit numerum in essentiis, sed solum in hypostasibus vel personis; cf. Pars 1, Inq 2, Tract 1, Qu 3, Ch 
4, Solutio, p. 463-4. Indeed, the Summist elaborates, there must be an order of origin in the divine, because if 
we think of the divine nature, we must think of one having that nature. And if we understand him as having that 
nature from another, we understand him with an incommunicable property, by which the one having nature? is 
separated from the one who is not from another. Thus, are introduced different hypostases, or things having a 
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After Richard’s example, the Summist concludes that there can only be three such persons, 
because a greater number of persons would destroy the supreme similarity and connection in 
the Trinity and introduce confusion and disorder, which would be absurd and unfitting.668  
More specifically, it would destroy the direct connection between each person with 
the others which the number three creates—a connection in which each member of the 
Trinity is loved by the other two in common, through a condilectio or shared love that 
represents the perfect form of love. This love is made possible by one person who is the 
terminus of the diffusion of love, one person who is the principle of this diffusion, and anther 
who is the medium of the diffusion.669 
In elaborating on the community shared by these three persons, the Summist gives an 
account which markedly resembles what we have seen in John of Damascus. ‘When we say 
Peter and Paul are both men,’ he writes, we accept that they share a common essence, even 
though there are two individuals. In a similar way, the three persons are the same according 
to what they are (secundum rem) and differ only according to reason (secundum rationem).670 
That, incidentally, is why things said of the persons are predicated relatively, not of the 
substance.671 
 
The Order and Equality of the Persons 
 
                                                        
nature under a discrete and incommunicable property (Res naturae sive habens naturam sub discreta et 
incommunicabili proprietate; Richard, DT IV.22). 
668 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q3, C7, Solutio (n. 319), 469.  
669 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q3, C7, Ad quartum (n. 319), 470. 
670 Vol 1, P2, In2, Tr2, S1, Q1, M2, C4, Ar2, Respondeo (n. 389), 573. 
671 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Qu 2, C3, Ar1, Contra b (n. 339), 504. 
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In treating the order amongst the persons, the Summist distinguishes between 
numerous definitions of the term ‘order’.672  For instance, there is order according to place, 
time, cause, reason, and origin of nature. Order according to place concerns these differences: 
superior, inferior, and equal; time: prior posterior, simultaneous; these are not the modes of 
order in the divine. Order according to cause is that by which we say that a cause is prior to 
its effect. This mode of order is not in the divine persons because they are co-equal.  
 When the last order of reason is defined as an order of different genera, which are 
first, middle, or last, it cannot be ascribed to the divine persons, as it suggests that the latter 
elements in the order are inferior to the former. If the order of reason is defined in terms of an 
order of origins, however, there is order in the divine being. For there is one person who is 
not from another; a second who is from the first and from which another comes; and a third 
which comes from both.  
For the Summist, as we have already seen, this order of origins entails an order of 
nature, because through the ways in which they originate, the divine persons allow for the 
diffusion of the essence or love of God amongst the members of the Trinity, such that each of 
the members bears the same nature or substance as the others.673 For this very reason, the 
order of origins within the Trinity is not one which renders one inferior to the other. To the 
contrary, it is an order which enacts their loving and being loved with one and the same kind 
of love.  
 The Summist then inquires whether the two Persons of the Trinity that originate in the 
one who does not have an origin do so such that neither proceeds from the other. The 
question at stake here is again the one disputed between Greeks and Latins as to whether the 
Spirit proceeds from the Father only or from both the Father and the Son. In reckoning with 
                                                        
672 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q4, C1, Solutio (n. 320), 471-2. 
673 Vol 1, P1, In2, Tr1, Q4, C2, Solutio (n. 321), 472. 
 246 
this question, the Summist presents a number of reasons which contest the Greek belief that 
the Spirit proceeds only from the Father.  
 The first is based on a quotation from Richard of St Victor:  ‘If two persons 
proceeded from only one person, certainly, neither of those proceeding would be immediately 
bound to the other.’674 For this reason, ‘the order of nature is not according to the essence,’ 
because the Holy Spirit would not have order to the Son except because he is from the Father, 
nor would the Son have order to the Holy Spirit except because he is from the Father. 
Therefore, they would be more closely related to the Father than to one another. Therefore, 
there would be no complete or equal proportion among the divine persons: which is unfitting 
of God. Therefore it remains that those two proceed from the Father in such a way that one 
proceeds immediately from the other, namely, the Holy Spirit from the Son—which is 
contradictory to the Greek opinion.675  
The second reason is this: the Person of the Father, from whom the others proceed, is 
one in essence with the persons of the Son and the Spirit. As he is entirely simple, moreover, 
he has one mode insofar as he is the origin of both, as the Greeks posit, because they are 
immediately from him, such that they do not have different habits of being ordered to him, 
because both are immediately ordered to himself, as they argue. Therefore, they proceed from 
him according to one habit and one mode. Therefore, if one comes through generation, the 
                                                        
674 Richard of St Victor, DT V.10. 
675 Vol 1, Pars 1, Inq 2, Tract 1, Qu 4, C5, Ad a (n. 324), 475-6. Richardus in libro De Trinitate: ‘Si gemina 
persona de una tantum procederet, profecto procedentium neutra immediate alteri adhaereret,’ supple ‘in 
ordine naturae, non secundum essentiam:’ quia Spiritus Sanctus non haberet ordinem ad Filium nisi quia a 
Patre, nec Filius ad Spiritum Sanctum nisi quia a Patre; ergo plus convenirent cum Patre quam ad invicem; 
non ergo esset omnimodo nec aequalis proportio in divinis personis: quod est inconveniens. Relinquitur ergo 
quod ita procedunt illae duae a Patre quod et una immediate procedit ab alia, scilicet Spiritus Sanctus a Filio: 
quod est contra opinionem Graecorum. 
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other one as well, and if the other comes through spiration from the Father, the first one does 
also, and in that way, both could be called the Son or the Spirit, and there could be multiple 
sons or multiple spirits: which is unfitting and false of the Trinity. Therefore, it is necessary 
that the Son and Spirit proceed from the Father such that one also proceeds from the other.676 
 The third reason is as follows: it is not possible to understand a third as ordered to 
unity unless by the mediation of a second, because the second is the mediator between the 
first and third. Thus, the habit of the third to the second is prior to and more immediate than 
the third to the first. As therefore the Son is the mediating person between the Father and the 
Holy Spirit, it is necessary to understand the habit of the Holy Spirit to the Son as prior to the 
habit to the Father.677 The fourth reason is as follows: the Holy Spirit proceeds from the 
Father as a distinct and determinate love; the Son however proceeds from the Father as 
intelligence from the mind; but distinct and determinate love never proceeds unless 
intelligence first proceeds from the mind, because we do not love unless we know.678 
                                                        
676 Vol 1, Pars 1, Inq 2, Tract 1, Qu 4, C5, Ad b (n. 324), 475-6. Persona Patris, a quo procedunt aliae, est 
unum in essentia cum persona Filii et persona Spiritus Sancti. Item, cum ipsa sit simplex omnino, se habens uno 
modo quantum est ex parte originis ad utramque, sicut ponunt Graeci, quia immediate sunt de ipso nec 
habitudo earum differens ad illam, quia scilicet immediate se habet utraque ad illam, sicut ponunt: ergo 
secundum unam habitudinem et unum modum procederent ab illa; ergo si una est per generationem, et alia, et 
si una per spirationem a Patre, et alia; et ita utraque potest dici Filius vel Spiritus Sanctus, et ita plures filii vel 
plures spiritus sancti: quod est inconveniens et falsum. Necesse est ergo quod ita procedant Filius et Spiritus 
Sanctus a Patre quod etiam unus procedat ab alio. 
677 Vol. 1, Pars 1, Inq 2, Tract 1, Qu 4, C5, Ad c (n. 324), 475-6. Non potest intelligi poni ordo ternarii ad 
unitatem nisi mediante dualitate, quia dualitas se habet quasi medium ad unitatem et ternarium, et prior est 
habitudo ternarii ad binarium quam ad unum et immediator. Cum ergo Filius sit persona media inter Patrem et 
Spiritum Sanctum, necesse est prius habitudinem intelligere Spiritus Sancti ad Filium quam ad Patrem. 
678 Quoting Augustine De Trinitate 8.4.  
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Therefore, love proceeds by the mediation of understanding. Similarly, therefore, the Holy 
Spirit is not able to proceed from the Father unless by the mediation of the Son. Therefore the 
Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as love from understanding.679 
The fifth and final reason is this: there is order amongst the divine persons. However, 
there is not order there according to superiority and inferiority, nor according to priority and 
posteriority. Therefore, the order there is closest to that of reason. But an order of reason is 
according to first, middle, and last…because in it, there is a first, from which nothing comes 
but which is from others, and a last, from which others come yet itself comes from none, and 
there is a middle, which is from another and from which another comes. 
As therefore in the divine persons there is an exemplar of this sort of order, it remains 
that there is one person there from which others come and that itself comes from none, and 
one which comes from others, while nothing comes from itself, and a middle which is from 
another and from which another comes. But the first of the aforementioned persons is the 
Father, the second, the Spirit, and the third, the Son. Therefore, he is from the person of the 
Father and from him comes the person of the Spirit, who is exclusively from others. Thus, it 
is not possible that there are two proceeding immediately from the first person, which does 
not have origin, so that neither proceeds from the other.680 
                                                        
679 Vol. 1, Pars 1, Inq 2, Tract 1, Qu 4, C5, Ad d (n. 324), 475-6. Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Patre sicut amor 
distinctus et determinatus, Filius autem procedit a Patre sicut intelligentia a mente; sed nunquam procedit amor 
distinctus et determinatus nisi prius procedat intelligentia a mente, quia non diligimus nisi cognitum; amor ergo 
procedit mediante intelligentia. Ergo similiter Spiritus Sanctus non potest procedere a Patre nisi Filio 
mediante; procedit ergo ita Spiritus Sanctus a Patre quod et a Filio, sicut amor ab intelligentia. 
680 Vol. 1, Pars 1, Inq 2, Tract 1, Qu 4, C5, Ad e (n. 324), 476. Ordo est in divinis personis; non autem est ibi 
ordo secundum superius et inferius nec secundum prius et posterius; nullo ergo modo convenientius est ibi ordo 
quam rationis; sed ordo rationis est secundum primum, medium, postremum, sicut patet in linea 
praedicamentali, quia ibi est primum, de quo nihil est, sed quod est de aliis, et ultimum, de quo alia et ipsum de 
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 In elaborating on the diverse origins of the different persons, the Summist follows 
Richard of St Victor in distinguishing between different possible ways in which one may 
proceed from another: mediately, mediately and immediately, or immediately only. 
Procession by mediation only cannot be in God, because this would sever the direct nature of 
his connection with and the similarity of the one proceeding from him. In God, therefore, 
there is only production that is immediate, as in the case of the Son’s procession from the 
Father, and both mediate and immediate, as in the procession of the Spirit from the Son and 
Father, respectively. This results in an immediate relationship between the Son and the 
Father, the Spirit and the Father, and the Son and the Spirit, and thus in immediate relations 
all around.681 
 
The Notions of the Persons 
 
The preceding discussion of order within the Trinity segues naturally into a treatment 
of the Summa’s description—within the treatise on divine names—of the notions of origin in 
God. Within this section, the Summist investigates the nature of these notions and their inter-
relationship with the properties and relations in God. He writes as follows: according to the 
common understanding of the definition, properties are those qualities that befit only one 
                                                        
nullo, et medium, quod de alio et aliud de ipso. Cum ergo ordo in divinis personis sit exemplar huiusmodi 
ordinis, relinquitur quod est ibi una persona de qua alia et ipsa de nulla, et una quae de alia et nulla de ipsa, et 
media quae de alia et de ipsa alia. Sed persona de qua alia et ipsa de nulla, est persona Patris; persona vero 
quae de alia et nulla de ipsa, est persona Spiritus Sancti; persona autem media est persona Filii; ergo ipsa est a 
persona Patris et ab ipsa persona Spiritus Sancti, quae solum de alia; non ergo possibile est quod sint duae 
procedentes immediate ab illa prima persona, quae non habet originem, ita quod neutra ab alia. 
681 Vol. 1, Pars 1, Inq 2, Tract 1, Qu 4, C6, Solutio (n. 325), 478. 
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person, and distinguish it from others. However, a relation is that which refers something to 
another, while a notion is that which makes a thing known. As regards the Trinity, this 
knowability is two-fold.  
By one mode, God is known in unity and indistinction, and in this way, the notion of 
God is the same as his essence, inasmuch as it is knowable. By another mode, God is known 
in the persons of the Trinity or in distinction, and this is the understanding of ‘notion’ that is 
under consideration in the present context. According to this therefore, the Summist affirms, 
a property in God is that which distinguishes one person from another person; a relation in 
the Trinity is the habit of the persons to one another. And a notion is through itself both 
firstly and properly the reason of the distinctions amongst the persons, as through it, one 
person is distinguished from another, and one person is referred to another. As therefore the 
properties make the persons differ and the relations refer them to one another, so a notion 
makes known the distinct being of the persons in relation.682  
From this point, the Summist inquires more specifically into the number of the 
notions.683 Claiming John of Damascus as his authority, he argues that in the three persons, 
                                                        
682 Vol 1, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M2, Respondeo (n. 464), 665. Secundum rationem intelligentiae communem 
sciendum est quod proprietas dicitur quod uni soli convenit, hunc ab illo distinguens…relatio vero est hunc ad 
illum referens…notio vero dicitur rem notam faciens…Deus est et vera Trinitas, qua cognoscibilis est, et haec 
est notio increata, et dicitur duobus modis: uno modo dicitur dispositio formae, qua cognoscitur in unitate et 
indistinctione, et hoc modo notio est ipsa essentia in quantum noscibilis est; alio modo dicitur dispositio, qua 
cognoscitur in personarum Trinitate sive in distinctione, et hoc modo accipitur in praesenti inquisitione notio. 
Secundum hoc ergo dicendum, secundum rationem intelligentiae propriam in divinis, quia proprietas est quo est 
distinctio personae a persona, relatio vero in Trinitate est habitudo personarum in invicem…notio vero est per 
se et prima et propria ratio distinctionis et relationis, ut per quod distinguitur persona a persona vel per quod 
refertur persona ad personam. 
683 Vol 1, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M3, C1, Respondeo (n. 465), 667. 
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five notions can be identified, because the ingenerateness of the Father implies innascibility, 
active generation implies paternity, and passive generation, filiation. Similarly, in procession 
is implied a relation to a first principle, and thus spiration: for everything that proceeds, 
proceeds from something. Thus, he concludes that there are five notions: innascibility or 
unbegotten/ungenerateness; paternity, filiation, procession, and spiration. There are however 
four relations: two by which the Father and Son are referred to the Spirit and the converse; 
and two by which the Father and the Son are referred to one another. In other words, there is 
one relation of the Father to the Son; one of the Son to the Father; one common relation of 
the Father and Son to the Spirit and one of the Spirit to the Father and Son. Thus, the Father 
and the Son are referred to the Spirit by one relation, not two, which designates the highest 
concord of those two persons.684   
Finally, the Summist inquires into the number of personal properties in God. He 
reiterates that there are five notions, four relations, and three properties, for personal 
properties are those which only befit one person and which distinguish it from the others. 
From this it is clear that the personal properties are three and are equal in number to the 
persons themselves. As noted already, there are four relations. For there is a relation of the 
Father to the Son and of the Son to the Father; likewise, there is a common relation of the 
Father and Son to the Spirit, and conversely of the Spirit to the Father and Son. Therefore 
there are only four relations in total. Yet beyond these four, five notions can be found; for the 
habit of the Father to the Son further implies that he himself does not derive from another 
principle—that he is innascible. Otherwise there would be an infinite regress of persons. 
Indeed, the number of the notions in the divine persons can be proved by invoking the order 
of origins amongst the persons.  
                                                        
684 Vol 1, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M3, C2, Respondeo (n. 466), 667. 
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In this regard, the Summist states that everything that is, is either from another or not 
from another: this the first way of distinguishing one being from another, and it is the way in 
which the persons are distinguished in God. Likewise ‘to be from another’ (esse ab alio) 
either is through generation or through spiration. Thus we have three properties, namely, not 
to be from another (esse non ab alio), or to be innascible or ingenerate, as in the case of 
paternity, and through this, to be from another (esse ab alio), through generation and thus 
through filiation, and finally, to be from another through spiration (esse ab alio per 
spirationem), which like generation is a form of procession.685   
 
Conclusion 
 
If the analysis above is any indication, the early Franciscan Summists offer a 
straightforward if rather more systematic account of Richard of St Victor’s doctrine of the 
Trinity. Bonaventure would of course develop this further, particularly with regard to the 
notion found in the Summa according to which the Son is the ‘center’ of the Trinity and 
indeed all things.686 Nevertheless, the Summa’s account is of fundamental significance for 
the way that it initially commandeers Richard’s account for Franciscan purposes. As a result 
of this initial appropriation, the Victorine theory would continue and still continues to feature 
in the Franciscan intellectual tradition to this day.  
This begs the question why early Franciscans decided to adopt Richard’s model of the 
Trinity in the first place. As I have already noted, one part of the Summists’ project was 
evidently to provide an up-to-date systematic theology. Since Richard had developed the 
                                                        
685 Vol 1, P2, In2, Tr3, S1, Q1, M3, C3, Respondeo (n. 467), 668. 
686 Zachary Hayes, The Hidden Centre: Spirituality and Speculative Christology in St Bonaventure (St 
Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Press, 1981).  
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most innovative and extensive account of the Trinity of recent years, the Franciscan fathers 
might have decided to foreground his work, even more so than Augustine’s, in an attempt to 
locate themselves at the cutting edge of contemporary research.  
Yet their motivation for appropriating Richard must have involved more than that, 
otherwise his doctrine of the Trinity would not have become such a defining feature of the 
Franciscan intellectual tradition. As in the case of other doctrines, there were surely reasons 
to do with the vision and example of Francis that inspired them to incorporate the Victorine’s 
thought. As Maria Calisi has shown, the Victorine account of the Father’s totally self-
diffusive love served very effectively to convey Francis’ vision of what God is like and how 
human beings made in his image should seek to live, namely, in a completely self-sacrificial 
and self-impoverishing manner.687  
As the Summa construes it, moreover, the role of the Spirit in the Godhead bespeaks 
the totally passive or receptive position of creation and indeed the human race must assume 
with reference to God: it stresses as Francis did that all beings are entirely dependent upon 
God’s sustaining, gratuitous love. Furthermore, the mediating role of the Son, who stands in 
the middle between the Father and the Son, plays well into a wider vision in which he stands 
at the centre of creation, as we will see in the chapter on the Incarnation. Although the early 
Franciscans never state explicitly—and we can on some level only speculate—as to why they 
showed preference for the Victorine account, the reasons mentioned above at least serve to 
suggest that there was a rationale for this choice which pertained specifically to ethos of the 
Franciscan order.  
 
 
                                                        
687 Maria Calisi, Trinitarian Perspectives in the Franciscan Theological Tradition. 
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9. CHRISTOLOGY 
 
 In the late thirteenth century, John Duns Scotus championed an account of the 
hypostatic union, or the union of Christ’s human and divine natures, which has been closely 
associated with his legacy ever since. This account has often been regarded as the first major 
instance of an attempt to relate the human to the divine nature of Christ as a substance to an 
accident. Many years before Scotus, however, the Halensian Summists had already 
developed a version of this account, which can also be found albeit in a more elementary 
form in earlier contemporary sources. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the contours of 
the Summa’s substance-accident model and the unique context in which it was written.  
As we have seen, this was a context in which the work of Avicenna was highly 
influential, not least when it came to providing the metaphysical underpinnings for the 
Franciscan account of the hypostatic union. The subsequent generation was dominated 
principally by Aristotle, whose works were enthusiastically although not uncritically 
appropriated by Bonaventure’s Dominican counterpart, Thomas Aquinas. In keeping with his 
Aristotelian metaphysical assumptions, Aquinas articulated a theory of the hypostatic union 
which conceived the relation of the divine and human natures like that of a part to a whole. 
Thus commenced what quickly became a vociferous debate in the time of Scotus over which 
theory could be more considered doctrinally sound.688  
                                                        
688 For instance, Aaron Riches makes a polemical case for Aquinas and against Scotus on the hypostatic union 
in his, Ecce Homo: On the Divine Unity of Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdman’s, 2016); cf. ‘Christology and the 
Scotist Rupture,’ Theological Research 1 (2013), 31-63. Similarly, Richard Cross calls the legitimacy of 
Aquinas’ account into question while supporting that of Scotus in his Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas 
Aquinas to Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
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These debates continue today, with many scholars regarding the Franciscan and 
Dominican accounts as mutually exclusive alternatives in terms of their claims to orthodoxy. 
Within this polemical context, the Summa Halensis has an important role to play, insofar as it 
highlights the metaphysical sources of the Franciscan theory, which were quickly eclipsed 
and to some extent forgotten in the next generation. By calling attention to those sources, I 
seek to provide grounds for the contention that each theory is sound when taken on its own 
terms. The reason for studying the Summa Halensis on this issue is not simply to draw 
attention to the first attempt fully to elaborate the theory for which Scotus became famous, 
consequently. The goal is to recover in the process what seems like the best available 
resource for tempering longstanding debates between Scotists and Thomists over the 
metaphysics of the Incarnation. 
 
The Context of Early Franciscan Christology: Antecedents 
 
At the outset of this inquiry, it is important to offer an analysis, however brief, of 
twelfth and early thirteenth-century developments in Christology that form the background 
for the Summa’s discussion. Prior to this time period, the study of Christ and his two natures 
had very little opportunity to advance in the West.689 Although the Western Middle Ages did 
witness the occasional production of—occasionally quite inspired—treatises on the 
Incarnation, such as Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo, the doctrinal reflections that can be found in 
such writings are relatively broad and even inchoate. They provide little in the way of detail 
about the mode of union between Christ’s human and divine natures. In contrast, the East had 
                                                        
689 See the important work by Lauge Olaf Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of 
Gilbert Porreta’s Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation During the 
Period 1130-1180 (Leiden: Brill, 1982).  
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formulated a sophisticated conceptual framework and vocabulary for dealing with 
Christological questions—and identifying Christological heresies—during the patristic 
period. By the time and indeed in the work of John of Damascus (674/5-749), therefore, it 
had more or less settled on a model for relating the two natures of Christ.  
With the exception of insights gleaned from Boethius (476-c. 524), the West was 
unable to benefit from Eastern formulations because of the cultural, linguistic and religious 
divide between East and West that had grown since the fifth century. When the discipline of 
theology—which was not so named at least until the time of Peter Abelard (1079-1145)—
began to move away in the twelfth century from a methodology which prioritized the 
interpretation of Scripture and the composition of devotional texts, in favour of one which 
focused on the systematic treatment of theological topics, consequently, the West was caught 
quite unprepared to reckon with Christological questions.  
As Marcia Colish demonstrates in her magisterial volumes on Peter Lombard, 
scholars working in the first half or so of the twelfth century, including Gilbert of Poitiers (d. 
1155), Peter Abelard, Hugh of St Victor (d. 1160), and Robert of Melun (1100-67), lacked a 
common understanding of the meaning of pertinent terms like ‘substance’, ‘nature’, and 
‘person’.690 While their theories of the hypostatic union consequently suffered from lack of 
clarity, some of their contemporaries perhaps unwittingly pandered to heresies, in particular, 
the tendency to divinize Christ, that had been long since condemned in the East.691  
In an effort to bring order to the situation, Peter Lombard laid out the three main 
opinions on the hypostatic union that were evidently circulating at the time he wrote his 
celebrated book of Sentences, which date to around 1150. His efforts in this regard were 
advanced significantly by a thorough study of John of Damascus, whose recently translated 
                                                        
690 Marcia Colish, Peter Lombard, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 399. 
691 Ibid., 398. 
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De Fide Orthodoxa raised his awareness of the Christological heresies of which the West had 
hitherto been largely ignorant.692 According to the standard reading of the Sentences, the 
Lombard presents all three opinions as potentially orthodox ways of construing the hypostatic 
union.  
Additionally, ‘it has been general practice to assume that the Lombard’s own opinion 
is only of peripheral importance to an understanding of his text and his presentation of the 
three theories.’693 As L.O. Nielsen shows in his important study of the doctrine of the 
Incarnation in the twelfth century, however, Lombard and his school came down clearly on 
the side of the third theory, which will be elaborated below.694 Whatever Lombard’s own 
opinion, however, his outline of the three opinions and the drawbacks potentially associated 
with each one became the main point of reference for all further Christological discussions of 
the period. This is certainly the case in the Summa Halensis, which is not exceptional 
amongst its contemporaries in reprising the opinions and casting one in a more favourable 
light than others.695  
Because of their centrality to the ‘Christological controversies’ of the late medieval 
West, I will state the opinions as Lombard presents them below. For ease of comparison, I 
will also provide the corresponding formulation of the Summa Halensis.696 The first opinion 
has become known as the assumptus homo theory: 
                                                        
692 Ibid., 399-400; cf. 418 on Lombard’s use of John of Damascus. 
693 L.O. Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century, 244. 
694 Ibid., 359. 
695 Walter Principe, William of Auxerre’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1963), 64: ‘by the time Auxerre wrote his Summa Aurea the presentation of the teachings of 
the three opinions had become schematized in ways that often failed to reproduce the opinions as they were 
originally stated about the middle of the twelfth century.’ 
696 Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (Florence: Quaracchi 1924) 
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Lombard’s Sentences Summa Halensis 
Some people say that in the very Incarnation of the 
Word, a certain man was constituted from a rational 
soul and human flesh, from which two every true 
man is constituted. And that man began to be God—
not, however, the nature of God, but rather the 
person of the Word—and God began to be that man. 
Indeed, they concede that that man was assumed by 
the Word and united to the Word, and nevertheless 
was the Word…Not however by the movement of 
one nature into another, but with the quality of both 
natures being preserved, it happened that God was 
that substance and that substance was God. Hence, 
truly it is said that God became man and man 
became God, and the Son of God became son of 
man and vice versa. And although they say that that 
man subsists from a rational soul and human flesh, 
they do not, however, confess that he is composed 
of two natures, divine and human; nor that the parts 
The first opinion says, first, that in the Incarnation 
of the Word of God there is a certain man, 
subsisting in the rational soul and a human body, 
who is prior to the union in nature, not in time. 
Second, it says that that man became God and God 
became that man, so that God was made as man and 
conversely that man was made God. Third, it says 
that in Christ there are two complete substances, 
each possessing its own nature (quid), unified in the 
person. Fourth, it says that the one assuming is 
[identical to] the one assumed, i.e. the Son of God is 
man or the son of man. Nevertheless, the supposit of 
the Son of Man is not assumed by the Son of God 
nor the converse. Fifth, and lastly, that man is not 
divine and human in nature but only human.698 
 
                                                        
Vol. 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, D3, M4, C1 (n. 46), 68-70. See also Walter Principe’s Alexander of Hales’ Theology of the 
Hypostatic Union (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), 97. 
698 Vol 4, Tr1, Q4, T1, M4, C1, I (n. 46), 69: Primo dicit quod in incarnatione Verbi divini constitutus est 
quidam homo ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens, prius unione natura non tempore. Secundo dicit 
quod ille homo coepit esse Deus et Deus coepit esse ille homo, ita ut Deus factus sit homo et e converso ille 
homo factus sit Deus. Tertio, quia in Christo sunt duae substantiae completae, quarum utraque facit quid in 
unitate personae. Quarto dicit quod assumens est assumptum, id est Filius Dei est homo sive filius hominis; 
tamen supposito filio hominis non supponitur Filius Dei nec e converso. Quinto et ultimo dicit quod ille homo 
non est divinae et humanae naturae, sed tantum humanae. 
 259 
of that one are two natures, but only soul and 
flesh.697 
 
While the homo assumptus theory’s most famous twelfth-century proponent was 
Hugh of St Victor, it had been upheld previously by various Eastern and Western Fathers.699 
According to this opinion, the Word assumed a human nature and became a particular man 
who was not already in existence, per adoptionism, or the idea that Christ was a normal man 
who was somehow co-opted as the messenger of God, but who became fully united to the 
Word at the moment of his conception. As Walter Principle has observed in his four-volume 
                                                        
697 Translation of Peter Lombard, Sent., Book 3, dist. 6, chap 2, no. 1 (2:50) taken from Franklin T. Harkins, 
'Filiae Magistri: Peter Lombard's Sentences and Medieval Theological Education On the Ground,’ in Medieval 
Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 3, ed. Philip W. Rosemann (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 65: 
Alii enim dicunt in ipsa Verbi incarnatione hominem quondam ex anima rationali et humana carne constitutum: 
ex quibus duobus omnis verus homo constituitur. Et ille homo coepit esse Deus, non quidem natura Dei, sed 
persona Verbi; et Deus coepit esse homo ille. Concedunt etiam hominem illum assumptum a Verbo et unitum 
Verbo, et tamen esse Verbum…Non tamen de migratione naturae in naturam, sed utriusque naturae servata 
proprietate, factum est ut Deus esset illa substantia, et illa substantia esset Deus. Unde vere dicitur Deus factus 
homo et homo factus Deus, et Deus esse homo et homo Deus, et Filius Dei filius hominis et e converso. Cumque 
dicant illum hominem ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistere, non tamen fatentur ex duabus naturis esse 
compositum, divina scilicet et humana; nec illius partes esse duas naturas, sed animam tantum et carnem. 
699 Marcia Colish, Peter Lombard, 400: this opinion ‘supported the idea that the Word had assumed a human 
nature, that he had become man a man fully united with the Word from the first moment of his conception, and 
not a man already in existence (i.e. adoptionism). Later, in order to counter the threat of Nestorianism, 
proponents of this doctrine emphasized the intimacy of the union between the two natures in the incarnate Christ 
and their inseparability once united in a single person.’ 
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study of the hypostatic union in the early thirteenth-century, this assumptus homo theory 
carried within itself the seeds of a twofold and in some ways opposed development.”700  
On the one hand, its earliest advocates emphasized the identity of the man assumed 
with the Word who assumed him to such an extent as to invest Christ with qualities like 
omniscience and omnipotence, not insofar as he was God but precisely inasmuch as he was 
man. Although they tried to stress the distinctness of the two natures, therefore, they 
nevertheless gave the impression of having divinized Christ’s human nature. On the other 
hand, the homo assumptus theory contended that the Word assumed a certain individual man, 
as opposed to human nature in general.  
As such, it suggested that there are two subjects or supposits in Christ, one which is 
man and one which is God. ‘Such stress on the duality of Christ coupled with clear 
statements that there are not two persons in Christ led opponents of the first opinion to 
describe its supporters as semi-Nestorians.’701 Even though their account differed from that of 
true Nestorians who went so far as to assign distinct personhood to the distinct subjects, 
Thomas Aquinas by the 1250s did not hesitate to pronounce it heretical owing to the way it 
combined two distinct and seemingly tenuously united hypostases in a new tertium quid.  
 The second, so-called ‘subsistence theory’, reads as follows: 
 
Lombard’s Sentences Summa Halensis 
There are others, however, who partially agree with 
these [proponents of the first opinion] but say that 
that man [Jesus Christ] consists not only of a 
rational soul and flesh, but of a human and divine 
nature, that is, of three substances: divinity, flesh, 
The second opinion says first that that man is not 
only constituted out of these two, namely, the 
rational soul and human body, but from three 
substances united in the person, namely, the deity, 
along with the soul and body, although the deity is 
                                                        
700 Walter Principe, William of Auxerre, 65. 
701 Ibid., 66; cf. Marcia Colish, Peter Lombard, 425.  
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and soul. They confess that this Christ is only one 
person, indeed merely simple before the 
Incarnation, but in the Incarnation made composite 
from divinity and humanity. He is not, therefore, 
another person than he was previously, but whereas 
previously he was the person of God only, in the 
Incarnation, he also became the person of man: not 
so that there were two persons, but so that one and 
the same was the person of God and man. 
Therefore, the person who was previously simple 
and existed in only one nature [now] subsists in two 
natures.702 
not said to be there as a part. The person of the 
Word was simple before the incarnation, but in the 
incarnation he was made composite by reason of the 
nature assumed. The divine person assumed not this 
or that man but human nature or humanity, which is 
against the first opinion which says that Christ was 
only one and not two. That man did not become 
God but the converse, because that supposit of man 
did not exist before he became God, neither 
temporally or naturally, which is opposite to the 
first opinion.703 
 
 
                                                        
702 Translation of Lombard’s Sent. Book III, dist 6, chap 3, no. 1 (2:52-3) taken from Franklin T. Harkins, 
‘Filiae Magistri,’ 66: Sunt autem et alii, qui istis in parte consentiunt, sed dicunt hominem illum non ex anima 
rationali et carne tantum, sed ex humana et divina natura, id est ex tribus substantiis divinitate, carne et anima, 
constare; hunc Christum fatentur, et unam personam tantum esse, ante incarnationem vero solummodo 
simplicem, sed in incarnatione factam compositam ex divinitate et humanitate. Nec est ideo alia persona quam 
prius, sed cum prius esset Dei tantum persona, in incarnatione facta est etiam hominis persona: non ut duae 
essent personae, sed u tuna et eadem esset persona Dei et hominis. Persona ergo quae prius erat simplex et in 
una tantum natura existens, in duabus et ex duabus subsistit naturis. 
703 Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, M4, C1, I (n. 46), 69: Secunda opinio dicit primo quod ille homo non solum constitutus 
est ex iis duobus, scilicet ex anima rationali et humana carne, sed ex tribus substantiis in unitate personae, 
scilicet ex deitate et anima et carne, nec tamen dicitur ibi deitas sicut pars. Secundo dicit personam Verbi fuisse 
simplicem ante incarnationem, sed in incarnatione dicit eam esse factam compositam ratione assumptae 
naturae. Tertio dicit quod divina persona assumpsit quid, non hominem hunc vel illum, sed naturam hominis vel 
humanam, quod est contra primam opinionem, et ex hoc dicit Christum esse tantum unum et non duo. Quarto 
dicit quod non coepit ille homo esse Deus, sed e converso, quia non fuit illud suppositum hominis antequam 
ipsum esset Deus, nec tempore nec natura: quod est oppositum primae opinionis.  
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 By contrast to the first opinion, the second stresses that the divine and human natures 
do not merge in Christ to form a new semi-divine, semi-human tertium quid. Rather, the 
Word, who was eternally a simple person, became a composite person at the Incarnation, 
possessing his divine as well as a human nature, entailing a body and a soul.704 The Word’s 
assumption of human nature—rather than a particular man— is quite important, insofar as it 
safeguards the subsistence theory from the suggestion that there are two persons in Christ. On 
this account, consequently, God became man, or the composite person.705 However, that 
person did not become God, because the person in question was always God. Thus, the 
Incarnation did not bring about a change in the Word—who eternally is the person that he 
is—but rather in the human nature that now became joined to the Word.  
 The third, habitus, theory can be stated as follows: 
 
Lombard’s Sentences Summa Halensis 
There are also others who deny not only [the 
existence of] a person composed of natures in the 
Incarnation of the Word, but even that some man or 
some substance was there composed or made from 
soul and flesh. Rather, they say that these two 
things, namely, soul and flesh, were united to the 
person or the nature of the Word not so that some 
The third opinion states that the soul and flesh are 
united to the person of the Word or with the divine 
nature in the Word, such that those two or three do 
not result in some one substance or person, but 
rather the Word of God clothed in those two as in a 
garment...Thus, the union was not substantial but 
[like that of] an accident with the subject.707  
                                                        
704 Marcia Colish, Peter Lombard, 401.  
705 For more on this concept, see Corey L. Barnes, ‘Christological Composition in Thirteenth-Century Debates,’ 
The Thomist 75 (2011), 173-206.  
707 Vol 4, Tr1, Q4, T1, M4, C1, I (n. 46), 69: Tertia opinio dicit quod illa duo, videlicet anima et caro, ita sunt 
unita personae Verbi vel naturae divinae in Verbo, ut ex illis duobus vel tribus non sit aliqua una substantia vel 
persona, sed magis Verbum Dei vestitum est illis duobus velut quodam indumento. Unde dicit quod Christus 
secundum quod homo non est quid nec Verbum incepit esse quid in incarnatione, sed qualiter ens vel quodam 
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substance or person was made or composed from 
these two or from these three things, but so that the 
Word of God might be clothed with these two as 
with a garment in order that he might suitably 
appear in the eyes of mortals.706 
 
 
 The source to which medieval thinkers generally trace this theory is Question 73 of 
Augustine’s Eighty-Three Different Questions which speaks of ‘the humanity of the incarnate 
Christ as a habit or garment which he puts on.’708 By thus affirming that the habitus, or 
human nature, is accidental to the person of the Word, proponents of the habitus view made 
themselves susceptible to two main charges, namely, that the union of the divine and human 
natures is tenuous at best, and that Christ as man is not ‘something’ (aliquid) in his own right. 
Because it downplayed or even obliterated the humanity of Christ in this way, opponents 
contended, the habitus theory gave way to what came to be known as ‘Christological 
nihilism’.  
                                                        
modo se habens. Et ex consequenti videtur dicere quod illa unio non fuerit substantialis, sed quasi accidentis 
cum subiecto.  
706 Translation of Lombard Sent. Book III, dist. 6, chap 4, no 1 (2:55) (Lombard, Sent. 3.6.4, nn. 1, 3 (ii. 55) 
taken from Franklin T. Harkins, ‘Filiae Magistri,’ 67: Sunt etiam et alii, qui in incarnatione Verbi non solum 
personam ex naturis compositam negant, verum etiam hominem aliquem, sive etiam aliquam substantiam, ibi ex 
anima et carne compositam vel factam diffitentur; sed sic illa duo, scilicet animam et carnem, Verbi personae 
vel naturae unita esse aiunt, ut non ex illis duobus vel ex his tribus aliqua substantia vel persona fieret sive 
componeretur, sed illis duobus velut indumento Verbum Dei vestiretur ut mortalium oculis congruenter 
appareret.  
708 Marcia Colish, Peter Lombard, 402; cf. 417-38 on Lombard’s own Christology. 
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In an attempt to suppress such nihilism, Pope Alexander III officially condemned the 
habitus theory in 1177.709 After this time, the third opinion was universally regarded as 
heretical, and the first opinion became subject to the growing suspicion that it, too, implied 
either nihilism or Nestorianism. While those who held the second opinion, at least around the 
middle of the twelfth century, also held that Christ as man is not aliquid, in order to avoid 
suggesting that he was a separate person, they evaded implication in the condemnation, 
because their teaching only applied to questions about the mode of union, rather than the 
constitution of the two natures.710 Their argument, in other words, was not that the humanity 
of Christ was insubstantial in its own right but only that it was accidental to the Word insofar 
as he is God.711 
In practice, consequently, the second opinion won the day. After 1177, it was the 
favoured opinion of scholars as wide-ranging as Simon of Tournai (1130-1201), Peter Cantor 
(d. 1197), Stephen Langton (1150-1228), and Godfrey of Poitiers.712 While the first opinion 
was still debated in the university context until at least the 1230s—and even in the Summa 
Halensis—it seems to have garnered very little active support from the late twelfth century.713 
Be that as it may, there was still considerable work to do on the part of the post-1177 
generation to show more clearly how Christ is aliquid, while at the same time demonstrating 
his unity-in-duality. Remarkably, this was a task scholars accomplished not by foreswearing 
                                                        
709 Ibid., 329. 
710 Walter Principe, William of Auxerre, 67. 
711 Ibid., 74. 
712 Ibid., 68. 
713 Walter Principe, Hugh of St Cher’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1970), 59. By the 1230s, virtually all scholars accepted the second opinion, rejected the 
third, and discussed the first only as a purely academic exercise; cf. William of Auxerre, 202.  
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all talk of accidentals but rather by giving a much more robust account of the sense in which 
the human nature of Christ can be understood as an accident in relation to the subject or 
substance of the Word. 
Although the likes of Langton and Poitiers had espoused the burgeoning substance-
accident account of the union between Christ’s divine and human natures in rather ‘loosely 
structured, meandering questions’,714 Principe acknowledges that it was the Summa Aurea of 
William of Auxerre, composed between 1215-25, which formulated this account in a more 
precise manner. For this very reason, that text was among the most influential, along with the 
writings of Alexander of Hales, for contemporaries and immediate successors, who largely 
simply reiterated the arguments of William and Alexander.   
Nevertheless, Principe notes, the work of both these two scholars was of limited use 
in that William’s account treated only a restricted and in some ways idiosyncratic set of 
questions about the hypostatic union, while Alexander of Hales’ more profound thoughts on 
the subject were ‘either fragmentary and lacking in clarity because of brevity (especially the 
Glossa; 1222-9) or deal with only certain aspects of the mystery (especially the quaestiones; 
1220-36).715 Despite the significant advances made by William and Alexander, consequently, 
                                                        
714 Walter Principe, William of Auxerre, 140; cf. 98: William was not the originator of the substance-accident 
model; Langton and Godfrey of Poitiers also espouse it. However, William takes it to a new level and influences 
later thinkers with his idea that Christ’s human nature ‘degenerates into an accident’ of the Word.  
715 Walter Principe, Hugh of St Cher, 21: William’s ‘Summa Aurea treats only a limited number of topics 
concerning the hypostatic union. Alexander of Hales’ Glossa and Quaestiones though more profound are either 
fragmentary and lacking in clarity because of brevity (especially the Gloss) or deal with only certain aspects of 
the mystery (especially the Quaestiones). The only other works [written between 1200-40] prior to the so-called 
Summa fratris Alexandri that treat the Hypostatic Union are either summaries of the preceeding works (Auxerre, 
Alexander) or individual questions such as those of Philip the Chancellor, or are so engaged in dialectics 
(Roland of Cremona and Godfrey of Poiters) as to be unhelpful.’ 
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a complete and systematic study of the hypostatic union had yet to be written. Although 
Principe acknowledges that the first such study can be found in the Summa Halensis, he 
declines to take this text into consideration, as does Richard Cross in his study of the 
metaphysics of the Incarnation between Aquinas and Scotus. Yet it is precisely this text that 
interests me here and that will be discussed in detail below.   
 
Metaphysics in the Summa Halensis 
 
 At the outset of this discussion, it is relevant to re-construct as fully as possible the 
theory of substance and accident that underlies the Summa’s section on the hypostatic union. 
As this effort will illustrate, there is considerable evidence that the Summa’s theory draws 
significantly on the work of Avicenna. For one thing, as we have seen in chapter six, the 
early Franciscan doctrine of the hypostatic union presupposes a plurality of substantial forms. 
The first substantial form that every being possesses is that of a soul—whether vegetative, as 
in plants, sensitive, as in animals, or rational, as in human beings.716 This form predisposes 
the being in question to assume a second, bodily or material form, which correlates to that of 
its soul. Thus, every being is a composite of two separate substances, namely, body and soul.  
As such a composite, a being is not only set apart from other beings of a similar 
nature but also predisposed to assume forms of another sort, namely, accidental forms or 
properties, to do with quality, quantity, location, relation, and so on. By contrast to the body-
soul composite or ‘subsistent nature’ in which they inhere, these accidental forms are unable 
to exist independently in the world. Although they increase the number of forms in any given 
subject, consequently, they do not proliferate or distinguish entities, as is the case with 
                                                        
716 For more on this, see my account of Avicenna, early Franciscans, and Bonaventure, in chapters 3-4 of Divine 
Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
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substantial forms.717 As forms of a sort, however, they are understood nonetheless to possess 
‘non-subsistent natures’ which enjoy existence or esse in their own right.718 Ultimately, 
therefore, an individual is defined as a unique ‘bundle’ of forms.719  
When a being undergoes a change, on this account, this is a result of the coming or 
going of an accidental form. Since change involves a shift from non-being to being on the 
part of such a form, all changes are substantial changes, that is, the type of change that 
Aquinas following Aristotle associated only with birth and death. That said, change does not 
precipitate constant shifts—even crises—in identity.720 For the soul preserves the unity of the 
being throughout the many fundamental reconfigurations in the constitution of its ‘bundle’ of 
accidental properties that may occur across time. 
A brief excursus on Aquinas’ theory of substance and accident, which has already 
been mentioned in chapter three, will throw the unique character of the Franciscan account 
into sharper relief.721 Following Aristotle to a large extent, Aquinas upholds a ‘unicity’ theory 
of form. In particular, he holds that every being is defined by only one form rather than a 
plurality of natures or forms. While human beings for instance have a human body in 
addition to the rational component, or the soul, the body is not a separate substance in its own 
right, for the form of the ‘rational animal’ entails embodiment. Conversely, for Aquinas, 
rationality can only be applied or exercised in the context of embodied life. 
                                                        
717 Vol 3, In1, Tr1, Q4, T1, C4, Ad objecta 3 (n. 56), 82: Formae istae substantiales faciunt essentialiter differre 
naturas, sed non ipsum suppositum, quia ‘una illarum quasi degenerat in accidens.’ 
718 Richard Cross, Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 19, cf. 45.   
719 Ibid., 10.  
720 Walter Principe, William of Auxerre, 39: Forms are either substantial or accidental; substantial and accidental 
changes occur by the corruption or transitus of forms. 
721 Lydia Schumacher, ‘Ontology,’ in Rationality as Virtue (London: Routledge, 2015), chapter 2. Richard 
Cross, Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 42: An accident actualizes a passive potency in a substance. 
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When a being of any kind undergoes change in this showing, the alternation 
represents a natural development of its single substantial form. Thus, any ‘accidents’ or 
properties that come to be associated with the being through the process of development 
merely realize an inherent potential that pre-existed in its singular nature or form. When a 
child grows taller or wiser, for instance, it does not gain an additional form, even if 
accidental, as it would by Franciscan standards. Instead, it becomes what it previously had 
the potential to be, and is thereby transformed into a fuller instantiation of its original form, 
namely, that of a rational animal.  
While accidents contribute esse to beings, consequently, as that by which they are in a 
certain state, they are not here construed as independently existing forms or ‘things’ with an 
esse over and above that of the form in which they are inhere. Whereas the Franciscan 
account treated every accident as a form over and above that of its subject, which 
nevertheless did not proliferate subjects, Aquinas’ account presupposes an alternative 
framework in which accidents are numerically identical with their subject while contributing 
nonetheless to its mode of being.722 
As I will demonstrate below, the more robust understanding of accidental properties 
as independently existing although not self-subsisting forms was not simply a by-product of 
the metaphysical resources that were actually available at the time in the work of Avicenna; it 
was perhaps still more so the means whereby late twelfth and early thirteenth-century 
thinkers, above all, the Summists, counteracted the tendency of the  
habitus and even the homo assumptus theories to reduce the humanity of Christ to something 
relatively insubstantial in the hypostatic union.  
                                                        
722 Richard Cross, Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 41. 
 269 
That is not to say that the Summists dismissed these other opinions altogether, 
although they admittedly affirmed Pope Alexander III’s condemnation of the third opinion. In 
keeping with the academic custom of the day—and perhaps in an attempt to provide an 
‘updated’ version of Lombard’s comprehensive book of Sentences—they not only rehearse 
all three opinions as they understood them but also elucidate them on their own terms, 
entertaining questions commonly posed about each one.723 Nevertheless, they ultimately opt 
                                                        
723 Walter Principe Alexander of Hales, 109: Alexander shows a preference for the second opinion in Glossa III, 
6, 8, and 10-13. The Summists articulated two main ways of understanding the distinction between the three 
opinions in Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, M4, C1 (n. 46), 68-70.  The second method of distinction is developed on the 
basis of a three-fold way of understanding being in Christ, in terms of esse morale, esse naturale, or esse 
rationale, which is a unique contribution of Alexander of Hales who finds inspiration for it in the work of 
Augustine De Trinitate XI, 25; Principe 61): ‘The first opinion concerns esse naturale, and [holds that] because 
there are two natures in Christ, Christ is two; and because both are complete substances…it can be said that God 
became that man and that man became God. The second opinion concerns esse morale, for “person” is a name 
of dignity, but dignity pertains to moral being. Therefore, moral properties pertain to the person. So it is said 
[according to this opinion] that because the person is one, Christ is one; and because the natures are united in the 
person, God is man and the converse, because Christ is one. And because a complete substance is not united 
with another complete substance, that is to say, a person is not united with a person, but a nature to a nature—
that is to say, human nature, comprised of a conjoined body and soul, or “this man,” consisting of both the 
divine and human natures—it is not possible to concede that man began to be God, but the converse, nor that 
man is deified, but that God is “humanified.” The third opinion considers esse rationale according to which it is 
said that Christ was something insofar as he was God and in a certain way he had the habit of a man, and this is 
because he is of human nature, which is added to the complete hypostasis or arrives after the hypostasis is 
complete. For, if the two natures are united in this person, one of them is added after this person already existed, 
but that which is added or arrives after something is already a hypostasis does not contribute to what the 
hypostasis is but to how it exists or is habituated, or its way of being. And therefore this opinion says that Christ 
is not something insofar as he is man. But this opinion was condemned by the Decree of Pope Alexander in 
1177.’  
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very clearly for the rendition of the second opinion that had been evolving in the decades 
preceding.  
 
The Metaphysics of the Incarnation in the Summa Halensis 
 
The treatise on ‘The Act of Incarnation’ in the Summa is divided into two main parts 
on ‘The Assumption’ and ‘The Union’, respectively.724 While the former covers the act 
whereby the Word took on human nature, the latter reflects upon the union between the 
natures as accomplished. In both sections, the main concern of the Summa is apparently to 
use the sort of substance-accident theory described above to affirm that Christ is aliquid, 
while at the same time insisting on his unity-in-duality.   
 
The Assumption 
 
In the treatise on the assumption, one of the key preliminary tasks the Summists 
undertake involves distinguishing more precisely than previous authors between an 
individual human nature and a person.725 Obviously, the Summists could not argue that Christ 
as man was a person without suggesting, together with proponents of the first opinion, that 
there were two persons in Christ—one divine and one human—and thus a ‘split personality’, 
as in Nestorianism. With a view to circumnavigating this heresy, they follow William of 
                                                        
 
724 Walter Principe, Alexander of Hales, 127: Alexander discusses the mode of union in Book III, Distinctions 6-
7 of his Glossa. 
725 On this topic, see Norbertus de Amato OFM, Doctrina Summa fratris Alexandri de Hales de ipsa natura a 
verbo assumpta: Disquisitio Historico-Systematica (Rome: Herder, 1956). 
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Auxerre in carefully delineating a three-fold definition of personhood as entailing singularity, 
incommunicability, and dignity.726  
On their account, a person is singular by virtue of being a unique instance of a 
universal, in this case, the rational soul. The instantiation of a soul occurs through its 
unification with a body, which establishes it as an individual substance or self-subsisting 
thing.727 Although singularity thereby confirms the distinctness of one person from another, 
the forms of soul and body that enact singularity are nonetheless common or communicable 
to all persons. While singularity makes a person quod est or what it is, consequently, it does 
not clarify quo est, or the unique ways in which that person manifests human nature.  
Following Porphyry and perhaps Boethius, the Summa contends that this level of 
individuation is achieved by a collection or ‘bundle’ of properties or accidental forms which 
is specific to the person in question and not the same in others.728 These properties are 
incommunicable, and as noted already above, they are subject to constant flux through the 
                                                        
726 This three-fold distinction itself had a pre-history which Magdalena Bieniak describes in The Body-Soul 
Problem at Paris 1200-50 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), chapter 1.2 on ‘The human soul and the 
concept of person.’ Walter Principe, William of Auxerre, 85: The distinction of dignity has its origins in Faustus 
of Riez, and possibly Boethius before him; it was invoked by Stephen Langton, Godfrey of Poitiers and others. 
However, William’s schematization of singularity, incommunicability, and dignity was followed almost 
universally by next generation of theologians. 
727 Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, D2, C4, Solutio (n. 35), 55: Distinctio singularitatis est in anima aliqua, dum est in 
corpore…distinctio vero incommunicabilitatis est, quam habet singulare aliquod, ut iste asinus animal; sed hoc 
non habet anima existens in corpore, cum ipsa et corpus communicant in constituendo unum esse. Distinctio 
vero dignitatis est, qua purus aliquis homo distinguitur ab alio rationalitate individuali, quae est dignissima 
proprietas. 
728 Walter Principe, Alexander of Hales, 63: The doctrine of individuation by accidents or properties is basically 
that of Porphyry and Boethius in his Commentarium in Porphyrium III, PL, 110-C-116B. 
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coming and going of accidental forms. For this very reason, the Summists follow William in 
revising Porphyry’s view that individuality is established primarily through an 
incommunicable conglomerate of accidents. In this regard, singularity takes priority as that 
which anchors the subject through alterations in the bundle which merely gives expression to 
a person’s fundamental identity.729  
Although the first two distinctions of singularity and incommunicability fully 
establish a person’s individuality, the final distinction is the ultimate arbiter of personhood 
according to the Summa. For it is derived from what is most dignified or excellent in all 
persons, namely, their unique rational capacities. On the ground that the very Mind and Word 
of God is found in Christ, the Summa insists that his personhood was that of the Son of God 
rather than that of the man Jesus.730 While Jesus’ personhood would have derived from his 
humanity if he were somehow to have lost his divinity, his human personhood could not help 
but be supplanted by the far superior divine personhood at the Incarnation.  
 That stated, the Summa is far from denying that Christ was aliquis or human in the 
fullest sense of the term. In fact, the first two aspects of its definition of personhood make it 
possible to affirm that he is an authentic human individual with a human soul and body and a 
                                                        
729 Walter Principe, William of Auxerre, 48. 
730 Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, D2, C5, Solutio (n. 35), 55: Ad esse ergo personae requiritur haec triplex distinctio, 
singularitatis, incommunicabilitatis et dignitatis, quae attenditur secundum proprietatem digniorem…Prima 
vero, secunda et tertia est in Christo Deo homine. Et, quamvis primam et secundam possit habere ex parte 
humanae naturae, tamen tertiam non potest habere nisi ratione divinae personae, et ita esse personam in 
Christo non est ratione humanae naturae. Cum enim ratio personae sumatur ab excellentiori proprietate et 
digniori, dignior autem proprietas in Christo non est ex parte humanae naturae, sed ex parte divinae personae, 
propterea relinquitur quod non est assumptio personae. Distinctio enim personarum debet esse secundum id 
quod in ipsis personis invenitur nobilius. Quia ergo in homine assumpto nobilissimum est esse Filium Dei, ideo 
secundum hoc inest ei distinctio personalis, ut sit una persona cum Filio Dei.  
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unique set of human properties that made him ‘this man’, even though his personal dignity 
was ultimately derived from his divinity.731  To bolster this contention, the Summa invokes 
Richard of St Victor’s definition of an individual—or hypostasis—as an ‘incommunicable 
substance which has certain distinguishing features’.732  
After citing Richard’s definition of the person as an ‘incommunicable substance of a 
rational nature which is distinguished through the property of dignity’, the Summa concludes 
that where a hypostasis is characterized by rationality and thus by dignity, it can be called a 
person. Thus, every person is a hypostasis, even though every hypostasis is not a person. 
Although a non-personal hypostasis would normally be a non-rational being, Richard’s 
definitions allow for the possibility of a hypostasis that so happens to be distinguished by all 
the properties that make someone human, while still deriving actual personhood from the Son 
of God.  
According to the Summa, this possibility was realized in the case of Christ. As man, 
he was a hypostasis that could rightly be described as an individual or even as ‘someone’ 
(aliquis; quis), since such names can refer either to the distinction of singularity alone, and 
thus to the individual humanity of Christ, or in other human beings, to all three distinctions 
together and so to the person. Thus, Christ was fully human. As the Son of God, moreover, 
he was a hypostasis that could be called a person. Since the term ‘hypostasis’ can mean both 
                                                        
731 Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, D3, M4, C1, Ar4, Solutio (n. 53), 78: Christus, secundum quod homo, non est persona, 
est tamen individuum. Unde, cum quaerit utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, sit quis, si hoc nomen ‘quis’ 
supponit generaliter substantiam singularem, hoc est dicere, si supponit individuum, dico quod est quis. Si vero 
supponit substantiam singularem, non alteri digniori coniunctam, sed distinctam, quod est persona, dico quod 
secundum quod homo, hoc modo non est quis. Walter Principe William of Auxerre, 125: names like individual, 
quis and aliquis can refer to the distinction of singularity alone and so to the individual humanity of Christ, but 
they may also refer in ordinary human beings to all three distinctions together and so to the person. 
732 Richard of St Victor, DT IV.3. 
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‘individual’ and ‘person’, however, it encompasses both his human and divine natures in their 
full integrity without duplicating the persons in Christ. While Christ was the Person of the 
Word from eternity, consequently, he was an individual in a purely temporal sense. 
In further reflections on the way Christ subsists in two natures, as one person, the 
language of substance and accident becomes particularly important in the Summa. That is not 
to say that the Summa accepts the contention of the third opinion that he failed to ‘be 
something’ as man—that his manhood was merely an accident or habitus that he assumed at 
the Incarnation. As we have already seen, the Summa defends the notion that the human 
nature of Christ is something substantial in its own right—a substantial form, as it were—just 
as is the case with his divinity.  
At the same time, however, it accepts that the Son of God as Son of God is not by 
nature united to the human nature. On the ground that anything that comes to be associated 
with something else after it is already complete has the mode or nature of an accident, the 
Summa concludes that the human nature of Christ ‘degenerates into an accident’ when it 
comes to the question of what belongs to the Son of God as God. To quote: 
 
The human nature is united to [the Word] as adjacent to it [as an accidental form], 
because man, which had not existed previously, is united to the Son of God existing 
from eternity, and so even though it is not an accident, it is attached to him in the 
mode of an accident.733   
 
                                                        
733 Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, D3, M4, C1, Ar4, Ad4 (n. 53), 79: Filius Dei, quamvis uniatur homini, personam a se 
habet, quia in comparatione ad humanam naturam est substantia fixa et per se, hoc est non in alio ut adiacens; 
humana vero natura est ei unita ut adiacens, qua homo, prius non existens, unitur Filio Dei ab aeterno existenti, 
et ita quoad hoc tenet modum accidentis, quamvis non sit accidens.  
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Because the enumeration of forms does not number subjects, the Summa legitimately 
concludes that Christ is ultimately one supposit, even though he subsists in two natures.734 
Since accidental forms have esse of their own on this understanding, moreover, the Summa is 
able to envisage the human nature as a substance or quod in itself, even though it is a quo 
with respect to the quod that is the Son of God. Further to treating this quod-quo distinction 
in Christ, the Summa discusses what it means to say ‘this is that nature’ versus ‘this is of that 
nature’.735  
                                                        
734 Vol 3, In1, Tr1, Q4, T1, C4, Ad objecta 2, 3 (n. 56), 81-2: Quamvis in Christo sit binarius essentialis, una 
tamen unitatum illius binarii degenerat quasi in accidentalem, liceat modo ita loqui sicut Doctores (William of 
Auxerre) locuti sunt, videlicet unitas, quae est ex parte humanae naturae. Et ideo ille binarius non numerat 
subiecta, sed naturas, quemadmodum numerus accidentium non numerat subiecta, sed suas formas. Formae 
istae substantiales faciunt essentialiter differre naturas, sed non ipsum suppositum, quia una illarum quasi 
‘degenerat in accidens’ (quoting Guil. Altissiod, Summa, III, tr. 1, q.3), eo quod est post adveniens.  
735 Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, D3, M4, C1, Ar1, Solutio (n. 50), 74: Dicendum quod refert dicere ‘hoc esse hoc’ et ‘hoc 
esse huius’; item, refert dicere naturam et rem naturae in omnibus citra Primum, scilicet Deum. Dicendum ergo 
quod quamvis plures naturae sint in Christo, non tamen praedicantur de Christo in rectitudine, hoc est dicere, 
ut Christus sit ipse naturae…quia ex parte divinae non differt natura et res naturae, quia persona est essentia; 
nec differt etiam dicere ‘hoc est hoc’ et ‘hoc est huius’, quia persona est divina essentia et persona est divinae 
essentiae. Sed ex parte humanae naturae differt; falsum enim est ‘Christus est humana natura’, et tamen verum 
est ‘Christus est humanae naturae’ vel ‘habens humanam naturam’. Quia ergo non praedicatur per essentiam 
natura humana de persona, scilicet de Christo, sed per causam, non dicitur Christus plura proper pluralitatem 
naturarum, quia ea quae dicitur in obliquitate, non numerant. Ex praedictis ergo rationibus non sequitur quod 
Christus sit plura, sed quod sit plurium; sicut non sequitur, ex parte hominis, quod, quamvis sit corpus et anima 
coniuncta, et anima est unum et corpus est unum, ergo homo est plura. According to Walter Principe, William 
of Auxerre, 38: what is invoked in this instance is a distinction from Hilary of Poitiers between a nature and a 
thing of a nature.   
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In God, there is no difference between being a nature and being of a nature, because 
the three divine persons are the divine essence in addition to being of the divine essence. 
When it comes to treating the human nature of Christ, however, this is not the case. For it is 
not true to say that ‘Christ is human nature’, even though it is true to say that he is ‘of human 
nature’ or ‘had a human nature’. Because the human nature is not predicated essentially or 
substantially of the person of Christ but in terms of the fact that he is ‘of’ that nature, and 
things predicated in such an oblique or accidental manner are not numbered, consequently, 
Christ is not said to be multiple persons, even though he is made up multiple natures.  
In offering this description of Christ’s human nature as an accident of the Word, the 
Summists admittedly became susceptible to two possible objections that were later raised by 
Thomas Aquinas. One objection states that by construing human nature as an accident, the 
Summa suggests that there is a passive potency in God to become human. In this way, 
allegedly, it implies that God is open to increased perfection and thereby undermines the 
claim that he is complete in himself. The other main objection points out that since accidents 
are detachable from their subjects, the account under review fails to establish the 
inseparability of the human and divine natures in the hypostatic union.  
The Summa’s response to such objections comes in the form of an exceptionally 
robust doctrine of the so-called ‘grace of union’, which had become a topic for discussion 
amongst medieval thinkers, under the influence of Augustine and Lombard.736 Following 
Alexander of Hales, the Summa takes this doctrine much further than any prior thinker had 
done by clearly distinguishing this grace from the created grace found in both ordinary 
                                                        
736 Walter Principe, William of Auxerre, 105: Discussion concerning the grace of union discussion entered into 
the tradition with the question of Christ’s predestination, under influence of Augustine and Lombard; cf. Vol 3, 
In1, Tr3, Q3, T2, M1 (n. 99), 143-8.  
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humans and in the humanity of Christ. For the Summa, the grace of union is that by which 
the Word actually assumed human nature.  
In elaborating on the nature of this grace, the Summa distinguishes between an active 
and a passive potential for union. Here, the Summa emphatically denies that the Word 
receives the accident of human nature through the sort of passive disposition through which 
created subjects receive accidents. Nevertheless, it affirms the active power of God—and 
God alone—to unite created nature to himself accidentally.  
As the Summa emphasizes, this union is not brought about in any way that changes 
the Word’s eternal existence as the second person of the Trinity, but rather in a manner that 
enacts a passive power in human nature to be joined to the Son of God.737 Thus, the Summa 
refutes the first objection by observing that in the exceptional case of the hypostatic union, 
the accident in question is assumed by God’s pro-active will, that is, the grace of union.738 
Since God’s good or gracious will is immutable, the Summa further contends, he maintains 
the union inseparably, such that the second objection is simultaneously overturned.739 
                                                        
737 Vol 3, In1, Tr1, Q2, T1, D2, M1, C1, Respondeo 2 (n. 11), 27: Omne unibile est possibile respectu unionis. 
Dicendum quod duplex est potentia, scilicet, activa et passiva. Si loquamur de potentia passiva, sic verum est 
quod natura divina nullo modo est unibilis, quia quod est unibile hoc modo, est possibile respectu maioris 
perfectionis; quia ergo non est possibile quod potentia Dei perficiatur ex actu incarnationis, propter hoc non est 
ponere secundum viam istam divinam naturam unibilem. Si autem loquamur de potentia activa, sic natura 
divina est unibilis humanae, quia in Deo est potentia activa, ut sibi uniat naturam humanam. Unibile ergo 
dicitur de natura divina secundum potentiam activam, scilicet quod possit sibi unire naturam creatam; de 
natura vero humana dicitur secundum potentiam passivam, eo quod possit uniri. Et in hoc etiam fuit summa 
ostensio et manifestatio suae potentiae. Ponatur enim quod non posset uniri active naturae humanae, hoc non 
diceretur esse perfectionis in Deo. Et sic concedendum est quod natura divina et humana sunt unibiles. 
738 On the grace of union, see Walter Principe, Alexander of Hales, 159, 218. 
739 Ibid., 152.  
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The Union 
 
The upshot of the Summa’s arguments regarding the union become clearer in the 
second major section in the treatise on ‘The Act of Incarnation’ which follows the section on 
the assumption or coming-to-be of the union which we have been considering so far. This 
second section covers the union itself, insofar as it is accomplished. At the start of this 
section, the Summa presents a number of different ways of understanding a union between 
two substances, derived from Alan of Lille, eventually narrowing in on the one that its 
authors regard as the most apt analogy for the hypostatic union.740 
Most importantly, the text distinguishes between a union simpliciter and a union 
secundum quid. What is one secundum quid is one through apposition, as in the case of a 
stone set next to another stone, an apple that transfers its scent to the hand that holds it, or an 
article of clothing assumed by the one wearing it. On the Summa’s account, no such mode of 
union accurately conveys the nature of the hypostatic union. This feat can only be 
accomplished by a mode of union simpliciter. Such modes can be defined in two ways, 
namely, insofar as something is one from multiple things, namely, through unionem, or in 
itself, that is, through unitatem, like the one God. What is one simpliciter through unionem 
can however be construed in an additional number of ways.741 In the case of a union that 
preserves both of the natures united—which is the main type of union that concerns the 
Summa here—either a third is produced from these two, or not. 
                                                        
740 Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T2, C1, Solutio (n. 57), 83. 
741 This list of ways is derived from Alan of Lille, Theologicae Regulae 100, PL 210, 617B-684C (PL 210, 
674B). It is also quoted in Alexander’s Gloss III, 7, 6 (A), p. 91; cf. III, 7, 19 (L), 96, though Alexander does not 
name Alan as his source and attributes the text to other sources. See Walter Principe, Alexander of Hales, 78. 
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In the first mode, there is the union of the soul and the body in one man composed of 
them: for there is no change in the nature of the soul or the body. In the second mode 
there is a union as we say that the sprig of a pear is united to a tree in which it is 
inserted, whether it is an apple or other tree. For the nature of both is preserved, 
namely, the pear and the apple, since neither the pear becomes an apple nor the 
converse, nor from those two is affected a third, that is, a tree which is neither an 
apple nor a pear tree. Rather, one is made of the other or is of the other, as pear from 
apple, because in the process of insertion the dominant [sprig] pulls the other into a 
unity with itself, so that it is from the other but is nevertheless not the other. 
Therefore, in a union, in which one is changed, there is a union in which one pulls 
another toward its own nature. In a union in which both are changed, there is a union 
in a third thing, namely, a third nature, which is made from the two. But in the union 
in which there is one from another, as in a union through insertion, there is a union in 
one hypostasis, so that one hypostasis has two natures. Whence the pear and the apple 
share the same tree trunk, after they are united through insertion, and thus the same 
hypostasis, namely, the same tree, which has two entirely different natures, such that 
there is one hypostasis but not one nature. This is the mode in which [the hypostatic 
union] must be explained...For the union of humanity to the deity is one in which one 
[is grafted into the other] or is from another, and not where one becomes the other or 
in which a third is derived from those two...And so as the divine person is 
predominant in this union, it draws human nature into unity with its hypostasis. 
Whence humanity is not part of the divine person, but is of it, because there is one 
hypostasis for both [natures], such that the integrity of both natures is 
preserved...Thus, it is clear that the union is in the single divine hypostasis or person. 
 280 
In this lengthy passage, we find the Summa proposing two basic models for the 
hypostatic union: the body-soul or ‘anthropological’ model and the ‘grafting’ model.742 The 
latter, which the Summa endorses as an analogy for the hypostatic union, is drawn from the 
way a branch from a pear tree is joined to the hypostasis of an apple tree, such that they form 
one hypostasis in which each is ‘of the other’, while maintaining the integrity of its own 
nature. In this analogy, we hear echoes of the ‘this is this’ versus ‘this is of this’ distinction 
mentioned above. By virtue of drawing the pear-tree branch into its own hypostasis, the 
Summa elaborates, the pear tree begins to draw its being from the apple tree’s hypostasis.743 
This is the sense in which it is said to be ‘of the being’ (de esse) of the apple tree. By the 
same token, the union in one hypostasis is said to render the apple tree ‘of the pear’, precisely 
because the pear has its being from this tree.  
                                                        
742 According to Richard Cross, Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 60-1, the grafting model is an analogy for the 
part-whole model such as was endorsed by Thomas Aquinas. But here it emerges clearly as attached to the 
substance-accident model; cf. Anselm Cur Deus Homo II.7 in support of the anthropological model.  
743 Vol 3, In1, Tr1, Q4, T2, C7, Ar2, Solutio (n. 65), 94: In Christo est unio divinae et humanae naturae, quae 
est quasi unio per insertionem. Sed in unione per insertionem unum non est alterum nec in altero, sed unum fit 
de hypostasi alterius, sicut quando pirum inseritur pomo, fit una hypostasis ex duabus naturis, scilicet una 
arbor, quia unum trahit alterum ad suam hypostasim, et ita unum fit de altero quantum ad esse suae hypostasis; 
unde pirum est de esse hypostasis vel arboris, cui unitur, et similiter pomum, et propter hoc, cum dicitur ‘ista 
arbor est pirum’, hic praedicatur ‘esse de’, quia pirum est de esse illius arboris. Similiter cum dicitur ‘Christus 
est homo’, quia non solum est sensus ‘Christus est ens in humana natura’, immo etiam humana natura est de 
Christo. Ita ergo est Verbum insitum, quod trahit humanam naturam ad esse suae hypostasis et quod est de sua 
hypostasi, sicut pirum de hypostasi pomi et tamen natura piri non est natura pomi. Similiter nec divina natura 
est humana; nec una natura fit de alia, sed facit haec unio unam naturam esse de hypostasi alterius et non unam 
esse aliam. Et ita non praedicatur ibi habitus solum, nec ‘esse in’ solum, sed ‘esse de’. Et sic facit quod homo 
est de esse personae Verbi sive ‘quid’ suae hypostasis, et non quod sit ipsum recte, immo praedicatur ibi ‘esse 
de’ et in rectitudine ‘Filius Dei est homo’ sicut et hic cum dicitur ‘haec arbor est pirum’.  
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In a similar way, the Summa argues, the Word draws human nature into its hypostasis 
so that neither the human nor the divine nature becomes the other by nature, but the man 
Jesus nevertheless draws his being from the hypostasis of the Word, to which he is joined. As 
an apple tree is said to be ‘of the pear’ consequently, the Word is rightly said to be ‘of human 
nature’ and to have this nature not merely as a habitus but as ‘something’ that is joined to it 
as one. Although the union so construed might seem at face value to bring about a change in 
God, who now has a mode of being, namely human being, which he did not have previously, 
the Summa denies any change in God at the Incarnation. In support of this contention, it 
distinguishes between:  
 
a type of union in which the ones united are both changed, as when water is united 
with wine, or in which only one is changed, as when the light of the sun is united with 
air. [In the latter case], the light is not changed nor does it receive any disposition that 
it did not have previously, even though now it is illuminating, which it did not do 
previously. For its illumination does not posit a new disposition in the light but in the 
recipient, because now there is illumination where there was none previously. In this 
way, [the Summa concludes], the union of the Word to flesh in no way is said to 
cause a change in the Word but only in that humanity, which received a ray of the 
divine where previously it received none, and in this way, there is no change in the 
eternal light.744 
                                                        
744 Vol 4, Tr1, Q4, T2, C7, Ar1, Solutio (n. 63), 93: Notandum quod quaedam uniuntur ita quod fit mutatio in 
utroque unitorum, ut aqua unitur cum vino; vel in altero tantum, sicut cum unitur lux solis ipsi aeri, lux non 
mutatur in illa unione nec recipit aliquam dispositionem quam non habuit prius, licet modo sit illuminans et 
prius non: hoc enim non ponit novam dispositionem in luce, ponit tamen in recipiente, quia modo est 
illuminatum et non prius. Secundum hoc dicendum quod unio Verbi ad carnem nullam facit mutationem in 
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To summarize, the Son of God does not move from not-being human to being human 
through the union, but the one that he joins to himself, namely, human nature, moves from 
not-being divine to being divine, through union with the Second Person of the Trinity.745 
Thus, the hypostatic union does not entail a symmetrical relationship between the human and 
divine but merely a one-sided relation of the one assumed to the one assuming.746 For the 
Summa, we have seen, the grafting analogy is emblematic and explicative of this 
asymmetrical relationship, which is itself like that of an accident to a subject.  
According to the Summa’s presentation, the main alternative to this model is the 
anthropological model, which was commonly invoked by many Greek patristic thinkers, 
including Cyril of Alexandria and Chalcedoians like Maximus the Confessor and John of 
Damascus, who defended it against its abuses by Monophysites like Severus of Antioch and 
John of Philoponus.747 While it is not clear, and not likely, that the Summists were aware of 
                                                        
Verbo, sed solum est mutatio in ipsa humanitate, quae modo recipit radium divinitatis et prius non, et propter 
hoc non est facta mutatio in luce aeterna. Cf. Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, D1, C2, Responsio 3 (n. 31), 50: Assumptio 
enim non ponit aliquid in assumente, quo scilicet assumens aliquam innovationem accipiat, sed ponit aliquid in 
assumptio, quo fit innovatio in creatura assumpta. 
745 Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T2, C7, Ar1, Ad tertium 3 (n. 63), 93: Filius Dei non transit de non-esse aliquo ad aliquod 
esse per istam unionem, sed aliquid quod se habet ad ipsum, sicut humana natura, transit de non-esse divino ad 
esse divinum per unionem cum Verbo in una persona et in unum esse personae.  
746 Cf. SH, Vol. 1, P1, I1, T1, Qu2, C1, Respondeo (n. 28), 47: Quando ergo aliqua dicuntur relative de Deo, 
non dicuntur relatione quae ponat mutationem in ipso, sed solum in creatura (When therefore certain things are 
said relative to God, they are not said by way of a relation which posits change in him but only in creatures). 
747 On the use of the body-soul analogy in historical theology, see Uwe Lang, John Philoponus and the 
Controversies over Chalcedon in the Sixth Century (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 50. See also ‘Chalcedonian 
Christology,’ in Thomas Weinandy, Does God Change: The Word’s Becoming at the Incarnation (Still River: 
St Bede’s, 1985), 32-66.  
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the whole history of this model, outside the work of John of Damascus, they reject it 
nonetheless, on the grounds, among others, that it seemingly implies that the divine and 
human natures, when united, comprise a ‘third thing’.748  
Here, the Summa suggests a number of reasons why it finds the body-soul analogy 
untenable as an explanation of the hypostatic union. One reason is that, in the case of the 
hypostatic union, what assumes is prior to what is assumed, and what assumes, assumes 
inseparably. Neither is the case in the body-soul relationship, because there is no pre-
existence of the soul as there is with the Second Person of the Trinity, and because the body 
and the soul, as distinct substances, are intrinsically separable, as becomes obvious at the 
point of death. Furthermore, the Summa contends, the Word who assumes, once united to the 
assumed human nature, affects a certain unity between the two; however, the soul does not 
bring about its union with the body, because they are created at the same time. Finally the one 
assuming and the assumed do not comprise a certain whole and are not parts of a whole, but 
soul with body compose a third thing. In other words, the whole human being is a third thing 
composited of body and soul as parts, but the Incarnate Son is not a third thing comprised of 
parts: human and divine nature. 
The problem with positing such a third thing, by all accounts, is that it implies a 
confusion or change in the two natures, once they are united in a being that is neither strictly 
divine nor strictly human. The fact that this seemed to be the case in the minds of the 
Summists may have been a function of their metaphysical assumptions, in particular, their 
body-soul dualism. Whereas Aquinas following Aristotle held that the soul is the form of the 
body, such that they comprise one substance, we have seen that the Summa treats body and 
                                                        
748 Vol 3, In1, Tr1, Q4, T1, C5, Responsio II (n. 36), 57. 
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soul as separate substances from which a third thing, the human person, is made.749 That said, 
Aquinas also rejects the body-soul analogy for the hypostatic union insofar as he is unable to 
conceive of the body and soul apart from each other, as is necessary in the case of the divine 
and human natures.  
Interestingly, many of the Summists’ contemporaries, including William of Auxerre 
and Hugh of St Cher, described the body and soul as ‘parts’ of the human nature, and the 
human and divine natures as ‘parts’ of the whole or ‘composed hypostasis’ that is Christ.750 
In this regard, they may have followed a trend set by Peter Abelard, who employed such part-
whole language in his own defence of the third opinion, which laid the groundwork for 
Lombard.751 This tendency may have been due to an understanding of both substantial and 
accidental forms as ‘parts’ in some sense of the term.  
According to the Summa, by sharp contrast, the human nature cannot be related to 
Christ as a part to a whole, because it would then be necessary to affirm that, prior to 
assuming human nature, a part of the Son of God was missing, and his perfection 
                                                        
749 Vol 3, In1, Tr1, Q4, T1, C3, Ar5, Problema II, Solutio (n. 55), 80: ‘Totum’ dicitur duobus modis. Uno modo 
‘totum’ dicitur ex compositione partium, et hoc modo totum et pars dicuntur ad aliquid, et a quo removetur 
intentio partis et totius; alio modo dicitur ‘totum’ ex eo quod nihil est accipere extra quod debet esse intra, et 
hoc modo Christus dicitur totum (‘Totum’ or ‘a whole’, can be defined in two ways. In one way ‘totum’ is 
defined in terms of a composition of parts, and in this way, the whole and parts are predicated in relation to 
something, from which the meaning of the parts and the whole is removed; in another mode ‘totum’ is that from 
which nothing is absent which should be present (i.e. nothing is missing). And in this way, Christ is ‘totus’, or a 
whole person, and ‘totum’: ‘totus’ as far as his person is concerned, and totum insofar as his nature goes).    
750 Walter Principe, William of Auxerre, 136; cf. Hugh of St Victor, 77-8.  
751 L.O. Nielsen, Philosophy and Theology in the Twelfth Century, 363. 
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diminished.752 Although Christ can be called a whole (totum) in the sense that nothing is 
missing from him, or insofar as he is ‘complete, the Summa insists that he cannot be referred 
to as a whole (totus) in the sense of being composed of parts of any quantitative sort. The 
only concession the Summa makes in this regard involves accepting that a part-whole model 
might be employed in a purely logical sense to say that human nature is part of the definition 
of the whole. But that concession amounted to rejecting the model as previous authors had 
apparently used it to capture the nature of the hypostatic union.  
 
The Context of Early Franciscan Christology: Later Developments 
 
While the Summa does not state why it takes a new stance against the part-whole 
model, we might speculate that doing so was regarded as essential to a larger effort to solidify 
the substance-accident model and to extrapolate the logical corollaries of its underlying 
assumptions. In undertaking this effort, the Summists offered a synthesis of the less 
developed insights of William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales which, while indebted to 
such sources, entails far more than the sum of them. Contrary to the contention of Principe, 
consequently, it is the Summa, more than the authors Principe himself considers, that seems 
to form the decisive link between the chaotic Christological circumstances of the twelfth 
                                                        
752 Vol 3, In1, Tr1, Q4, T1, C3, Ar5, Problema I, Solutio (n. 54), 80: Dicendum ergo quod, proprie loquendo, 
non est dicendum humanam naturam esse partem Christi…quia videretur ex hoc ipso ante humanitatem esse 
Filius Dei diminutus vel imperfectus. Tamen, si debet reduci ad aliquam rationem partis, debet reduci ad 
partem definitionis, quia, si vellemus definire Christum, nos diceremus ipsum esse personam in divina et 
humana natura.  
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century and the grand syntheses, particularly of the substance-accident model, produced from 
the middle of the thirteenth.753  
With the notable exception of Principe’s study, these later syntheses have been the 
primary focus of scholars working in the field of late medieval Christology. These scholars 
include Richard Cross, whose important study of the metaphysics of the Incarnation between 
Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus has already been mentioned. Like Principe, Cross 
overlooks the significance of the Summa Halensis as a precursor to the work of thinkers in 
his period, acknowledging William of Auxerre, if anyone, as the most likely forerunner of the 
full-fledged versions of the substance-accident model that can be found in the likes of 
Bonaventure and Scotus.  
A significant advantage of the present study is that it offers a revised genealogy of the 
substance-accident model that starts from the Summa Halensis. As we have seen, this text 
codifies the substance-accident model as it had developed to that point. In highlighting this, 
the present chapter serves as a sort of corrective footnote to the otherwise extremely astute 
and valuable intellectual histories of Cross, Principe, and others. At the same time, it enables 
the achievement of another objective of this chapter, which is to demonstrate that the 
substance-accident model does not preclude the tenability of the alternative that was later 
formulated by Aquinas, and vice versa.  
This contention may come as a surprise to some, given the highly polemical nature of 
the late thirteenth-century debate between proponents of the two different models, which 
Cross very effectively, and, I think, accurately, relates. What is particularly useful about the 
study of the Summa Halensis is that it highlights the contrast between the intellectual and 
historical contexts in which the two different models arose and confirms that each was the 
                                                        
753 Walter Principe, William of Auxerre, 10. 
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natural product of a particular time.754 That is not to say that either model was or is dated. 
Rather, it is to strengthen the case for the claim that both models were and remain tenable 
within their respective frames of reference.  
As I have already mentioned, the substance-accident model emerged at a time when 
Avicenna’s metaphysics was the most readily accessible for Latin thinkers. At the time, I 
have suggested, this metaphysics proved especially germane, insofar as its ‘hypostasized’ 
conception of accidents allowed Latin scholars to rebuff the heretical third opinion by re-
defining the very terms that had led to its condemnation. With the help of this metaphysics, 
consequently, the West managed to construct an orthodox Christology, despite the fact that it 
lacked the fully developed philosophical and theological resources for this purpose that were 
available in the Greek East.  
 By the time of Aquinas, things had moved on considerably. The era of Avicenna had 
given way to a period of preoccupation with the works of Aristotle, which had been 
instigated by the integration of Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle in the 1250s and 60s. 
Aquinas’ own commentaries on Aristotle bespeak an especial eagerness to follow the lead of 
Averroes in seeking to interpret Aristotle on his own terms. By his time, or at least through 
Aquinas’ own work, moreover, the West began to exploit key texts for understanding the 
patristic developments in Christology, such as the writings of Cyril of Alexandria and the 
documents associated with the Council of Chalcedon.755 
                                                        
754 Michael Gorman, ‘On a Thomistic Worry about Scotus' Doctrine of the Esse of Christ,’ Antonianum 84 
(2009), 719-33. See also idem., Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017).  
755 In texts like ST 3.2.1, cf. 3.2.6, Aquinas quotes the councils of Chalcedon, Constantinople, and Ephesus as 
well as Cyril Alexandria among other Greek fathers.   
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 That is not to suggest that the substance-accident model, which was seemingly 
developed without recourse these documents, was un-Chalcedonian. After all, its formulators 
had access to Boethius and John of Damascus and were clearly sensitive to the need to avoid 
‘confusion, change, separation, or division’ in the natures, even if they did not observe that 
this was the mandate of the Chalcedonian Definition itself. Because of his superior 
knowledge of the Greek Fathers and conciliar documents, Aquinas evidently deemed himself 
justified in concluding that he had orthodoxy and church history on his side in objecting to 
the substance-accident model of the hypostatic union. This was something he could hardly 
help but do, given his adoption of the Aristotelian metaphysical assumptions we have already 
discussed.  
 
Thomas Aquinas Against the Substance-Accident Model 
  
In his account of the union in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas explicitly inquires 
whether the human nature of Christ was united to the Word accidentally. He denies 
emphatically that this was the case, on the grounds that accidents, at least on his 
understanding of them, are not ‘forms’ in their own right but merely realize a passive potency 
in a being to exhibit some quantity, quality, or other mode of existence. For this reason, to 
affirm that the human nature of Christ was united to the Word by way of an accident would 
be to suggest that there is an inherent potential in God to become human, thus undermining 
the truth that he always completely is what he is: pure act.756 
By the same token, to say that it represented a form in its own right, accidental or 
otherwise, would be to imply the existence of two supposits in Christ and thus Nestorianism. 
                                                        
756 Richard Cross, Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 52. 
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Aquinas explicitly addresses the threat of Nestorianism in his reply to the initial question. For 
Aquinas, this heresy also entails an accidental union, because there are distinct divine and 
human persons on this account, which are only ‘united’ insofar as the Word ‘indwelled’ the 
man so that his will and works conformed to those of the Word.  
According to Aquinas, some recent masters—undoubtedly the proponents of the 
substance-accident model—in seeking to avoid the Nestorian heresy, ironically fell into it by 
affirming that the human nature of Christ was united to the Word after the manner of an 
accident. While they avoided numbering the persons in doing so, they ended up advocating 
the condemned third opinion. By maintaining an accidental union, therefore, Aquinas insists 
that their opinion falls into the error of Nestorius. For in Aquinas’ view, there is no difference 
between saying that the Word of God is united to the man Christ by indwelling or by putting 
on man as a garment, as per the third opinion.  
In light of the explanation of the substance-accident model that I have provided, this 
criticism of the model cannot help but seem rather over-simplified and short-sighted. In 
offering this critique, Aquinas clearly makes the same mistake as those proponents of the 
substance-accident model who eventually objected to his alternative. He interprets their 
account according to his own understanding of the substance-accident relation and 
consequently fails to recognize it as simply a different way of arguing for Lombard’s second 
opinion.  
When we look at Aquinas’ own rendering of this opinion momentarily, it will become 
evident that his account is simply another means to that same end. According to Cross, this 
account can be described in terms of a ‘part-whole’ model of the hypostatic union. While 
some readers of Aquinas explain his views on this topic in other terms—preferring for 
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instance to speak of his doctrine of ‘mixed relations,’757 I think Cross makes a helpful 
contribution by bringing to the fore this particular analogy for the Incarnation—and for 
Aquinas, as Cross stresses, it is only an analogy, with all the limits that entails.   
For the present purposes, the emphasis on this analogy is especially useful, because it 
highlights how Aquinas picked up on a once prominent feature of the prior tradition which 
had been roundly rejected by more recent proponents of the substance-accident model and 
revived it in an effort to offer an alternative to their view. In doing this, seemingly, Aquinas 
not only delivered an account of the union that was consistent with his own metaphysical 
perspectives but also located himself within the larger tradition of thinking on this topic that 
had developed to that point in the late medieval West.  
 
Thomas Aquinas on the Part-Whole Model 
 
There are a number of key texts in which Aquinas argues that the human nature of 
Christ is something analogous to a part of the body, such as a hand or a foot, including a 
question on whether there is only one being or esse in Christ, in his Sentences Commentary 
(1252-6);758 Quodlibetal Question 9;759 and a question on ‘the being of Christ’ in the Summa 
Theologiae.760 The reason this model is attractive to Aquinas is that concrete parts of a whole, 
by contrast to accidents, do not realize any latent potential in a substance or contribute to its 
                                                        
757 Thomas Weinandy, Does God Change. Michael Gorman, ‘Christ as Composite According to Aquinas,’ 
Traditio 55 (2000), 143-57. Corey Barnes, Christ’s Two Wills in Scholastic Thought: The Christology of 
Aquinas in Its Historical Contexts (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2012). 
758 Thomas Aquinas, In 3 Sent. D.6, q. 2, a.2: ‘Whether there is not only one being (esse) in Christ?’ 
759 Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibet IX, q. 2, a. 1[2]; IX, q. 2, a. 2[3]. 
760 Thomas Aquinas, ST 3.17.2; cf. Richard Cross, Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 52. 
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esse. Instead, they share in the esse of the subject or substance, such that their existence 
depends upon that of the entity of which they are parts. Although concrete parts cannot exist 
apart from a substance in the way accidents theoretically can, and are not therefore ‘things’ in 
their own right, they nevertheless maintain an individual identity as parts of the whole.761  
Thus, one can imagine a foot without imagining a whole body, in a way it would be 
difficult to imagine ‘white’ unless it was associated with something white. Conversely, one 
could imagine a person remaining complete as such even if that person were to lose a hand.762 
While the on-going existence of the part depends upon that of the whole, consequently, this is 
not the case the other way around. For this reason, the part-whole model provides a useful—
if imperfect—analogy for the way the human nature derives its existence from the Word. 
Since the Word on this account does not cease to be itself independently of the human nature 
of Christ, which cannot in turn exist or have esse except by derivation from the Word, the 
divine and human natures comprise a single entity, not a tertium quid.  
In thus denying that the human nature of Christ has esse or existence in its own right, 
later Franciscans like Scotus perceived Aquinas to be denying that the human nature was 
‘something’ for the Word to assume. By failing in this way to assert the fullness of that 
nature in Christ, Aquinas supposedly merited accusations of Monophysitism, or the heretical 
                                                        
761 Richard Cross, Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 54: According to Cross, Aquinas ‘is quite clear that concrete 
parts do not, for example, have a substantial form other than the substantial form of the whole. Equally, the 
separation of a concrete part from its whole entails the destruction of the part. [Thus], parts don’t realize 
potential in the way accidents do; they are not things and can’t exist in their own right apart from a substance 
but still have their own identity; accidents contribute esse to the suppositum (they have esse of their own) but 
parts do not; they share in the esse of the substance.’ 
762 As Cross notes on page 57 of Metaphysics of the Incarnation, ‘Aquinas makes it clear that the correct 
analogue for the hypostatic union is the addition of a part after the constitution of a person, because a person 
remains complete and does not cease to exist upon losing a hand.’  
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teaching that Jesus Christ possessed only a single nature which was either completely divine 
or some synthesis of the divine and the human.763 While this charge may obtain when 
Aquinas’ account is interpreted through the lens of Franciscan metaphysical assumptions, I 
have tried to demonstrate that he presupposes quite different metaphysical assumptions, 
which allow him fully to affirm the human nature of Christ in his own way. By the same 
token, the Franciscan account evades Nestorianism when interpreted on its own terms. 
As we have seen, in summary, both the Dominican and the Franciscan approaches 
fully affirm that the Person of the Word assumes human nature at the Incarnation, not in any 
way that alters the Word but rather in a way that affects the assumed human nature. In both 
accounts, this becomes joined to and derives its existence from the Word so as to form one 
hypostasis, whether in the way a part depends upon a whole or in the way an accident cannot 
exist without a substance. In that sense, proponents of the two different models who detect 
heretical tendencies in the work of their opponents only do so as a result of misinterpreting 
them. When each of the two accounts is assessed within its own frame of reference, both 
emerge as equally valid, albeit distinct, ways of defending the subsistence theory, or 
Lombard’s second opinion.764 
 
Conclusion 
 
According to the argument of this chapter, the study of the Summa Halensis is 
exceptionally effective for illustrating this point, because it was written in an era in which the 
reasons are particularly clear as to why this account was developed in the first place. This 
                                                        
763 Ibid., 78. 
764 Richard Cross, ‘Homo Assumptus in the Christology of Hugh of St Victor: Some Historical and Theological 
Revisions,’ The Journal of Theological Studies 65:1 (April 2014), 62-77, esp. 75-7. 
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indeed was an era during which the primary concern of scholars with regard to Christology 
was to find a way to re-define accidents that would avoid the error of the third and even the 
first opinion and establish the orthodoxy of the second. As we have discovered, moreover, 
Avicenna was the main resource available to them for this purpose.  
By the time Bonaventure was writing, circumstances had changed considerably. 
Although the substance-accident model remained popular amongst Franciscans, the rise of 
Aristotelian philosophy called for an alternative construal of the hypostatic union, which was 
ultimately provided by Aquinas. In drawing attention to the way each model developed in a 
particular context, and on the basis of distinct metaphysical assumptions, I have aimed to 
strengthen a case for the claim that the models represent two equally legitimate means to the 
same end. That is not to say that there may not be other reasons why one might prefer a 
particular model over another.  
Although the substance-accident model was not originally developed by Franciscans 
and was endorsed during its early history by scholars outside the Franciscan order, there are 
some obvious reasons why Franciscans quickly adopted it as their own and became its most 
avid and prominent supporters. For example, the model’s emphasis on the active and 
voluntary way in which God brought about and sustains the union is consistent with a wider 
Franciscan emphasis on the completely gratuitous or self-sacrificial and wholly unmerited 
love of God which sustains all creatures, which are entirely dependent upon him for their 
ongoing existence and states of being. 
Furthermore, the metaphysic underlying this account of the hypostatic union is 
compatible with the wider metaphysic Franciscans adopted, for reasons I have already 
explored in chapter six. While being a Franciscan was clearly not a necessary condition for 
adhering to this model, at least in the generation of the Halensisn Summists, therefore, it does 
seem to be a sufficient condition for doing so. Likewise, the account that was unique to 
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Aquinas became a hallmark of his school.765 While the disagreements between these two 
schools are real and not to be underplayed, this contribution seeks to mitigate them by 
highlighting the respects pertaining to the doctrine of the hypostatic union in which both are 
plausible on their own terms. As I have demonstrated, the key to accomplishing this feat is 
the study of the long-neglected Summa Halensis. 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
765 Richard Cross, Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 60.  
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10. INCARNATION 
 
In the previous chapter, we came to understand both that and how the Son of God 
assumed a human nature. But we have yet to grasp exactly why the Summa thinks he did this. 
According to numerous authors, the Summa follows Anselm of Canterbury’s Cur Deus 
Homo very closely in enumerating the reasons for the Incarnation.766 This conclusion is 
reached mainly by counting the number of quotations to Anselm in comparison to other 
sources cited in the text. As we already saw in the chapter on theistic proof, the early 
Franciscans, led by Alexander of Hales, were the first to appropriate Anselm’s thought, 
which had largely been neglected during the more than century-long gap that separated him 
from the early thirteenth-century scholastics.767  
When deploying Anselm as a source, however, we have discovered that the first 
Franciscan intellectuals tend to put his themes to use in a wider context which is entirely of 
their own making. This is certainly true regarding their account of the Incarnation. Although 
the Halensian Summists appropriate Anselm’s habit of enumerating necessary and fitting 
reasons for this event, I will show in this chapter that they go far beyond him in the way they 
define what those reasons entail. To this end, the first section of this paper will provide a 
brief synopsis of the key points of Anselm’s famous Cur Deus Homo, as a point of 
                                                        
766 Michael Robson, ‘Anselm’s Influence on the Soteriology of Alexander of Hales: The Cur Deus Homo in the 
Commentary on the Sentences,’ in Cur Deus Homo: Atti del Congresso Anselmiano Internationale, ed. Paul 
Gilbert, Helmut Kohl, Elmar Salmann (Rome: Pontificio Ateneo S Anselmo, 1999), 191-219. Jacques Bougerol, 
Introduction à l’étude de s. Bonaventure (Paris, 1961), 73. J. Patout Burns, ‘The Concept of Satisfaction in 
Medieval Redemption Theory,’ Theological Studies 36 (1975), 285-304. 
767 V. Doucet, Prolegomena in Librum III necnon necnon in Libros I et II ‘Summae fratris Alexandri (Quarrachi, 
1948), VII.   
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comparison with the Summa’s own discussion.  
Subsequent sections will treat the Summa’s take on the necessary and fitting reasons 
for the Incarnation, respectively. As regards its general arguments for the necessity of the 
Incarnation, Summa Halensis follows Anselm fairly closely.768  In further sections which 
describe how the Summa understands Christ’s human nature and the necessity of his 
suffering, both physical and psychological, however, it will become clear that the early 
Franciscans go well beyond Anselm in introducing an early—indeed the first historical 
instance—of a penal substitutionary theory of atonement.  
Such theories hold that Jesus Christ ‘was personally burdened with the sins of 
humanity, judged, condemned, and deservedly punished in our place.’769 Although the full 
development and popularization of penal theories is rightly credited to the Reformation 
period, their origins have sometimes been traced to Anselm, albeit with certain 
qualifications.770 As my analysis will illustrate, however, the origins of penal lines of thought, 
however inchoate, can actually be identified in the founders of the Franciscan intellectual 
tradition and indeed to their particular way of interpreting Anselm, whose legacy has clearly 
been impacted by the Franciscan reading of his thought ever since.771 
Following this discussion of the necessity of the Incarnation, I will go on to explore a 
way in which the Halensian Summists do not even pretend to look to Anselm as their source 
                                                        
768 Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica (Florence: Quaracchi, 1924).  
769 Gerard O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer: A Christian Approach to Salvation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 177.  
770 Ibid., 137: On the transformation of Anselm’s satisfaction theory into penal substitution theory. Jean Riviere, 
The Doctrine of Atonement: A Historical Essay, vol. 2, trans. Luigi Cappadelta (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
and Trubner Co., 1909). 
771 Andrew Rosato, ‘The Interpretation of Anselm’s Teaching on Christ’s Satisfaction for Sin in the Franciscan 
Tradition from Alexander of Hales to Duns Scotus,’ Franciscan Studies 71 (2013), 411-44. 
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of inspiration. This concerns their belief that the Incarnation of Christ would have fittingly 
occurred even if human beings had never sinned. The reason for this is simple, namely, to 
bring to completion the work of creation that was brought about through him as the second 
person of the Trinity. To show how Christ did this, an initial section under this heading will 
entertain the question debated within the Summa as to what kind of creature Christ should 
become in order to perfect creation. This will be followed by an enumeration of the reasons 
why Christ became a human being.  
In elaborating these reasons, the Summa offered the first instance in the West of a 
position that has come to be known as ‘supra-lapsarianism’, or the view that Christ would 
become Incarnate regardless of the fall.772 It presented an innovation that even Anselm could 
not have anticipated. To discern the ways in which the Summa goes beyond Anselm, 
however, we must start from an understanding of Anselm’s own account of the Incarnation, 
delineated below, against which the Franciscan one can be contrasted.  
 
Anselm on the Incarnation 
 
In his Cur Deus Homo, Anselm develops an argument for the Incarnation of Christ, 
which follows this logic: God made human beings to flourish, which requires that they 
                                                        
772 Justus Hunter notes on page 19 in his unpublished dissertation on ‘The Motive for the Incarnation from 
Anselm of Canterbury to John Duns Scotus’ (PhD Dissertation, Southern Methodist University, August 2015) 
that Rupert of Deutz (1075-1129) raises the hypothetical question whether Christ would have become incarnate 
without sin in his commentary on Matthew’s Gospel, De Gloria et honore Filii hominis (PL 1628, 13.684-86). 
However, Rupert’s account is rather undeveloped. By contrast the Summa’s, is not located within a larger 
systematic framework for thinking on this topic. Robert Grosseteste also entertained the question but probably 
slightly later than Alexander of Hales in his Sentences Commentary and also independently. 
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‘distinguish between right and wrong and between the greater and lesser good.’773 An 
overriding love and preference for the highest good, namely, God, makes it possible to do 
this, because it prevents persons from attributing excessive significance to things other than 
God which cannot serve as permanent and all-encompassing sources of human flourishing. 
The failure to do this, which occurred at the fall into sin, therefore undermined not only the 
human relationship to God but also the human ability to thrive.  
On the ground that sin is committed against the supremely good God, Anselm affirms 
that even a single and seemingly ‘lightweight’ sin is of infinite magnitude and has all-
pervasive consequences and manifestations.774 Naturally, God cannot forgive sin without an 
appropriate consequence or punishment for it, because this would contradict his will that 
human beings ‘give him their due’ as their creator by choosing to be what he made and 
enabled them to be of their own accord.775 However, human beings forfeited the ability to 
make recompense for the loss of the ability to fulfill his will—and thereby regain it—through 
original sin itself, which subsequently became an inherited disposition, albeit one that would 
be actualized in individual ways.776  
Although the obligation lies with human beings alone to make this repayment, 
consequently, no one can make it but the God who gave the ability to honor him in the first 
place.777 On account of his unchanging will that human beings always be able to do what they 
were made to do, namely, to honor God, consequently, it became necessary that the 
                                                        
773 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, trans. Brian Davies and G.R. Evans in Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), II.1; cf. I.11. 
774 CDH II.14. 
775 CDH I.12.  
776 CDH I.23. 
777 CDH II.6. 
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relationship be restored by a God-man.778 As God, this man was without sin and therefore 
had no debt to make restitution for sin. For the same reason, he alone had the power to efface 
the infinite sins against him. Christ did this by doing exactly what we were made to do, 
namely, by ‘upholding righteousness so bravely and pertinaciously that as a result he incurred 
death,’779 which is the punishment for sin.  
That is not to say that Christ’s death was actually required to make satisfaction for our 
sin on Anselm’s understanding. What was needed, rather, was not only to pay God his 
ordinary due but also to give back to him something more, to make up for what was taken 
from him in sin. By simply living a perfect human life, Christ could not have offered this 
supererogatory gift, precisely because this is what would have been required of him as a man. 
As Andrew Rosato writes in an important article on the subject, ‘There is only one possible 
thing that Christ could do that is not already owed to God, according to Anselm. As sinless, 
Christ is not obligated to die. If he were to do so for the honor of God, this would both be an 
act of sufficient goodness to pay the debt of sin and something not already owed to God.’780 
Although much is often made of the feudal context of Anselm’s discussion, which 
turned on certain social parameters regarding debt repayment, the discussion above lends 
support to the idea that Anselm is engaged in a project of demonstrating that conclusions 
taken on faith about the reason for Christ’s Incarnation can also be reached and proven 
profoundly plausible through rational reflection upon their entailments.781 As we have seen, a 
central feature of this project involves showing that there is a proportionality or fittingness to 
                                                        
778 CDH I.20; cf. II.4. 
779 CDH I.9. 
780 Andrew Rosato, ‘The Interpretation of Anselm’s Teaching on Christ’s Satisfaction for Sin,’ 415-16. 
781 David L. Whidden III, ‘The Alleged Feudalism of Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo and the Benedictine Concepts 
of Obedience, Honor, and Order,’ Nova et Vetera 9:4 (2011), 1055–87. 
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the way that God works in the world, which in many cases goes so far as to imply a certain 
necessity.  
The reason why the Incarnation for one was necessary, in summary, was simply that 
human beings severed their relationship with God, which had been established by God, which 
meant that human beings were both responsible to repair it, yet only God had the power to do 
so. Since God’s will to make that relationship possible is infallible, it was necessary for there 
to be a God-man who restored the relationship. While this restoration did entail death, which 
is the consequence of sin, Anselm does not actually regard Christ’s death itself as essential to 
making satisfaction: he is not an advocate of penal substitution, in which Christ’s death is 
what redeems us from ours.  
His focus is more on the fact that Christ had ‘no other opportunity to perform a 
supererogatory act’782 that was needed to make up for what God had lost through humanity’s 
failure to give him his due. While Christ’s life paid back what any human being owed to God, 
consequently, his death offered the ‘something more’ that was needed for this purpose. As we 
will see below, the Summa’s account of the necessity of the Incarnation follows Anselm’s 
relatively closely.  
 
The Necessity of the Incarnation  
 
 As noted above, Anselm’s authority far outstrips that of any other source in the 
Summa’s discussion of the necessity of the Incarnation.783 The first chapter of this section 
                                                        
782 Andrew Rosato, ‘The Interpretation of Anselm’s Teaching on Christ’s Satisfaction for Sin,’ 416. 
783 Michael Robson, ‘The Impact of Cur Deus Homo on the Early Franciscan School,’ in Anselm: Aosta, Bec 
and Canterbury: Papers in Commemoration of the 900th Anniversary of Anselm’s Enthronement as Archbishop, 
ed. D.E. Luscombe and G.R. Evans (Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 334-47. 
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inquires whether human nature is lapsed from the state in which it was made. In answer to 
this question, various affirmative statements are put forward. Most significantly, the Summa 
observes, it is unfitting that creatures whom God made to experience beatitude or union with 
him should know misery without sin.784 For this reason, humans must exist in their current 
state of misery because of their own culpable lapse from the state in which they were 
made.785 This state of misery—and ultimately death—is the rightful punishment for original 
sin and the resultant tendency of all humans to actualize the potential to sin of their own 
accord at their origins.  
 In chapter two, the Summa further inquires whether human nature lapsed reparably or 
irreparably. Following Anselm, it notes that all mortal sin is accompanied by an infinite 
quantity of guilt, since it offends against an infinite God. For this guilt, God would have to 
provide an infinite satisfaction.786 But the remission of mortal sin cannot be without infinite 
satisfaction, lest God’s will go unfulfilled. However, humans cannot offer this satisfaction. 
Thus, one might conclude that we must not be redeemable but are subject to an infinite 
punishment for sin, which lasts for an infinite time, that is, for eternity. Against this claim, 
however, the Summa states that while the guilt of angels is irreparable because they are 
immutable in nature, that of humans is reparable, precisely because they are changeable 
through free will.787 Thus, our sin is remediable.  
 This raises the question of chapter three whether it was necessary for God to repair 
lapsed human nature. Following Anselm again, the Summa insists that God cannot make 
anything in vain, as this would suggest a deficiency in him as the artificer; and since he made 
                                                        
784 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C1, Primo sic a (n. 1), 5: quoting Anselm’s CDH I.9. 
785 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C1, Ad objecta (n. 1), 6. 
786 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C2, Ad I.1 (n. 2), 11: quoting Anselm in CDH I.19. 
787 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C2, Solutio (n. 2), 10-11: quoting Anselm CDH II.8. 
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human nature for beatitude, human nature must be repaired.788 That is not to say that God is 
subject to necessity by compulsion or prohibition, as is the case with human beings. Because 
God is not the cause of sin, he is under no obligation to remedy it.789 Nevertheless, as Anselm 
says, he is subject to the sort of necessity that derives from the immutability and perfection of 
his will.790  
For the reparation of human nature, chapter four reiterates, a certain satisfaction for 
sin was needed. In order to explain how it was offered, the Summa distinguishes here as in 
other cases between the absolute and ordained power of God.791 When considered as 
absolute, God’s power is understood in terms of its infinite and unlimited or undetermined 
nature. In this sense, we must concede that he is able to repair human nature without 
satisfaction for sin.792 In his ordained power, however, he does not and even cannot forgive 
sin without satisfaction, because he has determined to do everything in accordance with what 
is just, and justice demands satisfaction or recompense for human sin.793  
Obviously, human beings cannot offer satisfaction for their own sin, since they lost 
the capacity to act aright through sin itself.794 Thus, the satisfaction of sin requires an act of 
God. Although God alone could repair the human race, human beings owed the debt to do so. 
Thus, the Summa concludes after Anselm that the one to make this satisfaction must be both 
                                                        
788 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C3, Pro 1, 7 (n. 3), 13. 
789 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C3, Contra a, b, c (n. 3), 13. 
790 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C3, Respondeo, (n. 3), 13; cf. Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, C3, Respondeo (n. 150), 211. According to 
Anselm, there is a necessity of immutability and a necessity of compulsion or prohibition. Quoting Anselm 
CDH I.10, I.20, II.4, II.5-6, II.18 in these passages.  
791 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C4, Respondeo (n. 4), 15-16. 
792  Vol 3, T1 Q1, C4, Respondeo (n. 4), 15-16; quoting Anselm CDH I.12. 
793 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C4, Respondeo (n. 4), 15-16. 
794 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C5, Ar1, Contra a, b (n. 5), 17: quoting Anselm CDH I.21. 
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God and human. 795 Since it was through the Son or the Second person of the Trinity that all 
things were made, the Summa states that it is through him that human nature must be re-
made.796 Although the Summa more or less follows Anselm thus far, the study of its account 
of the human nature of Christ below will set the stage for demonstrating that it ultimately 
adopts a new and more penal approach.  
 
The Human Nature of Christ  
 
In the Middle Ages, discussions of Christ’s human nature in general were strongly 
shaped by arguments, first and most famously advanced by Hilary of Poitiers, who 
‘essentially denies the psychological or affective reality of Christ’s suffering and pain.’797 As 
Paul Gondreau observes, Hilary believed that ‘Christ’s soul did not feel the pain inflicted 
upon his body, as if his body were, as it were, entirely anesthetized at the time of his 
crucifixion.’798 According to Gondreau, ‘Hilary adopted this view in his attempt to defend the 
orthodox Christian faith against the Arian heresy which took Jesus’ display of passion as a 
sufficient disclaimer of the divinity of Christ.’799 While most medieval authors did not 
                                                        
795 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C7, Contra b (n. 9), 23-4, quoting Anselm CDH II.6. 
796 Vol 3, Tr1, Q2, T1, D2, M1, C4, Ar2, Respondeo (n. 15), 32; cf. Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, D1, C1, Responsio (n. 
30), 49. 
797 Paul Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), 25.  
798 Ibid., 25. Jarred Mercer, ‘Suffering for Our Sake: Christ and Human Destiny in Hilary of Poitiers’s De 
Trinitate,’ Journal of Early Christian Studies 22:4 (Winter 2014), 541-68.  
799 Paul Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 25.  
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advocate Hilary’s position, many sought to offer a generous interpretation of his account and 
at very least developed ideas in conversation with it.800  
The Summa is no exception in this regard. At the outset of its discussion of Christ’s 
human nature, the Summa acknowledges with a nod to Hilary that the suffering of Christ 
might seem on some level to be inconsistent with his divine nature, which is impassible and 
omnipotent.801 After all, he enjoyed comprehensive knowledge of God, which would 
seemingly preclude pain and entails a greater pleasure than human beings can imagine.802 
Still, it recognizes Scripture’s affirmation that he was a ‘man of sorrows, acquainted with 
grief.’803 On this basis, the Summa concludes that Christ must have experienced sufferings in 
some way. Following John of Damascus and even Hilary himself, the Summa describes these 
sufferings in terms of Christ’s passions, or the negative side of his experience in both body 
and soul.804  
This way of understanding the passions was widely adhered to at the time, not least 
by Peter Lombard. 805 Amongst the passions, he includes sentiments like fear, agony, and 
sorrow that follow the perception of evil.806 Such passions are a consequence of the fall into 
sin, before which there was no such thing as evil.807 Moreover, they are themselves evil, in 
                                                        
800 Ibid., 50. 
801 Vol 3, Tr5, Q1, M1, Ad 1-8 (n. 141), 194-5; cf. II.1, 195, quoting Hilary, De Trinitate X.23. 
802 Vol 3, Tr5, Q1, M1, Ad II.5 (n. 141), 195. 
803 Vol 3, Tr5, Q1, M1, Contra II.b (n. 141), 195, quoting Isaiah 53:2-3. 
804 Ibid., 50; cf. 78: ‘De fide orthodoxa became accessible to the Master of the Sentences through Burgundio of 
Pisa’s Latin translation that was executed between 1153-4.’  
805 Paul Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 80; cf. Lombard III Sent. 15.1.81. It is found for instance in 
Peter Lombard. 
806 Ibid., 66. 
807 Ibid. 
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that they generally entail an inappropriate response to evil, which itself inflicts further 
suffering. As Gondreau points out, the Summa Halensis was the first text to present a 
systematic account of the Lord’s passions within a systematic theology.808 This account was 
partly based on that of Alexander of Hales, who was the first medieval author to move 
beyond Lombard’s Sentences in presenting a systematic treatment of the Lord’s passions’809 
in his own Gloss on Lombard’s Sentences. 
In a later departure from these Franciscan precedents, Thomas Aquinas followed 
Aristotle in affirming that passions entail feelings of joy, hope, and desire as well as fear and 
pain. In developing his account, Aquinas became the only medieval author to surpass the 
Summists in terms of the amount of attention he devotes to the passions of Christ, a topic on 
which he nonetheless looks to the Summa Halensis as a prototype. On his understanding, 
passions are not the products let alone the essence of sin but are neutral features of human 
nature. Their sinfulness or innocence ultimately depends on whether we reckon with them in 
a manner that is compatible with our own thriving and thereby God’s will or fail to do so.  
As component parts of human nature, the existence of passions in Christ can be 
established by reason according to Aquinas. By contrast, the Summists do not seem to think 
this and hold instead that the presence of passions in Christ must be taken as a matter of faith. 
In this regard, they accept, as Damascus affirmed, that God intended us to be impassible, or 
unable to suffer, as human beings were before the fall.810 That is not to suggest that pre-fall 
persons were unreceptive to the external, empirical stimuli on the basis of which thoughts and 
desires are formed. But it does mean that they were unable to be disturbed by them.811 Since 
                                                        
808 Ibid., 91. 
809 Ibid., 90. 
810 De fide II.11. 
811 Vol 2.1, Tr 3, Q1, T1, C1 (n. 469), 631ff. 
 306 
sin is the reason why persons become passible or capable of suffering, it is not immediately 
obvious that the sinless Christ should suffer. To explain the sense in which he did so, the 
Summa adopts an important distinction from Peter Lombard between the so-called ‘defects of 
punishment’ and the ‘defects of guilt’.812  
The defects of guilt are those we possess on account of our sin nature, which lead us 
to have inappropriate or irrational responses to external stimuli, that is, to exhibit the 
passions. The defects of punishment, however, merely constitute the consequences of sin.   
They include defects of the body, such as hunger, thirst and mortality, and the defects of the 
human soul, such as sadness, sorrow, and fear.813 Similar to Lombard, the Summa accepts 
that Christ assumed the defects of punishment. He did this to prove that he fully shared in our 
broken human nature, and as we will see, to rescue us from it. Because he was the perfect 
God, however, he did not share in our guilt.  
For this reason, Christ experienced the passions in a fundamentally different way 
from human beings.814 First of all, we cannot help but experience the passions or suffering 
because doing so is written into the code of our sin nature. For while Adam had an ability to 
suffer and was indisposed or not necessitated to do so, we have an ability to suffer (potentia 
patiendi) and cannot avoid doing so because of sin.815 Furthermore, we cannot help but be 
disturbed or dissuaded from what is good by sufferings, as that is precisely what the sin 
nature leads us to do. By contrast to us, Christ did not experience the defects of punishment 
                                                        
812 Ibid., 82; cf. Lombard III Sent. 15.1. 
813 Vol 3, Inq 1, Tr 1, Qu 4, Tit 1, Dist 3, Memb 3, Ch 1, Respondeo (n. 43), 67.  
814 Vol 3, Tr5, Q1, M1, Respondeo (n. 141), 197.  
815 Ibid. 
 307 
because he was guilty of them.816 There was no guilt in him because his human nature was 
not a natural facet of his divine being but one he freely chose to assume for our sakes. While 
we are constrained by human nature to undergo the passions, consequently, Christ 
exceptionally was Lord of his passions.817 
For this reason, he could be disturbed by feelings like hunger, fear, or sadness, and yet 
not be deterred from the good to which he is always orientated as God.818 Indeed, his sinless 
nature prevented him from responding to such passions in the way of normal persons, who 
turn from what is good on account of them. This is why Jerome—and medieval thinkers 
following him—called the passions in Christ ‘pro-passions’, namely, because they move the 
will towards what is right, even in the midst of various afflictions and evils, to which fallen 
humans would generally respond with further, moral evil.819  
According to the Summa, this is what Hilary meant when he insisted that Christ was 
not able to feel pain: not that he possessed a body or soul incapable of suffering hunger, 
thirst, fear or sadness, but that his suffering was not the product of being dominated by his 
passions or the infirmity of sin. In short, as Gondreau confirms, the words of Hilary did not 
preclude the truth of the passions but their cause. For the Summa, however, Christ was not 
only able to suffer along these lines but also had to do so for the sake of making satisfaction 
for sin. In what follows, therefore, we will consider the Summa’s arguments for the necessity 
                                                        
816 Ibid., 87; cf. Lombard III Sent. 15.1. Vol 3, Tr1, Q2, T1, C3 (n. 18), 37-8; cf. Vol 3, In1, Tr1, Q4, T1, D3, 
M1 (n. 37), 58-61, cf. (n. 38-45), 62-8. 
817 Vol. 3, Inq 1, Tr 5, Qu 1, M3, C1, Ad objecta 1-2 (n. 148), 207.  
818 Ibid., 86; cf. Lombard III Sent. 17.2. 
819 Ibid., 85 (and 29); cf. Lombard III Sent. 15.2.  Vol 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, D3, M2, C1, Ar2, Respondeo (n. 39), 63. 
Marilyn McCord Adams, What Sort of Human Nature? Medieval Philosophy and the Systematics of Christology 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1999). 
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of Christ’s suffering and death. Although Anselm is cited regularly in this context, we will 
discover that his Franciscan interpreters already begin to move beyond him in elaborating on 
the penal substitutionary nature of Christ’s atonement. 
 
The Necessity of Christ’s Suffering 
 
At the outset of this discussion, the Summa re-iterates its earlier point that suffering 
and death are necessary for human beings because these experiences constitute our 
punishment for sin. By contrast, Christ’s death was not necessary in any sense. As the 
Summa writes: ‘Christ did not have to die efficiently, because no cause could make him die; 
nor materially, because that necessity contracted by sin in us was not in him. Nor according 
to a formal cause, because such a cause is able to be prohibited nor is it voluntary.’820 The 
only reason why he had to die, the Summa concludes, was in terms of the final cause or 
purpose of bringing about satisfaction for our sin.821  
In elaborating on the question why suffering and death specifically was necessary for 
our redemption, the Summa invokes Anselm to explain that redemption entails recuperating a 
thing by a just price. Since the penalty for sin was suffering and death, it posits, there could 
be no recuperation of the human race without suffering and death.822  
Further reasons that confirm the necessity of Christ’s satisfaction by death are as follows. 
Since the human race fell in pride, pleasure, and honor, it was right that God in his mercy 
                                                        
820 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C1, Respondeo (n. 148), 206. 
821 Ibid. 
822 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C2, Respondeo (n. 149), 209, quoting the Glossa (PL 192, 419). Andrew Rosato, 
‘The Interpretation of Anselm’s Teaching on Christ’s Satisfaction for Sin,’ 425, citing Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M4, 
C1, A1. 
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made satisfaction through a Son who desired poverty, worthlessness and subjection. If he had 
chosen the way of prosperity, rather than adversity, it would not have befitted the divine 
effort to reverse the effects of sin.823  
 So great, indeed, was our sin, the Summa insists, ‘that we were not able to be saved 
unless the only begotten Son of God died for us debtors of death.’824 Only Christ could 
recuperate us in this way, because he alone of all men shared the nature of the infinite God.825 
Because he also shared in our broken human nature, the suffering and death he inevitably 
experienced was both able and necessary to satisfy for infinite human sins and relieve us of 
the ultimate consequences for them.826 As a fire generates heat but remains separate from it, 
so the Summa concludes that Christ’s passion consumes the whole guilt and punishment for 
sin without being touched by it.827  
Whereas Anselm had argued that redemption is impossible without satisfaction, the 
Summa clearly goes further here to claim that there is no satisfaction without Christ’s 
passion.828 It makes the shift, however subtle, from Anselm’s notion of supererogatory debt-
repayment to penal substitution. As such a penal substitute, the Summa avers, Christ needed 
to suffer every conceivable type of consequence of sin. In fact, there was no other way to 
                                                        
823 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M4, C1, Ar2, Respondeo (n. 151), 212-13.  
824 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C1, Respondeo (n. 148), 206. 
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828 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M3, C1, Respondeo (n. 148), 206-7, quoting Lombard III Sent. 18.5. 
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atone for every kind of sin.829 This means that it was essential for him not only to undergo 
physical suffering and death but also the sort of psychological trauma or suffering that 
accompanies our alienation from God, from which all further sin sprang in the first place.830 
The nature of this suffering and its redemptive power is what we will explore below.  
 
The Psychological Suffering of Christ 
 
The key to the Summa’s account of Christ’s psychological suffering is a distinction 
between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ reason that is drawn from Augustine.831 Another way the 
Summa speaks of this distinction is in terms of ‘reason as nature’ or ‘reason as reason.’832 
The difference at stake is between reason or intellect insofar as it is concerned with natural 
life, or reason insofar as it is concerned with the purposes of God.833 In that sense, the 
higher/lower reason distinction in the Summa resembles much more closely Avicenna’s 
doctrine of the ‘two faces of the soul’, or his distinction between theoretical and practical 
intellect, which respectively consider matters related to the soul insofar as it is separate from 
the body versus the soul insofar as it is related to the body. Either way, Avicenna’s 
                                                        
829 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, C2, Ar 1, Ad objecta 3 (n. 148), 204.  
830 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar1, Respondeo (n. 142), 199. See Boyd Taylor Coolman, ‘The Salvific 
Affectivity of Christ in Alexander of Hales,’ The Thomist 71 (2007), 24. See the broader article, pages 1-38, for 
an excellent and more in-depth study of this aspect of the Summa’s account. I am grateful to Boyd Taylor Coolman 
for extremely helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 
831 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2, Respondeo 1 (n. 143), 200.  
832 As Boyd Taylor Coolman points out in his article on, ‘The Salvific Affectivity of Christ in Alexander of 
Hales,’ 20, the distinction between ‘reason as nature’ and ‘reason as reason’ comes from Maximus the 
Confessor and is transmitted by John of Damascus; this is a distinction in the superior part of reason. 
833 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2, Respondeo 1 (n. 143), 200. 
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distinction operates purely at the level of the rational soul or intellect and thus differs 
significantly from Augustine’s, which is instead a distinction between the intellectual power 
on the one hand and the sense faculties on the other.  
As a corollary to its account of the intellect, the Summa offers a two-fold account of 
the will which entails both natural and rational or intellectual components.834 While the 
natural will fears the soul’s separation from the body and desires to maintain the body-soul 
union, the rational or deliberative will is entirely abstracted from bodily preoccupations and 
is therefore capable of preferring what is good and right, no matter the difficulties involved in 
doing so. As a human being with a natural appetite for survival, the Summa argues, Christ 
inevitably felt the pain of physical suffering and the fear of death; he underwent passion with 
regard to his natural will. By contrast, his deliberative or rational will experienced no 
suffering whatsoever because he as God remained constantly connected with God and his 
purposes.  
For this reason, he eternally experienced the highest joy (summum gaudium) and the 
pleasure of always participating in the fulfilment of God’s good will.835 Throughout his life, 
the Summa allows, Christ’s connection with God via higher reason informed his experiences 
registered by lower reason. The joy he found in God and in accomplishing his purposes 
provided him with an enduring source of consolation, despite the difficulties he faced in his 
human life. However, this situation changed dramatically at his ultimate passion and death. In 
this instance, the influence of higher reason over lower reason was temporarily suspended: 
lower reason lost access to the resources of higher reason, which remained as functional as 
                                                        
834 Vol 3, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), 201. 
835 Vol 3, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2, Ad objecta 1-4 (n. 143), 201 
 312 
ever as ever.836 As a result, Christ effectively underwent his final sufferings without access to 
the consolation he drew from God.837  
This is why he cried out ‘my God, my God, why have your forsaken me?’ 838 at the 
moment of his death, namely, because the Father in this sole instance did not seem to come to 
his aid. That is not to say that the Son of God ceased in this or any instance to be or be 
connected to God and thus to possess the highest joy.839 For the change in the Son’s 
relationship to God that is reflected in his outcry on the cross did not occur on the side of his 
divine but only his human nature: it had to do with lower reason’s sudden lack of access to 
the comfort that came from higher reason, not with a change in higher reason’s ability to 
commune with God or indeed in Christ’s status as a divine person.840 To affirm that it did 
affect change in these respects would undermine his divinity, on account of he was able to 
accomplish our redemption in the first place. By no means, consequently, does the Summa go 
as far as contemporary authors like Jürgen Moltmann to affirm that, for the sake of fully 
engaging in the human experience of suffering, the Son was alienated from the Father, even 
for a moment.  
The analogy the Summa invokes to explain the simultaneous connection and 
disconnection from God that the Son experienced as God and man, respectively, is that of 
light, which always subsists in the sun, but sometimes does not shine in certain places.841 
While Christ as the Light of God always maintains contact with the Father, the temporary 
                                                        
836 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar5, II (n. 146), 203. 
837 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2, Respondeo 3 (n. 143), 200-1. 
838 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2, Respondeo 3 (n. 143), 200-1. 
839 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q2, C1ff, 226ff.  
840 Vol 3, Tr5, Q1, M1, III, Respondeo (n. 141), 195-7.  
841 Vol 3, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar5, Ad objecta 2 (n. 146), 203. 
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bracketing of the light over his human nature meant that he was able to suffer pain without 
reference to his source of joy in God. Although God himself clearly does not suffer on this 
showing, the early Franciscan authors nevertheless allow that statements about Christ’s 
suffering can be ascribed to the Son of God insofar as they are referred to the Person who 
subsisted in two natures. In remarks that anticipate the future development of the doctrine of 
the ‘communication of attributes’, however, they point out that it is necessary to make clear 
that the person in question suffered pain by reason of his human rather than his divine 
nature.842  
In this regard, the Summa claims that Christ’s pain was the most severe pain 
imaginable, for several reasons. First of all, it was most contrary to the nature of the person it 
afflicted, who encapsulates the supreme good.843 Since Christ’s divine nature fostered the 
most intimate possible connection or fittingness between his body and soul, moreover, Christ 
could not help but experience the greatest suffering at the separation of the soul from the 
body that occurs at death. Above all, the Summa concludes, his pain was most extreme 
because it was voluntary.844 As the Summa asserts, Christ actually wanted to take on broken 
human nature, that is, to endure the defects of punishment (voluit puniri), because this was 
the only way to restore the human race to God.845  
Unless we think Christ came to earth with an explicit death wish, however, the Summa 
is quick to qualify this claim by distinguishing between an ‘absolute’ and ‘conditional’ kind 
of will. On this account, Christ could not have suffered out of a merely conditional will to do 
so, as that would entail that his suffering was part voluntary and part involuntary, which 
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would undermine the integrity of his intent to save us. Thus, the Summa distinguishes 
between three kinds of ‘absolute’ will, that is, a will that is not subject to force, a will for 
something in itself, and a will for something through another.846 Clearly, Christ’s will to 
suffer was absolute insofar as it was not subject to force.  
However, it was not absolute in the sense that he willed to die for its own sake.847 
What he willed, rather, was always, and only ever could be a good end consistent with his 
nature, to wit, the flourishing of the human race.848 On account of sin, the fulfilment of this 
will necessitated his suffering and death. But his will per se was not to suffer and die. Nor 
was it the will of the Father, who permitted and did not prevent Christ’s death, but did not 
himself cause it in the way of Judas, or the Romans and Jews at the time. What the Father 
willed, in fact, was exactly the will of the Son, namely, the good of the human race, which 
will be discussed further below in a section on the fittingness of the Incarnarion. For neither 
member of the Trinity was the passion of Christ a good in itself. It was a means to an end, 
and that end was the only proper object of the divine will.849 
When he fulfilled this will through his suffering and death, we have seen that Christ 
simultaneously experienced the joy of knowing in higher reason that he had accomplished 
God’s plan, along with the repugnance of lower reason at the harsh realities of suffering and 
death themselves. While this might seem like a psychological and even logical contradiction, 
the Summa counsels its readers to consider the analogous case of martyrs, who gloried in the 
chance to participate in God’s purposes, even in the moment of a treacherous death.850 The 
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major difference between martyrs and Christ, the Summa highlights, is that their suffering is 
due to violent extrinsic causes, but Christ’s was the product of his voluntary will to suffer, 
not only physical trials, above all death, but also the psychological trauma of enduring this 
suffering without recourse to hope in God.851  
By undergoing this tragic experience in the context of lower reason, while 
maintaining knowledge of, and delighting in, the divine purposes known to higher reason, 
Christ accomplished those very purposes. He took upon himself the punishment for our sin, 
both in his body, through suffering and death, and in the very depths of his soul, through 
momentary alienation from God. As we draw this part of our discussion to a close, it is worth 
going back to Anselm and seeing how the Summa’s account of the atonement compares to its 
source of inspiration. 
 
An Anselmian Theory of Atonement? 
 
In his Cur Deus Homo, Anselm presents a theory of atonement that turns on the 
notion of supererogatory debt repayment. Since God has made us to flourish by pursuing him 
as our ultimate good, and we have failed to do this, it is incumbent upon us not only to restore 
ourselves to the place where we can do what he made us to do but also to compensate 
somehow for the fact that we have previously failed to do this. By coming to earth and living 
a sinless life, Christ restored our capacity to honor God with our lives in a way that we could 
not do for ourselves. But since this kind of life was already owed to God, it did not suffice to 
compensate for the prior human failure to give God his due. Thus, Christ succumbed to 
death, not because death itself was necessary for this purpose but simply because it was all 
                                                        
851 Vol 3, In1, Tr4, Q3, C3, Ad objecta 5 (n. 134), 187.  
 316 
Christ had left, beyond his life, to give back to God something more than the life of 
honouring him that was already owed.   
Throughout its elucidation of the reasons for the Incarnation, we have seen that the 
Summa Halensis employs Anselm as its point of departure. While it follows him to a large 
extent in affirming the general necessity of the Incarnation, however, it moves beyond him 
very decisively in affirming that suffering and death on the part of Christ were crucial to 
achieving satisfaction for sin. The logic in this regard runs as follows: if the punishment for 
sin is suffering and death, then the only way to remove the punishment is for one without sin, 
namely, God, to undergo suffering and death. By uniting himself to broken human nature, 
this is exactly what the Son of God did.  
While he did not remove the temporal punishment for sin, namely, suffering and 
death themselves, which sin has established as a permanent feature of the present order, he 
did absolve us of eternal suffering and death that comes in the form of separation from 
God.852 This is something he accomplished not merely by experiencing the same kinds of 
physical sufferings, and above all, death, that we experience, but also by undergoing the very 
experience of psychological separation or alienation from God that gave rise to the penalties 
of suffering and death in the first place, and on account of which we presently undergo 
sufferings without any sense of hope in God.  
By entering the depths of our spiritual hopelessness, Christ has ultimately given us 
hope, not only for the good of a future life but also for the one in the present. As we continue 
to face trails of various kinds in this context, we can now do so in the way Christ modelled, 
namely, controlling rather than being controlled by the passions, enduring them in a way that 
does not compromise our integrity but rather enables us to fulfil God’s will for our existence. 
                                                        
852 Vol 3, T1 Q1, C5, Ar2, Respondeo (n. 6), 20. 
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Because Christ has taken all the consequences of sin upon himself, in summary, we are able 
to pursue a life here and in the hereafter that is not encumbered by guilt. In affirming this, the 
Summa clearly introduces an early version of the penal substitutionary atonement theory that 
became poplar at the Reformation.  
Certainly, there are differences between the early and later theories, which are more 
full-blown. The Summa for one does not focus on the way that Christ’s death appeased God’s 
wrath. While it gives a central place to Christ’s death and final outcry, moreover, it does not 
stress specifically the significance of the cross of Christ. Still, the early version of penal 
substitution it presents helps explain how later, more developed accounts became 
conceivable. Moreover, its extensive use of Anselm in this regard goes a long way towards 
revealing why such accounts have been mistakenly associated with his legacy ever since. By 
examining more closely how the Summists turn Anselmian themes to their own ends and 
define them in their ways, their atonement theory emerges as an excellent example of their 
tendency and capacity to hold in tension both an allegiance to authority and a commitment to 
innovation. 
 
The Fittingness of the Incarnation  
 
While we have been so far considering the Incarnation of Christ in terms of the way it 
remedied the effects of human sin, this is not the only or even the main reason why the 
Summa states that the Incarnation occurred. The primary reason for the Incarnation was quite 
simply the completion or perfection of creation. As we have seen in the chapter on the divine 
nature, the divine mind contains an infinite number of ideas for all things that have existed, 
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do presently or could exist.853 The one who determines which ideas to instantiate and who is 
responsible within the Godhead for instantiating them is the second person of the Trinity, the 
Son.  
The Son is the obvious candidate to bring about creation because his role in the 
Trinity is to receive ideas or commands from the Father and carry them out in the Holy Spirit, 
who is the one in whom the goodness of God comes to be expressed in the goodness of 
creatures.854 As the locus of the divine ideas and the one through whom they are instantiated, 
the Son is not only the image of God himself but also the ‘Archetype’ or Exemplar of all 
creation.855 He is at the center of everything because the basis for every being comes from 
him. For this very reason, however, no creature is complete until it is reconciled with its 
exemplar in him and thus with God. But this cannot happen until the exemplar himself 
becomes, in a sense, every creature: the universal every particular. To explain how this 
happened, the Summa entertains a number of preliminary questions whether it was even 
fitting for God to be united to a created being, and if so, which one.856  
 
What Kind of Creature? 
 
                                                        
853 SH 2.1, I1, Tr1, S1, Qu 2, Ti 1, C3, Ad objecta 1 (n. 11), p. 20: Unde omnium sive actualium sive possibilium 
est divina scientia. See also Lydia Schumacher, ‘The Early Franciscan Doctrine of Divine Immensity: Towards 
a Middle Way Between Classical Theism and Panentheism,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 70:3 (2017), 278-94.  
854 Vol 2.1, I1, Tr1, S1, Qu 2, Ti 1, C2, Ad contrarium a (n. 10), 19: Unus est mundus sensibilis et mundus 
sensibilis est exemplatum; multo ergo forius est unum exemplar scilicet mundus archetypus: nam maior est 
unitas exemplaris quam exemplati.  
855 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S1, Q1, C3, Ar2, In contrarium a (n. 3), 8: Mundus sensibilis respondet archetypo, sicut 
exemplatum exemplari; sed idem est mundus archetypus quod ipse Deus.  
856 Vol 3, Inq 1, Tract 1, Qu 1, Tit 1, Dist. 1, Respondeo 2, 26. 
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At the outset of this discussion the Summa notes that a union between the Son and a 
creaturely nature would require some kind of similarity between them. This similarity cannot 
derive from sharing in a common nature, for there is no commensurability between the finite 
and the infinite, the one through whom all things exist, and the ones that depend on him for 
their existence. However, there can be a likeness between them insofar as created things are 
caused by God and for this reason acquire qualities like goodness from him that are 
‘proportional’ as the Summa says to his goodness or reflect it in a particular way, without 
capturing it in full.  
Another ground-clearing query the Summa strives to address at this point concerns 
the very question of positing potential in God for union with another entity. The problem 
with doing so, it observes, is that the notion of potential implies the possibility for change or 
improvement in God, which is unbefitting of a being that is already complete and perfect. To 
alleviate the problem, the Summa distinguishes between a passive potential and an active 
one.857 God cannot be united to a creature through a passive potency, through which a quality 
or state is assumed that improves the assuming being. However, he can be united to a 
creature through an active power, where by his own initiative and volition he assumes a 
created nature not for his own benefit but for that of the created nature itself.  
Here, the assumption of a creaturely nature by God only brings about change or 
improvement on the side of the creature that is assumed. For it activates a passive power in 
                                                        
857 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, Q2, T1, D2, M1, C1, Respondeo 2 (n. 11), 27. This distinction was introduced in the 
anonymous, De potentiis animae et obiectis, ed. Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Powers of the Soul: An Early 
Unpublished Text,’ Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiéval 19 (1952), 131-170. See Magdalena Bieniak, 
The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200-1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press: 2010), 113. 
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created nature to be joined to the Son of God.858 The question therefore remains regarding the 
kind of creature to which the Son is most fittingly united. An initial option the Summa 
entertains in this regard is an angel, which is a purely spiritual being, albeit comprised of 
what the Summa calls ‘spiritual matter’.859 This option is quickly eliminated however on the 
ground that the ideas for creatures or exemplars in God are not only for spiritual but also for 
corporeal beings, and even for beings, in specific, human beings, that are both corporeal or 
bodily and spiritual.860  
Since human beings have a likeness to all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual, they 
enjoy a greater likeness to the full range of divine exemplars and are therefore more unitable 
to God than angels.861 Further support for this conclusion is derived from the similarities the 
Summa mentions between human beings and the divine in terms of nature, personhood, and 
power. With respect to nature, the Summa elaborates, the human soul governs its own body 
                                                        
858 Vol 3, In1, Tr1, Q2, T1, D2, M1, C1, Respondeo 2 (n. 11), 27: Omne unibile est possibile respectu unionis. 
Dicendum quod duplex est potentia, scilicet, activa et passiva. Si loquamur de potentia passiva, sic verum est 
quod natura divina nullo modo est unibilis, quia quod est unibile hoc modo, est possibile respectu maioris 
perfectionis; quia ergo non est possibile quod potentia Dei perficiatur ex actu incarnationis, propter hoc non est 
ponere secundum viam istam divinam naturam unibilem. Si autem loquamur de potentia activa, sic natura 
divina est unibilis humanae, quia in Deo est potentia activa, ut sibi uniat naturam humanam. Unibile ergo 
dicitur de natura divina secundum potentiam activam, scilicet quod possit sibi unire naturam creatam; de 
natura vero humana dicitur secundum potentiam passivam, eo quod possit uniri. Et in hoc etiam fuit summa 
ostensio et manifestatio suae potentiae. Ponatur enim quod non posset uniri active naturae humanae, hoc non 
diceretur esse perfectionis in Deo. Et sic concedendum est quod natura divina et humana sunt unibiles. 
859 David Keck, Angels and Angeology in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University. Press, 1998), 32, 94-5. 
860 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, Q2, T1, M2, C1 (n. 16), 33. 
861 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, Q2, T1, M2, C1, Respondeo 3 (n. 16), 35: Homo habit similitudinem cum omni creatura, 
scilicet corporali et spirituali, quarum rationes sunt in exemplari divino, quod non habet angelus; et ita homo 
est unibilior, cum secundum viam essendi magis exprimat similitudenim exemplaris divini.  
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and the bodies that fall under its purview, much as God governs the world. Furthermore, 
human beings are similar to God in terms of their personhood. Here, the Summa notes a 
particular affinity between human persons and the second person of the Trinity, who 
originates from the Father and is the origin of the Spirit, together with the Father himself.  
In a similar fashion, human beings originate from other human beings and have the 
potential to give rise to further human life. Although human beings are known as images of 
God in general, they are images of the Son more specifically who himself is the image of 
God, and as such, contains all the ideas God has for things he could make.862 This brings us 
to the likeness that human beings, as spiritual beings, enjoy to God and specifically the Son 
in terms of their cognitive power. This power enables them to think of any item they like or 
may encounter in the world. Through reason, consequently, human beings can in principle 
encompass all created things and the whole of the created order.863 As the Summa puts it, ‘all 
natures are united in the human.’864 
According to the Summa, ‘the soul is a likeness to all things’ not only in the sense 
that it is capable of knowing all things but also because it has something in common with all 
beings.865 Thus, human beings are similar to the earth through the sense, to water through 
                                                        
862 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, Q2, T1, C4, Ar2, Ad objecta 1 (n. 15), 32: Human beings are an express likeness of the 
image of God, the Son. 
863 Vol. 3, Tr 1, Qu 2, Tit 1, Qu 2, Memb 2, Ch 1, Respondeo, 34. 
864 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, Q2, T1, C2, 3 (n. 17), 36: Omnes enim naturae uniuntur in homine. 
865 Vol. 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, VI (n. 321), 387: Anima est omnium similitudo. Vol. 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, Solutio 
1 (n. 321), 388: [Anima] convenit enim cum substantiis corporeis inanimatis in esse, licet non in corporeitate, 
cum animatis in vita, cum sensibilibus in sensu, et ex parte incorporearum cum angelis in intellect cum Deo, 
sive…in intelligentia (The soul has something in common with inanimate corporeal substances in being, albeit 
not in being corporeal itself; with animated beings in life, with sensible beings in sense, with angels insofar as it 
is incorporeal and in the intellect or intelligence, with God).  
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imagination, to air through reason, to the skies through the intellect, to the heaven of heavens 
through intelligence; to stones through essence, to trees through life, to animals through sense 
and imagination, to other humans through reason, to angels through intellect, to God through 
intelligence.866  
This is why the Summa insists not only that all natures can be united in the human 
mind but also that all bodies are ordered to the human body, namely, because the human 
being has something in common with all bodies.867 Lest we jump too quickly to the 
conclusion that the human being is the only viable candidate for union with God, however, 
the Summa considers another option, namely, that the whole universe is most fittingly united 
with God. To set up this discussion, it distinguishes between three kinds of world:868 there is 
the archetypal or intelligible world that exists in the mind of God, that is, the Son. And here is 
the actual sensible world we know and experience every day. But this itself is two-fold.  
                                                        
866 Vol. 2.1, In4, Tr1, S1, Q1, Respondeo VI (n. 321), 385: Similis est terrae per sensum, aquae per 
imaginationem, aeri per rationem, firmament per intellectum, caelorum caelo per intelligentiam; similis est 
lapidibus per essentiam, arboribus per vitam, animalibus per sensum et imaginationem, hominibus per 
rationem, angelis per intellectum, Deo per intelligentiam. 
867 Vol. 3, Tr 1, Qu 4, Tit 1, Dist 2, Ch 2, Responsio 2 (n. 33), 52: Ad corpus humanum ordinatur omnia 
corpora, nec est aliquod corpus in universe cum quo non conveniat; propterea cum sit ultimum corporum in 
genere corporum, immediate se habet ad Deum et ideo unibile est (All bodies are ordained to the human body, 
with which all things in the universe have something in common. Therefore as the human body is the ultimate in 
the genus of bodies, it is immediately related to God and unitable to him). 
868 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, Q2, T1, C2, 2 (n. 17), 36: Triplex est mundus, scilicet archetypus…et iste est mundus 
intelligibilis; item est mundus sensilis vel sensibilis, et iste est duplex, scilicet maior et minor: maior est 
universum, minor est ipse homo…homo omnis creatura dicitur, quia homo habet convenientiam cum omni 
creatura. Sed minor mundus magis elongatur a archetypo et minus accedit ad ipsum quam maior mundus, cum 
dicatur diminutive respectu maioris mundi. 
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First, there is the macrocosm (maior mundus) which is the whole of the universe, and 
then there is the microcosm (minor mindus), or the human being that has a likeness to all 
creatures in virtue of being bodily and spiritual. This distinction between macrocosm-
microcosm was as old as some of the oldest Greek philosophy and patristic theology and 
continued to be popular in the Middle Ages, largely thanks to the transmission of Greek ideas 
to the west through Calcidius and Macrobius, among others like Martianus Capella and 
Boethius.869 Despite the strong case that can be made that God is most unitable to the human 
being, this distinction is invoked by the Summa to show that there are some compelling 
reasons, listed below, why the universe is most appropriately united to God: 
 
1. A universal effect is better assimilated to a universal cause than a particular effect.  
But God is a universal cause, and the universe a universal effect, while the human 
being is a particular effect; therefore, the universe is more assimilated to God than a 
human being and thus is more unitable to him. 
2. Although human beings as microcosms can in principle contain the universe through 
reason, the macrocosm is more directly related to God’s understanding of the world, 
as he created it, than a human being’s understanding of it, as a mere microcosm. Thus, 
the universe is more unitable to God than the human being.  
3. What is good is perfected by goodness; therefore a particular good is perfected by a 
particular goodness, and a universal good by a universal goodness. As a human being 
is a particular good, it is perfected by a particular good, and the universe by a 
universal one. But the highest good is a universal good. Therefore it is more unitable 
with the highest goodness. 
                                                        
869 Rudolf Allers, ‘Microcosmus: From Anaximandrosto Paracelsus’, Traditio 2 (1944), 319-408.  
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In typical scholastic fashion, the Summa then presents a number of further points on the other 
side of the argument:  
 
1. Human beings are universal and one, given that all natures can be in principle united 
cognitively in the human mind. However, the universe consists of a vast multiplicity 
of beings. Since God as the universal cause of all things is one, human beings are 
closer and more unitable to him than the universe.  
2. The universe is composed of multiple natures, while human beings have just one 
nature. As God is one, he is more unitable to humans than to the universe.   
3. Although the universe is more like God in a quantitative sense because it is universal 
as he is, the human being, though an individual, is more like God in a qualitative 
sense because all natures can be united in it.870 
 
After considering these various arguments, the early Franciscans ultimately conclude 
that the human being rather than the universe is most fit for union with God. This is because a 
manifold effect like the universe is not properly united to a unified cause unless it is 
assimilated to a unified nature like the human being, possessing the unifying power of 
rationality.871 While the universe may be considered a greater likeness to the archetypal 
world if we think only in terms of where it is most widely diffused, the human being is a 
better likeness because it is a better expression of the way in which all beings are united in 
                                                        
870 Vol 3. Inq 1, Tract 1, Qu 2, Tit 1, Memb 2, Ch 2, Ad objecta 1 (n. 17), 37. 
871 Vol 3. Inq 1, Tract 1, Qu 2, Tit 1, Memb 2, Ch 2, Respondeo (n. 17), 37: Concedendum est quod universum 
non est unibile Deo, sed homo, quia effectui multiplicato non debet uniri unitas causae simplicissimae, nisi 
reducatur in unitatem naturae. 
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the mind of the Son.872 On account the mind’s power to unify all things cognitively, the 
Summa goes even further to say that all creatures are ultimately ordered to the human being, 
who can contemplate a mental likeness to any one of them.873  
Amongst creatures, moreover, human beings are ultimate, because they alone are 
capable of knowing things as God knows them in himself as their source, that is, in relation to 
their divine models or exemplars.874 Because human beings are oriented to God, in summary, 
                                                        
872 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, Q2, T1, C2, Ad objecta 2 (n. 17), 37: Dicendum quod similitudo mundi archetypi potest 
dupliciter repraesentari in mundo sensibili: vel magis diffuse, vel magis expresse. Si magis diffuse sic magis 
repraesentatur in universo: magis vero expresse repraesentatur in homine in quo repraesentatur unitas in 
natura, et secundum modum personae Filii Dei, qui dicitur mundus archetypus.  
873 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, Q2, T1, M2, C1, 4 (n. 16), 35: Magis accredit anima ad Deum quam angelus quoad hoc: 
quoniam homo est ultima creatura et ultima in ordine universi et finis aliarum creaturarum, quod non angelus, 
et ita unibilior, quia magis accedens. SH, Vol. 3, Tr 1, Qu 4, Tit 1, Dist 2, Ch 2, Responsio 1 (n. 33), 52; cf. 
Vol. 3, Tr 1, Qu 4, Tit 1, Dist 2, Ch 2, Responsio 2 (n. 33), 52: Ad corpus humanum ordinantur omnia corpora, 
nec est aliquod corpus in universo cum quo non conveniat; propterea cum sit ultimum corporum in genere 
corporum, immediate se habet ad Deum et ideo unibile est. Vol 2.1, In1, Tr2, Q4, C3 (n. 88), 111: utrum omnia 
sint ordinata ad hominem. Vol 2.1, 416-17: all things ordered to the human soul. 
874 Vol 3. Inq 1, Tract 1, Qu 1, Tit 1, Dist. 1, Respondeo 2 (n. 10), 26: Dicendum quod quaedam est distantia 
essentialis rei ad rem, et hoc modo infinita est distantia naturae divinae ad naturam creatam. Alia est distantia 
rerum secundum esse ordinis, et haec non est infinita creaturae ad Creatorem. Et secundum istam minus distat 
homo a Deo quam aliqua alia creatura, quia ultimum corpus in natura est corpus humanum, communicans cum 
omni corpore in natura; similiter ultima forma in natura est anima raionalis, et inde est quod omnia alia 
ordinantur ad hominem, et ideo est propinquior Deo, et ita est ei unibilis (Furthermore, there is an essential 
difference between two things, and in this way, the distance between the divine and created natures is infinite. 
Yet there is also a distance according to order, and here there is not an infinite distance between creature and 
Creator. Indeed, according to this type of distance, the distance between humanity and God is less than that of 
any other creature, because the ultimate body in nature is the human body, which has something in common 
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and all beings are oriented to human beings, all beings are ordered through humans to God.875 
As a result, the human being is the obvious creature with which the Son would become united 
for the sake of uniting himself to every particular being. For this is the only particular form of 
being that can virtually encompass all others. This marriage of the universal and the 
particular is the feat Christ accomplished at his Incarnation, which the Summa regards as 
fitting regardless of sin for the reasons outlined below.876 
 
Fitting Reasons for the Incarnation  
 
1. Dionysius says in Divine Names 4 that, ‘the good is diffusive of its being’. Thus, we say 
that in the divine, the Father diffuses his goodness in the Son through generation. From both, 
moreover, there is a diffusion of the Holy Spirit through procession. This diffusion in the 
Trinity is the highest diffusion, where creatures do not exist.  
Where creatures do exist, however, if the highest good did not diffuse itself in creatures, one 
could think of a greater diffusion than that of God [i.e. within the Trinity]. If therefore God 
should be understood as the highest diffusion because he is the highest good, it is most fitting 
that he should diffuse himself in creatures; but this diffusion cannot be understood as highest, 
unless he is united to creatures.877 Therefore, it is fitting that God is united to creatures and 
                                                        
with all bodies in nature. Likewise, the ultimate form in nature is the rational soul, whereby all other things are 
ordained to to human kind and therefore [the human kind] is closer to God, such that it is unitable to him). 
875 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, Q2, T1, C2, c (n. 17), 37: Mundus factus est propter hominem, et homo propter Deum; si 
ergo rerum universitas ad hominem ordinatur et per hominem ad Deum, immediatius et propinquius se habet 
homo ad Deum quam universum. 
876 Vol 3, Tr1, Q2, T2 (n. 23), 41ff.  
877 Walter Principe, Alexander of Hales’ Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Medieval Studies, 1967), 84: on the ‘supralapsarianism’ of Alexander of Hales in his Quaestiones 15, 46. 
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above all to human beings. As a result, man would have been united to the highest good even 
if there had not been a lapse.878  
 
2. There is no perfection except in God, and the rational creature is entirely able to be 
perfected; but the rational creature, which is the human being, has two powers of cognition, 
sensitive and intellectual and has love in both; if therefore the whole person can be perfected, 
therefore this is also possible according to sense and according to intellect. Therefore it is 
necessary that in God both [sense and intellect] are beatified. But in God, considered 
according to his proper nature, the senses cannot be perfected, but only the intellect, because 
the senses are not beatified except in the senses or what is corporeal. Therefore, if the whole 
human must be perfected in God, such that it is necessary for God to become corporeal and 
sensible; but it is not fitting that he assume any corporeal nature whatever but only the human 
nature [which is comprised of body and soul].879  
                                                        
878 Vol 3, Tr1, Q2, T2, a (n. 23), 41: Dicit Dionysius: ‘Bonum est diffusivum sui esse’; sicut nos dicimus quod in 
divinis Pater diffundit suam bonitatem in Filium per generationem et ab utroque est diffusio in Spiritum 
Sanctum per processionem, et haec diffusio est in Trinitate et haec est summa diffusio, creatura non existente. 
Ergo si summum bonum, existente creatura, non se diffundit in creaturam, adhuc erit cogitare maiorem 
diffusionem quam diffusionem eius. Si ergo eius debet esse summa diffusio quia est summum bonum, 
convenientius est quod se diffundat in creatura; sed haec diffusio non potest intelligi summa, nisi ipse uniatur 
creaturae; ergo convenit quod Deus uniatur creaturae et maxime humanae; ergo posito quod ipsa non esset 
lapsa, adhuc ei uniretur summum bonum. 
879 Vol 3, Tr1, Q2, T2, b (n. 23), 41: Non est beatitudo nisi in Deo, item creatura rationalis tota est 
beatificabilis; sed creatura rationalis, quae est homo, habet duplicem cognitionem, scilicet, sensitivam et 
intellectivam, et habet delectationem in utraque; si igitur tota est beatificabilis, ergo et secundum sensum et 
secundum intellectum; ergo oportet quod in Deo beatificetur quantum ad utrumque. Sed in Deo, secundum se 
considerando et in propria natura, non potest beatificari sensus, sed solus intellectus, quia non beatificatur vel 
delectatur sensus nisi in sensibili solum sive in eo quod corporale est; si ergo totus homo debet beatificari in 
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3. Likewise, if one comes to understand three persons in one substance, and conversely, three 
substances in one person, then between those two [options] there are three persons and three 
substances. If therefore one extreme is in the nature of things, namely, three persons in one 
substance, as in the Trinity, and there is the medium, as in the case of three persons in three 
substances, as demonstrated by three men or three angels, therefore one must posit a third, 
namely, one person in three substances.880 But this cannot happen except through the union 
of the divine nature to the human, because in no other creature can one posit two substances 
as in the human being, namely, the spiritual and the corporeal, or body and soul; likewise, no 
creature is able to perfect man or to be united with him, because an angel is not able, as man 
according to his superior part is equal to an angel. Therefore it is fitting that there should be a 
union of the divine nature and the human nature in a unity of person in order that there might 
be perfection in the totality of things: as there are three persons in one nature and three 
persons in three natures, so there should be three natures in one person, namely, divine, body, 
and soul.881 
                                                        
Deo, oportet Deum esse corporalem et sensibilem; sed non est conveniens ut assumat quamlibet corporalem 
naturam, sed solum humanam.  
880 Walter Principe, Alexander of Hales, 83: as God is the unity of nature in several persons, so Christ is the 
unity of person in diverse natures. Alexander discusses this topic in his Gloss I, 31, 32b, p. 315; and states that 
the union most fittingly occurs in the human being in his Quaestiones 15, 48, 208-9. 
881 Vol 3, Tr1, Q2, T2, c (n. 23), 41: Contingit intelligere tres personas in unitate substantiae, et ex opposito tres 
substantias in unitate personae, et inter haec duo tres personas in tribus substantiis. Si ergo unum extremorum 
est in rerum natura, videlicet tres personae in una substantia, ut in Trinitate, et medium, ut tres personae in 
tribus substantiis, demonstratis tribus hominibus vel angelis, vel una persona in Trinitate, uno angelo in 
homine, ergo contingit ponere tertium, videlicet unam personam in tribus substantiis. Sed hoc non potest fieri 
nisi per unionem divinae naturae ad humanam, quia in nulla alia creatura est ponere duas substantias quam in 
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4. We find a unity of nature in three persons, and this is due to the perfection of nature, as in 
God. Furthermore, we find a unity of person in multiple natures, as in the human being. If 
therefore it pertains to the perfection of nature to exist in multiple persons, therefore it will 
also pertain to the perfection of person to be able to exist in multiple natures. If therefore 
what is most perfect is always attributed to God, as regards both nature and person, then the 
divine person will be able to be in multiple natures. But this cannot be posited from eternity, 
because multiple natures cannot be from eternity; therefore, there is a certain divine person 
who exists in multiple natures in time. But this is not possible unless he is united to a creature 
nature. Therefore it befits the demonstration of the perfection in the divine personality that 
the divine nature be united to the created nature in the divine person. But this does not befit 
just any created nature, but only the human nature; nor does it befit any person of the Trinity 
but only the Son. Therefore it remains that regardless of the lapse of human nature, this union 
fittingly occurs in the person of the Son.882 
                                                        
homine, scilicet spiritualem et corporalem, ut animam et corpus; similiter nulla creatura potest hominem 
perficere ita quod uniatur cum illa, quia angelus hoc non potest cum homo secundum partem superiorem sit 
angelo aequalis. Convenit ergo quod sit unio divinae naturae ad humanam in unitate personae ut sit in rerum 
universitate perfectio, ut sicut tres personae in una natura et tres personae in tribus naturis, ita tres naturae in 
una persona, scilicet divinitas, corpus, et anima. 
882 Vol 3, Tr1, Q2, T2, d (n. 23), 41: Nos invenimus unitatem naturae in tribus personis, et hoc est de 
perfectione naturae, ut in Deo; item, nos invenimus unitatem personae in pluribus naturis, ut in homine. Si ergo 
de perfectione naturae est quod est in pluribus personis, ergo et de perfectione personae erit quod potest esse in 
pluribus naturis. Si ergo semper quod est perfectius est Deo tribuendum quantum ad naturam et quantum ad 
personam, sicut divina natura est ens in pluribus personis, ita divina persona erit potens esse in pluribus 
naturis. Sed hoc non potest poni ab aeterno, quia plures naturae non possunt esse ab aeterno; est ergo aliqua 
divina persona in pluribus naturis ex tempore; sed hoc non est possibile nisi uniatur naturae creatae; convenit 
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The arguments presented above are quite dense and sophisticated; but they can be 
summarized succinctly as follows. The first states that God as the supreme good diffuses 
himself, because it is proper to what is good to give or share goodness, which cannot be 
withheld by any good being worthy of the name. He does this within himself, amongst the 
members of the Trinity. But where creatures exist, he must also do it outside himself, in 
creatures, lest there be a greater diffusion of goodness than his own. According to the second 
argument, this diffusion must happen by way of union to a human being. This is because 
human beings have all the faculties of other creatures along with the rational faculty that 
makes it possible in principle to think of all other creatures. For God to be united to a human 
therefore is for him to be virtually united to all things. 
The third reason holds that if there are three persons in one substance, as in the 
Trinity, and three persons in three substances, as in the case of three humans, then there must 
be a middle way, which involves one person in three substances. This cannot happen unless 
through the union of the divine nature to the human nature, which involves spiritual and 
corporeal substances or body and soul. Similarly, the fourth reason argues that if there is 
unity of nature in three persons, as in the Triune God, and unity of person in multiple natures, 
as in the human being, then there should also be a person that is able to exist in multiple 
natures, namely, divine and human. 
As these arguments suggest, the Summa does not here go so far as to affirm that the 
Son would have become incarnate regardless of sin necessarily. Presumably, it avoids 
                                                        
igitur ad ostensionem perfectionis in personalitate divina, quod uniatur divina natura naturae creatae in 
persona divina; sed non convenit cuilibet, sed solum humanae, nec etiam cuilibet personae in Trinitate nisi soli 
Filio; relinquitur ergo quod, circumscripto lapsu humanae naturae, adhuc est convenientia unionis in persona 
Filii. 
 331 
drawing this conclusion explicitly on the grounds that it is impossible to speculate as to 
God’s will regarding a pristine world that is unknown to us. Indeed, it is only possible to 
think in terms of necessities with regard to the world order that actually exists. Nevertheless, 
the Summa’s arguments from fittingness in this section quite strongly support the conclusion 
that God’s primary intention in becoming Incarnate was to establish his place as the centre of 
everything by joining himself to the one being, to air, the human being, to whom all beings 
are ordered and through whom he can be joined to all beings, thereby achieving their 
completion and perfection. Any effect of the Incarnation aside from or in addition to this was 
merely incidental. 
 
A New Reason for the Incarnation 
 
Although there is some sense in which the Summa’s account of the necessary reasons 
for the Incarnation, to do with human atonement, can be traced loosely back to Anselm, the 
introduction of this ‘supra-lapsarian’ position, whereby Christ would have become Incarnate 
regardless of sin, finds no medieval precedent to speak of. It is one of the most noteworthy 
Franciscan innovations, which would come to play an increasingly significant and central 
role in Franciscan incarnation theories, as already mentioned above with reference to Duns 
Scotus, not to mention in early modern theology. 
While supra-lapsariansim can be joined in principle with a variety of atonement 
theories, its combination with penal substitution in the early Franciscan context is worth 
noting in concluding this discussion, in light of certain objections that have been raised 
against the theory by contemporary theologians. On these accounts, it has been argued, the 
Father seemingly takes pleasure in turning an innocent man over to death in order to appease 
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his wrath against sinners.883 Moreover, the Son appears excessively willing to oblige in this 
regard. He evidently comes to earth out of a sadistic death wish.884  
Although this may be the case in some penal theories, I would argue that the 
Franciscan affirmation of an ‘Incarnation anyways’ provides a sort of ‘escape hatch’ through 
which the Summists pre-emptively evade these potential objections to their understanding of 
Christ’s penal work. As we have seen, Christ’s primary reason for coming to earth in their 
view was simply to consummate his relationship with all creation. The reason he took on a 
human rather than another form is that human beings have the ability in principle to think 
about the infinite variety of all the things God has made, an ability the Son of God possesses 
in actuality in virtue of his own infinity.  
For Christ to be united to human nature was therefore for him be united virtually with 
all of creation. Of course, uniting uniting himself to human nature under the circumstances of 
sin, which were not part of his original design, did require an adjustment on the human side 
of Christ’s experience, insofar as it necessitated that Christ take on the fallen human 
condition. As a result of this, Christ inevitably experienced suffering and death, which had 
become part of the natural course of human life in the wake of sin. Nevertheless, we cannot 
say that Christ was sent or came specifically to die on the early Franciscan account. This 
level of external determination regarding the events surrounding his death simply did not 
exist, precisely because the only reason for the Incarnation was ever to perfect and complete 
                                                        
883 Kathryn Tanner, ‘Incarnation, Cross, and Sacrifice: A Feminist-Inspired Reappraisal,’ Anglican Theological 
Review 86:1 (2004), 37. 
884 Gerard O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 167, citing E. Käsemann, Jesus Means Freedom (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1970), 114. 
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creation.885 The redemption of humanity from sin was merely an additional benefit of 
fulfilling this overarching purpose.  
When the sections of the Summa that delineate its penal elements are read in this 
light, penal substitution and supra-lapsarianism emerge as non-separable moments in its 
account of the Incarnation, as a result of which the objectionable aspects of penal theory 
seemingly lose their weight.886 Notwithstanding contemporary theological arguments to the 
contrary, early Franciscan thinkers illustrate, through their combined account of the necessary 
and fitting reasons for the Incarnation, that penal substitution theory is not beyond 
redemption. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The question that remains at the end of this analysis concerns why the Franciscans 
might have found the aforementioned theories especially attractive. One possible reason for 
the newfound interest in penal substitution may have been the growing penitential culture at 
the time.887 After Lateran IV, individuals were required to attend confession at least once a 
year, where they received instruction on how to do penance for their wrongdoings. The 
growth of the genre of confessors’ manuals, which enumerated a wide range of sins and their 
                                                        
885 Kathryn Tanner, ‘Incarnation, Cross, and Sacrifice,’ 43.  Gerard O’Collins, Jesus Our Redeemer, 159. 
886 I am grateful to Corey Barnes for suggesting this phraseology to me.  
887 Thomas Jude Jarosz, ‘Sacramental Penance in Alexander of Hales’ Glossa,’ Franciscan Studies 29 (1969): 
302-346. Alexander Murray, Conscience and Authority in the Medieval Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 49-86. 
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remedies, is one of the likely reasons why the Halensian Summists themselves devote an 
entire volume to listing countless kinds of sin.888  
The early Franciscans, who were preachers and confessors before they were 
theologians, were concerned to facilitate the penitence of parishoners and further the life of a 
church that was struggling to keep them. Thus, we will see in the next chapter that they 
outlined a very detailed account of the divine commands, the observance of which can curb 
and compensate for sin. The transgression of these commands called for acts of penance 
which it was one of the friars’ primary functions to assign, along with administering the 
Eucharist. While other sacraments like baptism and marriage were undertaken within the 
parish context, the Holy See had come increasingly to rely upon the friars as confessors who 
enabled the fulfilment of the Lateran IV mandates.889 
This primary focus of the friars is reflected in volume four of the Summa, on the 
sacraments; in the Cologne edition, this text runs 845 pages, 399 of which are devoted to 
penance, 262 to the Eucharist, and the remainder to other topics.890 Naturally, the increasing 
emphasis on the recompense human beings had to make for personal sins anticipated the 
development of an account of the way that Christ had already done so. While Anselm had 
seen satisfaction as a way of honouring God which makes recompense for the dishonor that 
has been shown him through sin, satisfaction was coming to be understood as a means of 
                                                        
888 J. Longère, ‘Quelques Summae de paenitentia à la fin du XIIe et au début du XIIIe siècle,’ La piété populaire 
au Moyen Âge (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale. 1977), 45-58. P. Michaud-Quantin, ‘Les Méthodes de la pastorale 
du XIIIe au XVe siècle,’ Miscellanea Mediaevalia (Berlin, 1970), 76-91. P. Michaud-Quantin, Sommes de 
casuistique et manuels de confession au Moyen Âge (XIIe-XVIe siècles) (Louvain-Lille-Montreal, 1962). 
889 Norman Tanner, ‘Pastoral Care: The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215,’ 112-25 and Michael Robson, ‘A 
Ministry of Preachers and Confessors: The Pastoral Impact of the Friars,’ 126-47, in A History of Pastoral Care, 
ed. Gillian Evans (London: Continuum, 2000),  
890 I am grateful to Timothy J. Johnson for drawing this to my attention. 
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cleansing oneself from the guilt of sin, which is something that had to be accomplished 
through Christ’s undergoing the punishment for sin.  
On another level, there is no denying that one of if not the most significant aspects of 
the Franciscan ethos concerns its emphasis on the suffering and self-sacrifice of Christ as a 
model for the Christian way of life. For Francis, in fact, Christ’s passion was the key to 
conveying the fundamentally self-giving nature of God to humanity: by suffering in his 
human life, Christ witnessed to the extent of God’s love which had been poured into creation. 
In this light, it is not surprising that the Halensian Summists laid such a major emphasis not 
only the suffering of Christ and his ability to emphathize with our suffering, but also on 
Christological questions in general, which absorb a relatively large amount of space by 
comparison to Dominican sources.891 That is not even to mention the more general interest at 
the time in the veneration of the passion and death of Christ, which may have enhanced the 
attractiveness of penal theory in the minds of the Summists.892 
Further to this, there is the matter of the Summa’s ‘supra-lapsarianism’, or inclination 
towards the view that Christ would have become Incarnate regardless of human sin. Here, the 
correlation is clearly detectable between early Franciscan doctrine and Francis’ own vision of 
the world, in which all creatures are regarded as brothers and sisters to us, like Christ, who 
reveal some aspect of God’s nature in the world. For this vision, Francis has garnered the title 
of patron saint of animals and ecology, and as such, the Franciscan notion that Christ came 
primarily to complete and perfect creation is hardly surprising. Since all things have been 
made by him, and he is in a sense, every creature, the way in which we treat creatures reflects 
                                                        
891 Kent Emery, Jr. and Joseph Wawrykow (eds), Christ Among the Medieval Dominicans (South Bend: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).  
892 Miri Rubin, Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991).  
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the way we would treat Christ. Thus, the supra-lapsarian doctrine perfectly encapsulates 
Francis’ belief that all creatures deserve our care and respect, regardless of their size or 
apparent significance. This belief, rather than a tendency routinely to follow authorities like 
Anselm, is ultimately what inspired the novelty that is the Franciscan doctrine of the reasons 
for the Incarnation.  
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11. MORAL THEOLOGY 
 
 The late medieval Franciscan thinker William of Ockham is often heralded as the first 
to formulate a full-blown moral theory that turns on obedience to divine commands.893  Well 
before his time, however, the Halensian Summists had offered the first Franciscan statement 
of this theory, in what represented a significant departure at the time from the more common 
focus on moral virtues and vices, such as can be found in earlier contemporaries like Peter of 
Poitiers, Prepositinus, Philip the Chancellor, William of Auxerre, and Roland of Cremona.894 
According to recent critics, the divine command theories that eventually usurped such 
theories exhibit a decided tendency to undermine personal moral autonomy and thus 
responsibility.  
                                                        
893 A version of this chapter has been published in Lydia Schumacher, ‘Divine Command Theory in Early 
Franciscan Thought: A Response to the Autonomy Objection,’ Studies in Christian Ethics (2016), 1-16. Bonnie 
Kent, Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1995). See also Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics 
(London: Continuum, 1995), 240-79, which explains how laws, rules, and commands came to feature more than 
virtue and happiness under nominalism. In the early modern period, a secular counterpart to divine command 
theory eventually emerged in the form of deontology, or an ethic which prescribes adherence to duties and laws. 
894 Petri Pictaviensis Sententiarum libri quinque, ed. Dom Hugh Mathoud, Paris 1655, reprinted in PL 211, 789-
1280. Ph. Moore, The Works of Peter of Poitiers: Master in Theology and Chancellor of Paris (1193-1205) (South 
Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1936). G. Lacombe, Prepositini Cancelarii Parisiensis (1206-1210) 
(Caen: Le Soulchoir, 1927). William of Auxerre was the first to incorporate a discussion of natural law, usually 
treated in exclusively legal treatises, into a theological account of the virtues, which nonetheless took priority, as 
O. Lottin observes in Psychologie et morale aux Xii et XIIIe siècles, Tome II, Première Part (Louvain: Abbaye du 
Mont César, 1948), 75. For an example of the focus on virtue and vices, see Roland of Cremona, Summae Magistri 
Rolandi Cremonensis, O.P. Liber Tercius (Bergamo: Umberto Midali, 2017). 
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After all, they render morality a matter of merely following arbitrary regulations, 
which must be accepted unquestioningly from an authoritative source. On this assumption, 
recent philosophers and theologians—Alasdair MacIntyre most famously—have sought to 
recover the traditional ethic of virtue which prevailed in some form not only in the 
aforementioned thinkers but also for much of the earlier medieval period.895 In most cases, 
this kind of ethic assists adherents in cultivating a personal moral disposition that makes it 
possible to act virtuously in a wide range of unpredictable circumstances.  
As such, it affirms the role of the moral agent in moral adjudication in a way that duty 
and divine command theories supposedly fail to do. Though the rehabilitation of virtue theory 
may be a worthwhile undertaking, this chapter will demonstrate that there is a way to 
elucidate divine command theory which is not susceptible to the so-called ‘autonomy 
objection’ described above. This way can be found in the Summa Halensis, and perhaps 
indeed in later Franciscan thinkers like Ockham, though demonstrating that is more 
controversial and less straightforward.896 
As we will shortly discover, the authors of the Summa regarded God’s commands—
administered initially through the Mosaic Law and subsequently through the Law of the 
Gospel—as the arbiters of the Christian moral life. For them, however, these divine laws or 
commands are no arbitrary rulings but remain fully intelligible in terms of the natural law that 
is innately known to all human beings—an aspect that some have regarded as missing in 
                                                        
895 G.E.M. Anscombe initiated the discussion in her landmark article, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy,’ Philosophy 
33:124 (1958), 1-19. Alasdair MacIntyre became more famous for raising this concern in his, After Virtue: A 
Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 2007).  
896 Edward Wierenga, ‘A Defensible Divine Command Theory,’ Nous 17:3 (Sept. 1983), 387-407. Thomas M. 
Osborne, Jr., ‘Ockham as a Divine-Command Theorist,’ Religious Studies 41:1 (March 2005), 1-22.  
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Ockham’s account.897 This law simultaneously engrains in human minds the eternal law of 
God that is expressed in the Law of Moses and in the Gospel.  
Thus, the natural law offers access to the rationale behind divine commands, which 
human beings on this account can weigh and consider for themselves. According to the 
Summa Halensis, this capacity for comprehending the commands is complemented by a 
complete freedom of the will to obey or disobey them. So construed, no moral act can be 
conceived as the mere fulfillment of an arbitrary duty. Rather, it is the product of a 
completely free choice to perform or decline to perform an act about which one is capable of 
adjudicating for oneself, that is, autonomously, and for which one therefore remains fully 
responsible.   
In order to make this case, I will assess the tractate on law that can be found in the so-
called Summa Halensis. Whereas the precise author of different sections of the Summa is 
sometimes difficult to determine, scholarship has succeeded in establishing that John of La 
Rochelle was the author of the treatise on law, large swaths of which simply reproduce his 
personal writings on this topic, which have recently been edited.898 In order to throw the 
                                                        
897 Marilyn McCord Adams’ riposte to this position in ‘The Structure of Ockham’s Moral Theory,’ Franciscan 
Studies 46 (1986), 1-35. See also Riccardo Saccenti’s survey of the doctrine of natural law in the middle ages 
and the Franciscan tradition in Debating Medieval Natural Law: A Survey (South Bend: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2016).  
898 The tractate on law in the Summa Halensis is heavily based on John's Summa de praeceptis et consiliis. See 
Victorin Doucet, ‘Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II Summa Fratris Alexandri,’ Doctoris 
Irrefragibilis Alexandri de Hales Summa Theologica (Forence: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1948), 211-13, 300. 
The most recent and most substantial study of this material is by Michael Basse (ed.), Summa theologica 
Halensis: De legibus et praeceptis: Lateinischer Text mit Übersetzung und Kommentar (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2018). See also the important studies of this text by the following: Aloysius Obiwulu, Tractatus de Legibus in 
Thirteenth-Century Scholasticism: A Critical Study and Interpretation of Law in Summa Fratris Alexandri, 
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distinctiveness of his Franciscan approach to Christian ethics into relief, I will begin with a 
brief comparison of the Summa’s structure and content to the more familiar text of Aquinas’ 
Summa, which offers the most mature and well-known statement of Christian virtue ethics. 
Although Aquinas’ Summa post-dates the Summa Halensis, the fact that it offers the most 
developed version of the alternative way of thinking that dominated previously makes it the 
most useful text for throwing the uniqueness and innovative ness into relief. 
 
The Summa Halensis vs. the Summa Theologiae 
 
Similar to Aquinas’ Summa, the Franciscan Summa is divided into three main parts, 
where the second part is itself divided into first and second parts. However, the similarities 
between the two texts largely end there. For while Part I of Aquinas’ Summa treats God, 
creation, angels, and humanity, the Franciscan Summa deals only with the doctrine of God. 
Part 2.1 of Aquinas’ Summa discusses the human end, acts, passions, habits, vice and sin, law 
and grace—or matters preliminary to virtue ethics--before dealing with the three theological 
and four cardinal virtues in Part 2.2. By contrast, the Franciscan Summa covers creation, 
angels, and humanity in Part 2.1 and provides an extensive catalogue of types of evil and sin 
in Part 2.2. The table of contents alone for this section alone runs over 25 pages.  
                                                        
Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas (Munster, 2003). Beryl Smalley, ‘William of Auvergne, John of La 
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In order to capture the level of detail to which the Summists resort in discussing sin, it 
is worth rehearsing some of the principal topics addressed in Part 2.2, which contains three 
main sections, namely, on evil, on sin, and on particular species of sin. The latter section 
contains headings on ‘venial and mortal sins’, ‘sins of omission and commission’, sins of the 
heart, speech, and action’, ‘the seven capital vices’, ‘sins of infirmity, ignorance, and 
purpose’, ‘sins of fear and love’, ‘the sin of concupiscence’, and ‘sins against God, 
neighbours, and the self’. In these sections, the Summists provide a lengthy catalogue of sins, 
which is to my knowledge unmatched in literature from this period and probably reflects the 
key role Franciscans played as confessors. Aquinas’ brief segment on ‘vice and sin’ in his 
own Summa is certainly no comparison, although it is well known that his volume 2.2 
circulated widely at the time, separate from other sections of the Summa, as an aid for 
confessors and moral teachers as well.  
In Part 3 of the Summa Theologiae, finally, Aquinas covers the Incarnation and 
sacraments, whereas the Franciscan Summa describes the Incarnation, the divine laws that 
are designed to counteract sin—and their fulfilment in the gospel—as well as grace and faith. 
Though there are many more differences between the two texts than the basic ones mentioned 
above, even these are striking and clearly testify to very different theological and moral 
perspectives and priorities. As scholars have observed, for instance, Aquinas devoted an 
extraordinary level of attention to his discussion of moral virtue, giving it a central place in 
his theological scheme, with two whole parts of his four-part work covering matters 
preliminary to virtue ethics and the virtues themselves, respectively.899 
By contrast, the early Franciscans commit a seemingly disproportionate amount of 
space to the extremely detailed enumeration of both human sins and the divine laws that have 
                                                        
899 Mark D. Jordan, ‘Aquinas Reading of Aristotle’s Ethics,’ in Ad Litteram: Authoritative Texts and Their 
Medieval Readers, ed. Mark D. Jordan and Kent Emery (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992). 
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been administered to curb them. In this regard, they certainly were not alone. Many scholars 
of the period devoted considerable attention to the Ten Commandments, particularly after the 
Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 declared knowledge of the Decalogue, along with the creed 
and the Pater Noster, essential for all Christian persons, as part of a larger effort to reform 
both morals and orthodox beliefs which were being compromised at the time. In the wake of 
this development, a wave of literature on the Decalogue was produced, not least as a basis for 
preparing sermons.1  
Nevertheless, John’s treatment, and that of his Franciscan contemporaries, is too 
extensive to be considered unexceptionable.900 Thus, one might suppose that the Franciscans 
had particular reasons, to do with their unique ethos as a religious order, for emphasizing 
divine commands. These reasons likely referred back, as in so many other cases, to the 
personality and prescriptions of Francis of Assisi. As has been detailed in chapter two, 
Francis proffered quite a literal interpretation of Scripture and what it means to imitate the 
life of Christ which is depicted there. For him, the literal imitation of Christ, made possible 
by the literal observance of the Franciscan rule, entailed obedience to strict and extremely 
specific rules and regulations concerning all aspects of ordinary as well as spiritual life.  
Since what it means to live like and by the grace of Christ was construed in this way 
from the earliest days of the order’s existence, it is hardly surprising that the first Franciscan 
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scholars would opt to advocate an already mainstream emphasis on divine commands. On 
account of this emphasis, the reader is hard pressed to find many references to the cardinal 
moral virtues, and discussion of the theological virtues is sparse and far from central. The 
only exception in this regard is the virtue of faith, which receives detailed coverage in a Part 
3 treatise on ‘grace and faith’, which follows the treatise on divine laws—and in specific, the 
Ten Commandments and their relationship to the Gospel—and which closes the whole of the 
Summa Halensis. 
For his part, in contrast, I have mentioned that Aquinas addressed the questions of 
grace and faith at the end and at the beginning of his Parts 2.1 and 2.2, respectively, covering 
the Old and New Laws only cursorily prior to his discussion of grace. Although Aquinas 
treats some of the same key theological topics as the Summists, such as grace, faith, and the 
law, consequently, the context in and extent to which he does so speaks volumes regarding 
the theological differences between them. As I have noted, Aquinas treats law and grace at 
the end of a section on preliminary matters pertaining to moral virtue. In his account, 
therefore, the law—whether divine or natural—is not incompatible with virtue. On the 
contrary, the law requires that human beings strive for the highest good, or what is best, and 
thus bear their lives and resources to the best of their abilities. Yet that is precisely what the 
virtues he subsequently discusses apparently make it possible to do.901 
When he discusses the Old (Mosaic) Law explicitly, Aquinas goes so far as to state 
that the whole purpose of that Law was to prescribe and make it possible to exhibit moral 
virtue.902 As the grace dispensed through Christ now performs this function, at least in those 
who receive grace through faith, working through the other theological virtues of hope and 
                                                        
901 Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics (Louisville: John Knox 
Press, 1990), 79. 
902 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 2.1.100.2. 
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love, that law is no longer needed. That is not to say that it has been abolished. As Aquinas 
notes, the Law of the Gospel contains the Old Law, precisely because it nurtures 
automatically the virtues that inhibit the transgression of the Law.903 For that very reason, 
however, he concludes that the Old Law has been rendered obsolete in practice, even though 
it remains theoretically valid.  
For the Franciscan Summists, by contrast, law, grace, and faith are not preliminaries 
or conditions for the possibility of moral virtue, as they are for Aquinas. Rather, the law 
represents the whole substance of early Franciscan moral theology, where grace and faith 
respectively represent the divine and human contributions that render the fulfilment of the 
law possible. Thus, grace performs a very different function in Franciscan thought than it 
does in that of Aquinas. In his work, I have hinted, grace sets us up to the fulfil the law—
which is simply to do whatever is morally appropriate in the circumstances.  
Because the circumstances vary radically depending on who is acting, towards whom, 
when, why, where, and how, and what the relevant action entails, however, determining how 
to act rightly in various circumstances requires spontaneous judgement and thus a remarkable 
level of adaptability, which is made possible by moral virtue.904 Whatever the value of human 
laws and duties—which Aquinas by no means foreswears—they are no substitute for the 
necessary involvement of the moral agent who must decide what laws or rules even apply in 
any given case, and that agent’s will to act according to duty. In that sense, the grace that 
supports the faith that enacts the theological virtues, which motivate moral virtue in ideal 
circumstances, is bound to have quite diverse and even highly individual ramifications.  
Indeed, grace is operative anywhere anyone operates in the best interests of 
themselves and others. Thus, it is active variously depending on who is acting and what 
                                                        
903 ST 2.1.107. 
904 ST 2.1.7. 
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action is involved. For the early Franciscans, by contrast, the function of grace is univocal: 
grace makes it possible for those with faith to fulfil the Mosaic Law. Where Aquinas spent 
hundreds of pages discussing the virtues, consequently, the early Franciscan Summists 
designate a 500-page section of their Summa to commenting on the nature and implications 
of the Mosaic Law. Thus it remains to examine more closely the Franciscan account of this 
Law, its fulfilment by the Gospel, its relationship to eternal and natural law, and ultimately, 
to the faith that is enlivened by grace.  
 
Mosaic Law and the Law of the Gospel  
 
In keeping with biblical and historical tradition, John of La Rochelle recognized three 
components of the Mosaic Law, as outlined in the Torah: the judicial and ceremonial precepts 
and the moral precepts provided in the Ten Commandments. Over half of John’s section on 
the Mosaic Law is devoted to considering these Commandments, which are themselves 
spread across two tablets. In accordance with a longstanding tradition of dividing the 
commands which can be traced back to Augustine, the first three commandments belong on 
the first tablet and order the human soul to God, while the latter seven are listed on the 
second and order inter-personal relations.905  
On John’s argument, the ‘ceremonial precepts depend on the mandates of the first 
tablet, which were all given to enable the worship of God and to keep human beings from 
                                                        
905 SH Vol 3, P2, In3, Tr1, Q3, C2, Ad objecta 1-3 (n. 270), 400: Moralia primae tabulae ordinant animam ad 
Deum; moralia autem secundae tabulae ad proximum (The moral laws of the first tablet ordain the soul to God’ 
the moral laws of the second tablet ordain the soul to the neighbour). On the complex relationship between early 
Franciscans and Augustine, see Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s 
Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), especially chapters 3-4. 
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idolatry’906, whereas the judicial precepts were given ‘for the purpose of preserving peace 
with others, and thus depend on the moral principles of the second tablet’.907 As John 
observes, however, these precepts are no longer necessary after Christ, who has provided 
conclusive justification for sin, that is, the failure to observe God’s law, for which the 
ceremonial and judicial laws formerly provided merely provisional compensation.908 
While it would be interesting to evaluate John’s account of each divine command in 
detail, that inquiry would take us far beyond the scope of the present project. In this regard, it 
suffices to note that where preceding thinkers—following Origen—had tended to interpret 
the Decalogue exclusively in terms of what medieval thinkers described as the ‘spiritual 
sense’ of the text, that is, with regard to its allegorical, moral, or eschatological implications, 
John worked under the influence of his earlier contemporary, William of Auxerre (d. 1231), 
who had insisted on a completely literal reading of the commands.  
Although ‘William’s analysis was too unusual to be wholly accepted, it was 
influential for both John of La Rochelle and Thomas Aquinas. John could not agree that 
every precept had a literal meaning, but he was prepared to admit that most of them did, and 
                                                        
906 Vol 3, P2, In3, Tr1, Q3, C2, Ad objecta 1-3 (n. 270), 400: Omnia ceremonialia dependebant a mandatis 
primae tabulae, quia omnia erant data ad divinum cultum et ut homo revocaretur ab idololatria (All ceremonial 
laws depend on the law of the first tablet, because they were all given to support the workshop of God and to 
deter human beings from idolatry). 
907 Vol 3, P2, In3, Tr1, Q3, C2, Ad objecta 1-3 (n. 270), 400: Iudicialia vero, quia erant ad conservandam 
pacem ad proximum, dependebant a moralibus secundae tabulae (The judicial precepts, which are ordained to 
preserve peace with a neighbour, will depend on the moral laws of the second tablet). 
908 Vol 3, P2, In3, Tr1, Q3, C2, Ad objecta 1-3 (n. 270), 400; cf. P2, In3, Tr1, Q5: De iustificatione per legem 
(On justification through the law), 406-12.  
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all were certainly comprehensible and thus observable in a spiritual sense.’909 The 
combination of a literal and spiritual reading of the Commands presumably made it possible 
theoretically to counteract all the specific sins enumerated in Part 2.1 of the Summa. Thus, it 
remains to consider how early Franciscans like John perceived the role of those laws in 
combatting sin in the current dispensation, that is, in an order which is privy to the revelation 
of the Incarnate Son. 
Needless to say, both Scripture and the Christian tradition teach that the Law of 
Moses was not abolished but fulfilled by the Gospel of Christ.910 Yet there are different ways 
of understanding what this teaching means. In Reformation theology particularly, the debate 
about the relationship between the Law and the Gospel became a matter of some significance. 
Following John Calvin, the Reformed tradition has tended to acknowledge three uses of the 
Law.911 The first is the political or civil use, in which the Law is regarded as the means by 
which God has generally revealed principles by which believing as well as unbelieving 
individuals should live. The second is the pedagogical use, in which the Law makes us aware 
of our transgressions and points us to Christ. The third is the didactic use, exclusively 
reserved for believers, whereby the Law continues to instruct us in the way we should live, 
even though it cannot condemn us any longer.  
Whereas the Lutheran tradition generally affirms the first two uses of the Law, many 
strands of this tradition have perceived the danger of a ‘works-based’ salvation lurking in the 
so-called ‘third use of the law’. The Catholic tradition, as represented by Aquinas, certainly 
                                                        
909 Lesley Smith, The Ten Commandments: Interpreting the Bible in the Medieval World (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 
38: see the chapters on God and neighbour for details about John’s exposition of each command. 
910 Mt. 5:17. 
911 Christina Aus der Au, ‘Being Christian in the World: The Tertius Usus Legis as the Starting Point of a 
Reformed Ethic,’ Studies in Christian Ethics 28:2 (2015), 132-41.  
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acknowledges the significance of the Decalogue and assumes a literal reading of it as the 
basis for moral theology.912 Yet it moves relatively quickly from this foundation to a spiritual 
reading of the commandments as means of cultivating the theological and moral virtues.913 
Thus, there is disagreement when it comes to determining what it means to affirm that the 
Law is fulfilled, though not completely abolished, by the Gospel, and it is vital in any 
instance to investigate how exactly a particular school of thought construes the relationship 
between the two.  
The early Franciscan focus on divine commands gives us reason to believe that the 
Gospel in this context is interpreted as that which literally enables believers to fulfil those 
commands in all their specificity, and thus to avoid committing any of a long list of sins. In 
Franciscan thought, in other words, there is already something like a ‘third use of the Law’. 
This claim is actually made explicitly in the very first chapter of the treatise on Mosaic Law, 
which considers ‘the uses of the law’.914 There, John writes that ‘the law of Moses functions 
according to three reasons, by divine dispensation’.915 
First, the law was given in support of the natural law. Because there are seeds of 
justice in human nature, he elaborates, the Law was added by divine mercy, such that by its 
authority and teaching, the natural human proficiency for justice might bear fruit in just acts. 
In that sense, he argues, the natural law is included in the law of Moses, which renders that 
                                                        
912 Beryl Smalley, ‘William of Auvergne, John of La Rochelle and Saint Thomas on the Old Law.’ 
913 See the discussion of the Decalogue in the Catechism of the Catholic Church: 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM.  
914 Vol 3, P2, In3, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 259), 366-9. 
915 Vol 3, P2, In3, Tr1, Q1, C1 (n. 259), 366: Et secundum hoc lex Moysi decurrit secundum tres rationes 
divinae dispensationis. Pars II, Inq IV, Tract 1, Qu 7, Respondeo (n. 559), 864: Nota ergo quod lex naturalis est 
sicut semen, lex Moysi sicut herba supercrescens, Evangelium sicut fructus (The natural law is like the seed, the 
law of Moses like the sprout, and the Gospel like the fruit). 
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law explicit. Secondly, the law was given to restrain sin. In other words, it was given to teach 
humanity what sin is and to deter us from it. Thirdly, the law was given in anticipation (ad 
figurandam) of the law of grace and to direct us towards it: it served as a sign of what it 
signified.916 
In that sense, John contends, the moral content of the law does not differ from that of 
the gospel. That is to say, the Law of the Gospel does not add new precepts to the 
Decalogue.917 It only secures the justification that comes from obeying the Ten 
Commandments in a different way, namely, through Christ rather than through the 
observance of ceremonial and judicial precepts. Thus, the law of Moses is included in the 
Gospel just as fully as—we will see—the natural law is included in the Law of Moses itself.  
This point is further substantiated in the Summa’s treatise on ‘The Law of the Gospel’ 
(de lege evangelica), which follows the treatise on Mosaic Law. In this context, John makes 
his view of the relationship between the two laws manifestly clear in bolstering the 
contention that the ‘law of the gospel and the law of Moses are one law in terms of their 
universal reason and diverse only in terms of their proper reasons’.918 As he goes on to 
explain, a universal or common reason can either pertain to the source/cause or goal/end or to 
the sense of the law. The source is the same in the case of both laws because ‘one God is the 
universal legislator of both the law and the gospel’.  
                                                        
916 Vol 3, P2, In4, Tr1, Q7, Respondeo (n. 559), 864: Comparatio est Legis et Evangelii sicut figurae et figurati 
sive signi et signati (The Law and the gospel are compared as a figure and what is figured or a sign and what is 
signified). 
917 Vol 3, P2, In4, Tr1, Q8, Respondeo (n. 560), 866: Quantum ad innovationem praeceptorum non addit 
Evangelium Legi. 
918 Vol 3, P2, In4, Tr1, Q5, Respondeo (n. 547), 845: Dicendum quod lex Evangelii et lex Moysi una lex est in 
ratione universali, diversae vero sunt in ratione propria. 
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Moreover, the end of both laws is the same, namely, Christ, who perfects rather than 
destroys the law (finis perficiens, non interficiens) in the sense that he makes it possible 
actually to do those things the law imposes a duty to do.919 Finally, the laws share a single 
sense because there is one universal truth, which, while expressed differently at different 
times, carries the same connotations.920 Nevertheless, the Summist acknowledges that the two 
laws differ in these three respects in terms of their proper reasons. As regards its source, for 
instance, the Mosaic law was given purely through humankind, while the gospel came 
through Christ.921 With respect to ends, the Law serves to deter us from evil through fear, 
while the gospel motivates us to do good through love.922 As regards senses, the laws differ 
in that the first is true in form, and the gospel is true in substance, and this insofar as it is 
ordered to the form.923  
On these grounds, the Summist sums up that the law of Moses and of the Gospel are 
one law in universal terms, and only differ in specific terms because the former was given to 
carnal people, the latter to spiritual ones, the former to children, and the latter to the 
mature.924 Since these ‘formal’ differences do not make for a substantial difference between 
the two laws, however, those laws do not differ as contraries but only as entities which 
                                                        
919 Vol 3, P2, In4, Tr1, Q5, Respondeo (n. 547), 846. 
920 Vol 3, P2, In4, Tr1, Q5, Respondeo (n. 547), 846: Unus sensus quia una universalis veritas (One sense 
because one universal truth). 
921 Vol 3, P2, In4, Tr1, Q5, Respondeo (n. 547), 846: Per comparationem ad efficientem differt Lex et 
Evangelium quia Lex data est per hominem purum, Evangelium vero per Christum (As regards its efficient 
cause, the Law differs from the Gospel because the Law is given through a pure man and the gospel through 
Christ). 
922 Vol 3, P2, In4, Tr1, Q5, Respondeo (n. 547), 846. 
923 Ibid. 
924 Ibid. 
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cannot be compared in terms of their proper reasons.925 In order to understand why this is so, 
we must turn to John’s writings on the eternal and divine law, which precede the treatises on 
Mosaic law and the gospel.  
 
Eternal and Natural Law  
 
As recent scholarship has established, John of La Rochelle was the first theologian 
systematically to develop an account of the eternal law that exists above our minds, in the 
mind of God, for which he nonetheless drew inspiration from Augustine.926 According to 
John, this law is impressed upon our souls;927 and ‘is that by which all things are ultimately 
ordained towards what is just.’928 Thus, both the Mosaic Law and the natural law are derived 
from the eternal law. 929 In order to define the content, as it were, of the eternal law, 
consequently, John turns first to consider the natural law, to which the Mosaic Law gives a 
privileged and complete expression.  
                                                        
925 Vol 3, P2, In4, Tr1, Q4, Respondeo (n. 546), 844. 
926 O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XII et XIII siècles, II.1 (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César, 1948), 52-3. 
See also 138-9 on the eternal law in Brady, ‘Law in the Summa Fratris Alexandri,’ where the author credits 
John with systematizing Augustine’s thought on the eternal law and providing the first concerted discussion on 
this score. Smith discusses John’s innovations regarding the eternal law in her book, The Ten Commandments, 
18-25. Aquinas follows John in ST 2.1.93.   
927 Vol 3, P2, In1, Q1, C1 (n. 224), 314: The eternal law is above our minds. Vol 3, P2, In1, Q1, C2 (n. 225), 
316: However, the eternal law is impressed on our soul. 
928 Vol 3, P2, In1, Q1, C1 (n. 224), 314: Lex aeterna est qua iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima. 
929 Vol 3, P2, In1, Q1, C7, Ar4 (n. 233), 328-9: In specific terms, Law of Moses, and the natural law it contains 
are derived from this law.  
 352 
In treating this topic, he initially inquires whether the natural law pertains primarily to 
reason or to the will. In answering this question, he states that the natural law is ‘that by 
which anyone understands and is conscious in themselves as to what is good and what is 
bad.’930 Thus, it seems at first glance to pertain primarily to reason. Since consciousness 
implies a habit, which is generally called a habit of the will’, however, John concludes that 
the application of the natural law is not simply an act of reason but also a habit of the will. In 
elaborating on this contention, he writes that an act of reason proceeds from and thus 
presupposes the substance of an innate operation.  
For example, ‘to shine’ is innate to the substance of the sun, even though shining or 
illuminating the world is itself a further operation, to which the substance of the sun cannot 
be altogether reduced. Similarly, he writes, the natural law is that which shines in reason. As 
such, it is in the will as an aptitude or habit to operate for the good.931 However, the aptitude 
must still be employed in operation. On this basis, John concludes that three components 
make up liberum arbitrium or the capacity for free choice, namely, reason (ratio), will 
(voluntas), and activity (facultas) in keeping with reason, which decides what to do, and the 
will, which provides the motivation to do it.932 
From this point, he turns to consider whether the natural law is the same as the 
conscience or what scholastics called ‘synderesis’.933 As noted above, the natural law is that 
                                                        
930 Vol 3, P2, In2, Q2, C1, Solutio, 343: Lex naturalis est qua quisque intelligit et sibi conscius est quid bonum 
et quid malum…conscium importat habitum, dicunt quod est habitus voluntati…lex naturalis actus sit rationis et 
habitus voluntatis. 
931 Vol 3, P2, In2, Q2, C1, Solutio (n. 243), 343.  
932 Vol 3, P2, In2, Q2, C2, Solutio (n. 243), 344: Cum liberum arbitrium sit facultas voluntatis et rationis, patet 
quod in intentione liberi arbitrii concurrunt tria, scilicet facultas, ratio et voluntas. 
933 Vol 3, P2, In2, Q2, C3, Solutio (n. 245), 344-5: An lex naturalis sit idem quod conscientia et synderesis 
(Whether the natural law is the same as conscience or reason). 
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which prescribes good and forbids evil. Though the conscience is formed by that law and 
regulates reason thereby, it can choose nonetheless to ignore or refuse to accept the 
judgments of the law. As such, it may vacillate between good and evil in a way that the 
natural law itself cannot do. In this regard, the purpose of synderesis, the so-called ‘spark 
(scintilla) of the conscience’934, is to regulate the will, instigating it to do good. Although 
synderesis itself can never be extinguished, the will may lose its connection with synderesis 
on account of inordinate, sinful desires.935 As a result, the conscience may become 
unreceptive to the natural law. For these reasons, neither conscience nor synderesis can be 
equated with that law itself.  
 Although the mind may lose touch with the natural law on account of a failure of the 
will, John further insists that the natural law itself can never be obliterated. It is permanently 
engraved on human reason, because it constitutes the image of God in human beings.936 That 
image cannot be lost under any circumstances, since that would imply a defect in God’s 
ability to make himself known to humanity, and thus a defect in God himself. For this reason, 
the intellectual power to apply the natural law always remains in principle. Likewise, the law 
itself does not change, although the circumstances in which it is applied may differ.937 To 
suggest otherwise would again imply some defect in God and the law he prescribes.  
 As already noted, however, the ability to adhere to the natural law may be destroyed 
in practice when the will becomes preoccupied with earthly objects of affection and pursues 
those instead of seeking to fulfil the natural law.938 When sin takes hold of the will in this 
                                                        
934 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q3, T4, C1, c (n. 417), 491. 
935 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q3, T4, C4, Solutio (n. 420), 495. 
936 Vol 2.1, In1, Tr1, S2, Q3, T4, C5, Solutio (n. 425), 499. 
937 Vol 3, Pars II, Inq II, Qu 3, Cap 2 (n. 247), 347-8.  
938 Vol 3, Pars II, Inq II, Qu 3, Cap 1, solution (n. 246), 346. 
 354 
way, we have seen, access to the law of reason is temporarily suspended. It becomes 
accessible only when the human will commits once more to conforming to the will of God;939 
that is, to doing what God commands, as he commands.940 In this connection, John further 
argues that the natural law does not merely order our actions in natural circumstances, as 
Aquinas believed.941 It also, and indeed, firstly, ordains us to God. For John, in fact, it is 
because human beings are made in the image and likeness of God that they have this:  
 
law by which they understand and are conscious in themselves of what is good and 
what is evil. For insofar as human beings are in the image of God, they have a 
cognition of the first truth, namely, God, because the image pertains to a power of 
knowing. But from the fact that human beings are in the likeness of God, they have 
the potential and also the duty to love the supreme good, because the likeness refers to 
the potential to love, and therefore, the law entails that human beings are ordained 
through love to God and also to neighbours.942  
  
 On this showing, consequently, it is nature rather than grace, which teaches us that we 
are subjected to our Creator and should perform good works in his honor.943 In that sense, the 
                                                        
939 Vol 2.1, Pars II, Inq I, Qu unica, Caput 8, Art 1, Solutio (n. 234), 330. 
940 Vol 2.1, Pars III, Inq I, Tract 2, Qu 2, Tit. 1, Memb 5, Cap 2, Art 1, Respondeo (n. 653), 1037.  
941 ST 2.1.94: Natural law.  
942 Vol 3, P2, In2, Q4, M2 C1 (n. 250), 353: Quod homo est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, habet legem qua 
intelligit et sibi conscius est quid bonum et quid malum…In eo enim quod homo est ad imaginem, habet 
cognitionem primae veritatis, quae Deus est, quia, imago attenditur in potentia cognoscendi. Ex hoc vero quod 
est ad similitudinem, est in potentia et debito diligendi summam bonitatem, quia similitudo attenditur in potentia 
diligendi, et propter hoc in lege est quod per ipsam ordinetur homo ad Deum et etiam ad proximum. 
943 Vol 3, P2, In2, Q1, C1, Solutio (n. 241), 339. 
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natural law strictly speaking impresses the eternal law upon our hearts.944 ‘It insinuates that 
we should love God above all things and above the self and through the self, and instigates us 
to do so, though not by causing or inducing us.’945 Since the natural law became unable to 
instigate the conscience to love God on account of sin, however, the Law of Moses was 
introduced to do so, and grace was ultimately supplied to induce us actually to follow that 
law. This grace is received through faith, in the manner discussed below.  
 
Faith  
 
The concept of faith that is often associated with later Franciscan thinkers at least is a 
strongly voluntarist one, according to which faith in God entails a ‘leap’ on the part of the 
will, which is not based on grounds or reasons. In the early Franciscan tradition, however, 
faith is attributed to the liberum arbitrium, which entails both reason, will, and their co-
operation.946 Thus, faith in this tradition is both a matter of what we believe in our minds—
but do not actually see—and desire or assent to in our hearts. As such, it entails both 
‘material’ and ‘formal’ components, that is, components which respectively supply the 
substance and enact the possibility of faith. 
                                                        
944 Vol 3, P2, In2, Q1, C1, Ad secundum (n. 241), 340. 
945 Vol 3, P2, In2, Q4, M2, C3, Solutio (n. 252), 357: Dicendum quod diligere Deum super omnia et supra se et 
propter se est in lege naturali tamquam insinuante et instigante, sed non tamquam efficiente vel perducente. Lex 
enim naturalis, eo quod lex, ostendit animae et insinuat quod debet Deum sic diligere; eo autem quod naturalis, 
se habet ad animam ut instigans ad hoc. 
946 Vol 3, P3, In2, Tr1, M8, C1 (n. 691), 1098.  
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 While the material act of faith is to know God, on the Summa’s account, the formal 
act of faith is to assent to love him.947 It is this love that gives us access to the first Truth that 
is impressed upon our minds and that guides the conscience.948 Because the First Truth is 
innately impressed upon our minds, it is the first object of our knowledge and is therefore 
known with utmost certainty. That certainty is only lost when the formal element of faith is 
forfeited by a will that becomes excessively preoccupied with loves other than God.949 In 
these circumstances, a super-added grace is needed to restore the formal element and thus to 
reinstate access to the first truth.950  
 In the first instance, consequently, faith on this definition entails a movement on the 
part of the will to obey God’s will as expressed in his commands.951 While a certain primacy 
is therefore attributed to the will, which can make its movement seem blind or unfounded, at 
least initially, this account does not promote voluntarism in the fullest sense of the term, 
because the initial act of the will is ordered towards the restoration of an intrinsic human 
knowledge of the First Truth, or God, which provides the rationale behind all of his 
commands.  
 Without a doubt, therefore, there is a cognitive component to the faith that motivates 
obedience to God’s commands. Yet the knowledge at stake here is love’s knowledge, which 
is accessible only to those who have learned properly, and completely voluntarily, to order 
their desires in relation to God. In this light, it comes as no surprise that at the very start of 
the Summa, theology is defined as a more ‘practical’ than ‘theoretical’ science, the primary 
                                                        
947 Vol 3, P3, In2, Tr1, M8, C3-4 (n. 681-2), 1082-3. 
948 Vol 3, P3, In2, Tr1, M7, C1 (n. 685), 1087.  
949 Vol 3, P3, In2, Tr1, M1, C1 (n. 673), 1064. 
950 Vol 3, P3, In1, Tr1, Q3, M2, C1 (n. 615), 973.   
951 Vol 3, P2, In3, Tr2, Q1, T1, C4, Ar1, Solutio. (n. 279), 419. 
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purpose of which is not to instruct the mind about God but to move the affections of the will 
towards what is good, on account of love for God. By loving God, first and foremost, we 
acquire access to the transcendentals, not least, truth, which help us not only to know the 
world as he knows it but also to live in it as he intended, and in the way that is most 
conducive to our well-being.  
Although the principles that have been given thus to make us good are hidden to us 
because they can only reside in the mind of the transcendent God, the Summist insists in this 
context that they are the most certain of all principles, precisely because they derive from an 
infallible being. When we conform ourselves to the God who is love by an act of faith which 
leads us to love him above all else, however, we become disposed to grasp the principles that 
might otherwise appear inscrutable, unfounded, or even arbitrary. That is why the Summist 
frequently repeats the words of Matthew 5:8: blessed are the pure of heart, because they will 
see God (Mt. 5:8)’.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of the discussion above, we may return to the question whether divine 
command theory undermines the autonomy of individuals to choose their own course of 
moral action and to understand and deliberate about the reasons why they should act. As 
mentioned previously, many critics suppose that personal moral agency is undermined by this 
theory, because an external factor, namely, the will of God, governs our lives, rather than 
individual decisions and choices. Because his will is inscrutable to us, the laws that proceed 
from it cannot help but appear arbitrary at best and contradictory at worst, in the sense that 
God could in theory command us to do wrong or even to hate him. 
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  Although such objections may well apply to other theories regarding the divine 
commands, the early Franciscan account evades them by positing a natural law with which 
God’s commands—and our own actions—must always remain consistent. That is not to 
suggest that God is constrained by the natural law, which orientates all things towards what is 
good or in their best interests. After all, God himself ordained the natural law in accordance 
with his eternal law, which ultimately orders all things towards him as the highest good. In 
this account, consequently, God could never command us to do wrong or to hate him, let 
alone to perform seemingly arbitrary acts, the personal value of which is unclear.  
 On the contrary, he commands us only to act for our own benefit, and he gives us 
recourse to an understanding of the relationship between his commands and our interests 
through the innate knowledge of the natural law itself. In the section of the Summa on the 
divine will, the Summist states as much when he inquires whether God can command what 
he does not will or prohibit what he wills. In addressing this question, he distinguishes 
between a will by which one prepares to accomplish an act and a will by which one actually 
accomplishes that act. Though God may test a person’s faith by issuing a command to act 
against his will in the first sense—as, for instance, when he asked Abraham to sacrifice his 
son, Isaac—he never ultimately commands what he does not will.952  
The same goes for the natural law, which regulates all things according to the highest 
good. Since this good is simply God, God would not command anything contrary to it, 
namely, himself.953 While he can obviously perform miracles, which are on some level 
contrary to nature, he cannot act against nature in the sense of causing creatures he has made 
to be obedient to him to do otherwise; nor in the sense that he would contradict his own 
                                                        
952 Vol 1, P1, Tr6, Q3, T2, M2, C1, Ar1, Respondeo (n. 274), 376. 
953 Vol 1, P1, Tr6, Q3, T2, M2, C1, Ar2, Solutio (n. 275), 380. 
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will.954 When it comes to miracles, moreover, he cannot cause things simultaneously to be 
and not to be something at the same time, because this would contradict his own will for their 
stability in being.955 Although God can change the course of the future, since it has not yet 
occurred, at least from the human perspective, moreover, he does not change the past, as in 
making someone corrupt who was not corrupt previously, because commanding and 
rewarding meritorious behaviour is part and parcel to the irrevocable, good order that he 
himself established.956 
By the same token, the Summist contends that God would not command anything 
contrary to the Decalogue, given that this law flows from the natural law, which ultimately 
orders creatures not only to themselves and others but principally to God. Since all things are 
orientated towards God as their end, nothing can be mandated by God which is contrary to 
the law that emanates from him.957 That again is not to limit his power, the Summa insists, 
for it is not consistent with divine omnipotence to do anything that would detract from or 
limit God’s goodness, or ours.958 
In summoning us to adhere to the divine commands, consequently, God offers us not 
only understanding of the respects in which obedience is consistent with our well-being, but 
also total freedom to obey or disobey his law. Granted, the knowledge of the natural law was 
lost through sin. For this reason, the Law of Moses and ultimately the Law of the Gospel had 
to be introduced, in the first case, to clarify the contours of the natural law, and in the second, 
to reinstate a consistent means of fulfilling it, namely, grace. This grace, administered by the 
                                                        
954 Vol 1, P1, Tr4, Q3, C2, Ar1, Respondeo (n. 152), 234.  
955 Vol 1, P1, Tr4, Q3, C3, Respondeo (n. 155), 236. 
956 Vol 1, P1, Tr4, Q3, C4 (n. 156), 237-8. 
957 Vol 1, P1, Tr6, Q3, T2, M2, C1, A3, Solutio (n. 276), 383. 
958 Vol 1, P1, Tr4, Q2, M1, C1, Respondeo (n. 136), 209. 
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Holy Spirit, re-awakens love for God, which is expressed in an initial act of faith that is 
evidenced through obedience to God’s commands.  
Though this initial step of faith might seem at first glance to entail acceptance of 
arbitrary divine laws, and thus the deferral of our own powers of deliberation, it soon restores 
our awareness of the natural law as fully expressed in the Law of Moses, thus providing 
access to the principles underlying the divine commands. While faith may be blind at first, 
therefore, it ultimately transforms us into initiated moral agents with the inner moral 
disposition to discriminate when and how to follow the divine law, and to do so of our own 
accord. In that sense, the early Franciscan divine command theory clearly establishes moral 
agency, or the human capacity for spontaneous moral judgment, albeit in a way that differs 
from the tradition of Aquinas. As such, it represents a viable foundation for Christian ethics, 
and one that is especially compatible with Francis’ emphasis on the literal observance of 
Christ’s example. This, one might surmise, is the inspiration behind the Summa’s invention 
of divine command theory in the first place. 
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12. CONCLUSION: THE PROMISE OF EARLY FRANCISCAN THEOLOGY 
 
This book set out to show that early Franciscan theology is innovative, and thus no 
mere rehearsal of prior Augustinian tradition. The case for the innovativeness of early 
Franciscan theology has now been made with reference to a variety of key theological 
themes, including the status and purpose of theology as a science, theistic proof, the divine 
nature, the Trinity, Christology, the reasons for the Incarnation, and moral theology. As the 
discussion draws to a close, it is worth revisiting these topics to summarize concisely the 
ways in which the Summists approached them in an original fashion. At the start, we learned 
that the theological vision of the Summa was strongly shaped by the circumstances 
surrounding the condemnation of 1241.  
The recent influx of Greek and Arabic sources which in one way or another contested 
the possibility of direct knowledge of God in the life to come was suddenly realized as 
incompatible in the generation of the Summists with the West’s own cherished affirmation of 
the beatific vision. In order to affirm the possibility of knowing God, whether here or in the 
hereafter, consequently, the Summa incorporated the Avicennian doctrine of the 
transcendentals, one the one hand, and the affective stream of the Christian tradition, on the 
other. The result was a theory in which the human mind enjoys an intuitive link with God, as 
his image, which makes it possible to know him directly, if finitely, through creatures in this 
life, and which lays the foundation for an encounter with his reality in the life to come.  
The benefits of this link are however reaped only by those whose affections are 
properly ordered toward God first and foremost. As we have seen, the love of God is the key 
which opens the door to knowledge. In this regard, the whole orientation of early Franciscan 
theology is practical: its purpose is to inspire and cultivate right affections through theoretical 
work that reveals just how profound God’s nature and work on our behalf can be understood 
 362 
to be. The Summa builds on its theological vision in a related discussion of theistic proof, 
which shows how our innate connection with God through his image makes it impossible not 
only to know what he is like through creatures, as seen in chapter four, but also to know that 
he necessarily exists. There are three ways that his existence can be discerned on the basis of 
the transcendentals, namely, through the self, through reflection on who God is in himself, 
and ultimately, through creatures.  
All these ways are however based on and spring from the knowledge of God that is 
gained through the self, that is, through reflection on the self as his image. By these means, 
we become aware of the fact that we do not exist through ourselves but through one who does 
exist through himself, namely, God. This awareness lays the foundation for the further effort 
to prove that God exists simply through rational reflection on the fact that existence is part of 
his definition as the one through whom all beings, including himself, exist. The innate 
knowledge of God as the one on whom all things depend for their being lays a foundation 
which makes it possible for encounters with creatures to ‘trigger’ the knowledge of their 
source and thereby also provide proof of his existence. As in the case of ordinary knowledge 
described in chapter four, however, knowledge of God in any of these ways—through what is 
inside, above, or below the self—only comes to those who approach him in the right attitude 
of devotion and love. 
The key to construing theistic proof along these lines, we have learned, is the 
Summa’s re-reading of Anselm’s argument in Proslogion 2-4. Richard of St Victor was the 
first to de-contextualize this famous argument from the larger twenty-six-chapter text of 
which it was a part. In doing so, he laid the groundwork for early Franciscans to assess it 
without reference to the rest of that text and in light of the highly popular work of Avicenna. 
The result was the attribution to Anselm of the kind of ontological argument which Avicenna 
championed, but which arguably cannot be found in the Proslogion itself.  
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The innovativeness of early Franciscan theology proper culminates in its treatment of 
the divine nature, which abandons Augustine’s longstanding tradition of attributing primacy 
to divine simplicity in favor of the newer Greco-Arabic tendency, championed in the West by 
Richard of St Victor and other twelfth-century thinkers, to describe God primarily in terms of 
his infinity. Although infinity was typically linked with incomprehensibility in preceding 
tradition, the 1241 generation, and the Summists above all, realized the urgent need to re-
define it in a way that allowed for knowing God in this life and in the life to come.  
To this end, they replaced a ‘negative’ concept of infinity such as is found in the 
Greek Fathers, for whom God simply lacks limits, with the more positive concept that is 
found in Avicenna. For Avicenna, what is infinite is that which contains innumerable positive 
possibilities. By attributing this idea to God, the Summists concluded that God is the sum 
total of all possibly and really existing things, who as such exceeds all natural things. In him, 
exist the patterns after which all creatures are directly fashioned, such that they provide an 
equally direct albeit limited window into who he is. The univocity that is inherent in the 
relationship between God and creatures so construed is precisely what makes him knowable 
in this way. Moreover, univocity is another sign of the influence of Avicenna.  
Through the appropriation of Avicenna, in summary, the Halensian Summists re-
casted the notion of infinity to render it the linchpin of the human ability to know the infinite 
God who had always previously been deemed unknowable. They initiated a total shift away 
from simplicity as the primary feature of God to infinity, establishing a tradition that would 
be carried to its fullest conclusions by John Duns Scotus and continues to feature in the 
Franciscan intellectual tradition to this day.  
The novelty of early Franciscan theology continues in its treatment of the Trinity. 
Here again, the Summists depart from the longstanding Western tradition of Augustinian 
Trinitarian theology, formulated most fully by Thomas Aquinas, in order to affirm their own 
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rendition of Richard of St Victor’s doctrine of the Trinity. This doctrine falls squarely in the 
Western tradition insofar as it affirms the filioque or the procession of the Spirit from the 
Father and the Son rather than the Father only. At the same time, however, the Victorine 
doctrine involves a rather more ‘Greek’ line of thinking, which gives primacy to the origins 
rather than relations of the divine persons, and which assigns a ‘monarchial’ role to the 
Father. Indeed, the early Franciscan doctrine of the Trinity, following Richard, manages to 
marry some of the key elements of both Greek and Latin trinitarian traditions in what is 
ultimately a new synthesis altogether.  
In the field of Christology, the Summa offers what was in many respects the most 
mature account available to date of the substance-accident theory of the hypostatic union that 
was growing in popularity and precision at the time. As has been shown, the Summists took 
up this theory and made it their own to such an extent that it would be associated almost 
exclusively with Franciscan thinkers from that point forward. Although Scotus has often been 
regarded as the most significant champion of this theory, which supposedly had little other 
precedent, my efforts to show that this theory already existed in the Summa highlight 
simultaneously the reasons why and the context in which this theory was developed in the 
first place. This context can easily be contrasted with the one that came to dominate in the 
generation of Aquinas, who advocated a very different part-whole model of the union under 
the inspiration of Aristotle. While Scotists and Thomists have long regarded their respective 
accounts of the hypostatic union as mutually exclusive, the study undertaken in this chapter 
and particularly of the Summa Halensis highlights that each account is intelligible and valid 
when interpreted within its own proper frame of reference.  
The Summa’s discussion of the reasons for the Incarnation represents an area of 
especial innovation. When it comes to delineating the necessary reasons for this event, the 
Summa starts from Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo and takes him as the basis for the discussion. 
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However, it departs significantly from Anselm’s own way of construing these reasons and 
radically redefines them. For Anselm, we have seen, the Incarnation of Christ was necessary 
in order to pay back what was owed to God as a result of sin and to compensate for what he 
had lost in the process. While the life of Christ succeeded in exemplifying the obedience and 
honor that is due to God, ‘something more’ was still needed to make recompense for 
humanity’s failure to do this in the first place. The only remaining option for offering this 
superogatory gift was therefore the suffering and death of Christ.  
Although these events in the life of Christ were necessary for restoring order between 
humans and God, they were not as such the locus of salvation for Anselm. In the Franciscan 
account, by contrast, the suffering and death of Christ become essential to making 
satisfaction for our sins. Since suffering and death, both physical and psychological, were the 
product of sin, the Summists contend, Christ had to undergo both forms of suffering unto the 
point of death in order to redeem us from them. In affirming this, the Summa articulates for 
the first time in Christian history an early version of the sort penal substitution theory of the 
atonement that would become popular at the Reformation.  
In the Franciscan account, however, this theory was combined with an equally 
innovative ‘supra-lapsarianism’, according to which the Incarnation of Christ would have 
fittingly occurred even if humanity had never fallen into sin. The reason for the Incarnation, 
on this showing, was first and foremost the completion of creation. This feat was 
accomplished when Christ became a human being, which is the only being that has 
something in common with all other beings and can virtually encompass them all by 
cognitive means. For this very reason, his Incarnation effectively enabled him to ‘become’ all 
creatures, the models for which exist in him. In doing so, he consummated the relationship 
between God and creatures that he initiated at creation and confirmed the role of natural 
beings as signs of who God is in the world and of his existence. Although there is a passing 
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reference to this kind of doctrine in at least one twelfth-century text, the Summa is the first to 
develop such a theory substantially.  
The moral theology of the Summa represents another area of innovative departure 
from prior tradition. While previous thinkers focused overwhelmingly in the cultivation of 
virtues, the Summa introduced a robust and extensive theory in which the moral life is based 
primarily on adherence to divine commands. A common objection to divine command 
theories has been that they tend to undermine the autonomy of the moral agent, who must 
observe God’s law no matter what it involves, without necessarily understanding its basis. 
The Summa clearly circumnavigates this objection by positing an innate knowledge of the 
natural law with which all of God’s commands are in accord. This knowledge discloses the 
rationale behind the commands. Furthermore, the Franciscan theory of the will’s absolute 
freedom to alternate between good or evil establishes the moral agent’s complete autonomy 
in respect to the question of obeying or disobeying them. There is no question of the moral 
agent acting as a sort of automaton. 
In concluding this brief summary of the Summa’s innovations, as outlined in this 
book, I will briefly reiterate them. When defining the nature of theology—and as one of the 
first systematic attempts to do so—the Summa advocates a form of voluntarism in which love 
is the key to knowledge, and a theory of knowledge in which innate concepts of the 
transcendentals allow for knowing things as they directly correspond to ideas in the mind of 
God. For the Summa, the motivation for systematically and comprehensively outlining our 
understanding of God is ultimately a practical one, namely, to inspire awe and love for God 
that is needed to know him. The exercise of the Summa itself, however seemingly speculative 
and theoretical, is no such thing.  
On the basis of its theological vision, the Summa transforms Anselm’s argument into 
the sort of ontological argument that it has since been understood to be. By the same token, it 
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establishes an approach to natural theology that would gain further momentum with Scotus 
and beyond. As regards the divine nature, it replaced the longstanding emphasis on divine 
simplicity with an emphasis on divine infinity. Likewise, it substituted the Western account 
of the Trinity first and foremost articulated by Augustine with a new model advocated by 
Richard of St Victor. In Christology, it offered the first major statement of the substance-
accident model that has been most associated with Scotus and that came to rival the part-
whole model of Aquinas.  
As regards the reasons for the Incarnation, the Summa offers the first historical 
instance of a penal substitutionary theory of the atonement and of the view that Christ would 
have become incarnate regardless of sin. The moral theology it develops replaces the 
longstanding stress on virtue theory with a theory revolving around divine commands. In this 
case, as in that of the other theological doctrines mentioned, the Summists’ innovations 
resulted not only from the sophisticated and creative recasting of their sources. They also 
seemingly give expression to aspects of the ethos and example of Francis of Assisi, whose 
memory remained vivid in the memories of the friars at this time.  
Although it was not consistent with the Summa genre to state any connections 
between Franciscan spirituality and Franciscan thought explicitly, they can be relatively 
easily discerned by the attentive reader. For example, the theological vision of the Summa, 
and its proof for God’s existence, give a reasoned account of the intimate cognitive 
connection with God and insight into all worldly affairs that Francis enjoyed owing to his 
love for the creator. The practical vision of the Summa further supports Francis’ tendency to 
prioritize cultivating love for God over acquiring knowledge, to the point of identifying love 
as the key to obtaining knowledge. The Franciscan account of God’s nature successfully 
articulates Francis’ belief that every single creature, no matter how lowly, is a direct object of 
God’s love, which deserves to be treated with care and respect.  
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The nature of the divine love, as Francis conceived it, is nowhere better described 
than through the Summa’s Trinitarian doctrine, which envisages the love of the Father as 
overflowing in a completely self-giving and self-abandoning manner through the Son to its 
beneficiary in the Spirit. The latter simply stands as the fullest possible expression and 
recipient of divine love. In affirming this, the Summa emphasizes the radical dependence of 
all creatures on God which Francis was always eager to reiterate. This dependence comes 
into fuller relief in the Summa’s Christology, which emphasizes the pro-active way in which 
God unites human nature to himself and maintains that union by his grace. A remarkable 
feature of the Summa is indeed the centrality it devotes to Christological questions. This 
however is not surprising when we consider that it was Francis’ encounter with the crucifix at 
St Damiano church that motivated him to found an order devoted to living as Christ did, in 
complete poverty and self-sacrifice, in the first place. 
The sacrificial attitude that is so crucial to the Franciscan principle of poverty is most 
poignantly revealed in the new emphasis the Summa places on Christ’s suffering as the locus 
of redemption. By undergoing the full extent of human sufferings, the Summa disclosed 
Francis’ understanding of the extent of God’s love for us and the kind of love we should be 
prepared to demonstrate to others. After all, others remain signs of the divine which are 
patterned after models maintained in the mind of the Son. The Summa’s cosmic vision of the 
way that Christ takes his place at the center of creation and consummates his relationship 
with it at the Incarnation conveys with supreme effectiveness the emphasis Francis placed on 
creation as a representation of the divine.  
The material on moral theology further portrays a distinctly Franciscan vision as to 
how we carry on the work of Christ pragmatically, namely, by observing the laws he laid 
down for this purpose. These laws counteract the virtually countless possible vices 
enumerated in the Summa, through which those laws can be broken. As in the other 
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examples, this ethical vision closely correlates to Francis’ emphasis on the literal 
interpretation of the gospel and what it means to lead a Christ-like life. From start to finish, 
early Franciscan theology promotes that kind of life, particularly as Franciscans understood 
it. It outlines a vision of God, his relationship to the world, and the role of human beings in 
the world, which reflects the religious charism of its authors.  
In the process of casting their scholarly vision, we have seen that the Summists also 
accomplished a number of other impressive feats. They incorporated the then immensely 
popular Avicennian sources more extensively and systematically than of their earlier 
contemporaries. They circumnavigated heresies, and they mastered many of the new Greek 
sources as well, without compromising certain key principles of their own Latin tradition. As 
we have seen, their work in these respects distinguished them amongst their contemporaries 
as the leading intellectual lights of the time. By any standards, the Summa must have seemed 
impressive at a time when scholarly survival depended upon addressing the intellectual 
challenges of the day in the most sophisticated and encompassing manner possible.  
At the same time, however, we have observed a happy coincidence between the 
historical sources and pressures of the day and the scholarly objectives that the Franciscans at 
Paris sought to fulfill. The Greco-Arabic sources were not merely the ones that were 
available and indeed urgent to incorporate at the time. They also happened to suit Franciscan 
efforts to do what scholars generally did in this period, turning sources to their own ends, 
incorporating them into a framework of their own devising. In doing this, the Summa set the 
stage more than any other work for the further development of the Franciscan intellectual 
tradition, to say nothing of scholasticism more generally.  
Although there is considerable variation amongst individual Franciscan thinkers, the 
doctrinal core of the Summa obviously made a lasting impression on later Franciscans, as 
much as some of the topics of discussion they codified continued to feature even in the works 
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of figures like Aquinas who took very different perspectives from them. Many of the 
doctrines and theories that were the objects of their innovation, for instance, are simply 
reiterated by Bonaventure. This is important to note not simply to give credit where credit is 
due but also to debunk the untenable theory that Franciscans before and including 
Bonaventure were merely Augustinian.  
As our study of the Summa has shown, the early Franciscan reading of Augustine was 
mediated by sources, spurious, Arabic, Greeks or otherwise, to such an extent that it simply 
cannot be conflated with anything that can be found in Augustine. By the time Bonaventure 
was working, most of these sources had been eclipsed or surpassed, but the reading of 
Augustine that was based upon them stuck. Thus, the study of Bonaventure obscures what 
that of the Summa reveals, namely, that the early Franciscan tradition is quite distinct from 
and at most points wholly unrelated to the one founded by Augustine. 
While the relationship between the Summa and Bonaventure will not come as a total 
shock to many who are aware that he acknowledges Alexander’s inspiration and tutelage in 
his Sentences commentary, readers will be more surprised perhaps to find many areas of 
continuity between the Summa and the work of John Duns Scotus. As I have noted already, 
Scotus adopts and adapts the doctrine of the transcendentals that was incorporated into his 
tradition by the Summists.959 He further develops the theory of knowledge that accompanied 
it.960 He did the same for Franciscan voluntarism. 961  
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There are other areas in which he extrapolated the logical, even sometimes extreme, 
conclusions of his predecessors. These pertain to his doctrine of God as infinite being;962 
natural theology;963 his theory of the univocity of being;964 and his treatment of the practical 
character of theology as a science.965 The early Franciscan Trinitarian theology also carries 
through to the work of the Subtle Doctor, who likewise elaborates fully the substance-
accident model of Christology that was bequeathed to him by his forebears.966 Additionally, 
he advocated penal substitution theory and famously declared that the Incarnation would 
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962 Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).  
963 Alex Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus: Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2009).  
964 Daniel P. Horan, Postmodernity and Univocity: A Critical Account of Radical Orthodoxy and John Duns 
Scotus (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014). 
965 Oleg Bychkov, ‘The Nature of Theology in Duns Scotus and His Franciscan Predecessors,’ Franciscan 
Studies 66 (2008), 5-62. Stephen D. Dumont, ‘Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between 
Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,’ Speculum 64:3 (Jul. 1989), 579-99. 
966 Russell L. Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Theology from Aquinas to Ockham (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 372 
have occurred regardless of sin.967 Above all, he is known for the rejection of virtue ethics in 
favor of divine command theory.968  
Many studies have already been written about Scotus’ thought on these and other 
topics, which allow a more elaborate comparison to be drawn between his positions and those 
of the Summists. My object in this book was not to undertake that comparison but only to 
begin to make it possible on the side of the study of early Franciscan thought. As such a 
comparison would reveal, there is a great deal of continuity between early and later 
Franciscan schools of thought, between which there has normally been supposed to be a 
break. Although Scotus is universally and indeed rightly recognized as a turning point in 
Franciscan intellectual history, he was nonetheless part of a larger tradition from which he 
inherited some of the key ideas for which he became famous.  
That stated, the object of this book has not simply been to shift the credit for 
Franciscan innovations back one generation, although this study does achieve that to some 
extent. The overarching goal has been to draw attention back to the ethos that inspired the 
development of Franciscan ideas in the first place. This ethos is not as easy to discern in the 
generation of Scotus, for a variety of reasons. By this time, for instance, the university had 
eclipsed the religious order as the primary site for theological reflection. The theories that 
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were initially formulated to further Francis’ vision of the world became subject increasingly 
to the rules of logical consistency and scholastic debate.  
As a result, the Franciscans of later generations might seem to be simply playing 
games with logic rather than striving to do justice to what are at base distinctly Franciscan 
intellectual intuitions. The advantage of highlighting early Franciscan innovations—and thus 
their continuity with the later Franciscan tradition—is that it allows for situating later 
manifestations of the tradition in relation to the ethos that clearly informs early Franciscan 
thought. By reading Franciscan thought in this light, it becomes possible to demarcate the 
Franciscan tradition, whether early or late, from any modern developments in intellectual 
history. Although there may be surface similarities between some Franciscan and modern 
concepts, the different ends to which they were deployed in their different contexts renders 
them virtually incommensurable. 
This discovery bears considerably on the charges that have recently been levelled 
against Franciscans for supposedly precipitating all the alleged ills of modern thought. In 
point of fact, it nullifies the question whether and how Franciscan innovations engendered the 
problems of modernity, which has garnered far too much attention in recent years. As a result 
of the present study, in summary, that question and the underlying assumption regarding the 
Franciscan ‘responsibility’ for modernity proves unworthy of further pursuit and unsound as 
a basis for any kind of argument or hypothesis. By the same token, attentions are shifted onto 
more pressing and interesting lines of inquiry regarding the contents and contribution of early 
Franciscan texts that have long been neglected in scholarship.  
In this connection, the study of Franciscan thought in its proper context helps us to 
see how Franciscan ideas were meant to be used and can indeed be employed today in line 
with their proper theological and philosophical purposes. For many years, scholars have 
made much of recovering or retrieving the work of Thomas Aquinas. However, Franciscan 
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tradition has never really managed to overcome its guilt by association to modernity in order 
to be mined in the same way. By highlighting the tensions between authority and innovation 
in early Franciscan thought, one ultimate objective of this project has been to make such a 
recovery possible in future. What this book seeks to awaken, in the last analysis, is our 
awareness of the untapped promise of early Franciscan theology. 
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